Guy Boyd v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 3, 2023
DocketNY-3330-14-0345-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Guy Boyd v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Guy Boyd v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guy Boyd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

GUY K. BOYD, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, NY-3330-14-0345-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: April 3, 2023 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Nathaniel Watty, Saint Albans, New York, for the appellant.

Kathleen J. Tulloch, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review and the agency has filed a cross petition for review of the initial decision, which granted the appellant’s request

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2 Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure. 2

for corrective action under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA) and dismissed his request for corrective action under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA). For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s petition for review, GRANT the agency’s cross petition for review, and REVERSE the initial decision regarding the appellant’s VEOA claim. His request for corrective action under VEOA is DENIED, and his request for corrective action under USERRA is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND ¶2 The agency advertised to fill a GS-7 Detective position. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7, Subtab 4k. The vacancy announcement , filled under merit promotion procedures, was open to both internal and external candidates. Id. The appellant, an outside candidate who was an agency employee but not an employee of the hiring healthcare system, was found qualified and placed on the certificate of eligibles. He was not interviewed, and the agency selected an internal candidate for the position. IAF, Tab 7, Subtabs 4b, 4c, 4d, 4f. On appeal, the appellant challenged his nonselection and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. In an initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that his uniformed service was a substantial or motivating factor in his nonselection and dismissed the USERRA part of the appeal. IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID) at 13. However, regarding the VEOA claim, the administrative judge found that the agency denied the appellant the right to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) and ordered the agency to reconstruct the selection pro cess. ID at 7-10. ¶3 The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a cross petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2. 3

ANALYSIS Because the appellant was a current Federal employee, he is not entitled to corrective action for his claim that he was denied an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). ¶4 Section 3304(f)(1) of Title 5 of the U.S. Code expressly provides preference eligibles with a right to compete for vacant positions when the agency issuing the vacancy announcement indicates that it will accept applications from individuals outside its own workforce. Harellson v. U.S. Postal Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 8 (2010). In its cross petition, the agency argues that it met its obligations by placing the appellant’s name on the certificate of eligibles, along with other well-qualified candidates, and that it was not legally required to consider him at every stage of the selection process, PFR File, Tab 2 at 6, including the interview stage, id. at 9. However, in Oram v. Department of the Navy, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17, the Board found that, as a matter of law, current Federal employees are not entitled to corrective action based on a claim of denial of an opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f). In reaching that result, the Board relied on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Kerner v. Department of the Interior, 778 F.3d 1336, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2015). There, the court found that, because the appellant was already employed in the Federal civil service, 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) was inapplicable in his case. After reviewing the text and legislative history of VEOA and its precursor, the Veterans’ Preference Act, the Federal Circuit concluded that nothing in the statutory language, the legislative history, or case law supports a presumption that section 3304(f)’s “opportunity to compete” provisions apply in instances in which an applicant already was employed in the Federal civil service, but rather that the intent of those provisions was to assist veterans in obtaining an initial appointment to the Federal service—not subsequent promotions or other intra-agency movement. Kerner, 778 F.3d at 1338. The court continued that, because veterans currently employed in a competitive -service position are already 4

“eligible to apply” to merit promotion vacancies, such applicants could not have been the intended beneficiaries of section 3304(f). Id. ¶5 Here, it is undisputed that the appellant was a Federal employee at the time the agency did not select him for the Detective position. IAF, Tab 7, Subtabs 4f-1, 4h-1; Tab 1 at 1, 3. Therefore, he could not prevail as a matter of law on his argument that he was denied the opportunity to compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f). Oram, 2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 17. For that reason, the administrative judge’s finding in the appellant’s favor was in error, 3 and the initial decision on the VEOA claim must be reversed and the appellant’s request for corrective action denied. 4

The appellant has not shown error in the administrative judge’s dismissal of his USERRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ¶6 On review, the appellant makes a bare allegation that the administrative judge erred in finding that he did not prove his USERRA claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. A petition for review must contain sufficient specificity to enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge justifying a complete review of the record. Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992). Because the appellant has not explained why he

3 A number of cases the administrative judge relied upon to support his position, including Shapley v. Department of Homeland Security, 110 M.S.P.R. 31 (2008), Styslinger v. Department of the Army, 105 M.S.P.R. 223 (2007), Jolley v. Department of Homeland Security, 105 M.S.P.R. 104 (2007), and Gingery v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kerner v. Department of the Interior
778 F.3d 1336 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Navy
2022 MSPB 30 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2022)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Guy Boyd v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guy-boyd-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2023.