Gut v. MacDonough

23 Mass. L. Rptr. 110
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedAugust 20, 2007
DocketNo. WOCV200701083C
StatusPublished

This text of 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 110 (Gut v. MacDonough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gut v. MacDonough, 23 Mass. L. Rptr. 110 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007).

Opinion

Agnes, Peter W., J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil action in the nature of a shareholder derivative action by Philippe Gut and Gwen Pratt Gut (“plaintiffs”), two minority shareholders of defendant Westboro Financial Services, Inc., a mid-tier holding company of defendant Westboro Bank. Defendant Westboro Financial Services, Inc. is majority owned by defendant Westboro Bancorp, MHC, a Massachusetts chartered mutual holding company.2 Defendant Westboro Bancorp, MHC owns approximately 64% of the outstanding shares of defendant Westboro Financial Services, Inc. and is controlled by a board of trustees most or all of whom also serve as its directors.

[111]*111The plaintiffs allege that a pending merger agreement between Westboro and Assabet Valley Bancorp (“Assabet”) whereby Assabet will acquire the outstanding publicly owned shares of Westboro Financial’s common stock for the price of $35 per share should be enjoined under Massachusetts law because the price per share is “grossly inadequate."3 In a nutshell, the plaintiffs claim that the merger deal has been driven by defendant Joseph F. MacDonough, who is the CEO and a director of Westboro and that he and other directors of Westboro are “conflicted” and not disinterested, and have pursued a course of conduct which amounts to self-dealing to the great detriment of the minority shareholders of Westboro. The plaintiffs allege, in particular, that (1) the process leading to the merger was flawed and unlawful because Westboro pursued a one-party negotiation with As-sabet instead of “shopping” the bank around in hope of attracting a merger partner willing to pay a higher price for the common stock, (2) that upon reaching a tentative deal with Assabet, Westboro entered into an unreasonable “lock-up” agreement which contained a 5% termination fee that effectively foreclosed other potentially interested parties from entering the merger competition and correspondingly prevented Westboro from giving meaningful consideration to any other bidders, and (3) that following the agreement with Assabet, Westboro rejected out of hand several offers which would have resulted in a price per share of Westboro common stock of $38.50, $40.00 and $41.00 respectively.

The defendants deny each and eveiy one of these allegations. The defendant Directors of Westborough maintain that they are disinterested and that they have acted at all times in accordance with their fiduciary obligations which under Massachusetts law are owed to the investors in defendant Westboro Bancorp, MHC, local economic and community interests, and the minority shareholders. The defendants maintain that the decision to enter into a one-party negotiation was not a rush to judgment, but rather a considered, tactical choice after receiving neutral and expert advice from their independent financial advisor, Richard Lewis Quad of RBC Capital Markets (“RBC”), and after a Board evaluation that identified Assabet as the strongest prospect. The defendants also maintain that the compensation and benefits to be paid by Assabet to certain officers and directors of Westboro as a result of the merger did not result in a windfall, but rather was less than the compensation these individuals were entitled to as a result of pre-merger agreements they had with Westboro. The defendants also maintain that they did not foreclose consideration of potentially better merger deals after entering into an agreement with Assabet and that there was nothing in their agreement with Assabet that effectively prevented others from exploring a merger with Westboro. Finally, the defendants maintain that there was never an offer higher than $35.00 per share of common stock from a potential merger partner that was in the best interests of Westboro.

This matter came before the Court for argument on August 9, 2007. Under the terms of the merger agreement between Westborough and Assabet, if the merger is not consummated by August 15, 2007, Assabet can walk away from the deal and leave Westborough to pursue whatever other options may exist.

II. STANDARD FOR GRANTING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court is required to perform a multi-part analysis. Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, 380 Mass. 606, 616-17 (1980). Initially, the court must determine whether the moving party has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, and that it faces a substantial risk of irreparable harm— losses that cannot be repaired or for which compensation will not be adequate after final judgment — if the motion for the preliminary injunction is not granted. Id. at 617 & n.11. See Hull Mun. Lighting Plant v. Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Elec. Co., 399 Mass. 640, 641 (1987). If the moving party has met this burden, the court must then engage in a balancing test in which the irreparable harm faced by the moving party is compared to the harm that an injunction would inflict on the other party. “If the judge is convinced that failure to issue the injunction would subject the moving party to a substantial risk of irreparable harm, the judge must then balance this risk against any similar risk of irreparable harm which granting the injunction would create for the opposing party.” Id. at 617. In balancing these factors, “(w]hat matters as to each party is not the raw amount of irreparable harm the party might conceivably suffer, but rather the risk of such harm in light of the party’s chance of success on the merits. Only where the balance between these risks cuts in favor of the moving party may a preliminary injunction properly issue.” Id. Furthermore, in an appropriate case, “the risk of harm to the public interest also may be considered.” Brookline v. Goldstein, 388 Mass. 443, 447 (1983). See also LeClair v. Town of Norwell 430 Mass. 328, 337 (1999); Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 392 Mass. 79, 89 (1984).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Unlike the typical case in which a preliminary injunction is sought on the basis of an abbreviated and often incomplete set of facts, the parties in this case have engaged in pretrial discovery and have supplied the court with a substantial record consisting of pleadings, depositions, affidavits and various attachments. The court has reviewed the record in its entirety. Nonetheless, the following factual findings are preliminary in nature and not necessarily controlling on the court at trial.

[112]*112 A. Events Leading Up to the Consideration of a Merger by Westboro

Westboro Bank was chartered in 1869 (coinci-dently, the same year as Assabet) and operated as a state chartered mutual savings back until 2000. In that year, Westboro reorganized into a Massachusetts mutual holding company. The Westboro Bank became a Massachusetts chartered stock savings bank, wholly-owned by Westboro Financial. Westboro MHC was formed and became the mutual holding company parent of Westboro Financial. Westboro MHC owns approximately 64% of Westboro Financial’s outstanding common stock. The remaining 36% is publicly owned.

Westboro Bank is headquartered in Westboro and maintains offices in the towns of Northboro and Shrewsbury. I accept as credible the characterizations by Joseph F. MacDonough who is the President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Westboro Bancorp MHC, Westboro Financial Services, Inc., and the Westboro Bank of the bank’s mission and the nature of its business:

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Bluebook (online)
23 Mass. L. Rptr. 110, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gut-v-macdonough-masssuperct-2007.