Gustafson, M. v. Springfield, Inc., Aplt.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 31, 2025
• Docket: 7 WAP 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-22-2024] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

MARK AND LEAH GUSTAFSON, : No. 7 WAP 2023 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS : ADMINISTRATORS AND PERSONAL : Appeal from the Order of the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE OF : Superior Court entered August 12, JAMES ROBERT ("J.R.") GUSTAFSON : 2022, at No. 207 WDA 2019 : Reversing the Order of the Court of : Common Pleas of Westmoreland v. : County entered January 15, 2019, at : No. 1126 of 2018 and Remanding. : SPRINGFIELD, INC. D/B/A SPRINGFIELD : ARGUED: April 9, 2024 ARMORY AND SALOOM DEPARTMENT : STORE AND SALOOM DEPT. STORE, LLC : D/B/A SALOOM DEPARTMENT STORE : AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : : : APPEAL OF: SPRINGFIELD, INC. D/B/A : SPRINGFIELD ARMORY AND SALOOM : DEPARTMENT STORE AND SALOOM : DEPT. STORE, LLC D/B/A SALOOM : DEPARTMENT STORE :

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: MARCH 31, 2025 In March 2016, thirteen-year-old J.R. Gustafson tragically died after he was

accidentally shot by his fourteen-year-old friend (the Juvenile) at the home of another.

After J.R.’s death, his parents, Mark and Leah Gustafson filed the underlying action

against Springfield Armory, the manufacturer of the firearm used to shoot J.R., and

Saloom Department Store, the retailer that sold the firearm. The trial court sustained

preliminary objections filed by Springfield and Saloom (collectively, the Defendants) and dismissed the Gustafsons’ complaint with prejudice. In doing so, the court relied on the

federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA or the Act), which bars

certain civil actions against firearms manufacturers and sellers from being brought in

either state or federal court. On appeal, an en banc panel of the Superior Court issued a

per curiam order reversing the trial court’s sustaining of preliminary objections and

remanding the case for further proceedings. We granted allowance of appeal to address

whether the PLCAA operates to bar the Gustafsons’ action and, if so, whether the PLCAA

is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and principles of federalism. After careful and sober consideration,

we answer those questions affirmatively. We therefore reverse the Superior Court’s per

curiam order and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the Gustafsons’ action with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The PLCAA

Necessary to the disposition of this matter is a thorough understanding of the

PLCAA. Thus, we begin there. When Congress passed the PLCAA in 2005, it included

specific enumerated findings of fact and purposes. Congress found, inter alia:

(3) Lawsuits have been commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek money damages and other relief for the harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including criminals.

(4) The manufacture, importation, possession, sale, and use of firearms and ammunition in the United States are heavily regulated by Federal, State, and local laws. Such Federal laws include the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act, and the Arms Export Control Act.

(5) Businesses in the United States that are engaged in interstate and foreign commerce through the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, distribution, importation, or sale to the public of firearms or ammunition products that have been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused by those

[J-22-2024] - 2 who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or ammunition products that function as designed and intended.

(6) The possibility of imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely caused by others is an abuse of the legal system, erodes public confidence in our Nation’s laws, threatens the diminution of a basic constitutional right and civil liberty, invites the disassembly and destabilization of other industries and economic sectors lawfully competing in the free enterprise system of the United States, and constitutes an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States.

(7) The liability actions commenced or contemplated by the Federal Government, States, municipalities, and private interest groups and others are based on theories without foundation in hundreds of years of the common law and jurisprudence of the United States and do not represent a bona fide expansion of the common law. The possible sustaining of these actions by a maverick judicial officer or petit jury would expand civil liability in a manner never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, by Congress, or by the legislatures of the several States. [ ]

(8) The liability actions commenced or contemplated by the Federal Government, States, municipalities, private interest groups and others attempt to use the judicial branch to circumvent the Legislative branch of government to regulate interstate and foreign commerce through judgements and judicial decrees thereby threatening the Separation of Powers doctrine and weakening and undermining important principles of federalism, State sovereignty and comity between the sister States. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3)-(8). In light of these findings, Congress set out its specific

purposes in passing the PLCAA, including, inter alia, to “prohibit causes of action against

manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or ammunition products,

and their trade associations, for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse

of firearms products or ammunition products by others when the products functioned as

designed and intended[]” and “[t]o prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose

unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce.” Id. at § 7901(b)(1) and (4).

To these ends, the PLCAA bars a “qualified civil liability action” from being brought

in either federal or state court. Id. at § 7902(a). A “qualified civil liability action” is defined

as “a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person

[J-22-2024] - 3 against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for

damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines,

or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified

product by the person or a third party[.]” Id. at § 7903(5)(A). A “qualified civil liability

action,” however, does not include: (i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of Title 18, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted;

(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se;

(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is sought [ ];

(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product;

(v) an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacturer of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries or property damage; or

(vi) an action or proceeding commenced by the Attorney General to enforce provisions of chapter 44 of Title 18 or chapter 53 of Title 26. Id. at § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi). These enumerated subsections are often referred to as the

PLCAA’s exceptions.

The Act also defines several terms included within the definition of a “qualified civil

liability action” that are relevant to our current discussion. Pertinently, the Act defines a

“qualified product” as “a firearm … , or ammunition … , or a component part of a firearm

or ammunition, that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

Id. at § 7903(4). A “manufacturer” is defined as “with respect to a qualified product, a

[J-22-2024] - 4 person who is engaged in the business of manufacturing the product in interstate or

foreign commerce and who is licensed to engage in business as such a manufacturer[.]”

Id. at § 7903(2). A “seller” on the other hand, with respect to a qualified product, is an

importer, dealer, or person engaged in the business of selling ammunition, as defined by

Title 18, who is engaged in that business in interstate or foreign commerce at the

wholesale or retail level. Id. at § 7903(6). Lastly, while the PLCAA does not define

“criminal misuse” it defines “unlawful misuse” as “conduct that violates a statute,

ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.” Id. at § 7903(9).

B. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 20, 2016, J.R. and the Juvenile were visiting a residence in Mt. Pleasant,

Westmoreland County.1 At some point, the Juvenile came into possession of a

semiautomatic handgun (the Firearm), which was manufactured by Springfield and

purchased by the Firearm’s owner from Saloom. Believing the Firearm was unloaded, as

the ammunition magazine had been removed, the Juvenile pulled the Firearm’s trigger.

Unbeknownst to the Juvenile, however, a live round remained in the chamber and, when

the Juvenile pulled the trigger, the live round discharged, killing J.R. As a result of his

actions, and upon his admission, the Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of involuntary

manslaughter in juvenile court.

In response to J.R.’s death, his parents Mark and Leah Gustafson (Plaintiffs), in

their individual capacity and as the administrators of J.R.’s Estate, filed a complaint

against the Defendants pursuant to the Wrongful Death and Survivor Statutes

1 The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint. As the trial court sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we must accept Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true for purposes of this appeal. See Mazur v. Trinity Area Sch. Dist., 961 A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. 2008).

[J-22-2024] - 5 (Complaint).2 Specifically, Plaintiffs raised products liability claims asserting defective

design, negligent design and sale, and negligent warnings and marketing in relation to

the Firearm, averring Defendants’ actions were the proximate cause of J.R.’s death.

Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Complaint in the nature of a

demurrer, seeking dismissal with prejudice pursuant to the PLCAA. According to

Defendants, the Firearm was a qualified product, and the case constituted a qualified civil

liability action under the PLCAA because J.R.’s injuries were caused by the Juvenile’s

unlawful use of the Firearm. Further, Defendants contended that none of the PLCAA’s

exceptions applied. According to Defendants, the only exception that arguably applied

was exception (v), otherwise known as the “product defect exception.” See 15 U.S.C

§ 7903(5)(A)(v). However, Defendants maintained that because the Complaint

specifically averred that the Juvenile intentionally pulled the Firearm’s trigger shooting

and killing J.R., and that the Juvenile was charged with, and adjudicated delinquent of,

involuntary manslaughter, the product defect exception was inapplicable. In other words,

the Juvenile’s volitional act of pulling the trigger constituted a criminal offense, which,

under the exception, is considered the sole proximate cause of J.R.’s injuries and thus,

the exception did not apply. Accordingly, Defendants insisted that the PLCAA barred

each of Plaintiffs’ causes of actions, requiring the trial court to dismiss the Complaint with

prejudice.

Plaintiffs filed a response, asserting the PLCAA did not bar their action. In

particular, they argued that since the PLCAA purports to intrude on a traditional area of

state sovereignty, a court must interpret the Act to minimize that intrusion and only find

that it bars claims when Congress has made its intent clear by providing a plain statement

that certain claims are prohibited. Plaintiffs insisted that when viewing their action through

2 Complaint at ¶¶ 15 and 16 (relying on 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8301 and 8302).

[J-22-2024] - 6 this lens, the matter could not be considered a qualified civil liability action because: (1)

the harm they alleged was not solely caused by the criminal misuse of a firearm, but was

caused, at least in part, by Defendants’ own tortious conduct; and (2) the product defect

exception should be read expansively to not include juvenile misdeeds as criminal acts.

