Gunabalan, A. v. Kumar, A.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

AARTHI GUNABALAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

ANISH KUMAR : No. 1135 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No: FD-23-008433

AARTHI GUNABALAN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

ANISH KUMAR : No. 1136 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered September 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at No: FD-23-008433

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED: August 27, 2026 In the appeal docketed at 1135 WDA 2025, Appellant, Aarthi Gunabalan, appearing pro se, challenges the Consent Order (dated August 13, 2025), which resolved all claims in a divorce action between her and her ex-husband, Appellee, Anish Kumar. In the related appeal docketed at 1136 WDA 2025,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

Appellant appears again pro se, to challenge the subsequent Divorce Decree (dated September 3, 2025), which incorporated the Consent Order. Appellant’s two main arguments with respect to both cases are (1) that the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court (trial court) improperly finalized the divorce proceedings without applying the correct governing law for the equitable distribution of marital property; and (2) the divorce proceedings were improperly finalized because several of Appellant’s discovery requests remain outstanding. Finding that these claims are waived or otherwise non-reviewable, we affirm.

In 2008, Appellant and Appellee were married in India. According to Appellant, her mother later gifted her real property located in India which, under the law of that country, would not be considered marital property. On July 20, 2023, Appellant commenced divorced proceedings in Allegheny County, where both parties resided. Appellant alleged that the marriage was irretrievably broken, and she petitioned for alimony and the equitable distribution of and assignment of martial property. On January 12, 2024, Appellant then petitioned for a protective order against Appellee, and a temporary order was granted. Appellant asked for the petition to be dismissed, and an order to that effect was entered on January 30, 2024.

On August 13, 2025, the parties appeared, with the aid of counsel, at a hearing to dispose of their respective economic claims in their divorce action. Appellant had contended that the real property in India gifted to her by her mother could not be considered martial property subject to equitable

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distribution. The trial court did not definitively rule on that issue, but at the hearing on August 13, 2025, the parties voluntarily agreed to a Consent Order, which constituted “a full and final settlement of all economic claims incident to divorce[.]” Consent Order, 8/13/2025, at para. 1.

The Consent Order provided in relevant part that the parties would equitably distribute their disputed properties, including real property, personal property, and bank account funds. See id., at paras. 2-22. It was further stated that the Consent Order would “resolve all claims which have been raised or could have been raised,” and that “[a]ny claim that has not been raised is hereby waived.” Id., at para. 20 (emphasis added).

As to the disputed ownership of real property in India, Appellee specifically disclaimed any interest, recognizing Appellant’s full ownership:

[Appellant] shall retain any and all real property owned by her, either individually or jointly with another, that is located in India.

[Appellant] shall also retain and all income related to this property and be solely responsible for any and all litigation regarding this property. [Appellee] waives any and all claims to the increase in value of these properties. This provision is intended to waive any and all interest [Appellee] has under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and India and shall be binding on his heirs and assigns. To the extent [Appellee] is required to execute any documents to effectuate this waiver, he shall do so within ten (10) days of presentation of same to him.

Consent Order, 8/13/2025, at para. 6.

Nothing in the record suggests that the parties contemplated that either of them would seek to appeal issues or claims governed by the Consent Order. Nevertheless, after the Consent Order and the Divorce Decree were entered,

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Appellant did just that. She raised numerous issues in her 1925(b) statement concerning not only the divorce action, but also the parties’ ongoing custody action and Appellant’s inability to obtain a protective order against Appellee, see Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6713 (PFA Act)).

In its 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court reasoned that Appellant’s custody claims were not yet ripe for appeal because the custody action remained pending as of the date on which the present appeals were filed. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 12/18/2025, at 3. Further, the trial court found Appellant’s PFA claims to be unpreserved for appellate review at this juncture because Appellant’s temporary PFA order had been voluntarily dismissed. See id., at 4.

With respect to Appellant’s remaining claims, which are of greater import here, the trial court determined that the Consent Order was controlling, as it constituted a full and final settlement of all matters pertaining to the divorce action. See id., at 4-5. Appellant only moved to set aside the Consent Order after the present appeals were filed, at which point the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of that motion. See id., at 5-6. No grounds for staying execution of the Consent Order, such as fraud or mistake, were presented. See id.

In her brief, Appellant now raises the following claims for our consideration:

1. Did the trial court err by exercising equitable distribution authority before determining the governing law applicable to foreign immovable property under conflict-of-laws principles and

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before adjudicating whether any legally cognizable marital interest existed in that property?

2. Did the trial court err by permitting equitable distribution proceedings to advance while material financial disclosure remained incomplete, preventing identification and classification of the marital estate and the establishment of the economic baseline required for equitable distribution?

