Gutierrez v. Baldwin

2024 IL App (5th) 180346-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 31, 2024
• Docket: 5-18-0346
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (5th) 180346-U NOTICE Decision filed 10/31/24. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-18-0346 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

ARMANDO GUTIERREZ, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Randolph County. ) v. ) No. 18-MR-5 ) JOHN BALDWIN, Director of Corrections; ) JACQUELINE LASHBROOK, Warden; and ) WILLIAM SPILLER, KENT BROOKMAN, ) and JASON HART, ) Honorable ) Eugene E. Gross, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Where the plaintiff forfeited his argument that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss by failing to raise the issue or argue it in his opening brief, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2 On January 29, 2018, the plaintiff, Armando Gutierrez, filed a pro se petition for a writ of

certiorari (petition) against defendants, John Baldwin, Director of Corrections, Jacqueline

Lashbrook, warden, and Kent Brookman and Jason Hart in the circuit court of Randolph County.

On May 29, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the circuit court granted on June

25, 2018.

1 ¶3 On appeal, the plaintiff argues that this court should grant a writ of certiorari based on his

underlying claims and that the circuit court erred in denying a writ of mandamus in a prior action.

We affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 The plaintiff is currently imprisoned at the Pinckneyville Correctional Center serving a

sentence of 40 years for first degree murder. On June 29, 2018, the plaintiff filed a pro se petition

in the circuit court of Randolph County against the defendants. According to the plaintiff’s

petition, in August 2015, he was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC),

incarcerated at the Menard Correctional Center. On August 27, 2015, he was served with an IDOC

prison disciplinary report charging him with violating an IDOC rule against “security threat group”

activity. The reporting IDOC employee alleged that the plaintiff was an “Overseer” for the Latin

Folk gang and, in that position, mediated between the East and West cell house unit coordinators

and the Latin Folk institutional leadership staff. The report stated that the position of overseer was

created to limit the number of inmates who were aware of the identity of the gang’s higher

leadership, in accordance with its “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. The report further explained

that three “confidential sources,” whose names were withheld for the “safety and security of the

institution” but who were considered reliable informants “due to the consistency of their

statements,” stated that the plaintiff held this position.

¶6 One week later, on September 3, 2015, the plaintiff appeared for his hearing before a prison

adjustment committee consisting of two correctional officers. For various reasons, the plaintiff

alleges that the hearing was biased and unfair, not held in accordance with the law, and that he was

denied an opportunity to properly prepare for the hearing. After the hearing, the plaintiff was found

to have violated the rules and was escorted to the segregation unit.

2 ¶7 On September 11, 2015, the plaintiff was served with a written decision that the adjustment

committee found him guilty as charged, repeating the allegations from the disciplinary report. The

adjustment committee recommended that the plaintiff be given one year in C-Grade status; one

year of segregation; one year of commissary restriction; and six months of restriction on contact

visits. The warden of Menard approved the findings and recommended discipline. On September

11, 2015, the plaintiff filed an offender’s grievance in which he complained, inter alia, that the

adjustment committee violated IDOC’s administrative regulations and procedures, as well as his

due process rights, by simply copying the disciplinary report verbatim rather than explaining its

decision. As to his requested relief, the plaintiff requested expungement of the disciplinary report,

a transfer to a medium security prison, $100 for every day that he had spent in segregation, and a

soy-free diet.

¶8 On October 8, 2015, the plaintiff mailed five affidavits to the grievance officer to

supplement his original grievance. The first affidavit was that of the plaintiff himself and the

remaining affidavits were from four other inmates who were in segregation with him. Read

together, the affidavits attested that three of the four inmates had been placed in segregation

pending an investigation about a week before the plaintiff was charged with participating in gang

activity, and that the investigation resulted in similar charges against them on the same date that

he was charged; and that another inmate was sent to segregation under similar charges a few weeks

later. The affidavits also asserted that each inmate: (1) learned of the charges against the others

“upon arrival” in segregation or shortly afterward, (2) was not acquainted with any of the others

before meeting them in segregation, and (3) did not hold a position in the Latin Folks organization

or know any person who did.

3 ¶9 On November 30, 2015, the grievance officer entered his report recommending the denial

of the plaintiff’s grievance. The report stated that the grievance officer had reviewed the

disciplinary report, the “ticket summary,” and the hearing procedures, and had contacted both the

adjustment committee and the investigations and intelligence unit, and, as a result, was satisfied

that the guilty finding was “based on a thorough investigation.” Further, the report addressed the

plaintiff’s requests regarding transfer, monetary compensation, and his diet. On December 3, 2015,

the warden concurred with the findings and recommendations of the report.

