Gullett v. State
Opinion
This appeal involves the right of the state to amend an affidavit after the jury had been impaneled and sworn to try the cause and after the court had instructed the jury in writing pursuant to Rule 1-7A. Other amendments had been made prior to the time of trial, but these are not questioned by appellant’s assignment of errors.
*8 The amended affidavit, set out in the note below, 1 at the time of the beginning of the trial, charged appellant with violation of §10-3011, Burns’ 1942 Replacement. 2
The record does not disclose that the appellant had been arraigned upon the amended affidavit at the time the jury was impaneled to try the cause, and over the objection of appellant the court permitted each count to be amended by changing the name of the owner of the car from “Robert Grindle” to “Mary Louise Grindle.”
*9 The swearing of the jury to try the cause is the beginning of the trial and the time at which jeopardy attaches. Maddox v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 92, 100, 102 N. E. 2d 225; Hunnel v. State (1882), 86 Ind. 431, 434; Joy v. State (1860), 14 Ind. 139; Ewbank, Indiana Criminal Law (2d Ed.) §225, p. 135. Under §9-1201, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, “ ‘Where an accused proceeds to trial without objection, the effect of the statute is to put in the record a plea of not guilty for him.’ Ingram v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 25, 30, 99 N. E. 2d 410, 411. See also Rogers v. State (1937), 211 Ind. 47, 5 N. E. 2d 509; Flowers v. State (1943), 221 Ind. 448, 48 N. E. 2d 56.” Harvey v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 574, 114 N. E. 2d 457.
In State ex rel Kaufman v. Gould (1951), 229 Ind. 288, 291, 98 N. E. 2d 184, we construed §§9-1124 and 9-1133, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, 3 and said: “This court has held in numerous cases that, after a defendant pleads to a criminal charge, the state cannot amend the affidavit as to matter of substance. Rogers v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 539, 82 N. E. 2d 89; Way v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 280, 66 N. E. 2d 608.” See also Dennis v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 210, 213, 102 N. E. 2d 650.
“ ‘Substance’ is that'which is essential to the making of a valid charge of crime.” Souerdike v. State (1951), 230 Ind. 192, 196, 102 N. E. 2d 367. “The names of third persons who are only incidentally or collaterally connected with the offense charged *10 against an accused need not be stated in an affidavit or indictment. State v. Hopper (1892), 133 Ind. 460, 32 N. E. 878; Joyce on Indictments, 2d Ed., §438. But as a general rule the name of one injured in his person or property, by the act of the accused, or the name of one whose identity is essential to a proper description of the offense charged should be alleged if known, and if unknown the fact should be alleged. Ibid. §432; 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations, §142.” Robinson v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 396, 112 N. E. 2d 861, 862. It is quite evident that §10-3011, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, defining the offense of vehicle taking requires the state to allege and prove that the vehicle used, driven, run or operated was “the property of another.” This is a material and essential allegation of substance the same as the ownership of property which is stolen. “The ownership of property stolen is a material allegation descriptive of the offense. Shelby v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 186, 96 N. E. 2d 340; Rhoades v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 569, 70 N. E. 2d 27.” State ex rel. Kaufman v. Gould (1951), 229 Ind. 288, 291, 98 N. E. 2d 184, supra. Therefore, it was error to permit the state to amend each count of the amended affidavit by changing the name of the ownership of the automobile involved.
Judgment reversed with instructions to the trial court to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 116 N. E. 2d 234.
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