3. Did the trial court err by treating the Consent Order as curing a framework in which governing law, marital entitlement, and complete financial disclosure — the predicates defining the scope of equitable distribution authority — had not been established before the Consent Order was entered?

Appellant’s Brief, at 2.

We resolve all three claims together for ease of disposition. Essentially, Appellant contends that the Consent Order, and resulting Divorce Decree, cannot be given effect because the trial court had not first resolved the parties’ choice of law dispute as to foreign property in India, and Appellee had not yet responded to some of Appellant’s discovery requests. These claims both ultimately fail for the same reason – Appellant voluntarily waived the right to raise them by agreeing to the terms of the Consent Order.

A consent order is “not a legal determination by the court of the matters in controversy[.]” Lower Frederick Twp. v. Clemmer, 543 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1988) (quoting Universal Builders Supply, Inc. v. Shaler Highlands Corp., 175 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa. 1961)). It is, rather, “merely an agreement between the parties – a contracting binding the parties to the terms thereof.” Id. (quoting Shaler Highlands Corp., 175 A.2d at 61). “[A] decree entered by consent of the parties is so conclusive that it will be reviewed only on a

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showing that an objecting party’s consent was obtained by fraud or that it was based upon a mutual mistake.” Sarsfield v. Sarsfield, 380 A.2d 899, 900- 901 (Pa. Super. 1977) (quoting Baran v. Baran, 72 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. Super. 1950)); see also Lee v. Carney, 645 A.2d 1363, 1365 (Pa. Super. 1994) (same). “[A] party who consents to, or acquiesces in, an order is not aggrieved and cannot bring an appeal.” Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Ry., 916 A.2d 1091, 1097 (Pa. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the parties agreed (with the aid of counsel) to abide by the Consent Order, which provides that the parties had resolved “all claims which have been raised or could have been raised,” and that “[a]ny claim that has not been raised is hereby waived.” Consent Order, 8/13/2025, at para. 20. Appellant now seeks review of issues that she has voluntarily waived pursuant to that agreement. Since Appellant agreed to be bound by the terms of the Consent Order, and she does not challenge its validity in the present appeals,1 the issues now being raised are procedurally barred. See Lee, 645 A.2d at 1365 (“[A]ppellant was counselled at the time of the entry of the consent Order and voice no objection to any of its provisions, and the record is devoid of any indicia of fraud or mistake.”).

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1 As noted by the trial court, Appellant did not seek to set aside the Consent

Order until after the present appeals had already been commenced. See Trial Court 1925(a) Opinion, 12/8/2025, at 5-6. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the Consent Order, preventing that issue from falling within the ambit of the present appeals. See Clemmer, 543 A.2d at 510 (court lacks authority to modify or vary binding contractual terms).

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Appellant attempts to skirt the controlling effect of the Consent Order by framing the issue as whether the trial court had authority to direct the equitable distribution of the parties’ property in India “before the legal evidentiary framework defining the marital estate has been established.” Appellant’s Brief, at 9. This argument fails for reasons discussed above – the issue was waived as part of the parties’ agreement to the terms of the Consent Order, which is not being challenged here. It is irrelevant that Appellant was dissatisfied with the discovery responses she had obtained at the time the Consent Order was entered. Appellant nevertheless agreed to be bound by the Consent Order, and she has provided no legal basis upon which incomplete discovery would now entitle her to any relief.

In addition, the trial court clearly had authority to allow the parties to settle their respective claims in the manner they chose. Appellant herself commenced the divorce action in Allegheny County. There is no dispute that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Appellant and Appellee, both of whom resided in that county at the relevant times. As such, the trial court had authority to direct the parties on how to dispose of properties located outside of Pennsylvania. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a)(1) (provision in Divorce Code authorizing trial court to make a “determination and disposition of property rights and interest between spouses”); see also Russo v. Russo, 714 A.2d 466, 467 (Pa. Super. 1998) (permitting trial court to direct party

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residing in Pennsylvania to sell property located outside of Pennsylvania). The Consent Order and Divorce Decree must therefore be upheld.2 Order affirmed; decree affirmed.

8/27/2026

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2 The claims raised by Appellant are also arguably barred, as the record does not show how she could have possibly been aggrieved by the trial court’s orders. Appellant’s claims chiefly concern the trial court’s determination over the parties’ respective rights in real property located in India. Yet, in the Consent Order, Appellee disclaimed any interest to that property, acknowledging Appellant’s sole ownership. See Consent Order, 8/13/2025, at para. 6. It does not appear that the value of the property in India was factored into the overall distribution of the marital estate, and Appellant has presented no evidence or argument to that effect. Since Appellant’s ownership of this property is uncontested, she cannot be prejudiced or otherwise aggrieved by the Consent Order. See Pa.R.A.P. 501 (party must be aggrieved to appeal a court’s order).