Further, Plaintiffs argued that if the PLCAA barred their claims, the Act itself was

unconstitutional because it, inter alia, violated both principles of federalism and the Tenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and was not a legitimate exercise of

Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.3 Upon learning of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional

arguments, the United States of America (United States or the government) intervened

to defend the PLCAA’s constitutionality. After hearing argument, the trial court sustained

Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice,

finding the PLCAA barred all of Plaintiffs’ claims and was constitutional.

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Superior Court and reasserted both their

statutory and constitutional arguments. Initially, a three-judge panel of the court, in a

published opinion, held the PLCAA barred Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Gustafson v. Springfield,

Inc., 207 WDA 2019 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 28, 2020) (withdrawn). The panel, however,

also held the Act unconstitutional, opining that it exceeded Congress’ authority under the

Commerce Clause and violated the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the intermediate court

reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case with directions for the trial court to

enter a declaratory judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor declaring the PLCAA “repugnant to the

constitution of the United States and, therefore, without the force or effect of law.” Id. at

63.

3 Plaintiffs also argued the PLCAA violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses

of the Fifth Amendment. This Court did not grant allowance of appeal to address those issues. As such, we will not discuss them further.

[J-22-2024] - 7 Both Defendants and the United States filed applications for reargument en banc.

The court granted reargument and withdrew the panel’s decision. After supplemental

briefing, the en banc panel issued a per curiam order reversing the trial court’s order

sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections and remanding for further proceedings.

Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 282 A.3d 739, 740 (Pa. Super. 2022) (per curiam).

Although five of the nine participating judges authored opinions either in support or

dissent of the court’s disposition, no single expression or rationale garnered majority

support. Rather, three judges concluded the PLCAA barred Plaintiffs’ claims but was

unconstitutional, see id. at 740-57 (Kunselman, J.) (Opinion in support of Per Curiam

Order to Reverse) (joined by Panella, P.J and Lazarus, J.); one Judge believed the Act

both did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims and was unconstitutional, see id. at 757-62 (Bender,

P.J.E) (Opinion in Support of Per Curiam Order to Reverse); one Judge thought the

PLCAA was constitutional but did not bar Plaintiffs’ action, see id. at 762 (Dubow, J.)

(Opinion in Support of Per Curiam Order to Reverse); and four Judges found the Act both

barred Plaintiffs’ claims and was constitutional, see id. at 762-76(Olson, J., dissenting)

(joined by Bowes, J. and McCaffery, then J., and Murray, J. concurring in the result); id.

at 776-89 (Murray, J., dissenting) (joined by Bowes, J., Olson, J. and McCaffery, then J.

concurring in the result). Altogether, a five-judge majority voted to reverse, albeit for

different reasons – two judges concluded the PLCAA simply did not apply under the facts

as alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint with conflicting opinions as to the constitutionality of

PLCAA, while three judges held that, even if the PLCAA barred the Plaintiffs’ action, the

Act was unconstitutional.

In response to the Superior Court’s per curiam order and myriad of accompanying

opinions, Defendants filed an application to correct, arguing that since a majority of the

court found both that the PLCAA barred Plaintiffs’ Complaint and was constitutional, the

[J-22-2024] - 8 trial court’s order sustaining their preliminary objections should be affirmed, not reversed.

The Superior Court denied Defendants’ request, stating the per curiam order “properly

reflect[ed] the votes of the individual judges and their separate writings in directing that

the PLCAA does not bar the claims at issue[,]” and “accordingly reflect[ed] only th[e]

[c]ourt’s majority agreement to reverse the trial court’s order, and all reasoning reflected

in the writings attached to the [o]rder are dicta.” Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 207 WDA

2019 (Pa. Super. filed August 19, 2022) (per curiam).

We granted allowance of appeal to address the following issues:

(1) Do [Plaintiffs’] claims for damages against the manufacturer and seller of a firearm that was criminally or unlawfully misused by a third party constitute a prohibited qualified civil liability action pursuant to the [PLCAA], 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 [ ]?

(2) Do [Plaintiffs’] claims fail to satisfy the product defect exception to the PLCAA when the discharge of the firearm was caused by an intentional trigger pull while the firearm was pointed at another person and resulted in a juvenile delinquency adjudication for involuntary manslaughter?

(3) Is the PLCAA a permissible exercise of the power of Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, or does it instead violate the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism? Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 296 A.3d 560 (Pa. 2023) (order).4

4 On October 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Smith & Wesson Brands

v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 145 S.Ct. 116 (2024) (Mem), Docket No. 23-1141, for which the Court held argument on March 4, 2025. There, the Mexican government brought an action against several firearms companies alleging the companies’ involvement in illegal trafficking of guns into Mexico, which were then used by Mexican drug cartels. The First Circuit held that the action was a “qualified civil liability action” under the PLCAA but that the action satisfied the predicate exception, 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii), to the PLCAA’s bar. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. Smith & Wesson Brands, 91 F.4th 511 (1st Cir. 2024). The issues the High Court granted certiorari on deal with the predicate exception’s applicability and do not implicate the issues this Court granted allowance of appeal to review.

[J-22-2024] - 9 As noted, the trial court sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature

of a demurrer. We review that decision under the following well settled standard: When an appellate court rules on whether preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were properly sustained, the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. The court may sustain preliminary objections only when, based on the facts pleaded, it is clear and free from doubt that the complainant will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish a right to relief. For the purpose of evaluating the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded, material, and relevant facts alleged in the complaint and every inference that is fairly deducible from those facts. Mazur, 961 A.2d at 101 101 (Pa. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

Based on the claims presently before us, we are tasked with addressing questions

of both statutory interpretation and constitutional validity. We will first consider whether

the PLCAA operates to bar Plaintiffs’ claims and then address Plaintiffs’ constitutional

challenges.

II. Applicability of the PLCAA

Determining whether the PLCAA bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint requires us to interpret

the Act, a federal statute. In this regard, we have previously explained:

“The construction of a federal statute is a matter of federal law.” Council 13, [Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO ex rel. Fillman v. Rendell,] 986 A.2d [63,] [ ] 80 [(Pa. 2009)]. Pursuant to federal rules of statutory construction, the courts consider the particular statutory language, as well as the design of the statute and its purposes in determining the meaning of a federal statute. Id. (citing Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)). But, if the [statute’s] language is clear, we should refrain from searching other sources in support of a contrary result. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228[ ] (2008) (“We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable.”); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 271[ ] (2000) (statutory interpretation “begins by examining the text … not by psychoanalyzing those who enacted it”); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6[ ] (1997) (where “[g]iven [a] straightforward statutory command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history”); Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S 249, 252-54[ ] (1992) (“[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a

[J-22-2024] - 10 statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”). Accord Dooner v. DiDonato, [ ] 971 A.2d 1187, 1195 ([Pa.] 2009) (“The language used by [Congress] is the best indication of its intent.”). Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motor Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011).

Further, as the PLCAA bars a qualified civil liability action from being brought in

state court per 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a), we are tasked with interpretating statutory provisions

that expressly preempt state law. While the preemptive language of the PLCAA “means

that we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the

[federal statute] to pre-empt at least some state law, we must nonetheless identify the

domain expressly pre-empted by that language.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,

484 (1996) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In Medtronic, the High Court

explained that in determining the extent of Congress’ intended preemption, courts are

guided by two presumptions: (1) the presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt

or supersede the state’s historic police powers unless that intent is clear and manifest;

and (2) the purpose of Congress is the touchstone in every preemption case. Id. at 485.

However, the Supreme Court has also explained that when a federal statute contains an

express preemption clause, courts “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which

necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.” Chamber of

Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v.

Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). Further, when a Congressional statute contains

an express preemption clause, courts “do not invoke any presumption against pre-

emption[.]” Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Trust, 579 U.S.

115, 125 (2016). Instantly, we find that the PLCAA contains such an express preemption

clause, which explicitly preempts state law relative to qualified civil liability actions. See

15 U.S.C. § 7902(a). Thus, we do not apply any presumption against preemption and,

instead, focus on the PLCAA’s plain language.

[J-22-2024] - 11 Plaintiffs, relying on Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991),5 and Bond v. United

States, 572 U.S. 844 (2012),6 argue that this Court should employ a narrow interpretation

of the PLCAA. They assert that the PLCAA intrudes on Pennsylvania’s sovereignty in a

myriad of ways, which, absent a “plain statement” of Congress’ intent to so intrude,

requires us “to interpret [the PLCAA] in a way that minimizes [that] intrusion[.]” Plaintiffs’

Brief at 22.

