Gus Postell v. United States

429 F.2d 528, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJuly 20, 1970
Docket19994
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 429 F.2d 528 (Gus Postell v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gus Postell v. United States, 429 F.2d 528, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093 (6th Cir. 1970).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He contends that his conviction for conspiring wilfully to evade and to defeat the collection of certain excise taxes and for the substantive offense of wilfully attempting to evade and to defeat the collection of the same taxes should be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697,19 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 709,19 L.Ed. 2d 906 (1968). Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal prior to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marchetti and Grosso. United States v. Andrews, 347 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956, 86 S.Ct. 431, 436, 15 L.Ed.2d 360 (1965).

In Marchetti, the Supreme Court held that the one who properly asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination could not be prosecuted for refusing to comply with certain requirements of the federal wagering tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In Grosso, the Court held that the failure to assert the privilege against self-incrimination at the time of trial did not constitute an effective waiver of the constitutional privilege since earlier Court decisions had established a rule contrary to the rule enunciated in Marchetti and Grosso. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 73 S.Ct. 510, 97 L.Ed. 754 (1953); Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419, 75 S.Ct. 415, 99 L.Ed. 475 (1955).

Neither of these decisions is apposite here. Petitioner did not refuse to comply with the federal wagering tax provisions. To the contrary, he obtained a wagering tax registration stamp, but then fraudulently reported the income obtained in an attempt to evade the excise taxes due under the Internal Revenue Code. “[0]ne who furnishes false information to the Government in feigned compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against prosecution for his fraud by challenging the validity of the requirement itself.” United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 79, 90 S.Ct. 363, 365, 24 L.Ed.2d 275 (1969). See United States v. Andrews, No. 18590 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1969). 1

Affirmed.

1

. It is significant that in Marchetti the Supreme Court emphasized that it was not declaring the wagering tax provisions as such “constitutionally impermissible.” 390 U.S. at 61, 88 S.Ct. 697.

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Bluebook (online)
429 F.2d 528, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 8093, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gus-postell-v-united-states-ca6-1970.