Gusdorff v. Schleisner

1 Balt. C. Rep. 743
CourtBaltimore City Circuit Court
DecidedMarch 28, 1898
StatusPublished

This text of 1 Balt. C. Rep. 743 (Gusdorff v. Schleisner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Baltimore City Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gusdorff v. Schleisner, 1 Balt. C. Rep. 743 (Md. Super. Ct. 1898).

Opinion

SHARP, J.

The bill in this case was filed August 19, 1896, by Gusdori'f against his partner, Schleisner, to compel Schleisner to pay up his agreed contribution to the capital stock of the partnership; to obtain a dissolution of the partnership, the appointment of receivers, an injunction to restrain Schleisner from, drawing certain funds he had on deposit in various banks and financial institutions, and for general relief.

An injunction was granted and a receiver appointed ex parte.

Schleisner filed an answer August 25, 1896, which answers all the allegations of the bill. In paragraph 11 the defendant denies the jurisdiction of the Court to decree the specific performance of the contract of partnership and to restrain him from drawing the money on deposit, and prays that this defense may be considered the same as if interposed by demurrer. On the same day a motion to dissolve the injunction was filed. This motion was set down for hearing on the demurrer contained in the answer. After argument an order was passed sustaining the demurrer and dissolving the injunction. An appeal was taken under Code, Article 5, Section 25, &c., and the order was affirmed. The order of the Court of Appeals did not remand the case.

The defendant now objects to all proceeding in this Court because there has been no remand.

The motion to dissolve was set down in the demurrer. The order passed in this Court was that the demurrer be sustained and the injunction dissolved. The bill was not dismissed. When this order was affirmed, this branch of the case was finished. Only questions raised by the demurrer were in issue; the balance of the case was not before the Court. The order of the Court of Appeals disposed finally of the demurrer and of this branch of the case; there was nothing to remand. The other issues were unaffected, and the balance of the case must proceed in the usual way.

After the decision in the Court of Appeals, the complainant asked leave to amend the bill by inserting a para.graph, alleging that a mistake hud been made in drawing the articles of partnership, it being contended that the parties had agreed that Gusdorlf was not to give his entire time to the business for the first six months, and that a stipulation to this effect was omitted in the written contract. After hearing argument of counsel, an order was passed on the 21st day of October, 1897, giving complainant leave to amend the bill, which was accordingly done.

The questions now before the Court are, the alleged mistake, the dissolution and the appointment of receivers.

A number of exceptions were filed by the defendant to the evidence. The first three exceptions are based on the contention that there is no case now pending in this Court. This point has already been disposed of. These exceptions are overruled.

A number of other exceptions to the evidence were filed. The evidence excepted to relates:

(1) To proof of mistake, which is objected to because it seeks to alter a written contract by parol evidence. Parol evidence is always admissible to show fraud, surprise or mistake. The objection is overruled.

(2) The evidence relating to Schleisner’s health is excepted to. This is admissible in connection with the issue of dissolution.

(3) Gusdori'f’s account of his interview with Dr. Friedenwald must be excluded (page 31, &c.)

(4) The evidence of Gusdorff’s readiness to make his agreed contrilrations to the capital of the concern is admissible.

[744]*744I think it clearly appears that a mistake was made in drawing the articles of partnership.

The contract is obviously imperfect. The partners are to share equally in the profits and losses. Each partner, after January 1st, is entitled to draw annually $4,Q00, to be charged to expenses. Eor convenience, I will call this salary. Each partner was to give his entire time to the business. The only exception to this rule of perfect equality is the stipulation that for the first six months, Schleisner was to draw his salary, but Gusdorff was not to do so. This inequality for the first six months- is not explained in the contract.

Gusdorff’s explanation is reasonable. He says he was engaged in another business in which he had partners, and which he could not close up immediately. He would not be able for the first six months- to give much time or attention to the new business, while Schleisner was to give his entire time to it after July 1st. It was, therefore, just that Schleisner should receive his salary while Gusdorff should not.

Gusdorff is confirmed on the main points by Lowenstein and by Schleisner himself. Lowenstein says it was agreed .that Gusdorff was to close up his other business. He was not to give his entire time to the new firm until he had closed up his old business. He says, “the $2,000 for the first six months was conceded by Mr. Gusdorff to Mr. Schleisner on account of his giving up his position and employment, and as I understood at the time, and going into partnership with Mr. Gusdorff, he having nothing to do, and taking an active interest in the business right off from the beginning; for that he was to receive $2,000.”

Lowenstein was obviously friendly to Schleisner. This was shown not only by evasive answers at the critical points of the case, but by his manner on the stand.

Schleisner admits that he knew Gusdorff was in another business in which he had partners and which it would necessarily take him some time to close up. Schleisner says his duties were to begin July 1, and Gusdorff’s were not, and that it was for this- reason he was to be paid $2,000 extra from the first of July to the first of January.

It is perfectly certain that the contract did not correctly represent the agreement of the parties as to Gusdorff. Though the contract provided that both should give their entire time to the business from July 1st, it is clear the agreement was- that Gusdorff was not to do so. Schleisner knew he was in another business. It was not intended that Gusdorff should- immediately abandon his old business, sacrifice his former partners and his interests in that partnership. There is no room for any real controversy on these points. The only real difference between the parties- is as to the .time when Gusdorff should begin to give his entire time to the business. Schleisner says he was to do so as soon as there was- work for him to do; inferentially he was to make any sacrifices to do so. In view of the fact that it was agreed that Gusdorff was to close up his old business, Schleisner’s contention is unreasonable and improbable.

Lowenstein says Gusdorff was to close up his business as soon as he could, but no specific time was- mentioned, so far as he knew. Gusdorff’s evidence is positive that he was to have six months to close up his business-; that his employees were employed by the year and their time did not expire until January 1st. In the meantime, they must be directed and controlled. Gusdorff’s story of the agreement is confirmed by the contract. The fact that Schleisner was to draw salary for the first six months and Gusdorff was not to do so, in connection with the fact that they were to be equal in all other respects, confirms Gusdorff’s claim that for this period he was not to give his entire time to the business. Schleisner’s account of the transaction is unreasonable and improbable. He is contradicted on many points by several of the other witnesses.

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Bluebook (online)
1 Balt. C. Rep. 743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gusdorff-v-schleisner-mdcirctctbalt-1898.