Guinn v. Imperial Sugar Co.

44 S.W.2d 409, 1931 Tex. App. LEXIS 1672
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 9, 1931
DocketNo. 9546
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 44 S.W.2d 409 (Guinn v. Imperial Sugar Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guinn v. Imperial Sugar Co., 44 S.W.2d 409, 1931 Tex. App. LEXIS 1672 (Tex. Ct. App. 1931).

Opinions

LANE, J.

This suit was brought by John H. Guinn against Imperial Sugar Company, a corpora[410]*410tion, to recover the sum of $35,000 for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him on or about the first day of September, 1927.

Plaintiff alleged that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the Imperial Sugar Company, hereinafter for convenience called the sugar company, acting by and through its servants, agents, and employees acting within the scope and course of their employment on behalf of the sugar company. He alleged that he was permanently injured by being struck by a heavy iron vise attached to a bench protruding from an automobile truck then and there being driven by an agent, servant, or employee of -the sugar company at its direction; that the defendant was guilty of negligence in a number of particulars; and that such acts of negligence were the proximate cause of all of the injuries of which he, plaintiff, complains.

The sugar company answered by general demurrer, general denial, and by an allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

- The court overruled defendant’s general demurrer. A jury was selected, impaneled, and sworn to try the cause, but the court after hearing the evidence of both parties, upon motion of defendant, instructed a verdict in its behalf. Such verdict was returned by the jury and judgment accordingly rendered, and from such judgment the plaintiff has appealed.

The undisputed evidence shows that one Carrol Scarborough was, at the time the plaintiff sustained his injuries, driving the truck upon which the vise which struck and injured the plaintiff was placed, and that the plaintiff received the injuries complained of as- a result of such striking.

It seems to be agreed on this appeal by both parties that the theory -upon which the trial court instructed a verdict for the sugar company was upon a conclusion that there was no fevidence to raise the issue as to whether or not Carrol Scarborough, the driver of the truck in question, was a servant, agent, or an employee of the sugar company at the time of the accident, or to raise the issue as to whether or not he was at such time under the special control of appellee, the sugar company, and upon the further conclusion that there was no evidence to raise the issue as to whether or not appellee and the Sugarland Industries were so jointly interested in the work being performed by the driver of the truck as to constitute appellee a joint tort-feasor at the time appellant sustained his injuries, and that there was no evidence to raise the issue as to whether or not there, was such an acting together of appel-lee with the Sugarland Industries in the particular errand on which said driver of the truck was engaged at the time appellant sustained his injuries as to make appellee liable as a tort-feasor for such injuries.

Appellant insists that the court erred in all of such conclusions, and in instructing a verdict for appelle.e thereupon, in that there was ample evidence to raise an issue upon each and all of such issues.

The majority of this court thinks that appellant’s contentions should be sustained.

Appellant testified that the truck being driven by Scarborough at the time of his injury was used by appellee; that as an employee of appellee sugar company he had driven the truck in hauling stuff around, getting what appellee had to have to work with; that appellee has a garage and repair shop which has on it a sign “Imperial Sugar Company” ; that the automobile which struck him was kept in a shed adjoining the garage, all under one roof; that he used such truck in doing his work for appellee; that his work was being done for appellee in furtherance of its business; that at the time he was injured by the truck it was on its way to put gas in a house in which one Kelley, an employee of appellee, lived.

Cook Butler testified: That Scarborough worked in the sugar refinery; uthat his headquarters was at the refinery; and that when he was sent out to work he was sent from the refinery by Mr. Inquist, who was his boss and whose headquarters was also in the refinery, that is, in a small building just back of the refinery; that all he knew was that Mr. In-quist worked for the sugar company; that he had charge there of the pipe fittings in the refinery, and of all the pipe fittings down anywhere. in Sugarland; that the name “Imperial Sugar Company” is on the bank building, the garage, and the machine shop; that the words on the bank building are “Imperial Sugar Company General Office”; on the garage, “Imperial Sugar Company Machine Shop and Garage.”

Carrol Scarborough testified that on September 1, 1927, the date when appellant was injured, he was employed-in pipe line fitting at Sugarland; that he was driving the truck which struck appellant; that Mr. Inquist, his foreman, sent him out to put some gas openings in a house on Imperial 'boulevard, and that on the way to the house the accident occurred.

It is shown that on the 10th day of May, 1921, Isaac Kempner, Daziiel Kempner, William Eldridge, Jr., and Gustav Ulrich associated themselves together under the name of the Sugarland Industries, unincorporated; such association was formed under a certain declaration of trust dated January 1, 1919, in which it is declared that said parties as trustees of the Sugarland Industries were conducting business under the name of Imperial Bank & Trust Company, Imperial Mercantile Company, Imperial Sugar Company, Imperial [411]*411Mattress Company, and Sugarland Manufacturing Company.

Gus Ulrich, vice president and general manager of the several industries at Sugar-land, including the Imperial Sugar Company, a corporation, shows by his testimony that the sugar company was incorporated in 1924, and, after such incorporation, the Sugarland Industries operated it under a lease contract until January 1, 1927, from which time the sugar company has operated the sugar business itself; that the two companies were separate and distinct companies, formed by the same parties, however. Being formed by the same parties, they entered into an agreement whereby for convenience and economy the Sugarland Industries became an employment agency for both companies.

Ulrich testified:

“If the Imperial Sugar Company needed anybody to work there for them, they made application, whoever wanted the help, the Sugar Company’s foreman, or whoever wanted the man, would make application to the labor department and Foreman in charge of the Industries, or through the Timekeeping Department of the Industries for such a man or men as they might want in the various departments, when they needed them. When The Sugarland Industries had a requisition for men or request for men, the men would be furnished by them to the Imperial Sugar Company for that particular job for the period they were needed; in other words, the Sugarland Industries furnished the man or men to the Imperial Sugar Company. Now, when those men quit working for the Sugar-land Industries and went over to the refinery or went over to work for the Imperial Sugar Company on that requisition for workmen, a record would be kept by the Sugarland Industries of the time that they worked for the Sugar Company, and the Sugar Company would be charged with that time by the Sug-arland Industries.

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Related

Daily v. Sugarland Industries
124 S.W.2d 199 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1938)

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Bluebook (online)
44 S.W.2d 409, 1931 Tex. App. LEXIS 1672, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guinn-v-imperial-sugar-co-texapp-1931.