Gulledge v. Director General of Railroads
This text of 270 F. 276 (Gulledge v. Director General of Railroads) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This cause was brought to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina by the defendants, from the superior court of Union county, North Carolina,[277]*277upon allegations that the defendant Seaboard Air Line Railway Company was fraudulently joined as a parly to this action, in that the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia Railway Company was and is a distinct corporation, organized under the laws of South Carolina, and that the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company is a corporation organized under the laws of North Carolina, and that the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company was made a party to this action for the fraudulent purpose of giving jurisdiction to the state court, and for the fraudulent purpose of denying or preventing jurisdiction of the United States District Court.
After hearing evidence, both oral and upon affidavit, for both the plaintiff and the defendants, on December 31, 1920, at Charlotte, and after listening to extended argument of counsel on both sides, it is the opinion of the court that the cause should be remanded to the superior court of Union county, North Carolina.
On the other hand, the plaintiff, a resident of North Carolina, produced evidence tending to show that 469 shares of the 471 shares of stock in the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia Railway Company were owned by the defendant Seaboard Air Line Railway Company; that during the last four or five years the passenger cars operated on the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia road were Seaboard Air Line cars; that the engines which pulled the cars on the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia were Seaboard Air Line engines; that bills of lading and waybills were issued by the agent at Jefferson, the terminus of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia Railway, on Seaboard Air Line stationery, and that this was regularly done for several years past; that the roadmaster or section master of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia Railroad was employed by the roadmaster of the Seaboard Air Line, and that he made his reports to the Seaboard Air Line roadmaster, and that he was paid for his services since 1916 by the Seaboard Air Line; that the claim agent, who attempted to settle the claim, which is the basis of this suit, with the plaintiff, was a Seaboard Air Line [278]*278claim agent, and signed himself as such, and has his office and home in Charleston, S. C.; that an annual pass was issued to the roadmaster of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia by the Railroad Administration as an “employé of the S. A. L. Ry.”; and further that the president of the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company is the president of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia Railway Company, and that the treasurer of the Seaboard is and was treasurer of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia; that the vice president and other general officers were officers in common of both roads, and that the locomotive engine which injured the plaintiff was Seaboard Air Line locomotive No. 131; and it was generally understood among the public that the Seaboard Air Line operated the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia.
While it was stoutly denied by counsel for the defendants that the Seaboard Air Line had any other connection with the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia than that of owner of 469 shares of stock above referred to and $35,000 of the $70,000 bond issue of said road, and they argue further that the fiscal accounts of the Charlotte, Monroe & Columbia were kept separate and distinct from the Seaboard Air Line’s —and I do not find that this is not a fact — yet from all the facts and circumstances adduced upon the hearing before me, and the allegations in the complaint, I am not able to say that the defendant Seaboard Air Line Railway Company was joined as a party to this action for the fraudulent purpose of denying jurisdiction to the United States District Court.
Having this view of the matter, the court is constrained to grant the motion to remand; and it is so ordered. The clerk at Charlotte will enter.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
270 F. 276, 1921 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1474, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gulledge-v-director-general-of-railroads-ncwd-1921.