UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN JOSEPH GUILLOTTE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 21-1422
DR. PHILLIP KNOWLIN, ET AL. SECTION: “J” (5) ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to StateP rao C slea im filed by Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government (“TPCG”). (Rec. doc. 40). Plaintiff Brian Guillotte has not filed a memorandum in oppositioITn tIoS tOhRe DmEoRtiEoDn in accordance with the local rules of this Court. For the following reasons, that thGeR MAoNtiToEnD to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (Rec. doc. I4.0 ) is Backgrou. nd See Guillotte is a frequent filer of lawsuits in this Court. ( E.D. La., Civ. A. Nos. 21- 1400, 21-1422, 21-1775, 21-1850, 21-2016). In this lawsuit, through largely illegible Complaints (Rec. docs. 1, 4, 4-1), Guillotte alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, medical malpractice, and negligence by CorrectHealth regarding the medical treatment he received while incarcerated at Lafourche Parish Detention Center. Before the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned, this Court had already recommended that Defendants CorrectHealth, Dr. Phillip Nowlin, and the Lafourche Parish Government be dismissed from the lawsuit. (Rec. docs. 37, 42). With regard to the TPCG, Guillotte lists it as a defendant and refers to it as “overseer of 32nd Judicial District.” (Rec. doc. at p. 2). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts as follows: I am still being held [in Lafourche Parish]. Now when the seatbelt ticket was issued Terrebonne Parish gave me a probation warrant from 2017. I have no idea what this is about. They gave no information on this. I was in jail numerous times and this warrant was never brought on me til now. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at pp. 5-6).
Terrebonne knows where I am at and I’ve been incarcerated and they still have a detainer on me when I was incarcerated on my court date. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at p. 8).
Terrebonne has illegally held me on old warrants and a warrant they knew I was already incarcerated on. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at p. 9).
Plaintiff then states that he seeks $10,000.00 from the TPCG for “illegal incarceration.” On July 26, 2021, Guillotte filed a deficient complaint for habeas corpus and a writ of mandamus. (Rec. doc. 1). On September 14, 2021, Guillotte corrected the deficiency, still titling his complaint as a request for writs of habeas corpus and mandMaemnudso.z (aR-Teca.r danogc.o 4 v).. FLliobreersally construing Guillotte’s complaint – as this Court must do, , 982 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2020) – the Clerk of Court construed Guillotte’s cIIo. mplaLinetg aasl oStnaen odfa “rpdrison condition” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court acceptIsn arlel Kwaetlrl-ipnlae aCdaenda lf aBcrtesa cahs etsr uLeit,i gv.iewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). However, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of Ashcroft v. Iqbal action will not do.” , 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The Court must thus identify pleadings that are conclusory and are not entitled to the assumptioIdn. of truth and legal conclusions must be supported by the factual allegations that are pled. at 677–78.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffIidci.ent factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it doIeds. dBeamrtahnodlo mmeowre vt. hLaand raeny tunadorned, “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” accusation. ; , Civ. A. No. 14-1468, 2015 WL 365525, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015). sua sponte 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.iCn. f§o r1m99a7 pea(cu)p erreiqsuire the Court to dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding after a determination that they are frivolous. TSheee CCoauy rvt . hEasste lbleroad discretion in determining thmeo dfrifiiveodl oouns ontahteurr eg roofu ntdhse
cBoomokpelra inv.t .K oonce , 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986), sua sponte, , 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in the complaint. Under thTiasl isbt avt. uGtiell,e ay claim is frivolous only when it lacksN aenit zakrge uva. bWleil lbiaamsiss either in law or in fact. , 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998); , 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such aHsa rwpheer nv .t hShe ocwoemrpslaint alleges the violation of a legal interest
that clearly does not exist. , 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). It also lacks an arguable factual basis only if the facts alleged are D“celnetaornly v b. Haseerlneasns,d” eaz category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. , 504 U.S. see also Neitke 25, 32-33 (1992); , 490 US. at 327-28. The Court must thus determine whether a plaintiff’s claims aRreee bveass evd. Coonll ianns indisputably meritless legal theorys eoer Jcalcekasrolny bv.a Vsealnensos yfactual allegations. , 27M Fo.o3rde 1v7. M4,a 1b7u6s (5th Cir. 1994);
, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); , 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1II9I.9 2). Law and Analysis A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Under Rule 8, Plaintiff is required to state the basis for his claim for relief against each individual defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Generalized statementSse oe fW alalelkgeerd vw. Sroonutghd oCienng. wBeillll nToelt. sCaot.isfy Plaintiff’s obligation to properly plead the claim. , 904 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a proper pleading requires more
than “bare bones” allegations). Plaintiff’s pleading here is no more than generalized statements that “Terrebonne Parish” put a hold on him in the Lafourche Parish jail due to a “probation warrant.” If Terrebonne Parish – as named by Plaintiff in his complaint – refers to TPCG, TPCG is not even the proper parAtyd athmast vo.v MercsCeoeys, controls, or is responsible for the district courts or the District Attorney. , No. 11-0129, 2011 WL 6935332, *3 (M.D. La. Nov. 9, 2011) (finding dismissal appropriate when plaintiff failed to allege direct personal involvement by supervisory official).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN JOSEPH GUILLOTTE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NUMBER: 21-1422
DR. PHILLIP KNOWLIN, ET AL. SECTION: “J” (5) ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to StateP rao C slea im filed by Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government (“TPCG”). (Rec. doc. 40). Plaintiff Brian Guillotte has not filed a memorandum in oppositioITn tIoS tOhRe DmEoRtiEoDn in accordance with the local rules of this Court. For the following reasons, that thGeR MAoNtiToEnD to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim (Rec. doc. I4.0 ) is Backgrou. nd See Guillotte is a frequent filer of lawsuits in this Court. ( E.D. La., Civ. A. Nos. 21- 1400, 21-1422, 21-1775, 21-1850, 21-2016). In this lawsuit, through largely illegible Complaints (Rec. docs. 1, 4, 4-1), Guillotte alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his medical needs, medical malpractice, and negligence by CorrectHealth regarding the medical treatment he received while incarcerated at Lafourche Parish Detention Center. Before the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned, this Court had already recommended that Defendants CorrectHealth, Dr. Phillip Nowlin, and the Lafourche Parish Government be dismissed from the lawsuit. (Rec. docs. 37, 42). With regard to the TPCG, Guillotte lists it as a defendant and refers to it as “overseer of 32nd Judicial District.” (Rec. doc. at p. 2). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts as follows: I am still being held [in Lafourche Parish]. Now when the seatbelt ticket was issued Terrebonne Parish gave me a probation warrant from 2017. I have no idea what this is about. They gave no information on this. I was in jail numerous times and this warrant was never brought on me til now. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at pp. 5-6).
Terrebonne knows where I am at and I’ve been incarcerated and they still have a detainer on me when I was incarcerated on my court date. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at p. 8).
Terrebonne has illegally held me on old warrants and a warrant they knew I was already incarcerated on. (Rec. doc. 4-1 at p. 9).
Plaintiff then states that he seeks $10,000.00 from the TPCG for “illegal incarceration.” On July 26, 2021, Guillotte filed a deficient complaint for habeas corpus and a writ of mandamus. (Rec. doc. 1). On September 14, 2021, Guillotte corrected the deficiency, still titling his complaint as a request for writs of habeas corpus and mandMaemnudso.z (aR-Teca.r danogc.o 4 v).. FLliobreersally construing Guillotte’s complaint – as this Court must do, , 982 F.3d 395, 399 (5th Cir. 2020) – the Clerk of Court construed Guillotte’s cIIo. mplaLinetg aasl oStnaen odfa “rpdrison condition” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court acceptIsn arlel Kwaetlrl-ipnlae aCdaenda lf aBcrtesa cahs etsr uLeit,i gv.iewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. , 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). However, a pleading that offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of Ashcroft v. Iqbal action will not do.” , 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The Court must thus identify pleadings that are conclusory and are not entitled to the assumptioIdn. of truth and legal conclusions must be supported by the factual allegations that are pled. at 677–78.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffIidci.ent factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it doIeds. dBeamrtahnodlo mmeowre vt. hLaand raeny tunadorned, “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” accusation. ; , Civ. A. No. 14-1468, 2015 WL 365525, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2015). sua sponte 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.iCn. f§o r1m99a7 pea(cu)p erreiqsuire the Court to dismiss cases filed by prisoners proceeding after a determination that they are frivolous. TSheee CCoauy rvt . hEasste lbleroad discretion in determining thmeo dfrifiiveodl oouns ontahteurr eg roofu ntdhse