¶ 10 In May 2016, the Director of IDOC issued an order referring the decision back to the

adjustment committee based on a recommendation from the Administrative Review Board (ARB).

The Director instructed the committee to “rewrite” its decision “to address the reliability of the

confidential sources and provide additional information to substantiate” the finding of the

plaintiff’s guilt.

¶ 11 In November 2016, the adjustment committee rewrote its decision concerning the

plaintiff’s discipline. The new decision retained the language from the original disciplinary report

but added two new paragraphs. The first paragraph stated that the plaintiff was identified as a Latin

Folks overseer for the East and West cell houses “by multiple confidential sources”; that

identification of those sources was being withheld for reasons affecting the safety and security of

the institution; and that the sources were “deemed reliable due [to] the consistency of their

statements.” The second paragraph provided the language of the IDOC regulation against gang

activity that the plaintiff was found to have violated. The new decision was approved by the warden

on November 17, 2016, and served upon the plaintiff on November 28, 2016.

¶ 12 Sometime in November 2016, prior to being served with the new decision, the plaintiff

filed a complaint for mandamus relief in the circuit court of Randolph County, case No. 16-MR-

4 123. That matter was resolved on May 15, 2017, when the circuit court granted the defendants’

motion to dismiss. The defendant filed a notice of appeal in that matter, which was dismissed for

want of prosecution on October 13, 2017.

¶ 13 On August 24, 2017, the ARB and the Director finalized the denial of the plaintiff’s

grievance, explaining that in the rewritten decision of November 2016, the adjustment committee

had included additional information on the reliability of the confidential sources and additional

information to substantiate the plaintiff’s guilt. The ARB and the Director further stated that, based

on a total review of all available information and a check for compliance with the procedural due

process safeguards of the IDOC’s regulations, they were reasonably satisfied that the plaintiff

committed the offense with which he was charged. Accordingly, it was recommended that the

grievance be denied.

¶ 14 On January 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis and

appointment of counsel with a copy of his current IDOC trust fund account attached. On the same

date, the circuit court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion with the requirement that he

pay a filing fee of $2.75 within 60 days. On January 29, 2018, the plaintiff paid the required filing

fee and filed a pro se complaint for common law writ of certiorari requesting the circuit court

review the propriety of a prison disciplinary report and its related penalties against the defendants.

The plaintiff also filed a brief in support of the complaint attaching numerous documents relevant

to his claims.

¶ 15 In his complaint, the plaintiff named John R. Baldwin, Director of IDOC, Jacqueline

Lashbrook, the warden of the Menard Correctional Center, William A. Spiller, staff investigator,

and Kent E. Brookman and Jason N. Hart, members of the adjustment committee, as defendants.

In general, the plaintiff claimed that the adjustment committee did not follow the IDOC regulations

5 governing the disciplinary procedure and that its failure to do so violated his right to due process

under both state and federal law. The plaintiff requested the circuit court to grant certiorari and

dismiss the institutional report and guilty finding against him, as well as a claim for monetary

damages for the days he spent in segregation.

¶ 16 On May 29, 2018, the defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-

619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016)) and a

memorandum in support thereof. According to the defendants, the plaintiff was not entitled to

relief because: (1) he did not lose good conduct credit, so he was not entitled to due process

protections, and the time he spent in and the conditions of segregation did not create a significant

and atypical hardship; (2) he received all due process protections to which he was entitled; and

(3) his claim for monetary damages was barred by sovereign immunity. On June 25, 2018, the

plaintiff filed a response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss and memorandum in support thereof.

The plaintiff argued that: (1) the charges were not verified or substantiated because the adjustment

committee simply believed the officer who wrote the report and relied on evidence from three

confidential informants that was rejected in the case of another inmate; (2) the chairman of the

committee’s own words showed that he was biased against inmates alleged to be gang members;

and (3) segregation was a deprivation of a liberty interest under Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281,

1287 (7th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff stated, however, that he was no longer “contesting that his claim

for money damages is barred.”

