Gurminder Singh v. Google LLC

District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 15, 2021·No. 5:16-cv-03734·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 GURMINDER SINGH, Case No. 16-cv-03734-BLF

8 Plaintiff, ORDER REGARDING 9 v. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTIONS TO FILE UNDER SEAL 10 GOOGLE LLC, [Re: ECF Nos. 135, 137, 140, 149] 11 Defendant.

12 13 Before the Court are administrative motions to file under seal filed by both Plaintiff 14 Gurminder Singh (“Plaintiff”), ECF No. 135 (“PMTS”), and Defendant Google LLC (“Google”), 15 ECF No. 140 (“GMTS”). Each Party has filed a declaration in support of the other’s 16 administrative motion. ECF Nos. 137, 149. For the reasons stated below, each of the Parties’ 17 administrative motion to file under seal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 18 I. LEGAL STANDARD 19 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 20 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of 21 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 22 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Consequently, filings that are “more than tangentially related to the 23 merits of a case” may be sealed only upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for 24 Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2016). Filings that are only 25 tangentially related to the merits may be sealed upon a lesser showing of “good cause.” Id. at 26 1097. This standard applies to motions for class certification. See, e.g., Adtrader, Inc. v. Google 27 LLC, 2020 WL 6391210, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (citing cases). 1 “Under the compelling reasons standard, a district court must weigh relevant factors, base 2 its decision on a compelling reason, and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying 3 on hypothesis or conjecture.” Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 679 (9th Cir. 2010) 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In general, compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such court files might 5 . . . become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to gratify private spite, 6 promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Algarin v. 7 Maybelline, LLC, No. 12CV3000 AJB DHB, 2014 WL 690410, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2014) 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a 9 litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, 10 compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Courts have found that a 11 party has demonstrated compelling reasons warranting sealing where “confidential business 12 material, marketing strategies, product development plans could result in improper use by business 13 competitors seeking to replicate [the company’s] business practices and circumvent the time and 14 resources necessary in developing their own practices and strategies.” Algarin, 2014 WL 690410, 15 at *3. 16 Sealing motions filed in this district also must be “narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of 17 sealable material, and must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Civil L.R. 79-5(b).1 Under Civil 18 Local Rule 79-6(d), the submitting party must attach a “proposed order that is narrowly tailored to 19 seal only the sealable material” which “lists in table format each document or portion thereof that 20 is sought to be sealed.” In addition, a party moving to seal a document in whole or in part must 21 file a declaration establishing that the identified material is “sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A). 22 “Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents 23 as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.” Id. 24 Where the moving party requests sealing of documents because they have been designated 25 26 1 The discussion of Civil L.R. 79-5 refers to the version of that rule that was in effect at the time 27 the Parties filed these administrative motions. Civil L.R. 79-5 has since been amended. See Civil 1 confidential by another party or a non-party under a protective order, the burden of establishing 2 adequate reasons for sealing is placed on the designating party or non-party. Civ. L.R. 79-5(e). 3 The moving party must file a proof of service showing that the designating party or non-party has 4 been given notice of the motion to seal. Id. “Within 4 days of the filing of the Administrative 5 Motion to File Under Seal, the Designating Party must file a declaration . . . establishing that all of 6 the designated material is sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). “If the Designating Party does not file a 7 responsive declaration . . . and the Administrative Motion to File Under Seal is denied, the 8 Submitting Party may file the document in the public record no earlier than 4 days, and no later 9 than 10 days, after the motion is denied.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(2). 10 II. PLAINTIFF’S ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 11 Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to file under seal parts of its opening brief and 7 12 exhibits attached to the brief. See PMTS at 2-5. Google had designated the materials in the brief 13 and exhibits as “Highly Confidential—Attorneys’ Eyes Only” under the Parties’ protective order. 14 See id. In accordance with Civil L.R. 79-5, Google filed a declaration in support of sealing some 15 of those materials. ECF No. 137-1 (“GDecl.”). Google says that that its narrowed sealing request 16 is required to prevent public release of its proprietary methods for filtering invalid clicks on 17 Google platforms. Id. ¶¶ 4-8. Google says that some of the other material contains sensitive and 18 confidential revenue data that could jeopardize Google’s competitive standing. Id. ¶ 9. 19 The Court finds that Google has narrowed Plaintiff’s sealing request to only material for 20 which there are compelling reasons for sealing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s administrative motion to 21 file under seal is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The following documents and 22 portions of documents related to Plaintiff’s motion for class certification SHALL remain under 23 seal: ECF Document Portions Reason 24 134 Plaintiff’s Motion for 2:14-16, These portions of the Memorandum of 25 Class Certification 4:22-28, Points and Authorities contain highly 5:1-6, 5:16- sensitive and detailed technical 26 28, 6:1-4, information relating to the design, 6:9-12, evaluation, and maintenance of Google’s 27 6:21, 10:8, invalid click filters. These portions also 13:15-21 reference internal, sensitive revenue data. ECF Document Portions Reason 1 business information would allow 2 Google’s competitors unwarranted insight into Google’s systems and filtering of 3 invalid activity, thus enabling them to unfairly compete with Google. The 4 disclosure of this information would also compromise Google’s filters, allowing 5 those who benefit from invalid activity to evade Google’s invalid click detection 6 systems, causing irreparable competitive and reputational harm to Google. 7 134-4 Tang Decl. Ex. 3 2:13-24, These portions of the transcript of the 65:1-25, deposition of Google’s 30(b)(6) witness, 8 73:17-25, Per Bjorke, contain highly sensitive and 100:10, detailed technical information relating to 9 100:16-21, the design, evaluation, and maintenance 100:24- of Google’s invalid click filters, including 10 101:25, the confidential names of those systems. 134:4- Public disclosure of this highly sensitive 11 135:9.

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