Gulley v. United States

117 F. Supp. 336, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4261
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedDecember 16, 1953
DocketNo. 867
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 117 F. Supp. 336 (Gulley v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gulley v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 336, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4261 (D. Nev. 1953).

Opinion

FOLEY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Betty Gulley, the mother of Wallace Phillip Gulley, brought this action against the United States of America and Mary Jane Gulley to determine whether she or Mary Jane Gulley, now Mary Jane Wauson, is entitled as beneficiary to the proceeds of a National Service Life Insurance policy issued July 1, 1943, on the application of Wallace Phillip Gulley.

In Bradley v. United States, 10 Cir., 143 F.2d 573, a National Service Life Insurance policy was issued to Eugene Morris Bradley while serving as a flying officer in the United States Army, in which his mother was designated as beneficiary. .Subsequently he married and his wife testified at the trial that the insured had discussed with her the matter of changing the beneficiary in his policy from his mother to her and had expressed an intention to do so. She also testified that he later informed her that “he had taken care of the insurance at the army base.” Affidavits of a number of his comrades stated he had on numerous occasions discussed with them the proposition of changing the beneficiary of his insurance from his mother to his wife and that he had sought and obtained advice from them concerning the method for effecting the change and expressed an intention so to do. After the death of the insured, the Veterans’ Administration requested and received the “confidential personal report” executed by the insured and filed with the Headquarters of the 57th Pursuit Group, Windsor Locks, Connecticut. The Veterans’ Administration informed the mother of its receipt of the report, and that according to it, her son had stated that his wife was the beneficiary under the government insurance. The Court in its opinion stated, 143 F.2d at page 577:

“(6) In every case involving war risk insurance wherein the courts have recognized and decreed a change of beneficiary, the facts have amply shown not only an expressed intention, but positive and unequivocal acts on the part of the insured, designed to effectuate his expressed intentions. [Citing cases.] And in the absence of some act or deed hav[337]*337ing for its purpose the execution of the insured’s intention, the courts have refused to decree a change of beneficiary. [Citing cases.]
“(7) To meet this postulate, it is argued that the ‘confidential personal report’ executed by the insured, addressed to and filed with his group headquarters, constituted not only an expression of his intention, but an attempt to change the beneficiary from his mother to his wife, which the court should recognize as the fulfillment of his intentions and the requirements of the regulations. * * *
“(8) * * * When given its most liberal construction in the light of all the facts and circumstances, we are convinced that it [confidential personal report] cannot be treated as an effectuation of the insured’s intention to change his beneficiary.”

Circuit Judge Murrah delivered the opinion of the Court, Circuit Judge Brat-ton concurred, and Circuit Judge Phillips dissented. There is a difference of opinion on the questions here presented among the circuits — some follow the prevailing opinion and others the dissenting opinion. Judge Phillips, considering the confidential report said:

“In the report, referred to in the majority opinion, the insured stated that he had the policy of insurance and that the beneficiary thereunder was Ann M. Bradley, his wife, and that the policy was in her possession. That he believed that by making such statement in the report and delivering the policy to his wife he had effected the change of beneficiary is manifest by the fact that immediately thereafter he told his wife he had ‘taken care of the insurance at the Army Base.’ ”

In the present case, the confidential report does not show who had custody of the policy.

In Shapiro v. United States, 2 Cir., 166 F.2d 240, 241:

“* * * insured reported to Lt. Dunn, a battalion adjutant at Fort McClellan, Alabama, and said he had recently been married and wished to change the beneficiary of his insurance policy from his mother to his wife. A day or two later, he stated to Dunn that he wished to fill out the form so changing his beneficiary. Lt. Dunn told a clerk to give Shapiro the form for changing his life insurance beneficiary. The clerk gave him a W. D., A. G. 0. Form No. 41 which, though entitled ‘Designation of Beneficiary’, was not designed to be used to change the beneficiary of an insurance policy but was a form intended for designating the beneficiary of the six months’ gratuity, payable in case of death, and the person to be notified in case of emergency. * * * Shapiro filled out and signed this form, naming his wife as primary beneficiary, and his mother as alternate beneficiary, in the event the wife died before payment was made. Lt. Dunn then witnessed this form, which was forwarded by the message center to the War Department in Washington. * * *
“(4) We have in the case at bar both an act of the insured in signing the form, and oral evidence of his intent to effect thereby a change of beneficiary of his insurance policy. Under the authorities, a change of beneficiary was thus legally effected. [Citing cases.]”

In referring to Bradley v. United States, 10 Cir., 143 F.2d 573, and Judge Phillips’ dissenting opinion therein, and Collins v. United States, 10 Cir., 161 F.2d 64, the Court, near the close of its opinion, stated:

“We cannot say that either decision differed as a matter of law from the other authorities we have cited, or from the conclusion we have reached in the case at bar. If the [338]*338Bradley: dedsion be thought to differ, the conclusion reached in the dissenting opinion of Judge Phillips accords with our own views.”

In Kendig v. Kendig, 9 Cir., 170 F.2d 750, 751, Circuit Judge Healy, speaking for the Court of a confidential statement such as we have here, said:

“(2) Kendig’s confidential statement filed with his Aviation squadron is the most important item of proof here. The mother claims it is purely hearsay, or, if competent for any purpose, that it can be considered only as evidence of an unexecuted intent. We disagree. The statement is not hearsay nor is its probative value limited to its bearing on the insured’s intent, if indeed it bears more than retrospectively on that subject. It has dignity at least as evidence of a past act — much greater dignity, we think, than has an oral declaration made in the course of a conversation, however serious. Oral declarations of this type are likely to be misunderstood or misreported, or they may have been intended merely to reassure. This statement, on the contrary, imports verity. Its solemnity becomes evident when we remember that it was prepared and signed by one who realized that his life was hourly in jeopardy and who was aware of the inexorable circumstances under which, only, the document would be opened and read.”

The Court, having heard the evidence adduced at the trial, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Findings of Fact

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Related

Parker v. United States
125 F. Supp. 731 (D. Colorado, 1954)

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Bluebook (online)
117 F. Supp. 336, 1953 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gulley-v-united-states-nvd-1953.