Gump Co. v. United States

3 Ct. Cust. 137, 1912 WL 19275, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 75
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 1, 1912
DocketNo. 758
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 3 Ct. Cust. 137 (Gump Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gump Co. v. United States, 3 Ct. Cust. 137, 1912 WL 19275, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 75 (ccpa 1912).

Opinion

Barbee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Prior to the enactment of the tariff act of August 5., 1909, the importers entered under bond for warehousing the merchandise involved in this case which was then dutiable, but which under the provisions of paragraph 717 of the tariff act of 1909, herein below quoted, might be entitled to free entry under the conditions prescribed in said paragraph, the relevant part of which is as follows:

717. * * * Other works of art * * * which have been produced more than one hundred years prior to the date of importation, but the free importation of such objects shall be subject to such regulations as to proof of antiquity as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.

The tariff act took effect August 6, 1909.

Under the authority oiparagraph 717 the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated on the 20th day of August, 1909, general regulations relating thereto, which are as follows (see T. D. 29958):

Importers making entry of articles under said provision of law will be required to produce upon entry, in addition to the consular invoice required by law, the following evidence to show that such articles were produced more than 100 years prior to the date of their importation:
1. An affidavit of the ultimate consignee stating that he has investigated the origin and history thereof, and believes the same to have been produced more than 100 years prior to the date of their importation, which shall be substantially in the following form:
* * . * * * *• *•
2. A declaration of the foreign seller or shipper certified by the United States consul at the place of shipment, stating the name of the producer of such articles and the date and place of their production, and also stating the name and residence of the person from whom and the date when such seller or shipper acquired the same; provided, [138]*138however, that if such seller or shipper is not in possession of all such facts, he may state in lieu thereof such other facts as may be in his possession tending to show that such articles were produced more than 100 years prior thereto, which declaration shall be substantially in the following form:
*******
A careful examination of such articles should be made by the appraising officer to ascertain whether the same are works of art or articles of the character provided for in said provision of law, and also whether the same were, in fact, produced more than 100 years prior to their importation, and- his findings in such regard should be clearly stated in his return upon the invoice, which return and the collector’s report thereon, together with all papers and affidavits pertaining to the entry, will be forwarded by the collector to the department for final determination.

The merchandise all remained in the bonded warehouse until after September 1, 1909, and was in fact withdrawn for consumption in three different lots — one on September 15, another November 11, 1909, and the other on the 6th day of January, 1910. The entry was liquidated September 3 and the protest filed September 14, 1909.

It appears by the letter of the appraiser to the collector of customs, embodied in the record and which was in answer to the protest, that the appraiser made no examination as to the antiquity of the articles because no claim of antiquity was made at the time of entry, and the appraiser did not know that such claim would be made. The truthfulness of the statements in this letter is not challenged.

At the time the merchandise was so withdrawn for consumption from the bonded warehouse the importers had not complied with the aforesaid regulations of the Treasury Department, and it was assessed for duty by the collector, against which assessment the importers protested, claiming free entry under paragraph 717 upon the ground that the merchandise was works of art produced more than 100 years prior to the date of importation.

Sometime (but the precise date can only be inferred) the importers produced and filed affidavits of the foreign shipper and of the ultimate consignee, both of which were duly subscribed and sworn to, as required by said regulations, and which, if seasonably filed, it is assumed for the purposes of this case, were a sufficient compliance in that respect with the regulations aforesaid. They were dated, respectively, October 12 and November 12, 1909.

As already stated, it appears that neither of these affidavits was before or considered by the collector at the time duty was assessed upon the merchandise.

The Board of General Appraisers, upon the hearing of the protest, found, and, as we think, upon sufficient and competent evidence, that the importations were works of art; and there was evidence that would warrant the finding, although the board did not make [139]*139tbe same, that they were produced more than 100 years prior to importation.

The board overruled the protest upon the ground that the before-mentioned regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury had not been complied with because the affidavits were not filed at the time the merchandise was withdrawn from warehouse.

The importers here contend that, inasmuch as no regulations were in force relating to this merchandise at the time the goods were entered in bond for warehousing, no obligation devolved upon them to furnish to the customs officers the affidavits required by the regulations before withdrawing the goods from warehouse, and in that connection claim that withdrawal from warehouse is not an entry within, the contemplation of such regulations.

The Board of General Appraisers held that the word “entry” in the regulations meant, as applicable to this case, that the affidavits referred to must be filed at the time the goods were withdrawn from the bonded warehouse, which act the board characterized as a “withdrawal entry.” The importers criticize the use of this term and claim that an entry by such name is not recognized in the customs law, and that the entry referred to in the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury is that made when the merchandise is imported.

We do not understand the importers to contend that the provisions in the regulations relating to the affidavits that must be filed with the entry are unreasonable, nor do they appear to us so to be. The law is well settled that the reasonable regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, when he is authorized by statute to establish the same, are entitled to and have the force of law. Lunham v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 220; T. D. 31258); McBride v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 293; T. D. 31354).

In the case last cited this court had occasion to consider regulations relating to the importation of works of art imported expressly for presentation to a national institution, etc.

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Bluebook (online)
3 Ct. Cust. 137, 1912 WL 19275, 1912 CCPA LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gump-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1912.