Initially, it is important to note that Gregory and Bond involved implied preemption

statutes, as opposed to the PLCAA’s express preemption. See Delana v. CED Sales,

Inc., 486 S.W.3d 316, 323 (Mo. 2016). Accordingly, other courts, such as the Supreme

Court of Missouri, have found that Gregory and Bond are inapplicable to an analysis of

5 In Gregory, state court judges brought a challenge under the federal Age Discrimination

in Employment Act (ADEA) with respect to a mandatory retirement provision of the Missouri Constitution requiring state judges to retire at the age of seventy. In rejecting the judges’ ADEA claim, the United States Supreme Court explained that the authority of states to determine the qualifications of important elected officials is at the heart of a representative government, and such authority is reserved to the states under the Constitution. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463. The Court further invoked the “plain statement” rule, explaining that “‘[i]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted). The High Court refused to read the ADEA to cover state judges because Congress had not made it clear in the statute that judges were included. See id. at 467. 6 Congress enacted the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (the

Chemical Weapons Act) in order to implement the International Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. In Bond, a defendant was convicted of possessing and using a chemical weapon under the Chemical Weapons Act after spreading two toxic chemicals on the car, mailbox, and doorknob of her romantic rival. While the Chemical Weapons Act could be read to include the defendant’s conduct, the United States Supreme Court found that Congress was not completely clear that the statute intended to cover purely local minor criminal offenses and concluded reading the statute in such a manner “would mark a dramatic departure from [its] constitutional structure and a serious reallocation of criminal law enforcement authority between the Federal Government and the States.” Bond, 572 U.S. at 866. As such, the Court found the Chemical Weapons Act did not cover the defendant’s actions.

[J-22-2024] - 12 the PLCAA because the Act “expressly and unambiguously preempts state tort law,

subject to the enumerated exceptions.” Id. We agree that Gregory and Bond are

inapplicable to our analysis of the PLCAA because the Act expressly and unambiguously

preempts state tort law. See also Travieso v. Glock Inc., 526 F. Supp.3d 533, 541 (D.Ariz.

2021) (“[T]he PLCAA contains a clear statement of Congress’s intent to preempt the

states.”); Estate of Kim ex rel. Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387-88 (Ak. 2013) (“The

PLCAA expressly preempts state common law by requiring that state courts immediately

dismiss qualified civil liability actions.”). We further agree that “there is no need to employ

a narrow construction” when analyzing the PLCAA. Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 323. As we

reject Plaintiffs’ contention that we must employ a narrow reading to the PLCAA’s

preemption clause, our understanding of the scope of that preemption “must rest primarily

on a fair understanding of congressional purpose[,]” which is “primarily … discerned from

the language of the pre[]emption statute and the statutory framework surrounding it.”

Travieso, 526 F.Supp.3d at 541 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485-86) (internal citations

and quotations omitted and emphasis removed).

A. Qualified Civil Liability Action

As noted, PLCAA bars a “qualified civil liability action” from being brought in state

court and defines such an action, subject to specific exceptions discussed more fully

below, as:

a civil action or proceeding or an administrative proceeding brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product, or a trade association, for damages, punitive damages, injunctive or declaratory relief, abatement, restitution, fines, or penalties, or other relief, resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party[.] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A). Applying the plain language to the instant matter, Plaintiffs (1)

brought a civil action against both a manufacturer and seller, (2) of a qualified product,

[J-22-2024] - 13 (3) for damages, (4) resulting from the criminal or unlawful use of a qualified product by

a person or third party, thus seemingly barring their claim under the PLCAA.7

However, the crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that Section 7903(5)(A) of the Act does

not bar their action because their claims do not “result[ ] from the criminal or unlawful

misuse of a qualified product[.]” Plaintiffs observe that the PLCAA does not define the

term “resulting from” and the Court should interpret the term in light of the PLCAA’s stated

purposes. Specifically, according to Plaintiffs, Congress intended the PLCAA to bar

causes of action “‘for the harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of’ a

gun [,]” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 39 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (emphasis added by

Plaintiffs)), rather than harms caused by a combination of third-party gun misuse and gun

company conduct, such as that which led to J.R.’s death. Id. at 41. Plaintiffs argue that

an interpretation of Section 7903(5)(A) that would bar causes of action where the harm

was caused by a combination of third-party criminal misuse of a firearm and gun company

actions would ignore the phrase “solely caused by” in Section 7901(b)(1) and violate rules

of statutory construction requiring courts to give effect to all provisions of a statute. Id. at

40 (citing Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 246 (1893)). Plaintiffs further contend that

reading Section 7903(5)(A) consistently with Section 7901(b)(1) accomplishes Congress’

stated intent to prohibit theories of liability “without foundation.” Id. at 41 (quoting 15 U.S.

§ 7901(a)(7)). Plaintiffs also reiterate their position that Bond and Gregory mandate their

interpretation.8

7 Plaintiffs do not contest that Defendants qualify as either manufacturers or sellers under

the PLCAA or that the Firearm is a qualified product. 8 Plaintiffs additionally argue that federalism mandates the Court adopt their position. We address Plaintiffs’ federalism concerns later in our discussion of the PLCAA’s constitutionality.

[J-22-2024] - 14 In response, Defendants counter that the facts and circumstances of this case

clearly satisfy each of the required elements of a “qualified civil liability action.”

Specifically, as to Section 7903(5)(A)’s requirement that damages “result[ ] from the

criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product[,]” Defendants assert Plaintiffs’ injuries

arise entirely from the Juvenile’s independent criminal acts. Defendants’ Brief at 17.

Defendants observe the Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent of involuntary manslaughter

for his actions resulting in J.R.’s death and that, under Pennsylvania law, a delinquent act

includes “an act designated a crime under the law of this Commonwealth, or of another

state if the act occurred in that state, or under Federal law[.]” Id. at 17-18 (quoting 42

Pa.C.S. § 6302) (emphasis removed)). In Defendants’ view, the Juvenile’s adjudication

“conclusively establishes that Plaintiffs’ claims are based on the criminal misuse of the

[Firearm] by a third party[,]” id. at 19, and the action is thus a “qualified civil liability action”

pursuant to the PLCAA.9 The United States does not take a position on whether the

PLCAA bars Plaintiffs’ claims but, as discussed infra, only advocates in support of the

PLCAA’s constitutionality.10

9 After the Court held oral argument, Defendants filed a request entitled “Application

Under PA.R.A.P. 2501(a)” (Application) in order to bring the opinion from the Rhode Island District Court in Santos v. City of Providence, 2024 WL 1198275 (D.R.I. Mar. 20, 2024), to the Court’s attention. Neither Plaintiffs nor the United States have filed a response to the Application. The Application is granted. 10 Numerous amici have also filed briefs in support of the parties. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the Office of the Attorney General, Federalism Scholars, the Pennsylvania Association for Justice, and Everytown for Gun Safety Support Fund filed briefs in support of Plaintiffs. The State of Montana, joined by nineteen other states, the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel and the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, and The National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. have filed briefs in support of Defendants.

[J-22-2024] - 15 Initially, we find Plaintiffs’ reliance on the PLCAA’s purpose section, Section

7901(b)(1), in an attempt to narrow the Act’s preemptive language, unpersuasive.

Addressing an identical argument, the District Court of Arizona stated: While instructive, a statute’s purposes section cannot control over the law’s express terms. Preambles and prefatory language, such as the findings and purposes section of the PLCAA, are valid sources for determining congressional intent. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A GARDNER, READING LAW 167- 70 (2012). However, these sources are used to resolve ambiguities, not to create them, and it is well established that the purposes section of a statute will not control in the face of clear enacting provisions. Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing cases); see also H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 245[ ] (1989); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.04, at 146 (5th ed. 1992, Norman Singer ed.). In the present case, the language of the PLCAA’s enacting provisions clearly shows Congress intended to preempt a broader scope of actions than those suggested by the Plaintiff. As such, the recitation of the phrase “solely caused” in the purposes section will not control the Court’s analysis. Travieso, 526 F.Supp.3d at 543. See also Estate of Kim, 295 P.3d at 386-87 (“[A]

statutory preamble can neither restrain nor extend the meaning of an unambiguous

statute; nor can it be used to create doubt or uncertainty which does not otherwise exist.

The [plaintiff’s] construction would elevate the PLCAA’s preamble over the substantive

portion’s clear language.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Delana, 486 S.W.3d

at 322 (“The general statement of the purpose of the PLCAA does not redefine the plain

language of a statute. Therefore, the statement of purpose does not overcome the fact

that the specific substantive provisions of the PLCAA expressly preempts all qualified civil

liability actions against firearms sellers, including claims of negligence.” (internal citations

omitted)). In line with courts that have previously considered the issue, we agree that the

PLCAA’s purpose section could be helpful in resolving any ambiguity in the Act’s

operative language. However, we find that the PLCAA’s definition of a “qualified civil

liability action” as an action seeking damages “resulting from the criminal or unlawful

misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party[,]” contains no such ambiguity

[J-22-2024] - 16 and clearly evinces Congress’s intent to preempt a broader scope of actions than those

suggested by Plaintiffs. To wit, if Congress intended to limit the Act’s bar on qualified civil

liability actions to those “solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of firearms

products[,]” it could have used that language in Section 7309(5)(A). Stated differently,

Congress’s failure to employ such limiting language indicates its intent for the Act to

encompass a wider range of civil actions. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 528

(2003) (“When Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits

it in another section of the same Act, we have recognized, it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusions or exclusion.”)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that Plaintiffs’ interpretation would

render several of the PLCAA’s exceptions superfluous. See Travieso, 526 F.Supp.3d at

543. For example, as to exception (iii), Section 7903(5)(A)(iii), known as the “predicate

exception,”11 “if [the] PLCAA preemption never covered cases alleging any wrongful

conduct by a manufacturer, then the exception allowing actions for a seller’s knowing

violation of State or Federal gun laws would be completely unneeded.” Id. The same

conclusion applies to the “product liability exception”, which is particularly relevant here.

