GUNDERSON v. COMMISSIONER

2002 T.C. Memo. 26, 83 T.C.M. 1143, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 28
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 25, 2002
DocketNo. 16050-99L
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 T.C. Memo. 26 (GUNDERSON v. COMMISSIONER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GUNDERSON v. COMMISSIONER, 2002 T.C. Memo. 26, 83 T.C.M. 1143, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 28 (tax 2002).

Opinion

HARLEY GUNDERSON, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
GUNDERSON v. COMMISSIONER
No. 16050-99L
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 2002-26; 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 28; 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143; T.C.M. (RIA) 54630;
January 25, 2002, Filed

*28 Respondent's motion for summary judgment granted.

Harley Gunderson, pro se.
Marty J. Dama, for respondent.
Vasquez, Juan F.

VASQUEZ

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VASQUEZ, Judge: This case is before the Court on respondent's motion under Rule 120, 1 which, pursuant to Rule 120(b), the Court shall treat as respondent's motion for summary judgment under Rule 121.

The sole issue is whether respondent's determination to proceed with collection as to petitioner's 1993 taxable year was an abuse of discretion.

Background

At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Arlington, Texas.

On January 9, 1997, respondent sent petitioner a notice of deficiency in his income tax for 1993. In response to this notice, petitioner filed a timely petition with*29 this Court. On July 7, 1997, respondent made a master file assessment for the amount of the 1993 deficiency. 2 After realizing that a Tax Court petition had been timely filed, respondent abated the master file assessment on June 22, 1998.

On March 3, 1998, the Court entered a stipulated decision that petitioner's deficiency for 1993 was $ 5,954. Petitioner and respondent both signed this decision document. On May 21, 1998, respondent made a nonmaster file assessment of $ 5,954 to reflect the stipulated decision. 3

*30 On February 2, 1999, respondent sent petitioner a Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of your Right to a Hearing under sections 6331 and 6330. On March 4, 1999, petitioner filed a Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. After respondent conducted a hearing by telephone, respondent issued a notice of determination. In the notice, respondent stated:

   Your challenge to the appropriateness of the collection action

   was that you felt the I.R.S. notice issued June 22, 1998,

   which showed the abatement for the premature master file

   assessment showing nothing due on that account, relieved you

   also of the non-master file assessment made in accordance with

   the Tax Court's determination reflected in the decision document

   signed by you and Judge Mary Ann Cohen and entered March 3,

   1998. The notice reflects only internal accounting changes.

   I.R.S. does not have authority to change the Tax Court

   determination, and that was not the purpose of the notice.

On October 8, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for Lien/Levy Action under Code Section 6320(c) or 6330(d). In response to a Court order, petitioner filed an*31 Amended Petition for Lien or Levy Action under Code Section 6320(c) or 6330(d) on November 29, 1999. 4

Discussion

I. Summary Judgment

Respondent moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether respondent's determination to proceed with collection as to petitioner's 1993 taxable year was an abuse of discretion. Respondent argues that petitioner disputes only the underlying liability of $ 5,954 and that the validity of the liability is not properly before us.

Rule 121(a) provides that either party may move for summary judgment upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy. Full or partial summary judgment may be granted only if it is demonstrated that no genuine*32 issue exists as to any material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

We conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts regarding whether respondent's determination was an abuse of discretion.

II. The Levy Action

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Bluebook (online)
2002 T.C. Memo. 26, 83 T.C.M. 1143, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 28, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gunderson-v-commissioner-tax-2002.