Guillory v. Contra Costa County

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ANDREW SAMUEL GUILLORY, Case No. 25-cv-00084-WHO

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. DISMISS

10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY PAROLE, et Re: Dkt. Nos. 27, 31, 32 al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Pro se plaintiff Andrew Samuel Guillory (“Guillory”) filed this action on January 3, 2025, 14 against his parole officer, defendant Carlos DeJesus, and the Division of Adult Parole Operations 15 (“DAPO”), which is part of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the 16 “CDCR”), (together, the “Contra Costa defendants”), challenging the condition of his parole that 17 requires him to participate in a sex offender group therapy program facilitated by the HOPE 18 Program.1 He believes that the condition constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 19 the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and violates his constitutional right to 20 due process and equal protection because it forces him to disclose what he says was a “juvenile 21 adjudication” in front of “convicted child molesters.” He also claims that the defendants’ 22 disclosure of records pertaining to that “juvenile adjudication” in the context of his participation in 23 the HOPE Program violates the California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 827 and 828. 24 Guillory previously asked for preliminary injunctive relief preventing the defendants from 25 enforcing the challenged condition of his parole. I denied his request, explaining that his claims 26

27 1 The HOPE Program is also a defendant in this case, though it has never entered an appearance, 1 were not likely to prevail on their merits because, among other things, DeJesus is entitled to 2 absolute immunity for claims like Guillory’s, which arise out of DeJesus’s imposition of parole 3 conditions, and DAPO is immune from Guillory’s claims under Eleventh Amendment. 4 The Contra Costa defendants now move to dismiss Guillory’s complaint. Their motion is 5 granted. DeJesus is entitled to the absolute immunity afforded to parole officers engaging in their 6 duties, and DAPO is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Moreover, Guillory’s claims, as 7 pleaded, are implausible. He is on parole for a violation of California Penal Code section 8 290.012(a), having failed to register as a sex offender after being convicted of “at least one count 9 of Attempted Rape” in 1995. He does not contest that he failed to register as a sex offender. 10 California Penal Code section 290 requires his participation in a Sex Offender Treatment Program. 11 Accordingly, the condition of parole that Guillory challenges—that he attend a sex offender 12 treatment program—is likely reasonable, particularly considering the broad deference afforded to 13 parole offices determining such conditions. I will give Guillory leave to amend his complaint one 14 more time, to clarify claims relating to alleged falsification of documents that he raises for the first 15 time in opposition to the Contra Costa defendants’ motion. 16 BACKGROUND 17 I. RELEVANT FACTS 18 On October 19, 2022, Guillory was charged with failing to update his sex offender 19 registration annually, as mandated by California Penal Code section 290.012(a) (Felony). He is 20 required to update it within five working days of his birthday, based on his felony conviction and 21 juvenile adjudication for Attempted Rape, California Penal Code section 261(a)(2) in 1995. He 22 failed to do so. Defendants’ RJN (“Defs’ RJN”) [Dkt. No. 26-1] Exs. A-B.2 Guillory had also 23 2 The defendants request that I take judicial notice of two documents that they submitted as part of 24 their opposition to Guillory’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Dkt. No. 26-1 (Defs’ RJN). The first is the abstract of judgment in People v. Guillory, Superior Court of California, County of 25 San Mateo, Case No. 22-NF012889-A, which indicates that on April 21, 2-23, Guillory pleaded to one count of violation of Cal. Penal Code § 290.012(a), Failure to Register as a Sex Offender. 26 Defs’ RJN, Ex. A. As this document is a matter of public record and its authenticity is not subject to dispute, I will take judicial notice of it. The second is the felony information in the same case, 27 People v. Guillory, Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, Case No. 22-NF012889- 1 been convicted of other serious and/or violent felonies between 1995 and 2005, making him 2 subject to sentencing pursuant to California Penal Code section 667(b)-(j) (the “three strikes” law) 3 and Penal Code section 1170.12(c)(1) (which provides sentencing modifications for individuals 4 with prior serious or violent felony convictions). Defs’ RJN, Ex. B. 5 As a condition of his parole from his violation of Penal Code section 290.012(a), the parole 6 office in Contra Costa County (through Guillory’s parole officer, Carlos DeJesus) required 7 Guillory to join the HOPE Program sex offender treatment program and attend sessions twice a 8 week. Dkt. No. 6 (Amended Complaint, or “AC”) at 1. Guillory has been told that his parole will 9 be revoked if he does not participate in the program. 10 II. ALLEGATIONS 11 In his Amended Complaint, Guillory alleges that participation in the HOPE Program 12 violates his constitutional rights and also California Welfare and Institutions Code sections 827 13 and 828. AC at 1. He says that DeJesus “shared [his] protected, and confidential juvenile 14 adjudication with the HOPE Program,” which he believes violates California state confidentiality 15 laws pertaining to juvenile records, and that the HOPE Program “forced [him] to look at 16 photographs of children, and the person showing me the photographs asked [him] if [he] want[ed] 17 to have sex with those children,” which he believes constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in 18 violation of the Eighth Amendment. AC at 1. Guillory claims that “[b]eing forced to discuss [his] 19 protected, and confidential juvenile adjudication in front of convicted child molesters could put 20 [him] at risk,” and characterizes the rehabilitation program as “excessive and disproportionate 21 punishment” for a juvenile adjudication that occurred “decades” ago. Id. 22 In the opposition that he filed in response to the Contra Costa defendants’ motion to 23 dismiss, Guillory includes new allegations. See Opposition (“Oppo.”) [Dkt. No. 34].3 He states: 24 “I want to be clear that I am accusing Contra Costa County parole, and Carlos DeJesus of 25 defamation, slander, and falsification of records.” Id. at 1. He states that “[e]verything that was 26

