Gutierrez v. Enright

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Gutierrez v. Enright

91 A.D.2d 972, 457 N.Y.S.2d 343, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16263

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 3, 1983

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 91 A.D.2d 972 (Gutierrez v. Enright) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Gutierrez v. Enright, 91 A.D.2d 972, 457 N.Y.S.2d 343, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16263 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983).

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Opinion

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendant Ford Motor Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Ferraro, J.), entered May 17,1982, as granted the branch of plaintiffs’ motion which sought leave to serve an amended bill of particulars. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, with $50 costs and disbursements, and the aforesaid branch of plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Under the circumstances of this case, Special Term abused its discretion by permitting the plaintiffs to amend their bill of particulars to set forth and specify an entirely new theory of product defect, almost eight years after service of the original bill of particulars, two years after service of the supplemental bill of particulars and 22 months after the filing of a statement of readiness (cf. Hird v General Motors Corp., 61 AD2d 832). Damiani, J. P., Lazer, Gulotta and Bracken, JJ., concur.

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— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendant Ford Motor Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Ferraro, J.), entered May 17,1982, as granted the branch of plaintiffs’ motion which sought leave to serve an amended bill of particulars. Order reversed insofar as appealed from, with $50 costs and disbursements, and the aforesaid branch of plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Under the circumstances of this case, Special Term abused its discretion by permitting the plaintiffs to amend their bill of particulars to set forth and specify an entirely new theory of product defect, almost eight years after service of the original bill of particulars, two years after service of the supplemental bill of particulars and 22 months after the filing of a statement of readiness (cf. Hird v General Motors Corp., 61 AD2d 832). Damiani, J. P., Lazer, Gulotta and Bracken, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

91 A.D.2d 972, 457 N.Y.S.2d 343, 1983 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 16263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gutierrez-v-enright-nyappdiv-1983.

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