STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2020CA1149 C/ W NUMBER 2020CAI 150
W ' -[ a, ULF WAVE OYSTERS, INC., BAYOU CANARD, INC., ALTHEA LYNN
VFFRANK URISICH, MITCHELL B. JURISICH, SR., MITCHELL B. JURISICH, JR., JURISICH, GRASSHOPPER OYSTERS, INC., PELICAN ISLAND OYSTERS, INC., PRINCE CHARMING, INC., & SHELL ISLAND, INC.
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY
Judgment Rendered: AUG it 9 2021'
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Suit Number C685093 c/ w C685094
Honorable Trudy M. White, Presiding
George Pivach, II Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Corey E. Dunbar Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., et al Belle Chasse, LA
Lawrence E. Marino Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Cearley W. Fontenot State of Louisiana, through the Lafayette, LA Coastal Protection & Restoration
Authority and
Richard L. Traina
Harry J. Vorhoff Baton Rouge, LA
BEFORE: GUIDRY, McCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ. GUIDRY, J.
Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority (CPRA), appeals from a judgment of the district court in favor
of plaintiffs, Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich,
Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper
Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island,
Inc. ( collectively " plaintiffs"), reversing decisions of an administrative law judge
and remanding the matter to the State of Louisiana, Division of Administrative Law,
to conduct a hearing on compensation relative to marketable oysters. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CPRA acquired leases from plaintiffs, ten oyster leaseholders, in 2013 and
2015 pursuant to the Oyster Lease Acquisition and Compensation Program
OLACP), La. R. S. 56: 432. 1. The notices of acquisition stated that it was necessary
and proper for CPRA to acquire the leased property for purposes of coastal
protection, conservation, or restoration as part of the Shell Island Restoration Berm
Enhancement Project ( BA -I10) and Shell Island West Restoration Project ( BA -
111). CPRA paid the plaintiffs compensation for the fair market value of their leased
acreage and compensation for the marketable oysters contained on the leased
acreage.
Thereafter, plaintiffs initiated two administrative proceedings by requesting
an administrative hearing in response to the 2013 and 2015 acquisitions. Plaintiffs
claimed the compensation issued by CPRA failed to properly compensate them for
the fair market value of their leasehold interest and for the standing oyster crop that
was acquired. Particularly, plaintiffs asserted with regard to the standing oysters that
CPRA failed to pay the current sack price for marketable oysters and reduced the
2 compensation for marketable oysters by utilizing rules not legally adopted by CPRA
as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
CPRA subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on February 25,
2019, in each administrative proceeding. CPRA asserted that plaintiffs' claims
aris[ e] from coastal restoration projects" and therefore, in light of this court' s prior
decision in Bayou Canard, Inc. v. State, through Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authori , 17- 1067 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 14/ 18), 250 So. 3d 981, 989, writ denied,
18- 0965 ( La. 10/ 29/ 18), 254 So. 3d 1209, and waiver language in the state oyster
leases waiving all claims " whatsoever" against the state arising from coastal
restoration projects, plaintiffs have waived all claims, including OLACP claims,
against the state arising from the Shell Island Restoration Project. Therefore, CPRA
asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiffs'
claims.
Plaintiffs responded by filing motions for partial summary judgment
regarding their right to an administrative hearing and compensation resulting from
the " harvest efficiency ratio procedure" ( HERP) reduction. Plaintiffs asserted that
the oyster lease clauses do not eliminate the rights created by the legislature in
enacting OLACP, and CPRA is without authority to interpret oyster leases in a
manner that permits them to ignore OLACP or repeal or abrogate the rights created
by OLCAP, including the right to compensation and the right to an administrative
hearing. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that HERP is a rule, which must be
promulgated in accordance with the rule making procedure found in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that was not done in this case. Therefore,
plaintiffs asserted that because there is no legal basis to support the reduction, they
should be compensated for one hundred percent of the marketable oysters located
on the oyster leases.
3 Thereafter, the administrative law judge ( ALJ) signed orders granting
CPRA' s motions for summary judgment. The ALJ found that the language of
plaintiffs' oyster lease contracts eliminates any right whatsoever of plaintiffs to
make any claims against CPRA as a result of coastal restoration projects, which
includes a request for an administrative hearing in order to contest the amount of
compensation due for CPRA' s acquisition of plaintiffs' oyster leases. Specifically,
the ALJ found there was no mandatory requirement for a hearing under the terms of
La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( C); rather, the legislature allowed for the possibility of a hearing
under OLACP, and plaintiffs waived that possibility in their oyster lease contracts.