cBoomokpelra inv.t .K oonce , 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1986), sua sponte, , 2 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 1993). However, the Court may not dismiss an action merely because of questionable legal theories or unlikely factual allegations in the complaint. Under thTiasl isbt avt. uGtiell,e ay claim is frivolous only when it lacksN aenit zakrge uva. bWleil lbiaamsiss either in law or in fact. , 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998); , 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, such aHsa rwpheer nv .t hShe ocwoemrpslaint alleges the violation of a legal interest
that clearly does not exist. , 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999). It also lacks an arguable factual basis only if the facts alleged are D“celnetaornly v b. Haseerlneasns,d” eaz category encompassing fanciful, fantastic, and delusional allegations. , 504 U.S. see also Neitke 25, 32-33 (1992); , 490 US. at 327-28. The Court must thus determine whether a plaintiff’s claims aRreee bveass evd. Coonll ianns indisputably meritless legal theorys eoer Jcalcekasrolny bv.a Vsealnensos yfactual allegations. , 27M Fo.o3rde 1v7. M4,a 1b7u6s (5th Cir. 1994);
, 49 F.3d 175, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1995); , 976 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir. 1II9I.9 2). Law and Analysis A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
Under Rule 8, Plaintiff is required to state the basis for his claim for relief against each individual defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Generalized statementSse oe fW alalelkgeerd vw. Sroonutghd oCienng. wBeillll nToelt. sCaot.isfy Plaintiff’s obligation to properly plead the claim. , 904 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that a proper pleading requires more
than “bare bones” allegations). Plaintiff’s pleading here is no more than generalized statements that “Terrebonne Parish” put a hold on him in the Lafourche Parish jail due to a “probation warrant.” If Terrebonne Parish – as named by Plaintiff in his complaint – refers to TPCG, TPCG is not even the proper parAtyd athmast vo.v MercsCeoeys, controls, or is responsible for the district courts or the District Attorney. , No. 11-0129, 2011 WL 6935332, *3 (M.D. La. Nov. 9, 2011) (finding dismissal appropriate when plaintiff failed to allege direct personal involvement by supervisory official). Plaintiff has not stated a claim for any type of violation against TPCG. Plaintiff has named TPCG (Terrebonne Parish) as a
defendant without any facts to support a claim against it. Plaintiff’s complaint is merely conclusory. Accordingly, the Court dismisses these claims. B. Monell Claims
TPCG is the only Terrebonne Parish-related defendant named by Plaintiff. Any claim against a defendant in an official cBaupragcei tvy. Pisa, riinsh r oefa lSitt.y T, aam cmlaaimny against the government
entity which the defendant serves, Monell , 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999), what is commonly referred to as a claim. The existence of a constitutional violation and a municipality’s liability for that violation are two separate issues, and liabilityB raottwanch ve. sB oonlilny when the municipality itself causes the constitHutaioren avl. Cviiotyla otfi oCno raitn tihss Mueis. s . , 500 Fed. Appx. 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing M, o7n4e Fll.3d at 649, n. 4 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Regarding claims generally, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: a plaintiff must Iinn itoiradlleyr atlole gheo ltdh aat amnu onficfiicpiaalli tpyo olirc ya o lro ccauls tgoomve wrnams ean cta uunseit inlia fbalcet oufn tdheer Sdeecptrioivna 1ti9o8n3 offo rr itghhet sm inisfcloicntdeudct of one of its employees, , a plaintiff must allege that the custom or policy served as a moving force behind the constitutional vi.o lTaot isoant isafyt tihses ucaeu soer int hfaactt r[ehqisu]i reinmjeunrties resulted from the execution of an official policy or custom. The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation, moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain Spiller vs.p Ceictiyfi co ff aTcetxs.. City, Police Dep’t
, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added; citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Further, “[a] plaintiff may not infer a pCoollliec yv .m Berarezloys bCetyc.ause harm resulted from some intersaecet iaolnso w Witeht zae lg vo. vPeernnzmateontal entity.” , 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993); id, eCnivt.i fAy. No. 09-7211, 2009 WL 5125465, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 2009). Rather, he must Stheee policy or custom that allegedly caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Murray v. Town of Mansura Treece v. Louisiana , 76 FW. Aetpzpe’lx 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); , 74 F. App’x 315, 316s o(5letlhy Cir. 2003); , 2009 WL 5125465, at *3. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable because it employsr eas ptoonrdtfeeaats osur p–e roior,r in other Mwoonredlsl, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory.” , 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). In other words, attempts to recover against TPCG are limited to claims directly associated with the policy Ssetea tMemoneenllt sv,. Dreegpu’tl aotfi oSnocs., Saenrdv s.d Oefc itshieo nCsit yo foffi cNiaelwly Yaodrokpted and promulgated by the TPCG. , F4r3a6ir Ue .Sv.. A65rl8in, g6t9o1n (1978). Plaintiff alleges no official policy or custom in his complaint. , 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir.1992) (finding stehea ta lasoll eMgaotriroisn sv . oDfa all assi nCgoluen toyr isolated incident do not demonstrate a policy or custom); ,
960 F. Supp. 2d 665, 687 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that claim of failure to respond to obvious physical and medical needs would be dismissed when it was premised on an isolated issue versus a policy or custom). In this case, Guillotte has also failed to allege that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy or custom, much lesMs odnoeells he identify such a policy or custom of the TPCG. He has thus failed to state a proper claim against TPCG. Guillotte does not assert any factual allegations related to a written or express TPCG policy, nor does he show a widespread pattern or practice of TPCG employees. The Complaint fails to mention
a single fact outside of Guillotte’s own alleged illegal incarceration. “A § 1983 plaintiFffr amirues tv . pCleitayd o ffa Actrsli nwgittohn sufficient particularity to meet all the elements of recovery.” , 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that conclusory allegations of policies were insufficient to state a claim where the complaint stated no facts to support assertions that policies or lack thereof resulted in a violation of rights). As noted, while there is no heightened pleading standard with respect
to claims against municipalities, “a plaintiff may not infer a policy merely because harm resulted from some interaction with a governmental entity. The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlyinMg acyosn vs.t iBtudt. ioofn Caol mvimol’artsi,o Pno, rmt oorfeNoevwe rO, rclaenannsot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Colle v. B razos Cnty., ,T Nexo.. 14-1014, 2015 WL 1245683, *10 (E.SDp. ilLlear. Mv. aCri. t1y 8o, f 2T0e1x5. )C i(tqyu, oPtoilnicge Dep’t , 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993)); , 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)) (granting motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to identify any official policy or custom that caused her alleged injuries). As noted above, the Fifth Circuit – as well as its District Courts – have repeatedly hMealdtt htehwats evv. Bidoewnicee Coofu annty ,i sToelxa.ted incident is insufficient to establish a customF roari rpeolicy.
, 600 Fed. Appx. 933, 934 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing , 957 F.2d at 1278) (affirming dismissal of complaint without leave to amend where allegations of deliberCaotlel ieirn dvi.f fReorbenerctes were confined to the actions of the unknown correctional officers); , No. 13-245, 2015 WL 1128399, *4, n.29 (M.D. La. March 11, 2015) (granting motion to dismiss municipal liability claim against sheriff and compiling cases for the proposition that an isolated incident combined with conclusory allegations of policy, practice, and custom is insufficient to state a claim). Without one factual allegation to show an alleged constitutional violation was
committed pursuant to a TPCG policy or custom, the complaint attempts to hold TPCG respondeat superior Id. liable on a theory. This is prohibited under § 1983. Accordingly, the instant motion is granted with respect to the Section 1983 claims against TPCG, and tIhVo.se clCaoimncsl aurseio dnismissed with prejudice.
IFTo rI SthOeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons, GRANTED IT IS FURTHER t hOaRt tDhEeR MEoDtion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 40) is . tDhIaStM tIhSeS EfeDd eWraITl Hla wPR cElJaUimDsIC aEgainst the Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government are3 rd February . New Orleans, Louisiana, this ____ day of ______________________, 2022.
MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE