Gulf Interstate Gas Company v. Garvin

303 S.W.2d 260
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJune 21, 1957
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 303 S.W.2d 260 (Gulf Interstate Gas Company v. Garvin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gulf Interstate Gas Company v. Garvin, 303 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1957).

Opinion

STANLEY, Commissioner.

The appeal is from a judgment upon a verdict for $18,000 as compensation for a 30-inch pipe line easement through a fire clay leasehold. The right of condemnation and procedure are under the provisions of KRS 278.502, 416.230 et seq., and Title 15, U S.C.A., § 717f(h).

The commissioners fixed $600 as reasonable compensation, and on exceptions of the property owners that sum was adjudged by the county court without a jury. The amount was paid by the pipe line company, and it took possession. The present judgment was rendered on an appeal by the owners of the leasehold. The appeal to this court Í9 by the pipe line company. A reversal of the judgment is. sought upon the grounds that the award is grossly excessive and evidence was received of an erroneous measure of compensation, and the instructions authorized a recovery upon that basis.

The easement and right of way is 66 feet wide and contains 3¼ acres, more or less.' The judgment particularly describes the rights of the pipe line company and the rights of the owners of the servient estate in relation to mining and removal of clay below the strip subject to limitations which are calculated to protect the pipe line.

The pipe line company and the owners of the fee or of the surface of the land had agreed upon their compensation, and the latter are not parties. The proceedings are confined to the leasehold interests. A mineral lease of this type is regarded in Kentucky as the sale and conveyance of title to the minerals in place and as constituting a severance of the minerals from the surface estate. Swiss Oil Corp. v. Hupp, 253 Ky. 552, 69 S.W.2d 1037; Williams’ Adm’r v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 283 Ky. 644, 143 S.W.2d 297, 131 A.L.R. 1364. However, title to the clay passed subject to the lease.

The mining lease or conveyance, em bracing 110 acres, was executed in July, 1948, by Burchett, et al. to R. O. and Russell Blevins and later assigned to J. C. Gar-vin and Russell Blevins. It is for a term of twenty years or so long as clay can be profitably mined unless terminated sooner by agreement or failure to comply with the terms of the lease or conveyance. The original lease provides for the payment of royalty to the lessors of 20 cents per ton of *262 merchantable fire clay mined and removed, with a minimum of $300 a year. The assignment provides for the payment of royalty of 5 cents per ton to be paid to R. O. Blevins.

There was conflicting evidence as to the quality and quantity of the vein of clay on the tract and as to whether it may be profitably mined. The weight of the evidence seems to be that it may not.

As a basic or general rule, when property is taken by eminent domain, the measure of compensation to be awarded the owner is the fair market value, considering the property in its condition and situation at the time it is taken, and such sum as will reasonably compensate the owner for any damages to or depreciation in the remainder of the tract, considering the easement and use thereof. This, in short, is the difference between the fair market value of the whole premises immediately before the talcing and the fair market value thereof immediately afterward. Madisonville H. & E. R. Co. v. Ross, 126 Ky. 138, 103 S.W. 330, 13 L.R.A., N.S., 420; Saulsberry v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 226 Ky. 75, 10 S.W.2d 451; Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Igo, 314 Ky. 146, 234 S.W.2d 149. And, generally speaking, when land has valuable deposits of minerals, that circumstance may be considered as an evidential fact so far as it affects the market value of the land without separation of values of the surface and the minerals. Saulsberry v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., supra, 226 Ky. 75, 10 S.W.2d 451; 4, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 13.22[1] ; Hollister v. Cox, 131 Conn. 523, 41 A.2d 93, 156 A.L.R. 1412; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, § 242. In the present case, as we have stated, there was a separation in title as between the owners of the surface and the owners of the fire clay and right to mine it. It may be presumed that the pipe line easement is permanent and there will be no reversion, and that the leaseholders will fully comply with the terms of the mining lease, although in submitting the questions the general terms of the lease should perhaps be stated. So, we are concerned with the measure of recovery for taking a part of the mineral deposits in place and interfering with the right or impeding the quarrying and removal of clay that was not so taken.

We have generally ruled in a number of cases in which an easement for a gas pipe line was condemned that the measure of compensation to the owner of the land is something less than the value in fee or is the difference in value of the strip of land taken with and without the easement. Typical of these cases is Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Million, 314 Ky. 137, 234 S.W.2d 152. But in the present case, although the right to take out the clay some distance below the pipe line is given the owners by the judgment, it appears that mining of the fire clay must be done by the stripping method, so that there is little likelihood that the underlying clay could be recovered. Even if it could be mined by tunneling, the condition would apparently be the same. Therefore, in respect to the taking of the strip through the clay, the owners thereof are entitled to be compensated in the amount of the full value thereof in place. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Igo, 314 Ky. 146, 234 S.W.2d 149. Thus, where a stone quarry was condemned, the measure of recovery was held to be the actual value of the stone in place and not its prospective value when cut and sold in the market. Cole v. Ellwood Power Co., 216 Pa. 283, 65 A. 678; Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 61 N.W.2d 687, cited 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 174.

Dealing with this as a distinct subject of compensation, there should be an additional allowance for damages sustained in relation to the mineral outside the strip which may result from the situation in which it was left by reason of the appropriation of the strip and the installation or maintenance of the pipe line. Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. v. Jackman, 311 Ky. 507, 224 S.W.2d 660. There is evidence, *263

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Bluebook (online)
303 S.W.2d 260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gulf-interstate-gas-company-v-garvin-kyctapphigh-1957.