GULF, MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. United States

339 F. Supp. 489, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1075, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15012
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedFebruary 18, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 5662-69, 6332-70
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 339 F. Supp. 489 (GULF, MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
GULF, MOBILE AND OHIO RAILROAD CO. v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 489, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1075, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15012 (S.D. Ala. 1972).

Opinion

ORDER

PITTMAN, Chief Judge.

This cause is now submitted upon defendant’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and plaintiff’s Cross Motion For Partial Summary Judgment.

This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 1346(a) (1) of Title 28 of the United States Code.

On November 8, 1957, and supplemented on November 19, 1957, the plaintiff, Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company (hereinafter referred to as “taxpayer”) applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for authority to issue five-percent income debentures, Series A, due December 1, 2056, in principal amount not to exceed $28,343,800. The income debentures were to be exchanged on a voluntary basis for up to 283,438% shares of taxpayer’s issued and outstanding preferred stock, without par value, $5 Series, with a stated value *490 of $100 per share. The terms of the exchange were one Series A income debenture in principal amount of $100 for one share of preferred stock.

The interest on the income debenture was payable currently, only if earned, and cumulative interest was limited to 15 percent. The preferred stock was without par value and carried a stated value of $100. Dividends on the preferred were payable at the rate of $5 per share per annum when and as declared by the board of directors and were cumulative, subject, however, to certain limitations. The stock was callable at its stated value plus any accumulated and accrued dividends. It was carried on taxpayer’s balance sheet at its stated value of $100 per share. At all times here relevant, the preferred stock and income debentures were listed and traded on the New York Stock Exchange. At the date of the exchange the market price for the preferred shares was less than the principal amount of the debentures.

On December 20, 1956, the Interstate Commerce Commission granted plaintiff the authority to issue the income debentures. Pursuant to that order, taxpayer, during the period December 31, 1957, through December 31, 1962, issued a total of 187,116 income debentures in exchange for a like number of shares of preferred stock. 1 The total exchange resulted in a debit of $18,711,600 to the preferred stock account and a corresponding credit to the income debentures account in the same amount.

Subsequently, taxpayer filed claims for refund with respect to its taxable years ended December 31, 1959 and 1961, in which it claimed a refund of taxes based on, among other things, a deduction for amortizable bond discount arising from the exchange of the above debentures. The deduction was computed by taking the total principal amount ($18,711,600) of debentures issued and subtracting therefrom the total market value ($11,869,092.44) of the preferred stock, as determined by the listed price on the New York Stock Exchange. The result, $6,842,507.56 was determined by taxpayer to be the total discount arising from the exchange, which amount was claimed to be amortizable over the life of the debentures. Upon disallowance of these claims, these actions were timely commenced.

The crux of the problem in these cases dealing with bond discount is that there is no statutory treatment of the subject. Section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows corporations and individuals to deduct all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year. This has been supplemented by Internal Revenue Regulation 1.163-3 (a) which provides :

“If bonds are issued by a corporation at a discount, the net amount of such discount is deductible and should be prorated or amortized over the life of the bonds. For purposes of this section, the amortizable bond discount equals the excess of the amount payable at maturity (or, in the case of a callable bond, at the earlier call date) over the issue price of the bond.”

It is agreed by the parties that if the bonds had been issued for cash in the amount of the selling price of the preferred stock at the time of the exchange, the discount would be proper and the amortization deduction allowed. Taxpayer contends that the bonds-for-stock situation presented here should be treat- ■ ed the same as bonds-for-cash. The argument is that there is no basis in economic reality for differentiating be *491 tween the two transactions. Also, it is pointed out that the same result could have been accomplished in a two-step exchange (bonds for cash; cash for preferred stock) which arguably would have escaped the challenge encountered here. The Government maintains that the bonds-for-stoek exchange is an entirely different event than one involving cash and should meet with a different result. The transaction is characterized as a recapitalization within the meaning of Section 368(a) (1) (E) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with the result being a mere reshuffling of the capital structure with no new capital added. The fact that taxpayer’s preferred stock account was debited $100 for each share of stock taken in, and the income debenture account credited $100 for each bond that was issued, is cited as proof of the “reshuffling” aspect of the exchange.

In deciding this issue, the court is faced with an apparent conflict of authority. Taxpayer relies upon decisions from the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits as well as several District Court cases. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1971); Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 308 F.2d 39 (2nd Cir. 1962); Montana Power Co. v. United States, 232 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir. 1956); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. United States, 130 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1942); Claussen’s Inc. v. United States, 71-2 U.S.T.C. 9632 (S.D.Ga. July 29, 1971); Cities Service Co. v. United States, 316 F.Supp. 61 (S.D.N.Y.1970), reaff’d 71-2 U.S.T.C. 9501 (1971); Industrial Dev. Corp. v. United States, 51 A.F.T.R. 1514 (N.D.Ill.1956); Southern Fertilizer & Chem. Co. v. Edwards, 167 F.Supp. 879 (M.D.Ga.1955).

The Government places its emphasis on a line of Court of Claims decisions and a recent Tax Court case. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1102 (Ct.Cl. July 14, 1971); Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1324, 193 Ct.Cl. 257 (1970); Erie Lackawanna Ry. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 425, 190 Ct.Cl. 682 (1970); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222, 188 Ct.Cl. 302 (1969); Montana Power Co. v. United States, 159 F.Supp. 593, 141 Ct. Cl. 620 (1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 842, 79 S.Ct. 23, 3 L.Ed.2d 76 (1958); National Alfalfa Dehydrating and Milling Co. v.

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339 F. Supp. 489, 29 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1075, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15012, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gulf-mobile-and-ohio-railroad-co-v-united-states-alsd-1972.