Guy Charles Perrodin, II. v. Western World Insurance Company

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: March 26, 2025
• Docket: CA-0024-0524
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-524

GUY CHARLES PERRODIN, II

VERSUS

WESTERN WORLD INS. CO., ET AL.

***************

ORTEGO, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

I respectfully dissent as to the majority’s opinion affirming the trial court’s

granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of Western World Insurance

Company (“Western”) and dismissing Plaintiff, Guy Charles Perrodin, II’s

(“Perrodin”) claim against Western World Insurance Company.

I agree with the majority that, generally, a CGL policy, such as Western’s

policy, and specifically the exclusion(s) for “Your product” and “Your work” would

generally exclude coverage for most poor workmanship and defective construction

claims as to the parties to this insurance contract. However, as an appellate court,

our review of each case is as to the specific set of facts and evidence presented, along

with the underlying and unique relationship that existed between the parties at that

time.

As this court is aware, the entire policy and exclusions must be considered in

making a determination whether coverage applies. LeBlanc v. Aysenne, 205-297

(La. 1/19/06), 921 So.2d 85; Peterson v. Schimek, 98-1712 (La. 3/2/99), 729 So.2d

1024; Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630

So.2d 759 (La. 1994).

Additionally, this court has previously acknowledged that if there are mixed

question of fact and law, such as in this coverage issue, it is for the trier of fact, in this case, the judge or jury, to decide. Sonnier v. Diversified Health Care, Inc., 22-

420 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/14/22), 364 So. 3d 1213.

The trial court, along with the majority of this panel, considered the “Your

Product” -Exclusion L and the “Your Work”- Exclusion K, standing alone, in denial

of coverage and dismissal of plaintiff’s claims, yet apparently did not consider those

exclusions in connection with Exclusion J of this CGL policy.

The CGL policy Exclusion J, in pertinent part, includes the following

(emphasis added):

J. Damage Property

“Property damage” to:

....

(2) Premises you sell, give away or abandon, if the “property damage” arises out of any part of those premises;

“Paragraph (2) of this exclusion does not apply if the premises are “your work” and were never occupied, rented or held for rental by you.”

Here, the affidavit of Oak Alley’s owner states and confirms that neither

he, individually, nor Oak Ally ever occupied, rented or held the property for

rental purposes. The undisputed evidence further shows that the sale of these

premises was a transaction only between Stymest and Perrodin, and there was

no contract between the plaintiff and defendants to have this house built.

Additionally, the only parties to this CGL policy were Western and Oak Alley,

as neither Stymest nor Perrodin were parties thereto. Thus, showing there

exists a mixed question of fact and law as to the issue of coverage, which is

for the trier of fact to determine. Finally, a review of the record shows that both parties submitted contradictory

evidence to support their respective positions at the hearing as to this coverage issue,

and specifically as to the issue of whether the property/premises sold truly “fits”

within the policy’s definition(s) of “Property Damage,” “Your Product,” and the

“Your Work,” and as to the issue of Plaintiff’s claims being excluded by the

exclusions K and L. Thus, the trial court reviewed and erroneously weighed the

contradictory evidence presented by the parties, found in favor of the Defendants’

evidence and granted their motion for summary judgment. However, it is still the

law that a motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits

and the judge's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the

truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable

fact. All doubts should be resolved in the non-moving party's favor. Hines v.

Garrett, 04-806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764.

In dissenting, this writer is not attempting to make any statement as to

the merits of this matter. Quite simply, at this stage of litigation, the unique

and specific facts of this case are such that I would find that there does exist

genuine issues of material fact which, by law, precludes the granting of

summary judgment. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court and remand this

matter for a full trial on the merits.

GJO