Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich, Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island, Inc. v. State of Louisiana through the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority

Louisiana Court of Appeal·Decided August 19, 2021·No. 2020CA1149, 2020CA1150·Unknown

Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

NUMBER 2020CA1149

C/ W

NUMBER 2020CAI 150

W ' -[ a, ULF WAVE OYSTERS, INC., BAYOU CANARD, INC., ALTHEA LYNN

VFFRANK URISICH, MITCHELL B. JURISICH, SR., MITCHELL B. JURISICH, JR., JURISICH, GRASSHOPPER OYSTERS, INC., PELICAN ISLAND OYSTERS, INC., PRINCE CHARMING, INC., & SHELL ISLAND, INC.

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH THE COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY

Judgment Rendered: AUG it 9 2021'

Appealed from the

Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana

Suit Number C685093 c/ w C685094

Honorable Trudy M. White, Presiding

George Pivach, II Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Corey E. Dunbar Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., et al Belle Chasse, LA

Lawrence E. Marino Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Cearley W. Fontenot State of Louisiana, through the Lafayette, LA Coastal Protection & Restoration

Authority

and

Richard L. Traina

Harry J. Vorhoff Baton Rouge, LA

BEFORE: GUIDRY, McCLENDON, AND LANIER, JJ.

GUIDRY, J.

Defendant, the State of Louisiana, through the Coastal Protection and

Restoration Authority (CPRA), appeals from a judgment of the district court in favor of plaintiffs, Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich,

Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper

Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island,

Inc. ( collectively " plaintiffs"), reversing decisions of an administrative law judge and remanding the matter to the State of Louisiana, Division of Administrative Law, to conduct a hearing on compensation relative to marketable oysters. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

CPRA acquired leases from plaintiffs, ten oyster leaseholders, in 2013 and

2015 pursuant to the Oyster Lease Acquisition and Compensation Program

OLACP), La. R. S. 56: 432. 1. The notices of acquisition stated that it was necessary and proper for CPRA to acquire the leased property for purposes of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration as part of the Shell Island Restoration Berm

Enhancement Project ( BA -I10) and Shell Island West Restoration Project ( BA -

111). CPRA paid the plaintiffs compensation for the fair market value of their leased

acreage and compensation for the marketable oysters contained on the leased

acreage.

Thereafter, plaintiffs initiated two administrative proceedings by requesting an administrative hearing in response to the 2013 and 2015 acquisitions. Plaintiffs claimed the compensation issued by CPRA failed to properly compensate them for the fair market value of their leasehold interest and for the standing oyster crop that was acquired. Particularly, plaintiffs asserted with regard to the standing oysters that CPRA failed to pay the current sack price for marketable oysters and reduced the

compensation for marketable oysters by utilizing rules not legally adopted by CPRA as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

CPRA subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on February 25, 2019, in each administrative proceeding. CPRA asserted that plaintiffs' claims

aris[ e] from coastal restoration projects" and therefore, in light of this court' s prior

decision in Bayou Canard, Inc. v. State, through Coastal Protection and Restoration

Authori , 17- 1067 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 5/ 14/ 18), 250 So. 3d 981, 989, writ denied, 18- 0965 ( La. 10/ 29/ 18), 254 So. 3d 1209, and waiver language in the state oyster

leases waiving all claims " whatsoever" against the state arising from coastal restoration projects, plaintiffs have waived all claims, including OLACP claims, against the state arising from the Shell Island Restoration Project. Therefore, CPRA asserted that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiffs' claims.

Plaintiffs responded by filing motions for partial summary judgment regarding their right to an administrative hearing and compensation resulting from the " harvest efficiency ratio procedure" ( HERP) reduction. Plaintiffs asserted that the oyster lease clauses do not eliminate the rights created by the legislature in enacting OLACP, and CPRA is without authority to interpret oyster leases in a manner that permits them to ignore OLACP or repeal or abrogate the rights created

by OLCAP, including the right to compensation and the right to an administrative hearing. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted that HERP is a rule, which must be promulgated in accordance with the rule making procedure found in the

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and that was not done in this case. Therefore,

plaintiffs asserted that because there is no legal basis to support the reduction, they should be compensated for one hundred percent of the marketable oysters located

on the oyster leases.

Thereafter, the administrative law judge ( ALJ) signed orders granting

CPRA' s motions for summary judgment. The ALJ found that the language of plaintiffs' oyster lease contracts eliminates any right whatsoever of plaintiffs to make any claims against CPRA as a result of coastal restoration projects, which includes a request for an administrative hearing in order to contest the amount of compensation due for CPRA' s acquisition of plaintiffs' oyster leases. Specifically,

the ALJ found there was no mandatory requirement for a hearing under the terms of La. R. S. 56: 432. 1( C); rather, the legislature allowed for the possibility of a hearing under OLACP, and plaintiffs waived that possibility in their oyster lease contracts. The ALJ also signed orders denying plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. The ALJ found that plaintiffs waived the opportunity for a hearing in their oyster lease contracts, and their request for additional compensation based on

CPRA' s acquisition of their oyster leases is moot because of said waiver.

Plaintiffs filed petitions for judicial review of the final decisions of the ALJ,

including the order granting CPRA' s motion for summary judgment and the order denying plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The two petitions for

judicial review were thereafter consolidated. Following a hearing, the district court signed a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against CPRA: reversing and vacating CPRA' s motion for summary judgment, reversing the denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granting plaintiffs' motion, remanding the matter back to the Division of Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing on compensation relative to the marketable oysters under OLACP, and ordering that the administrative hearing on compensation be held without applying CPRA' s HERP rule, considering that the rule has been held by this court to be unenforceable in Bayou Canard, Inc. The district court further ordered CPRA to promulgate a rule

for compensation relative to marketable oysters pursuant to the APA.

rd

CPRA now appeals from the district court' s judgment, and plaintiffs have

filed an answer to the appeal seeking a remand of this matter to the Division of Administrative Law to conduct an administrative hearing on all compensation to which the plaintiffs are entitled under OLACP.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

A district court' s judicial review of a final administrative decision is governed

by the APA and its standard of review as set forth in La. R.S. 49: 964( G):

The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or

decisions are:

1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

4) Affected by other error of law;

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Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich, Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island, Inc. v. State of Louisiana through the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, (La. Ct. App. 2021).

Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich, Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island, Inc. v. State of Louisiana through the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (Gulf Wave Oysters, Inc., Bayou Canard, Inc., Althea Lynn Jurisich, Mitchell B. Jurisich, Sr., Mitchell B. Jurisich, Jr., Frank Jurisich, Grasshopper Oysters, Inc., Pelican Island Oysters, Inc., Prince Charming, Inc., and Shell Island, Inc. v. State of Louisiana through the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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