This exception states that “where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional

act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole

proximate cause of any harm.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’

position that the PLCAA only covers actions where the harm was solely caused by a third-

party bad actor would render the product liability exception’s limitation of proximate cause

11 Exception (iii) “has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception’ because a plaintiff

not only must present a cognizable claim, he or she also must allege a knowing violation of a ‘predicate statute.’” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir.2009) (citing, inter alia, City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir.2009)).

[J-22-2024] - 17 absolutely meaningless. See id. at 543-44. Thus, we decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to graft

the limiting language “solely caused” contained in the PLCAA’s purpose section onto the

Act’s broader definition of a “qualified civil liability action.”

As to whether Plaintiffs’ alleged harm “result[ed] from the criminal or unlawful

misuse of a qualified product[,]” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A), we find the Illinois State Supreme

Court’s decision in Adames v. Sheahan, 909 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. 2009), with facts strikingly

similar to those in the case sub judice, to be particularly instructive. In that case, a

thirteen-year-old boy (the shooter) came into possession of firearms owned by his father.

Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 745. The shooter showed the firearms to his friend (the victim)

and the boys started playing around with the weapons. Id. at 746. At some point, the

shooter removed the magazine from one of the firearms and placed it in his pocket. Id.

Then, believing the firearm was unloaded because he had removed the magazine, the

shooter pointed the firearm at the victim and pulled the trigger, discharging the gun and

shooting the victim. Id. The victim died as a result of his injuries and the shooter was

later found delinquent of, inter alia, involuntary manslaughter. Id.

The victim’s estate (the Estate) filed suit against, inter alia, Beretta U.S.A.

Corporation (Beretta), the manufacturer of the firearm, raising claims for product liability

design defect, negligent design, failure to warn, and breach of the implied warranty of

merchantability. Id. at 751. After the PLCAA was implicated, the Estate argued that its

action was not a qualified civil liability action because the alleged harm did not “result[ ]

from the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product.” Id. at 760. Relying on the

PLCAA’s definition of “unlawful misuse,” the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Estate’s

argument, determining that “[the shooter’s] use of the [firearm] … certainly violated the

Criminal Code, a statute, when he was adjudicated delinquent for involuntary

manslaughter and reckless discharge of a firearm, satisfying the definition of ‘unlawful

[J-22-2024] - 18 misuse.’” Id. 761. Further, relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “criminal” as

an adjective, the court found that the shooter’s misuse of the firearm also “had the

character of a crime and ‘in the nature of a crime’ and, therefore, was a criminal misuse.”

Id.

In reaching these determinations, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the Estate’s

argument that it should not look to the shooter’s juvenile adjudication in determining

whether there was an unlawful or criminal misuse because the shooter had not been

convicted of anything and lacked criminal intent. The court observed that the PLCAA

does not require a criminal conviction or criminal intent. Rather, it merely requires criminal

or unlawful misuse. Id. In fact, the court noted that Congress did require a conviction in

order for an exception to the PLCAA to apply under Section 7903(5)(A)(i). Id. at 761-62

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i) (“an action brought against a transferor convicted under

section 924(h) of Title 18, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly

harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted[.]”)). The court found that

when Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from

another section of the same act, courts may presume Congress acted intentionally and

purposely in that exclusion. Id. at 762 (citing Clay, 537 U.S.at 528).

Similar to Adames, in the case sub judice, the Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent

in juvenile court of involuntary homicide for his actions related to the shooting of J.R.

Under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375, a “delinquent act” is defined as, absent

certain exceptions not relevant here, “an act designated a crime under the law of this

Commonwealth, or of another state if the act occurred in that state, or under Federal

Law[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. Pursuant to the Crimes Code, “[a] person is guilty of

involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a

reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly

[J-22-2024] - 19 negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a). In

order to adjudicate a child delinquent, the court must find the child committed the

delinquent act by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(b). As such,

the Juvenile’s adjudication for involuntary manslaughter is proof beyond a reasonable

doubt that, through his reckless or grossly negligent actions in shooting J.R. with the

Firearm, he caused J.R.’s death, in violation of the criminal law of this Commonwealth.

The PLCAA defines “unlawful misuse” as “conduct that violates a statute,

ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified product.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 7903(9). The Juvenile’s adjudication for involuntary manslaughter is proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that he violated a statute related to his use of the Firearm, which all

parties concede is a “qualified product.” In this regard, we concur with the Illinois

Supreme Court’s conclusion in Adames that a juvenile adjudication clearly satisfies the

PLCAA’s definition of “unlawful misuse.” Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 761.

That said, the PLCAA does not define “criminal misuse.” Thus, as the Illinois

Supreme Court did in Adames, we consult Black’s Law Dictionary (Black’s). See

Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 307 (Pa. 2022) (“To discern the legislative

meaning of words and phrases, our Court has on numerous occasions engaged in an

examination of dictionary definitions.”) (internal citations omitted). “Criminal” in Section

7903(5)(A) of the Act is used as an adjective and Black’s defines “criminal” in its adjective

form as, “1. Of, relating to, or involving a crime; in the nature of a crime… 2. Of, relating

to, or involving the part of the legal system that is concerned with crime; connected with

the administration of penal justice … 3. Wrong, dishonest, and unacceptable.”

CRIMINAL, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Further, under Section 6302 of the

Juvenile Act, a delinquent act is “an act designated a crime under the law of this

Commonwealth[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302. As the Juvenile was adjudicated of involuntary

[J-22-2024] - 20 manslaughter for shooting J.R., we conclude his actions were “[o]f, relating to, or involving

a crime[,]” and “in the nature of a crime[,]” and constituted “criminal” misuse of a qualified

product under the PLCAA. See Blacks, supra.

In reaching this conclusion, we find the fact that the Juvenile was not convicted of

a criminal offense immaterial to our analysis. As stated supra, the plain language of

Section 7903(5)(A) does not require a criminal conviction. See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)

(defining a “qualified civil liability action” as an action seeking damages “resulting from

the criminal or unlawful misuse of a qualified product by the person or a third party[.]”

(emphasis added)). Like the Illinois Supreme Court recognized in Adames, Congress’s

failure to require a criminal conviction in Section 7903(5)(A) contrasts with its inclusion of

a criminal conviction requirement elsewhere in the PLCAA, and because Congress specifically included language requiring a conviction in [S]ection 7903(5)(A)(i), but did not include such language in [S]ection 7903(5)(A), we presume that Congress did not intend criminal misuse to require proof of a criminal conviction. Adames, 909 N.E.2d at 762. As such, we conclude that an underlying criminal conviction

is not required for an action to meet the PLCAA’s definition of a “qualified civil liability

action.” See also, e.g., Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 321 (“PLCAA preemption is based on

‘criminal or unlawful misuse’ and not the existence of a criminal conviction.”); Ryan v.

Hughes-Ortiz, 959 N.E.2d 1000, 1008 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (“[T]he PLCAA does not

require a criminal conviction in order for an activity to qualify as ‘criminal or unlawful

misuse.’”).

We acknowledge that Plaintiffs argue that this interpretation renders the phrase

“unlawful misuse” meaningless surplusage. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 31. We disagree, as such

an assertion ignores the PLCAA’s definition of “unlawful misuse,” which requires “conduct

that violates a statute, ordinance, or regulation as it relates to the use of a qualified

product.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(9). Actions can satisfy this definition even if the law they

[J-22-2024] - 21 violate is purely civil in nature. As discussed above, however, criminal misuse requires

actions that are “[o]f, relating to, or involving a crime[,]” and “in the nature of a crime[.]”

Black’s, supra. One can violate a civil statute, ordinance, or regulation, through actions

that are not criminal in nature. Under the PLCAA, those actions would qualify as “unlawful

misuse” but not “criminal misuse.”

Based on the above analysis, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ alleged harm resulted

from the Juvenile’s “criminal or unlawful misuse” of the Firearm and, as such, their action

constitutes a “qualified civil liability action” pursuant to the PLCAA, unless one of the Act’s

enumerated exceptions is found to apply.