The ALJ also signed orders denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment. The ALJ found that plaintiffs waived the opportunity for a hearing in
their oyster lease contracts, and their request for additional compensation based on
CPRA' s acquisition of their oyster leases is moot because of said waiver.
Plaintiffs filed petitions for judicial review of the final decisions of the ALJ,
including the order granting CPRA' s motion for summary judgment and the order
denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The two petitions for
judicial review were thereafter consolidated. Following a hearing, the district court
signed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against CPRA: reversing and vacating
CPRA' s motion for summary judgment, reversing the denial of plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment and granting plaintiffs' motion, remanding the matter
back to the Division of Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing on
compensation relative to the marketable oysters under OLACP, and ordering that the
administrative hearing on compensation be held without applying CPRA' s HERP
rule, considering that the rule has been held by this court to be unenforceable in
Bayou Canard, Inc. The district court further ordered CPRA to promulgate a rule
for compensation relative to marketable oysters pursuant to the APA.
rd CPRA now appeals from the district court' s judgment, and plaintiffs have
filed an answer to the appeal seeking a remand of this matter to the Division of
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST CIRCUIT
NUMBER 2020CA1149 C/ W NUMBER 2020CAI 150
W ' -[ a, ULF WAVE OYSTERS, INC., BAYOU CANARD, INC., ALTHEA LYNN
VFFRANK URISICH, MITCHELL B. JURISICH, SR., MITCHELL B. JURISICH, JR., JURISICH, GRASSHOPPER OYSTERS, INC., PELICAN ISLAND OYSTERS, INC., PRINCE CHARMING, INC., & SHELL ISLAND, INC.
VERSUS
STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY
Judgment Rendered: AUG it 9 2021'
Appealed from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Suit Number C685093 c/ w C685094
Honorable Trudy M. White, Presiding
George Pivach, II Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Corey E. Dunbar Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., et al Belle Chasse, LA
Lawrence E. Marino Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Cearley W. Fontenot State of Louisiana, through the Lafayette, LA Coastal Protection & Restoration
Authority and
Richard L. Traina
Harry J. Vorhoff Baton Rouge, LA
BEFORE: GUIDRY, McCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ. GUIDRY, J.
Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority (CPRA), appeals from a judgment of the district court in favor
of plaintiffs, Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich,
Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper
Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island,
Inc. ( collectively " plaintiffs"), reversing decisions of an administrative law judge
and remanding the matter to the State of Louisiana, Division of Administrative Law,
to conduct a hearing on compensation relative to marketable oysters. For the reasons
that follow, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
CPRA acquired leases from plaintiffs, ten oyster leaseholders, in 2013 and
2015 pursuant to the Oyster Lease Acquisition and Compensation Program
OLACP), La. R. S. 56: 432. 1. The notices of acquisition stated that it was necessary
and proper for CPRA to acquire the leased property for purposes of coastal
protection, conservation, or restoration as part of the Shell Island Restoration Berm
Enhancement Project ( BA -I10) and Shell Island West Restoration Project ( BA -
111). CPRA paid the plaintiffs compensation for the fair market value of their leased
acreage and compensation for the marketable oysters contained on the leased
acreage.
Thereafter, plaintiffs initiated two administrative proceedings by requesting
an administrative hearing in response to the 2013 and 2015 acquisitions. Plaintiffs
claimed the compensation issued by CPRA failed to properly compensate them for
the fair market value of their leasehold interest and for the standing oyster crop that
was acquired. Particularly, plaintiffs asserted with regard to the standing oysters that
CPRA failed to pay the current sack price for marketable oysters and reduced the
2 compensation for marketable oysters by utilizing rules not legally adopted by CPRA
as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
CPRA subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on February 25,
2019, in each administrative proceeding. CPRA asserted that plaintiffs' claims
aris[ e] from coastal restoration projects" and therefore, in light of this court' s prior
decision in Bayou Canard, Inc. v. State, through Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authori , 17- 1067 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 14/ 18), 250 So. 3d 981, 989, writ denied,
18- 0965 ( La. 10/ 29/ 18), 254 So. 3d 1209, and waiver language in the state oyster
leases waiving all claims " whatsoever" against the state arising from coastal
restoration projects, plaintiffs have waived all claims, including OLACP claims,
against the state arising from the Shell Island Restoration Project. Therefore, CPRA
asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiffs'
claims.
