Gulden v. Chance

180 F. 178, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5460
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania·Decided January 28, 1910·No. No. 8,·Published

Opinion

ARCHBATD, District Judge

(specially assigned). The charge of infringement of complainant’s trade-mark “Don Carlos” was eliminated by the decision of the Court of Appeals (165 Fed. 624), and the [181] question of unfair competition therefore alone remains. To make this out, a clear purpose on the part of the defendants must be shown to palm off their goods as those of the complainant, by imitative and misleading dress, and thus divert to themselves a portion of his trade. That there was any intention of that kind, or that anything more than ■a general, if not an unavoidable, correspondence in the make-up of the defendants’ packages with those of the complainant, has been shown, cannot, under the evidence, be successfully maintained. The defendants are reputable dealers in Philadelphia; the house (father and sons) having been in business there for upwards of 60 years, and having packed olives for 30 years, and having an equal standing in the trade with the complainant, who has been in business in New York for 40 years, and packed olives for 33 years. The temptation which sometimes prompts one man to try and steal the trade of another was therefore wanting. And while it must be confessed that, in these days of keen business competition, the same scruples, as once, do not always obtain, there was not thus, at least, the same occasion for such dishonest attempts as there might otherwise have been. Neither are the defendants shown to have cheapened on the complainant, putting out an inferior quality of goods at a lower price, which is one of the most frequent incidents of unfair trade; and the defendants are therefore relieved from unfavorable imputation to the extent that these, circumstances are not present.

Without resting the case upon these features of it, however, and upon a full consideration of all the evidence, the charge of unfair competition cannot be regarded as made out. It centers about the adoption by the defendants of the name “Don Caesar” as one of their brands, and the selection, in that connection, of a display label, on which, in company with it, a branch of olives in natural colors was shown, this being designedly imitative, as it is said, of the complainant’s “Don Carlos” label, similarly embellished and colored, a red wax cap at the same time being substituted by the defendants for a green cap previously used, thus completely copying the distinctive marks of the complainant’s goods. This change took place, as it is pointed out, just about the time that an experienced salesman, named Weed, went over from the complainant to the defendants’ employ, and was made at his suggestion, the better to enable him to divert and control the trade which he had worked up for the complainant. And as further proof that the imitation was designed, it is claimed that cuts of the complainant’s “Don Carlos” labels were submitted to the manufacturer, by whom the “Don Caesar” labels were gotten out, with instructions to take them as a guide. Previous to this, also, the defendants had changed over from the bulb bottles, in which they packed stuffed olives, to ring bottles, which the complainant was the first to introduce for that purpose, if not to design. And just about the time that the “Don Caesar” labels were adopted, the neck labels on these ring bottles were also changed; a form having a depending ear being chosen the same as that of the complainant, and a plate of stuffed olives with similar colors and lettering, in place of two halves of a split •olive on the complainant’s label, being shown. These imitative changes, [182] as it is claimed, are too many and too marked to be accidental, and are of cumulative force, establishing a determined purpose to unfairly appropriate the complainant’s trade. As so put, a case of some seriousness may seem to be made out. But it disappears when the full facts are known.

The complainant has 12 shapes and styles of packages, and 6 different brands, all except the large King brand covering identically the same character and quality of berry, no particular kind of olives being thus associated and identified with any special brand or style of dress. In this respect he is like most other packers, who pack and label their goods in much the same shaped bottles, branded, of course, with different names, and marked with special labels, but otherwise closely approaching each other in design and color; those appropriate to the packing of olives being necessarily few. No packer therefore has a monopoly of any particular style of bottle, or scolor or character of seal. He may, of the labels which he gets up, and of the names or brands which he adopts, but even here the names, colors, and symbols unavoidably run together and have to be dealt with accordingly. Olives being largely of Spanish origin, Spanish names for brands naturally suggest themselves, and we therefore have “Isabella,” “Alfonzo,” and “Don Carlos,” among those of the complainant, as we have “Don Caesar” among the defendants’; and “Señor Juan,” of another packer; to say nothing of “Manzanilla,” “King,” “Queen,” “Spanish Queen,” “Amaranth, Queen,” “Regine,” “Crown,” an'd“Monte Christo;” all of which are made use of. So in color, form, and design of labels; olives in clusters, surrounded by leaves, depending from branches, more or less naturally colored, with red and gold lettering for contrast, and displayed on oval labels, must be expected to figure; while the style of bottles, whether large or small, or vase or cylinder or jar; and the caps which close them, whether red or green or gold, or wax or metal, may vary without danger of infringement, according to the taste of the party. These are the conditions which surround the subject, and are not to be lost sight of in considering it; no exclusive rights being possible in that which is thus common property. This is not to say that a combination of color and style of packing may not be distinctive, and have become so identified with the goods of some one dealer that a manifestly purposed imitation of them will not be regarded as fraudulent. But before that result is reached, in view of the innocent possibilities, in the present instance the combination must be so unusual and the imitation so clear that the similarity could not be other than designed. And the question is whether there is anything of that kind here.

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Gulden v. Chance, 180 F. 178, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5460 (circtedpa 1910).

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Chance v. Gulden
165 F. 624 (Third Circuit, 1908)