B. The Product Liability Exception

The PLCAA commands courts to dismiss actions that satisfy the definition of a

“qualified civil liability action.” However, otherwise-prohibited qualified civil liability actions

“shall not include” any action that satisfies any of the PLCAA’s six exceptions as set forth

in 15 U.S.C. §§ 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi). Plaintiffs assert their action satisfies the “product

liability exception” in Section 7903(5)(A)(v), which exempts from the definition of “qualified

civil liability actions:”

[A]n action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably foreseeable manner, except that where the discharge of the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death personal injuries or property damage[.] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). Here, the parties do not contest that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is

“an action for death, physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect

in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a reasonably

foreseeable manner[.]” See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 28; Defendants’ Brief at 20-29 (only arguing

the “exception to the exception” renders the product liability exception inapplicable). The

issue therefore is whether Plaintiffs’ claim falls into the “exception to the exception,” i.e.,

[J-22-2024] - 22 whether the “discharge of the [Firearm] was caused by a volitional act that constituted a

criminal offense[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(v). Plaintiffs insist the requirements of the

exception to the exception are not met because the discharge of the Firearm was neither

a “volitional act” nor a “criminal offense.”

i. Criminal Offense

Plaintiffs assert that while the Juvenile’s actions may be considered a juvenile

offense, they do not constitute a “criminal offense” under the PLCAA. First, they insist

the natural meaning of the phrase “criminal offense” is “conduct actionable in the criminal

justice system.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 28. According to Plaintiffs, in Pennsylvania “juvenile

proceedings are not criminal proceedings[,]” id. at 29 (quoting In re S.A.S., 839 A.2d

1106, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2003)), and under the Juvenile Act, juveniles are not charged with

crimes but rather with committing delinquent acts. Id. (citing In re R.A., 761 A.2d 1220,

1224 (Pa. Super. 2000)). Further, Plaintiffs argue the PLCAA’s text suggests that

Congress did not intend for juvenile offenses to be considered criminal offenses, as

Congress did not expressly include juvenile offenses in the product liability exception. In

the Plaintiffs’ view, “Congress’s failure to mention ‘juvenile offenses’ indicates that

Congress likely intended ‘criminal offense’ to have a narrower meaning than any acts that

could conceivably be subjected to criminal law.” Id. at 30. Lastly, again relying on

Gregory, supra, Plaintiffs argue that Congress has not made it clear that juvenile offenses

are included within the meaning of “criminal offense” and the Court should settle any

ambiguity in the Act in their favor. Id. at 32.

Citing Adames, Travieso, and Ryan, Defendants counter that the “PLCAA’s focus

with respect to the product defect exception is whether the volitional act that caused the

discharge of the firearm constituted a criminal offense, not on whether the person

committing such act was, or could be, charged with a criminal offense.” Defendants’ Brief

[J-22-2024] - 23 at 28 (emphasis omitted). In the case sub judice, Defendants assert the Juvenile engaged

in a volitional act at the time he shot J.R. that constituted the criminal offense of

involuntary manslaughter. Id. As such, they contend the exception to the exception

applies to bar Plaintiffs’ claims.

To reiterate, in this case, the Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for his actions

in shooting J.R. Under the Juvenile Act, that adjudication is proof beyond a reasonable

doubt the Juvenile committed “an act designated a crime under the law of this

Commonwealth,” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, specifically involuntary manslaughter. See 42

Pa.C.S. § 6341(b) (“If the court finds on proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the child

committed the acts by reason of which he is alleged to be delinquent it shall enter such

finding on the record and shall specify the particular offenses, including the grading and

counts thereof which the child is found to have committed.”). Even though the Juvenile

was charged under the Juvenile Act rather than through the criminal division, that does

not change the fact that his actions constituted the crime of involuntary manslaughter as

set forth in the Crimes Code.

As further example, consider the disposition in Travieso. In that case, the district

court addressed the application of the product liability exception as it pertained to an

action initiated after a fourteen-year-old girl shot and severely injured another, but did not

face charges in either juvenile or criminal court. In Travieso, the court found:

the PLCAA’s product liability preemption is triggered by the criminal nature of the act, not whether the actor is or can be charged with the crime. Here, even if a juvenile shooter would not face a criminal conviction, the finding of delinquency would be based on an admittedly criminal act. As such, the [c]ourt is convinced that regardless of whether the [s]hooter would face criminal charges, the criminal nature of the act triggers the PLCAA’s preemption. Travieso, 526 F.Supp.3d at 547 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). We agree

with the Travieso court that the exception to the exception is triggered by the criminal

[J-22-2024] - 24 nature of the act rather than whether the shooter faced or could have faced criminal

prosecution. As such, we determine that the phrase “criminal offense” in the product

liability exception includes actions by juveniles that constitute “an act designated a crime

under the law of this Commonwealth[.]”12

ii. Volitional Act

Plaintiffs also argue that the Juvenile’s shooting of J.R. was not a volitional act but

rather an “unintentional discharge of a gun thought to be incapable of discharging[.]”

Plaintiffs’ brief at 33 (citing Gustafson, 282 A.3d at 760 (Bender, P.J.E., concurring)).

Relying on various dictionary definitions and prior Superior Court cases, Plaintiffs assert

the term volitional connotes some form of intent. Id. at 34 (citing, inter alia,

Commonwealth v. Brumbaugh, 932 A.2d 108, 111 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“volitional” used in

relation to “knowingly made”); Commonwealth v. Feeney, 101 A.3d 830, 834 (Pa. Super.

2014) (“volitional” used in relation to “deliberate”)). As used in the PLCAA, Plaintiffs assert

12 We further observe that under certain circumstances a juvenile who is accused of

committing a delinquent act can face criminal prosecution. Pursuant to Section 6355 of the Juvenile Act “[a]fter a petition has been filed alleging delinquency based on conduct which is designated a crime or public offense under the laws … of this Commonwealth, the court … may rule that [the Juvenile Act] is not applicable and that the offense should be prosecuted, and transfer the offense, where appropriate, to the division or a judge of the court assigned to conduct criminal proceedings, for prosecution of the offense if” certain specific conditions exist. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a). In those circumstances, under Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the exception to the exception, whether the PLCAA bars an action would depend on a judge’s decision whether or not to transfer a juvenile offender’s case to criminal court. If the judge transfers the case, the PLCAA would bar a plaintiff’s action. However, under Plaintiffs’ interpretation, if a judge declines to transfer the case, the PLCAA would not bar the action. To hinge the applicability of the PLCAA’s preemption on a trial judge’s decision whether or not to transfer a juvenile offender’s case to criminal court would be contrary to Congress’s stated intent of barring “qualified civil liability action[s]” from being brought in either Federal or State court. See 15 U.S.C. § 7902(a). Accord Travieso¸ 526 F.Supp.3d at 547 (“While the decision whether to charge the [s]hooter as an adult is discretionary, the [c]ourt cannot believe that the PLCAA’s preemption hinges on whether the state actually exercises this discretion of how to charge a shooter. To hinge the effect of the PLCAA on a state’s discretionary choice would be contrary to Congress’s purpose.”).

[J-22-2024] - 25 volitional “logically includes some level of decision or choice to discharge the gun, at a

minimum.” Id. They argue here the Juvenile “did not decide, or intend, or make a choice

to discharge” the Firearm as he thought it was unloaded and “incapable of discharging a

round.” Id. at 34-35. According to Plaintiffs, this interpretation is in line with Congress’s

intent and any alternative understanding would conflate “criminal offense” and “volitional

act” and render “volitional act” superfluous. At a minimum, Plaintiffs contend the question

of whether the Firearm’s discharge was caused by a volitional act is a jury question.

Defendants counter, citing Judge Murray’s dissenting opinion below, that whether

the Juvenile intended to shoot J.R. is irrelevant, as the PLCAA’s requirement of a

volitional act “includes no mens rea requirement and does not reference an actor’s acuity

or state of mind[.]” Defendants’ Brief at 28. According to Defendants, the Juvenile

committed a volitional act by pointing the Firearm at J.R. and intentionally pulling the

trigger. As such, they contend the exception to the exception applies and Plaintiffs’ action

is not permitted under the product liability exception.

“Volitional” is not defined in the PLCAA, but Black’s defines “volition” as “1. The

ability to make a choice or determine something. 2. The act of making a choice or

determining something. 3. The choice or determination that someone makes. – volitional,

adj.” VOLITION, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). We reject Plaintiffs’ argument

that because the Juvenile did not intend to shoot J.R., or to discharge the Firearm at all,

his actions were therefore not volitional. We find the key question is not whether the

Juvenile made a “choice or determination” to shoot J.R. but rather whether he made “a

choice or determination” that caused the discharge of the Firearm which constituted a

criminal offense. This interpretation is in line with the plain language of the product liability

exception, which does not mention the shooter’s intent to shoot an individual or that a

shooter intended the consequences of his actions. The only requirement is that the

[J-22-2024] - 26 “volitional act” or the “choice or determination” caused the discharge of the firearm and

constituted a criminal offense. See 15 U.S.C. § 7309(5)(A)(v) (“where the discharge of

the product was caused by a volitional act that constituted a criminal offense, then such

act shall be considered the sole proximate cause of any resulting death, personal injuries

or property damage[.]”). The volitional act at issue here, or the choice or determination

the Juvenile made, was to pull the trigger. As discussed fully above, this choice or

determination constituted the criminal offense of involuntary manslaughter, for which the

Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent. Further, the Juvenile’s choice to pull the trigger

clearly caused the discharge of the Firearm.13 It is of no moment that the Juvenile did not

intend to shoot J.R. Stated differently, what brings Plaintiffs’ claim within the exception

to the exception is the Juvenile’s choice or determination to pull the trigger, not his intent

behind the action.

Our interpretation is consistent with that of other courts that have addressed the

product liability exception. For example, the Adames court determined that the juvenile

chose and determined to point the gun at the victim and pull the trigger. Adames, 909

13 The direct link between the Juvenile’s volitional act of pulling the Firearm’s trigger and

J.R.’s death makes this case readily distinguishable from Chavez v. Glock, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d, 236, 353 (2012). There a father stored his firearm in his vehicle in a manner that allegedly violated California penal statutes. Then, while he was driving, the father’s three-year-old son gained possession of the firearm and shot father in the back, severely injuring the father. Father filed suit against, inter alia, the firearm’s manufacturer raising product liability claims. The manufacturer filed for summary judgment based on the PLCAA. In addressing the exception to the exception, the appellate court found that “[b]y specifically linking the actual act of discharge to the criminal offense, as it did,” Congress did not intend “to allow any unlawful act in the causal chain, however remote from the actual firing of the weapon, to defeat the exclusion.” Chavez, 207 Cal.App.4th at 1318. The father’s alleged criminal offense of improperly storing the firearm was far removed from the firearm’s discharge. The Juvenile’s volitional act and criminal offense of pulling the Firearm’s trigger here was the direct cause of the Firearm’s discharge.