Plaintiffs responded by filing motions for partial summary judgment
regarding their right to an administrative hearing and compensation resulting from
the " harvest efficiency ratio procedure" ( HERP) reduction. Plaintiffs asserted that
the oyster lease clauses do not eliminate the rights created by the legislature in
enacting OLACP, and CPRA is without authority to interpret oyster leases in a
manner that permits them to ignore OLACP or repeal or abrogate the rights created
by OLCAP, including the right to compensation and the right to an administrative
hearing. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that HERP is a rule, which must be
promulgated in accordance with the rule making procedure found in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that was not done in this case. Therefore,
plaintiffs asserted that because there is no legal basis to support the reduction, they
should be compensated for one hundred percent of the marketable oysters located
on the oyster leases.
3 Thereafter, the administrative law judge ( ALJ) signed orders granting
CPRA' s motions for summary judgment. The ALJ found that the language of
plaintiffs' oyster lease contracts eliminates any right whatsoever of plaintiffs to
make any claims against CPRA as a result of coastal restoration projects, which
includes a request for an administrative hearing in order to contest the amount of
compensation due for CPRA' s acquisition of plaintiffs' oyster leases. Specifically,
the ALJ found there was no mandatory requirement for a hearing under the terms of
La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( C); rather, the legislature allowed for the possibility of a hearing
under OLACP, and plaintiffs waived that possibility in their oyster lease contracts.
The ALJ also signed orders denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary
judgment. The ALJ found that plaintiffs waived the opportunity for a hearing in
their oyster lease contracts, and their request for additional compensation based on
CPRA' s acquisition of their oyster leases is moot because of said waiver.
Plaintiffs filed petitions for judicial review of the final decisions of the ALJ,
including the order granting CPRA' s motion for summary judgment and the order
denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The two petitions for
judicial review were thereafter consolidated. Following a hearing, the district court
signed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against CPRA: reversing and vacating
CPRA' s motion for summary judgment, reversing the denial of plaintiffs' motion
for partial summary judgment and granting plaintiffs' motion, remanding the matter
back to the Division of Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing on
compensation relative to the marketable oysters under OLACP, and ordering that the
administrative hearing on compensation be held without applying CPRA' s HERP
rule, considering that the rule has been held by this court to be unenforceable in
Bayou Canard, Inc. The district court further ordered CPRA to promulgate a rule
for compensation relative to marketable oysters pursuant to the APA.
rd CPRA now appeals from the district court' s judgment, and plaintiffs have
filed an answer to the appeal seeking a remand of this matter to the Division of
Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing on all compensation to
which the plaintiffs are entitled under OLACP.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A district court' s judicial review of a final administrative decision is governed
by the APA and its standard of review as set forth in La. R.S. 49: 964( G):
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are: 1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 3) Made upon unlawful procedure; 4) Affected by other error of law; 5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 6) Not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court. In the application of this rule, the court shall make its own determination and conclusions of fact by a preponderance of evidence based upon its own evaluation of the record reviewed in its entirety upon judicial review. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by first-hand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency' s determination of credibility issues.
When reviewing a final administrative decision, the district court functions as
an appellate court, confining its review to the administrative record. Doc' s Clinic,
APMC v. State, ex rel. Department of Health and Hospitals, 07- 0480, pp. 7- 8 ( La.
App. 1st Cir. 11/ 2/ 07), 984 So. 2d 711, 718, writ denied, 07- 2302 ( La. 2/ 15/ 08), 974
So. 2d 665. Once a final judgment is rendered by the district court, an aggrieved
party may seek review by appeal to the appropriate appellate court. La. R.S. 49: 965;
Mid -City Automotive, LLC v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety, 19- 1219, p.
7 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 11/ 20), 304 So. 3d 457, 461. On review of the district court' s
R judgment, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or legal
conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana
Supreme Court to factual findings or legal conclusions of the court of appeal. Mid -
City Automotive, LLC, 19- 1219 at p. 7, 304 So. 3d at 461. Thus, an appellate court
sitting in review of an administrative agency reviews the findings and decision of
the administrative agency and not the decision of the district court. Mid-Cily
Automotive, LLC, 19- 1219 at p. 7, 304 So. 3d at 461. Consequently, this court will
conduct its own independent review of the record in accordance with the standards
provided in La. R. S. 49: 964( G).
Oyster Statutes
The leasing of state- owned water bottoms to private parties for the purpose of
oyster farming is governed exclusively by a specific statutory scheme. Avenal v.
State, 03- 3521, p. 13 ( La. 10/ 19/ 04), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1095, cert. denied, 544 U. S.