¶ 17 On June 25, 2018, the circuit court entered its order granting the defendants’ motion to

dismiss stating: “Plaintiff seeks a Common Law Writ of Certiorari for disciplinary action taken

against him in 2015. The same incident was the subject matter of Randolph County Case 16-MR-

123 seeking mandamus relief which was dismissed on May 15, 2017.” The plaintiff filed a notice

6 of appeal on July 5, 2018, indicating that he was appealing from the circuit court’s June 25, 2018,

order. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, the plaintiff raises three issues for this court’s review: (1) that the Menard

Correctional Center’s adjustment committee did not comply with the IDOC Director’s order to

address the reliability of the confidential sources or failed to provide additional information to

substantiate the committees finding of guilt; (2) that the Menard Correctional Center’s adjustment

committee failed to adhere to the law regarding prison disciplinary standards and requirements

before the findings of guilt or innocence; and (3) that the circuit court erred by dismissing the

plaintiff’s original complaint for mandamus. The defendants argue, inter alia, that the plaintiff

forfeited review of the circuit court’s dismissal order of June 25, 2018, where he did not challenge

the circuit court’s application of the doctrine of res judicata in his opening brief on appeal.

¶ 20 A common law writ of certiorari is a general method for obtaining circuit court review of

administrative actions when the act conferring power on the agency does not expressly adopt the

Administrative Review Law (ARL) and provides for no other form of review. Smith v. Department

of Public Aid, 67 Ill. 2d 529, 541 (1977). Because the statutes governing prison disciplinary

procedures, see sections 4-8-7 and 3-8-8 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-8-7,

3-8-8 (West 2016)), neither adopt the ARL nor provide for any other method of judicial review,

certiorari review of prison discipline is generally appropriate. Oliver v. Pierce, 2012 IL App (4th)

110005, ¶ 12. The standard of review under a common law writ of certiorari agency’s exercise of

its discretion is arbitrary and capricious, or the agency’s action is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 272 (1996).

7 ¶ 21 The purpose of the writ of certiorari is to bring the entire record of the inferior tribunal

before the circuit court to determine, from the record alone, whether that tribunal proceeded

according to law. Reichert v. Court of Claims, 203 Ill. 2d 257, 260 (2003). Review is limited to

consideration of the actions of the administrative body. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit

District No. 1, 133 Ill. 2d 413, 427-28 (1990).

¶ 22 Here, however, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s petition under section 2-

619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016)) prior to the circuit court’s review of the

administrative action. While the defendants did not argue in their motion to dismiss that the

plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata, the circuit court nonetheless entered an order of

dismissal on that ground. Our standard of review of a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the

Code is de novo. Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 583 (2000). A section 2-619 motion to

dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint and raises defects, defenses, or other

affirmative matters that appear on the face of the complaint or are established by external

submissions that act to defeat the claim. Id.

¶ 23 Here, we agree with the State that the plaintiff has failed, on appeal, to challenge the circuit

court’s ruling on his motion to dismiss. The plaintiff failed to argue that the basis for the circuit

court’s ruling was improper, and instead addressed the merits of his claims of error in the

administrative process, for which no hearing was held, and no ruling was made in the lower court.

¶ 24 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) sets out the requirements for appellants’ briefs.

Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369 (2010). The rule lists the sections of the brief that shall be

included, as well as requirements for each section. Id. With respect to arguments, the rule states

that the briefs shall contain:

8 “Argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor,

with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. *** Points not argued

are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for

rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018).

¶ 25 Our supreme court has repeatedly held that the failure to argue a point in the appellant’s

opening brief results in forfeiture of the issue. Vancura, 238 Ill. 2d at 369. Both argument and

citation to relevant authority are required. Id. An issue that is merely listed or included in a vague

allegation of error is not “argued” and will not satisfy the requirements of the rule. Id. A reviewing

court is entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive

legal argument. Walters v. Rodriguez, 2011 IL App (1st) 103488, ¶ 5. The appellate court is not a

depository in which an appellant may dump the entire matter of argument and research. Thrall Car

Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145 Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986). Further, a pro se litigant must

comply with the same rules and is held to the same standard as licensed attorneys. Holtzrichter v.

Yorath, 2013 IL App (1st) 110287, ¶ 70.

¶ 26 A liberal review of the plaintiff’s opening brief reveals that he failed to raise any challenge

to the June 25, 2018, order dismissing his petition. The plaintiff does not argue in his opening brief

that the circuit court’s order, finding that his claim for a writ of certiorari was barred by the

doctrine of res judicata, was entered in error. The only procedural error that the plaintiff alleges

the circuit court made is that it erred in dismissing a prior mandamus claim, presumably in case

No. 16-MR-123, over which we have no jurisdiction. Neither in his opening brief, nor his reply

brief, does the plaintiff argue that the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint for a writ of

certiorari where it erred in its application of the doctrine of res judicata. Because the plaintiff’s

opening brief provided no argument regarding the reason for the circuit court’s dismissal of his

9 petition, we find the issue is forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (arguments

not raised in an opening brief “are forfeited”).

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 29 Affirmed.