[J-22-2024] - 27 N.E.2d at 763. Accordingly, even though the juvenile did not intend the consequences of

his actions, his act was nonetheless a volitional act. Id.

The Travieso court came to a similar conclusion when it determined that the mere

fact that the shooter did not intend to shoot the victim or fire the gun did not mean that

the shooter did not act volitionally. Travieso, 526 F.Supp.3d at 548. That court found

that the shooter took numerous actions, including taking possession of the firearm,

pointing the firearm at another individual, and pulling the trigger that constituted volitional

actions. Id. Similarly, in Ryan, the court determined that the volitional act that caused

the firearm’s discharge was the individual’s unlawful possession of the firearm, thus

bringing the case under the auspices of the PLCAA. Ryan, 959 N.E.2d at 1008-09.

Based on the above analysis, we determine that the product liability exception

does not exempt Plaintiffs’ Complaint from the PLCAA’s definition of a “qualified civil

liability action.” The PLCAA, therefore, bars Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

III. Constitutionality of the PLCAA

With our determination that Plaintiffs’ action is barred by the PLCAA, we now turn

to Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges. Plaintiffs argue the PLCAA is not a valid exercise

of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution and

violates the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, as well as general principles of federalism.

As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ue respect for the decisions of a

coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment

only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.” U.S.

v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). “With this presumption of constitutionality in mind,”

id., we will now address Petitioners’ constitutional challenges in turn.

A. The Commerce Clause

[J-22-2024] - 28 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with

foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST

Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has identified three broad categories of activity the

Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to regulate: (1) “the use of the channels of

interstate commerce[;]” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or

things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate

activities[;]” and (3) “the power to regulate those activities having substantial relation to

interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”

U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995) (internal citations omitted). As the PLCAA

clearly does not fall within the first two categories, we narrow our inquiry to whether the

Act regulates activities that “substantially affect interstate commerce.”

Plaintiffs argue the PLCAA is not authorized by the Commerce Clause because it

does not regulate commerce, but instead regulates states. In this vein, Plaintiffs reject as

immaterial Congress’s statement that the qualified civil liability actions have a substantial

impact on interstate commerce. They assert that simply because Congress says a

particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it

so and the final determination of whether an activity sufficiently affects interstate

commerce is a judicial, not a legislative, one. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 64-65 (citing Lopez¸ 514

U.S. at 557 n.2). According to Plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has explained that in every

case where it has sustained federal regulation on the basis of its indirect effect on

commerce, the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character.

Plaintiffs compare the PLCAA to the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act

(ACA), which the High Court addressed in National Federation of Independent

Businesses v. Sebelius¸ 567 U.S. 519 (2012). There, according to Plaintiffs, the Court

held that Congress’s power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of

[J-22-2024] - 29 commercial activity and, notwithstanding the individual mandate’s effect on interstate

commerce, it was impermissible under the Commerce Clause because it did not regulate

existing commercial activity. Plaintiffs’ Brief at 62 (citing Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 552

(opinion by Roberts, C.J.)). In Plaintiffs’ view, the PLCAA suffers from similar flaws as

they contend the PLCAA does not regulate the firearms industry or the conduct of firearms

companies or the sale, possession or use of firearms or individuals in any manner.

Rather, they contend the Act regulates states by prohibiting them from enforcing their

common law as compared to their statutory laws. Id. at 63-64. As such, Plaintiffs assert

the PLCAA does not regulate lawsuits affecting interstate commerce but rather “lawsuits

that do not emanate from Congress’s preferred source within the state.” Id. at 64. In light

of these arguments, Plaintiffs assert that the PLCAA is not an authorized exercise of

Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and courts that have found otherwise were

incorrect.

Defendants counter Congress found that lawsuits against the firearms industry

were “an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce[,]” Defendants’ Brief

at 32 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6)), and that one of the PLCAA’s stated purposes is

to prevent or alleviate such burdens. See id. at 33 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(4)).

According to Defendants, in order to ensure the PLCAA would not exceed its Commerce

Clause authority, Congress specifically limited the Act’s applicability to those

manufacturers and sellers engaged in interstate commerce. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §

7903(2), (4), (6)). In Defendants’ view, “there can be no question of the interstate

character of the [firearms industry] and Congress rationally perceived a substantial effect

on the industry of the litigation that the Act seeks to curtail.” Id. at 35 (quoting City of New

York v. Berretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 395 (2d. Cir 2008)). Defendants further

observe that the highest courts of several other states have previously concluded the

[J-22-2024] - 30 PLCAA is authorized under Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and implore this

Court to find the same.

The United States concurs with Defendants’ analysis of the PLCAA’s purpose and

impact on interstate commerce. The government further rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that

the Act does not regulate private conduct, observing that the PLCAA preempts select

suits “brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product[.]”

United States’ Brief at 14 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(a) (emphasis provided by United

States)). In addition, the United States rejects Plaintiffs’ reliance on Sebelius because,

unlike the ACA’s individual mandate, the PLCAA does not force anyone to engage in

commerce, and it only reaches suits that have an explicit connection to or effect on

interstate commerce. Id. at 16.

While this is an issue of first impression for this Court, and the Supreme Court has

not addressed the PLCAA’s constitutionality, numerous other courts have addressed the

question of whether the PLCAA falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. The

first court to do so was the Second Circuit in City of New York, which found that the

PLCAA did not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority “where there can be no

question of the interstate character of the industry in question and where Congress

rationally perceived a substantial effect on the industry of the litigation that the Act seeks

to curtail.” City of New York, 524 F.3d at 395. Numerous other appellate courts have

subsequently agreed with the Second Circuit’s conclusion. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565

F.3d 1126, 1140 (9th Cir 2009) (“Congress carefully constrained the Act’s reach to the

confines of the Commerce Clause.”); Adames, supra, 909 N.E.2d at 765 (agreeing with

City of New York); Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 323 (the PLCAA preempts state tort law

“pursuant to Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce.”). After

[J-22-2024] - 31 careful consideration, we concur that Congress’s Commerce Clause powers permitted it

to enact PLCAA.

In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that in enacting the PLCAA, Congress

made several factual findings. Of particular significance, Congress found that lawsuits

had been filed against firearms companies operating in interstate and international

commerce “for harm caused by the misuse of firearms by third parties, including

criminals[,]” and that firearms companies engaged in interstate and international

commerce should not be held liable for such harm. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(3), (5). Congress

further explicitly found that imposing such liability on the firearms industry “constitutes an

unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States.” Id. at §

7901(a)(6). The existence of congressional findings, however, “is not sufficient, by itself,

to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at

614. “Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially

affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, “[w]hether particular operations

affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of

Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question[.]” Id.

(internal citations omitted). That being the case, the Supreme Court also stated that

[w]hile Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burden that an activity has on interstate commerce, the existence of such findings may enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affects interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect is visible to the naked eye. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

Further, we are not required to determine if a regulated activity actually has a substantial

effect on interstate commerce, but only “whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so

[J-22-2024] - 32 concluding.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557;

Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-80 (1981)).

The facts of the instant matter make clear that the interstate nature of the firearms

industry cannot be disputed. Defendant Springfield, who designed, manufactured, and

sold the Firearm, is an Illinois corporation. Complaint at ¶ 18. Defendant Saloom sold

the Firearm in retail in Pennsylvania and is a Pennsylvania limited liability company. Id.

at ¶ 19. The shooting also occurred here in Pennsylvania. A firearm designed and

manufactured by an Illinois corporation that was sold and used in Pennsylvania

necessarily must have been involved in interstate commerce in some manner. Further,

it cannot be disputed, as evidenced by the numerous cases cited within this opinion, that

the firearms industry has faced, and will likely continue to face, litigation over its products.

Under these circumstances, we determine that it was reasonable for Congress to

conclude that these suits would financially impact the firearms industry. See 15 U.S.C. §

7901(a)(3) (“Lawsuits have been commenced against manufacturers, distributors,

dealers, and importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which seek

money damages and other relief[.]” (emphasis added)). Given this conclusion, we hold

it was completely reasonable for Congress to find that these suits “constitute an

unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States[,]” 15 U.S.

§ 7901(a)(6), and to enact the PLCAA to “prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose

unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce.” Id. at § 7301(b)(4).

Such a finding is inapposite to the Supreme Court’s determination in Lopez that a

portion of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 making it a federal offense to possess

a firearm in a school zone exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. With

respect to that act, the Supreme Court was concerned it did not contain a “jurisdictional

element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession

[J-22-2024] - 33 in question affects interstate commerce.” Lopez, 513 U.S. at 561. Similarly, in finding a

portion of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that provided a federal civil remedy

for victims of gender-motivated violence was outside Congress’s Commerce Clause

authority, the High Court in Morrison expressed concern that Congress did not include a

“jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of

Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.