1049, 125 S. Ct. 2305 ( 2005). Under this scheme, the State of Louisiana owns " all
oysters and other shellfish and parts thereof grown [ on the state' s water bottoms],
either naturally or cultivated, and all oysters in the shells after they are caught and
taken therefrom ... except as provided in R.S. 56: 4." La. R.S. 56: 3; Avenal, 03-
3521 at p. 13, 886 So. 2d at 1095. However, in order to foster, cultivate, and protect
the Louisiana oyster industry, the state has statutorily authorized the issuance of
oyster leases to private parties. Avenal, 03- 3521 at p. 13, 886 So. 2d at 1095.
The Department of Wildlife and Fisheries is authorized to grant leases on
state- owned water bottoms for oyster cultivation, bedding, and harvesting, and
matters relating thereto, as provided in Subpart D of Part VII of Chapter I of Title
56 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950. La. R. S. 41: 1225. According to La.
R. S. 56: 425( C), "[ t] he secretary may make such stipulations in the leases made by
him as he deems necessary and proper to develop the industry; however, these
stipulations must be consistent with the provisions of this Subpart. The secretary may also make such stipulations as he deems necessary and proper in relation to
coastal protection, conservation, or restoration."
In 2006, the Louisiana legislature adopted Act 425 relative to oyster leases,
which amended and reenacted oyster statutes in Title 56 of the Revised Statutes and
authorized the acquisition by the state of oyster leases directly impacted by coastal
protection, conservation, or restoration projects; established a hierarchy of rights;
established limitations on actions against the state, its political subdivisions, or the
United States; and established a lease acquisition and compensation program in the
Department of Natural Resources.
Following the revision, an oyster lessee enjoys the exclusive use of water
bottoms leased and of all oysters and cultch grown or placed thereon; however, this
exclusive use is subordinate to the rights or responsibilities of the state, any political
subdivision of the state, the United States, or any agency or agent thereof, to take
any action in furtherance of integrated coastal protection. La. R. S. 56: 423( A)( 1).
Additionally, the state of Louisiana, the United States, and any agency, agent,
contractor, or employee thereof shall be held free and harmless from any claims
arising under any oyster lease for actions taken for the purpose of coastal protection,
conservation, or restoration. La. R.S. 56: 427. 1( A). However, a leaseholder whose
oyster lease is acquired in whole or in part by CPRA pursuant to La. R.S. 56: 432. 1
for dredging, direct placement of dredged or other materials, or other work or
activities necessary for the construction or maintenance of a project for integrated
coastal protection may seek compensation from the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority pursuant to that Section. La. R. S. 56: 427. 1( C)( 1).
In particular, Act 425 created OLACP. La. R. S. 56: 432. 1. Due to potential
conflicts between the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries oyster leasing program
and the Louisiana coastal restoration program provided for in La. R.S. 49: 214. 1 et
seq., the legislature directed CPRA to develop a program for the acquisition of and
7 compensation for oyster leases or portions of oyster leases upon which occurs or will
occur, dredging, direct placement of dredged or other materials, or other work or
activities necessary for the construction or maintenance of a project for integrated
coastal protection. La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( A).
Under OLACP, the state of Louisiana, through CPRA, may acquire any oyster
lease, in whole or in part, due to the impact of dredging, direct placement of dredged
or other materials, or other work or activities necessary for the construction or
maintenance of a project for integrated coastal protection. La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( B).
Acquisition shall be implemented by a notice of acquisition issued to the leaseholder,
which shall specify the acreage acquired and the effective date of the acquisition.
La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( B)( 1). CPRA shall determine the compensation for any
acquisition pursuant to this Section in accordance with rules or regulations adopted
by that department after consideration of recommendations by the Louisiana Oyster
Task Force and shall issue its determination of compensation, along with the full
amount of its determination of compensation, to the leaseholder together with the
notice of acquisition. La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( B)( 2)( a) and ( 3). Acceptance of such
payment shall not preclude any claim for additional compensation, as provided in
56: 432. 1. La. R.S. 56: 432. 1( B)( 3).
A leaseholder whose lease is acquired in whole or in part may seek an
administrative hearing through CPRA as to whether the acquisition due to the impact
of dredging, direct placement of dredged or other materials, or other work or
activities necessary for the construction or maintenance of a project for integrated
coastal protection is proper or whether the compensation issued by CPRA satisfies
the rules or regulations of that department. Adjudications are conducted before an
administrative law judge, who issues a final decision to the leaseholder. La. R. S.
56: 432. 1( C)( 2) and ( 3). A leaseholder may seek judicial review of the final decision of the administrative law judge in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. La. R. S.
56: 432. 1( D)( 1).
In the instant case, plaintiffs requested an administrative hearing seeking
additional compensation, because the compensation issued by CPRA allegedly
failed to properly compensate them for their leasehold interests and standing oyster
crops acquired by CPRA. Additionally, plaintiffs sought a determination as to
whether the compensation issued by CPRA for each of the notices of acquisition
satisfies the rules and regulations under OLACP.
In seeking summary judgment before the ALJ, CPRA asserted that based on
language in the plaintiffs' oyster leases and this court' s previous holding in Bayou
Canard, plaintiffs " waived" all claims against CPRA arising from coastal restoration
projects, including OLACP claims. The oyster leases' at issue each contain a
Coastal Wetlands Restoration Advisory" clause, which provides, in part:
P] ursuant to the Louisiana Constitution and the public trust doctrine, the State as Lessor hereby conveys to Lessee a limited interest in the water bottom which is described in this lease, subject to the conditions that: ( 1) this lease is subservient to the State' s past, present or future coastal restoration projects; ( 2) the State' s coastal restoration projects may cause adverse effects in the area of this lease; and ( 3) the State is only issuing this lease based upon the mutual understating of both the State and the Lessee that Lessee' s property interest conveyed by this lease shall not include any right whatsoever to make claims against the State as a result offreshwater diversion or any other coastal restoration projects .... [ Emphasis added.]
Additionally, the leases contain an " Allocation of Risk and Liability, and
Indemnification" clause, which provides, in part:
I] n consideration of the issuance of this lease, Lessee shall assume all liability and risk of loss, and agrees that this lease is subservient to all past, present or future activities as described above. Lessee also agrees to indemnify and hold ... the State of Louisiana, the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, the United States, and any agency, agent, contractor, or employee thereof, harmless from and for, all loss, damage, costs andlor expense in any way associated with this oyster lease and the oysters, cultch, reefs and beds located therein, including
While not all of the leases contain identical lease language as that quoted in this opinion, the overall substance of the following lease provisions is the same in each lease. 9 any loss, sustained by the Lessee ... arising out of, connected with, incident to, or directly or indirectly resulting from or related to ... any other action taken for the purpose of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration undertaken by the State of Louisiana, the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, political subdivisions of the state, the United States,and any agency, agent, contractor, or employee thereof. Emphasis added.]
It is undisputed that CPRA acquired plaintiffs' oyster leases due to two coastal
restoration projects. The language of these leases, particularly the " Coastal
Wetlands Restoration Advisory" clause, eliminates any right whatsoever of lessees
to make any claims against CPRA as a result of coastal restoration projects. This
explicit, broad language has been found to extend to all claims against CPRA by an
oyster lessee resulting from a coastal restoration project. See Bayou Canard, Inc.,
17- 1067 at p. 12, 250 So. 3d at 989.
Plaintiffs assert that these waiver clauses cannot apply to requests for an
administrative hearing pursuant to OLACP, and that Bayou Canard, which was not
brought pursuant to the administrative procedure in OLACP, is distinguishable.
However, from our reading of the statutory scheme as a whole, in conjunction with
the lease language and prior jurisprudence, we disagree.
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Avenal, 03- 3521 at pp. 23- 24, 886 So. 2d at
1102, found clauses like the ones at issue in the instant appeal to be legally valid and
enforceable under the authority granted the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries in
La. R. S. 56: 425( C). In fact, La. R.S. 56: 425( C) was amended in 2006 to specifically
provide that "[ t] he secretary may also make such stipulations as he deems necessary
and proper in relation to coastal protection, conservation, or restoration." Contrary
to the prior language contained in La. R.S. 56: 425( C) regarding stipulations, there is
no language requiring that this stipulation be consistent with the provisions of
subpart D governing the oyster industry.
In addition to the stipulation language in La. R. S. 56: 425( C), the legislature
also added the language found in La. R. S. 56: 431. 1 creating OLACP and the right
10 to compensation for oyster leases acquired by CPRA for construction or
maintenance of a project for integrated coastal protection. Louisiana Revised Statute
56: 432. 1( B)( 3) specifically refers to proceedings under OLACP as " claims for
additional compensation." Consequently, given the language in the oyster leases,
which language the State was authorized to include, La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( B)( 3)' s
reference to OLACP proceedings as " claims for additional compensation," and our
prior holding in Bayou Canard, we find the ALJ was legally correct in granting
summary judgment in favor of CPRA.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and
grant summary judgment in favor of CPRA. We likewise deny plaintiffs' answer to
the appeal. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou
Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich, Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich,
Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince
Charming, Inc., and Shell Island, Inc.
REVERSED; RENDERED; AND ANSWER TO APPEAL DENIED.