Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Looker

14 S.W. 611, 78 Tex. 279, 1890 Tex. LEXIS 1387
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 21, 1890
DocketNo. 2964
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 14 S.W. 611 (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Looker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Looker, 14 S.W. 611, 78 Tex. 279, 1890 Tex. LEXIS 1387 (Tex. 1890).

Opinion

HOBBY, Judge.—

This is a suit for damages for overflowing plaintiff’s land.

It is alleged in substance that defendant negligently, etc., constructed an embankment of earth about 13 feet high from the north bank of the Bosque Biver in a northwest direction, about 1200 yards long and at the distance of about 200 yards from the river, and opposite and adjacent to plaintiff’s land left a culvert about 80 yards wide. That said land lay in a gentle [282]*282slope from west to east, and when said river overflowed its banks, which it did frequently before the construction of the road of defendant, the waters would gradually rise and spread over the same and leave a rich deposit. That said embankment changed the flow of said waters and formed a kind of pocket, which forced all the overflowed waters for a distance of 1300 yards through said culvert on plaintiff’s land in a rapid current, which washed away and destroyed the soil, houses, fences, and crops off of plaintiff’s land, to his damage in the sum of $11,837.50.

The defense was a general denial.

The case was tried on February 7, 1888, and plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for $431.

The first assignment of error is that “The court erred in permitting-the witness C. H. McSpadden, over the objection of the defendant, to testify in answer to the following question: 'Why was it the waters of the Bosque did not flow in 1887 as they did formerly?’ To which the witness replied, 'The railroad obstructed it.’”

The ground of objection was that the witness Avas not an expert and hence incompetent to give an opinion.

This witness had testified that he Avas well acquainted with the plaintiff’s farm, etc., situated on the Bosque River and just below the railroad; had knoAvn it and had resided there and on his, one mile north of it, for about twenty years. He also testified to the correctness of the plot in evidence shoAving the bridge, river, farm, etc., and described in detail the overflowed lands. He also testified that he was present in 1887 on defendant’s railroad during the overflow, and he gavera lengthy account of ' it and testified to his examination of the bridge and trestle during the overflow; described the physical features of the valley and explained how the waters prior to the construction of the bridge would spread out, and that a part of it would flow through a depression on plaintiff’s land and a part through another near the trestle, and that now, since the construction of the railroad, the Avater is forced through the trestle, causing a strong current, etc.

The explanation attached by the judge to the bill of exceptions shows, that the witness was required to state the facts upon which his opinion was based.

The witness having apparently fully stated all of the facts upon.whiohthis opinion Avas founded, it was competent for him to answer the question.

In the case of the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company v. Reason, 61 Texas, cited by appellant in support of his assignment, the question which was -held to be inadmissible because calling for an opinion Avas this, “Was it not your own fault and negligence?” The distinction between this question and that propounded to McSpadden, in vieAvof his evidence then before the court, is too obvious to require discussion.

The case of the International & Great ¡Northern Railway Company v. [283]*283Klaus, 64 Texas, 294, was similar to this, and a like question was there-involved. A defectively constructed bridge was claimed to have obstructed the water and caused the injury. Several witnesses who were-familiar with and resided on the stream for many years stated that after heavy rains the water rushed down the channel, bearing trees, etc., in quantities. They then stated that in their opinion the openings in the bridge were not sufficient to admit the passage of the drift.

It was held to be admissible, although objected to upon substantially the same grounds as the present case.

The case of Porter v. Manufacturing Company, 17 Connecticut, 249,. was cited in support of the doctrine that upon a question of this character the opinions of unskilled witnesses were generally more satisfactory than those of scientific witnesses having no personal knowledge of the facts. We think there was no error in admitting the testimony.

The second, third, and fourth assignments are:

2. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to show by the witness O. H. McSpadden that his place was about a mile up the river from that of the plaintiff, and that the same current of water which afterwards overflowed the plaintiff came out of the river above the witness’s, place and ran over the same in currents, and greatly washed, damaged, and injured the same, and that his place was too far above the railroad to be affected by the embankment. ,

“3. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to show by the witness Mrs. 0. H. Sedberry that she owned a farm about one and a half miles above plaintiff’s farm, on the same side of the Bosque River, not affected by the railroad, and that her farm had been damaged more in 1887 than it had been in previous years; and also erred in refusing to permit the defendant to show by the witness J.W. Helm the damage done at other places on the river immediately above and below plaintiff’s place which were unaffected by the railroad.

“ 4. The court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to show by the witness T. A. McSpadden that he owned the farm south of and below plaintiff on the Bosque River, and that the rise of the river in 1872 was greater than in 1887, and still that his land was not damaged as much in 1872 as it was in 1887, and that his land was too far below the railroad to be affected by the embankment.”

It appears from the explanation of the judge attached to the bill of exceptions that “ the witnesses did testify as to the height of the different floods, and that defendant was not confined to the height of the waters, at plaintiff’s land, but was permitted to prove the height of the different floods for miles above and below plaintiff’s land. This was done to show whether the flood alleged to have damaged plaintiff’s land was an extraordinary flood or not.”

The objection made by the plaintiff to the foregoing testimony we un[284]*284derstand from the judge’s statement was as to the damage done to the witness’s land. This was excluded on the ground of its being immaterial.

Under the facts of this case we do not see that the court erred in excluding this testimony. Had it been shown that the land above and below plaintiff’s was overflowed by the same waters in 1887, and the damage done and its extent, and that it was too far from the embankment to be affected by it, this would have established the fact that there was no similarity whatever in the situation of this land and plaintiff’s with respect to the embankment, the cause o£ the injury to plaintiff, and that the same causes did not operate to overflow plaintiff’s land which affected that of the witnesses.

The land of MeSpadden and Mrs. Sedberry, above and below plaintiff’s, may have been injured by the overflow of 1887; the embankment may not have in the least degree contributed to it, and yet this would not have afforded the inference that plaintiff’s land was not damaged by the current which resulted from the concentration of the waters in the culvert of the embankment.

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14 S.W. 611, 78 Tex. 279, 1890 Tex. LEXIS 1387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gulf-colorado-santa-fe-railway-co-v-looker-tex-1890.