The PLCAA does not contain any similar jurisdictional issues. The Act bars a

qualified civil liability action from being brought in federal or state court, see 15 U.S.C.

§ 7902(a), and defines such an action, in relevant part, as a civil action brought “against

a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product[.]” Id. at § 7903(5)(A). The Act further

defines these terms. A manufacturer, in relevant part, is “a person who is engaged in the

business of manufacturing the product in interstate or foreign commerce[.]” Id. at §

7903(2). A seller is, with respect to a qualified product, an importer of firearms or

ammunition, a person engaged in selling or repairing firearms or their parts, or a seller of

ammunition who is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. Id. at § 7903(6). Lastly,

a qualified product is a “firearm … or ammunition … or a component part of a firearm of

ammunition, that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id.

at § 7903(4). As seen from these definitions, Congress carefully crafted the PLCAA to

ensure the Act only barred suits that directly involved products and defendants engaged

in interstate commerce. These jurisdictional requirements materially distinguish the

PLCAA from the more tenuous connections to interstate commerce the Supreme Court

found insufficient in Lopez and Morrison.

The PLCAA’s jurisdictional requirements also differentiate the Act from the ACA’s

individual mandate that the Supreme Court addressed in Sebelius, “which requires

individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level of

[J-22-2024] - 34 coverage[.]” Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 530-31. In addressing the government’s argument

that the individual mandate fell within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, Chief

Justice Roberts, writing only for himself on this issue, observed that the Constitution gives

Congress the authority to regulate commerce, which “presupposes the existence of

commercial activity to be regulated.” Id. at 550 (Roberts, C.J.). In finding the Commerce

Clause did not authorize the individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts noted the

individual mandate did not regulate existing commercial activity but, instead “compel[led]

individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that

their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 552 (Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis

in original). The PLCAA’s bar on qualified civil liability actions does not compel similar

activity as it only pertains to actions that involve a qualified product, which by definition

requires activity in interstate commerce to have already occurred. See id. at § 7903(4).

Therefore, unlike the individual mandate, the PLCAA does not compel anyone to become

active in commerce by purchasing a product but, rather, only applies after a product has

already moved in interstate commerce.14

14 We further reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the PLCAA is not a valid preemption law

because it does not regulate individuals or the firearms industry in any manner but rather, regulates only “lawsuits that do not emanate from Congress’s preferred source within the state.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 64. However, as the United States observes, the PLCAA explicitly regulates individuals by barring qualified civil liability actions brought by any “person,” which the Act defines as, inter alia, “any individual.” 15 U.S.C. § 7903(3). Further, while the PLCAA’s provision that “[a] qualified civil liability action may not be brought in any Federal or State court,” id. at § 7902(a), may not initially appear to regulate the firearms industry, Congress need not employ “a particular linguistic formulation” in preempting state law, and thus, “it is a mistake to be confused by the way in which a preemption provision is phrased.” New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 584 U.S. 453, 478 (2018) (Murphy). In analyzing the concept of express preemption, which the PLCAA accomplishes, the Supreme Court in Murphy discussed its prior holding in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), which involved the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (the Deregulation Act), providing that “no State or political subdivision thereof” could enact or enforce any regulation relating to certain activities of covered airlines. Id. at 420 (Stevens, J., (continued…)

[J-22-2024] - 35 B. Tenth Amendment

The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by

the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,

or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. “[T]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the

power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve

power to the States.” New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). One of these limits is

that “Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative process of the States by

directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” Id. at 161

(quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (brackets provided in New York)). This concept is known

as the anticommandeering doctrine and “is simply the expression of a fundamental

structural decision incorporated into the Constitution, i.e., the decision to withhold from

Congress the power to issue orders directly to the States.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 470.

In New York, the Supreme Court found that a federal statute that required states,

under certain circumstances, to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste or to “regulat[e]

according to the instructions of Congress[]” violated the Tenth Amendment. New York,

505 U.S. at 175. The High Court found the statute would either “’commandeer’ state

governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes” or “command to state

dissenting) (quoting the enactment). The Murphy Court stated the Deregulation Act may “appear to operate directly on the States,” but looking beyond the language “it is clear that this provision operates just like any other federal law with preemptive effect. It confers on private entities (i.e., covered carriers) a federal right to engage in certain conduct subject only to certain (federal) constraints.” Id. at 478-79. The PLCAA’s bar on qualified civil liability actions operates in a similar fashion: it confers on private entities (i.e., firearms manufacturers and sellers) a federal right to engage in interstate commerce subject only to certain (federally allowable) civil suits (i.e. exceptions to the bar on qualified civil liability actions). Viewed in this manner, the PLCAA clearly regulates the firearms industry rather than merely the states themselves and, as such, it is a permissible form of express preemption.

[J-22-2024] - 36 governments to implement legislation enacted by Congress[,]” and “the Constitution does

not empower Congress to subject state governments to th[at] type of instruction.” Id. at

175-76. In Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997), the Court invoked the anticommandeering

doctrine to invalidate a portion of the Brady Act that required state and local law

enforcement officials to perform background checks and other tasks in relation to

handgun license applications, stating

We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. Id. at 935.

More recently, in Murphy, the Supreme Court found a federal statute that

prohibited states from authorizing sports gambling violated the anticommandeering

doctrine. Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474. According to the Court, the statute “unequivocally

dictate[d] what a state legislature may and may not do” and “state legislatures [were] put

under the direct control of Congress.” Id. According to the Court, it was “as if federal

officers were installed in state legislative chambers and were armed with the authority to

stop legislators from voting on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state

sovereignty is not easy to imagine.” Id. According to the Murphy Court, the

anticommandeering doctrine bars Congress from both affirmatively commanding states

to act and prohibiting state legislatures from acting as “[t]he basic principle – that

Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures – applies in either event.” Id. at

475.

Numerous courts have rejected arguments that the PLCAA violates the Tenth

Amendment and the anticommandeering doctrine. According to the Second Circuit in

[J-22-2024] - 37 City of New York, “the critical inquiry with respect to the Tenth Amendment is whether the

PLCAA commandeers the states.” 524 F.3d at 396. That court found the PLCAA did not

violate the Tenth Amendment as the Act “does not commandeer any branch of state

government because it imposes no affirmative duty of any kind on any of them.” Id. at

397 (quoting Connecticut v. Physicians Health Servs. of Conn., Inc., 287 F.3d 110, 122

(2d Cir. 2020)). Other courts that have addressed Tenth Amendment challenges to the

PLCAA have concurred with the Second Circuit’s holding. See Adames, 909 N.E.2d at

765 (agreeing with City of New York); Estate of Kim, 295 P.3d at 389 (“The PLCAA does

not compel Alaska’s legislature to enact any law, nor does it commandeer any branch of

Alaska’s government.” (emphasis in original)); Delana, 486 S.W.3d at 323-24 (“The

PLCAA does not commandeer the executive or legislative branch of Missouri government

…. The PLCAA does not violate the Tenth Amendment.”). We agree with these courts

that the PLCAA does not command state executive officers to implement federal

regulations nor does it direct state legislatures to pass any legislation. The Act merely

directs that qualified civil liability actions may not be brought in federal or state court.

Plaintiffs assert the PLCAA’s requirement that state courts dismiss cases that are

fully supported by state law impermissibly infringes on state sovereignty by commanding

state courts to construe state tort law according to Congress’s direction. According to

Plaintiffs, this command conflicts with Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), because

“[t]here is no federal common law. Indeed, Congress has no power to declare substantive

rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’

be they commercial law or part of the law of torts.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 55 (quoting Erie

R.R., 304 U.S. at 78). Yet, according to Plaintiffs, that is exactly what the PLCAA does

as it “is as if federal officers were installed in” the filing offices of every state courthouse

[J-22-2024] - 38 “and were armed with the authority to stop” any gun litigation Congress disfavored.” Id.

(quoting Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Erie R.R. is misplaced. Prior to the passage quoted by

Plaintiffs, the Supreme Court stated, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal

Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the

state.” Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added). The PLCAA is such an “act of

Congress” that is enforced over applicable state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.15

To the extent the PLCAA requires state judges to dismiss civil actions that could otherwise

proceed under state law, that requirement does not violate the anticommandeering

doctrine, but is rather a product of the Supremacy Clause. See New York, 505 U.S. at

178-79 (“Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state judges

to enforce them, but this sort of federal ‘direction’ of state judges is mandated by the text

of the Supremacy Clause.”); see also Delaware County, Pa. v. Federal Housing Finance

Agency, 747 F.3d 215, 228 (3rd. Cir. 2014) (“A state official’s compliance with federal law

and non-enforcement of a preempted state law – as required by the Supremacy Clause

– is not an unconstitutional commandeering.”).

As to the anticommandeering doctrine, Plaintiffs rely on Murphy, asserting the

Supreme Court has made clear that the Tenth Amendment’s anticommandeering

requirement is not limited to commandeering of state officials. Murphy, according to

Plaintiffs, rejected the argument that Congress could “prohibit[] states from enacting new

law.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 53 (quoting Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474) (brackets provided by

Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs assert that is exactly what the PLCAA does by prohibiting states from

15 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance

thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST Art. VI, cl. 2.

