Gustin v. PHH Mortgage Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: October 29, 2024
• Docket: 4:24-cv-02917
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BRANDON LEE GUSTIN, Case No. 24-cv-02917-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING EX PARTE APPLICATION 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 20 10 PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 11 Defendant.

12 13 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte application for a temporary restraining 14 order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 20. The Court finds this matter appropriate 15 for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 16 The Court DENIES the application. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 In May 2024, Plaintiff Brandon Gustin filed his complaint against Defendant PHH 19 Mortgage Corporation. See Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 3. According to Plaintiff, he and his wife 20 signed a promissory note with IndyMac Bank for $338,000 in 2006 for their residential property 21 located at 11 Benita Way in Martinez, California (“the Property”). Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that 22 the Property “was wrongfully foreclosed and sold.” Dkt. No. 20 at 4. Plaintiff’s complaint brings 23 claims against Defendant challenging the assignment of the loan under the Uniform Commercial 24 Code and for wrongful foreclosure. Compl. at 6, 11, 13, 14. Plaintiff acknowledges that 25 Defendant is the current servicer of the loan, not a trustee or beneficiary. Id. at 6. 26 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 4. After Plaintiff failed to timely 27 oppose or otherwise respond to the motion, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case 1 On October 23, 2024, Plaintiff timely responded to the order to show cause and also filed 2 an ex parte application seeking to temporarily enjoin the execution of an unlawful detainer order 3 entered against Plaintiff on June 25, 2024. See Dkt. No. 18. The requested TRO would stay the 4 execution of a writ of possession on the Property apparently scheduled for October 31, 2024. See 5 Dkt. No. 18 at 4. Plaintiff’s original TRO application sought a stay until November 25, 2024. See 6 id. at 5. Plaintiff then filed an amended ex parte application requesting a stay of the writ of 7 possession until the “current litigation for wrongful foreclosure is resolved.” See Dkt. No. 20 at 4. 8 The Court directed Defendant to file any opposition to Plaintiff’s amended ex parte application by 9 October 29, 2024. Dkt. No. 22. Defendant timely filed its opposition. Dkt. No. 23. 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD 11 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may enjoin 12 conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard 13 for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction are substantially 14 identical. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839, n.7 (9th 15 Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must establish: (1) that it is likely to succeed on 16 the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; 17 (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 18 See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary relief is “an 19 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 20 to such relief.” Id. at 22. A court must find that “a certain threshold showing” is made on each of 21 the four required elements. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the 22 Ninth Circuit’s sliding scale approach, a preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious 23 questions going to the merits” if “a hardship balance [also] tips sharply towards the [movant],” 24 and “so long as the [movant] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 25 injunction is in the public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 26 Cir. 2011). 27 // 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff argues that he will suffer irreparable harm if he and his family are evicted from 3 the Property. See Dkt. No. 20 at 4. While the Court acknowledges the inherent disruption that 4 will result from the imminent sheriff’s lockout, Plaintiff’s ex parte application nonetheless fails 5 because he has not shown a likelihood of success, or even “serious questions” going to the merits, 6 as to the relief he seeks. The Court lacks jurisdiction to award such relief under the Rooker- 7 Feldman doctrine. The doctrine “bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction 8 over a proceeding in ‘which a party losing in state court’ seeks ‘what in substance would be 9 appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s 10 claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.’” Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 11 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994)). It 12 applies unless Congress has granted federal district courts statutory authority to review certain 13 state court judgments. See id. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Rooker-Feldman to bar 14 jurisdiction “[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a 15 state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Noel v. Hall, 341 16 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 In seeking a stay of the writ of possession ordered as to the Property, Plaintiff’s ex parte 18 application asks the Court to restrain state officers from carrying out a state court judgment. See 19 Dkt. No. 20 at 2 (citing California Code of Civil Procedure § 918 for the premise that “[t]he court, 20 or any judge thereof, may stay the execution of any judgment”). But under Rooker-Feldman, 21 these state law principles do not apply to a federal district court. As Plaintiff acknowledges, his 22 home was “foreclosed and sold” in May 2024, and in June 2024, a state court entered an order “for 23 restitution and possession” of the Property to the new owner. See id. at 4. Even assuming without 24 deciding that the foreclosure sale itself was unlawful and should be set aside as Plaintiff argues, 25 “the requested temporary restraining order in this case would, if granted, invalidate the judgment 26 in the unlawful detainer proceeding.” See Tagoia v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 17-CV-06777- 27 YGR, 2018 WL 1156836, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018). Accordingly, the Court has no 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is not possible for the Court to award the relief Plaintiff seeks in his ex parte 3 application, Plaintiff “fails to show a likelihood of success on the merits—or even a serious 4 question” as to that issue. See Greene v. U.S. Bank, N.A. as Tr. for Truman 2016 SC6 Title Tr., 5 || No. 19-CV-07448-RS, 2020 WL 1308344, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2020). As such, the Court 6 || DENIES Plaintiffs ex parte application, Dkt. No. 20. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 Dated: October 29, 2024 ° HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 10 United States District Judge 11 a 12

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