[J-22-2024] - 39 enacting and enforcing new laws recognized through common law rather than through

legislation. Plaintiffs’ argument in this regard relies on their interpretation of the predicate

exception, which they assert “allows states to enforce their tort law in otherwise prohibited

lawsuits if the harm was caused by a knowing violation of a statute enacted by the

legislature.” Id. at 50 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7903(4)(A)(iii)). According to Plaintiffs, if the

case sub judice claimed that Defendants violated a legislatively passed statute that

required the Firearm to be sold with certain safety features or warnings, the PLCAA would

permit Pennsylvania courts to impose liability under the predicate exception. Therefore,

Plaintiffs contend the PLCAA does not preempt any theory of liability but rather “prevents

states from using their judicial branch to establish civil liability standards in certain cases.”

Id. at 51 (emphasis removed). The United States counters that nothing in the PLCAA

prohibits state courts from altering or creating common law or from interpreting state

statutes, as it does not “foreclose[] the possibility” that state court interpretations of state

legislation may bear on whether a state law falls within the PLCAA’s exception. United

States’ Brief at 20 (quoting City of New York, 524 F.3d at 396).

Plaintiffs’ reliance on Murphy fails for a simple reason: the PLCAA does not bar

states from enacting any law and instead merely preempts state law in relation to qualified

civil liability actions. The predicate exception does nothing to alter this conclusion.

Rather, the exception merely excuses from the general definition of a qualified civil liability

action “an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product knowingly

violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and

the violation was a proximate cause of the harm which relief is sought[.]” 15 U.S.C.

§ 7903(5)(A)(iii). Unlike the statute at issue in Murphy, the predicate exception does not

“dictate[] what a state legislature may and may not do.” Murphy, 584 U.S. at 474. The

PLCAA does not contain any language comparable to the statute at issue in Murphy that

[J-22-2024] - 40 declared it to be unlawful for states to authorize sports gambling. Under the PLCAA state

legislatures remain free to pass any statute they deem appropriate, while the predicate

exception does not limit states’ ability to recognize new causes of action through common

law. Nor does the predicate exception prohibit states from interpreting state statutes

through their courts. See City of New York, 524 F.3d at 396 (reflecting court would not

“construe the PLCAA as foreclosing the possibility that predicate statutes can exist by

virtue of interpretations by state courts.”). Thus, the predicate exception simply carves

out civil actions alleging certain knowing violations of state or federal statutes from the

Act’s general definition of a qualified civil liability action. States remain free, either through

their legislatures or their courts, to recognize any cause of action they deem appropriate.

All the PLCAA, including the predicate exception, does is preempt certain causes of

actions involving the firearms industry.

Plaintiffs further assert the PLCAA, through the predicate exception, violates the

Tenth Amendment and federalism principles by impermissibly intruding on states’

lawmaking authority and infringing on their sovereign right to allocate their lawmaking

powers as they see fit. Plaintiffs contend the authority of states to make law through their

courts is a core aspect of their sovereignty and Congress does not have authority to

determine what branch of state government is used to make state law. Plaintiffs Brief at

49 (citing Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78). According to Plaintiffs, through the predicate

exception, Congress essentially determined that states are required to enact laws

regulating the firearms industry though their legislatures rather than their courts. In this

sense, Plaintiffs analogize the PLCAA to the New York Court of Appeals decision in In re

Vargas, 131 A.D.3d 4 (N.Y. App. Div, 2nd Dep’t 2015), where the court, in addressing a

federal statute regarding the granting of professional licenses to undocumented

immigrants, stated “[t]he ability, indeed the right of the states to structure their

[J-22-2024] - 41 governmental decision-making process as they see fit is essential to sovereignty

protected by the Tenth Amendment.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 53 (quoting Vargas, 131 A.D.3d

at 24.). In addition to the arguments made in their brief on this issue, Plaintiffs also adopt

the arguments made by their amicus Federalism Scholars, a group of constitutional law

professors. See Federalism Scholars Brief at 1. According to amici, the PLCAA

impermissibly intrudes on states’ ability to allocate their law-making authority between

their legislatures and courts, through the predicate exception and concludes “[a]

congressional enactment, like [the] PLCAA that denies state court authority to declare

state law and requires instead exclusive reliance on legislatures for the definitive

pronouncement of that state’s law invades the core of state sovereignty.” Id. at 24 (citing

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 751 (1999)).

In response the United States asserts the Supreme Court has never recognized

this novel theory that a federal statute violates the Tenth Amendment by infringing on a

state’s decision of which branch of government it chooses to make law. See United

States’ Brief at 19. On the other hand, the government argues, the Supreme Court has

explicitly rejected arguments that “general principles of federalism place some areas of

state authority beyond the reach of a validly enacted Act of Congress.” Id. at 21 (citing

Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550

(1985)). In their reply brief, Plaintiffs assert the United States is incorrect in asserting that

the Supreme Court has never recognized that state’s decision on which branch of

government it chooses to make law violates the Tenth Amendment as the Court has

recognized that “the States are free to allocate the lawmaking function to whatever branch

of state government they may choose.” Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 6 (quoting Minnesota v.

Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461n.6 (1981)).

[J-22-2024] - 42 Initially, we find Plaintiffs’ reliance on Erie R.R. unpersuasive. Erie R.R. simply

stands for the proposition that “[t]here is no federal general common law.” 304 U.S. at

78. Under Erie R.R., states are free to make their own common law “provid[ed] there is

no overriding federal rule which pre-empts state law by reason of federal curbs on trading

in the stream of commerce.” Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389 (1974). As the

PLCAA has explicitly preempted state tort law in regard to qualified civil liability actions,

we find Erie R.R. does not impact our Tenth Amendment analysis.

Next, as a New York state intermediate appellate court decision, Vargas is clearly

not binding on this Court and, to the extent it would have any persuasive value, we do not

find the case instructive. Vargas involved a federal statute “which generally prohibits the

issuance of state professional licenses to undocumented immigrants unless an individual

state has enacted legislation affirmatively authorizing the issuance of such license.”

Vargas, 131 A.D.3d at 6. In addressing an undocumented immigrant’s application for

admission to the New York State bar, the intermediate appellate court found the statute

violated the Tenth Amendment to the extent it required the state legislature to act in order

to grant an individual admission to the bar, rather than the court. The court’s focus was

not on the statute in general but rather “solely” on the impact it had on the judicial branch’s

decision to grant licenses to practice law, and the court emphasized “that the Tenth

Amendment concerns implicated here by the issuance of law licenses do not exist in

regard to the issuance of other types of professional licenses by other arms of the state’s

government.” Id. at 27. Clearly, by its own terms, Vargas does not impact Tenth

Amendment analysis to circumstances outside the limited arena of the judiciary’s granting

of bar admissions, which the PLCAA clearly does not implicate.

Even if the analysis in Vargas was applicable, the statute at issue there is easily

distinguishable from the PLCAA. As the district court aptly explained in Travieso

[J-22-2024] - 43 unlike the statute at issue in Vargas, the PLCAA does not simply allow states to “opt out” and allow tort claims as long as the legislature creates them. While the statute’s restrictions in Vargas became inoperative as soon [as] the legislature acted, the PLCAA preempts tort actions regardless of what branch creates them. It does not matter if they are developed by the court or codified by the legislature. Travieso, 526 F. Supp.3d at 551 (internal citations omitted).

As the Travieso Court implies, nothing in the PLCAA, and specifically the predicate

exception, dictates to states what branch of government can pass laws. States remain

free to enact new laws either through their legislatures or develop legal doctrines at

common law through their courts. All the PLCAA does is preempt certain civil actions

regardless of what branch of state government has created them. The predicate

exception does not alter this structure but merely exempts claims raising certain specific

statutory violations from the general definition of a qualified civil liability action. This

exception has no impact on how states choose to allocate their lawmaking authority.

Assuming Plaintiffs and the Federalism Scholars are correct that the federal

government does not have authority to dictate to states which branch of their government

shall enact certain laws, we agree with the United States that that principle is not

applicable to the PLCAA. See United States Brief at 19. The reason, as explained above,

is straightforward: nothing in the PLCAA dictates to the states which branch of

government they can use to enact any laws.16 The Act merely bars certain civil actions

from being brought. The predicate exception does not alter this conclusion as the

exception merely excludes certain statutory based claims from that general bar. States

16 Twenty states have either filed or joined amicus briefs in this matter. None of those states have argued the PLCAA unconstitutionally infringes on their sovereignty by dictating which branch of their respective governments they choose to enact laws. See Brief of State of Montana (joined by eighteen other states) and Brief of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (takes no position of the Act’s constitutionality).

[J-22-2024] - 44 remain free to enact any law they wish through any branch of government they wish

without any restriction from the PLCAA.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ action is a qualified civil liability action pursuant to the PLCAA and does

not qualify under the Act’s product liability exception. As such, the PLCAA operates to

bar Plaintiffs’ action. Further, the PLCAA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce

Clause authority and does not violate the Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism.

We therefore vacate the Superior Court’s per curiam order reversing the trial court and

remand for reinstatement of the trial court’s order sustaining Defendants’ preliminary

objections in the nature of demurrer.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the opinion.

Justice McCaffery did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

[J-22-2024] - 45