27 1 recorded on video and the static 99 report meets these criteria, and the statements made by Contra 2 Costa County parole on video at my containment meeting at the Hope Program also meets these 3 criteria.” Id. Here, Guillory is seemingly expanding upon something that he included in the 4 context of seeking a preliminary injunction, where he contended that he was never convicted of a 5 sex offense and that Contra Costa County had added convictions to his “Static-99R.” See Dkt. No. 6 15 (Opposition/Response re Motion for Extension of Time and Motion for Preliminary Injunction) 7 (alleging that the parole office added claims to his Static-99R report, and then “illegally shared” it 8 with the HOPE Program). 9 A Static-99R is an actuarial risk assessment instrument for predicting the risk of sexual 10 recidivism in adult male sex offenders. Guillory attached something entitled “Static-99R 2016 11 Screening,” (which appears to be a report generated on May 18, 2023), to his preliminary 12 injunction request; he claimed that the convictions listed within the report were falsely added. See 13 Dkt. No. 15, at p. 2. The attached Static-99R report details Guillory’s past sex offenses, including 14 a conviction for Attempted Rape in 1995. See id. It also states that while on parole in 2013, 15 Guillory was arrested and returned to CDCR custody for 180 days for Sexual Battery and Use of 16 Alcohol. Id. At the June 11, 2025, hearing on the Contra Costa defendants’ motion to dismiss, 17 Guillory stated again that everything on the Static-99R was falsified and that its contents are 18 defamatory. It is unclear whether Guillory claims that all information on the Static-99R report is 19 “falsified” or amounts to “defamation” or “slander,” or only some of the information is. It is also 20 not clear from the Amended Complaint or Guillory’s representations at the hearing whom he 21 believes is responsible for this alleged falsification. 22 III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 23 Guillory filed his initial complaint on January 3, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. Upon review, 24 Magistrate Judge Thomas Hixson found the complaint to be deficient because it did not comply 25 with Rule 8, nor did it state a cognizable claim against the defendants. Dkt. No. 4. Judge Hixson 26 ordered Guillory, if he was able, to file an amended complaint by February 21, 2025, including all 27 facts and claims to be presented, and complying with Rule 8. Dkt. No. 4. Guillory filed an 1 most ways; for example, it was not clear from the Amended Complaint whom Guillory meant to 2 name as defendants. Dkt. No. 6 (Amended Complaint or “AC”). Guillory, upon Judge Hixson’s 3 request, clarified who the defendants were, and those defendants—the Contra Costa Parole Office, 4 Parole Officer DeJesus, and the HOPE Program—were served.4 Dkt. Nos. 8, 9. 5 On April 11, 2025, the Contra Costa defendants filed a motion for extension of time to file 6 a dispositive motion. Dkt. No. 13. In opposing that motion, Guillory also requested preliminary 7 injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from forcing him to participate in the HOPE Program 8 during the pendency of this lawsuit. Dkt. No. 15 (Opposition/Response and Motion for 9 Preliminary Injunction). 10 After considering the papers submitted, I denied Guillory’s motion for a preliminary 11 injunction. I explained that he had not shown that he was likely to prevail on the merits of his case 12 because, among other things, the condition of parole he challenged—that he attend a sex offender 13 treatment program—was likely reasonable, considering his section 290.012(a) violation and the 14 broad deference afforded to parole officers in determining conditions of parole. Moreover, I found 15 that the Contra Costa defendants were in all likelihood immune from Guillory’s claims. Dkt. No. 16 28 (Order Denying Preliminary Injunction). The other factors courts weigh when considering 17 whether to afford preliminary injunctive relief also disfavored Guillory. Id. The defendants 18 moved to dismiss Guillory’s claims shortly thereafter. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 21 sufficiency of a claim. A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 22 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cook v. 23 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Rule 8 24 provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 25 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint must plead “enough facts 26 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 27 1 570 (2007). Plausibility does not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility 2 that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 687 (2009). A complaint 3 must therefore provide a defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for 4 relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quotations and citation omitted). 5 In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as 6 true and construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Manzarek v. 7 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 8 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as 9 true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere 10 conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court 11 should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it 12 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. 13 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citations and quotations omitted). 14 However, a court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad 15 faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 16 previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party ..., [and] futility of amendment.’” 17 Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (alterations in 18 original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 19 DISCUSSION 20 I. THE HOPE PROGRAM 21 Guillory named the HOPE Program as a defendant in this action. It was served with the 22 Summons and Complaint on March 25, 2025, Dkt. No. 12, and failed to appear or otherwise 23 respond by the time prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk entered a 24 notice of Entry of Default. Dkt. No. 25 (entered on April 29, 2025). On May 14, 2025, Guillory 25 filed a motion for default judgment as to the HOPE Program. Dkt. No. 31. It has not responded to 26 that motion. At the hearing on June 11, 2025, counsel for the Contra Costa defendants explained 27 that he does not represent the HOPE Program and has no information about its participation (or 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) permits a court to enter default judgment against 2 the defendant in default. While default judgments are ordinarily disfavored because “[c]ases 3 should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible[,]” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 4 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), the district court’s decision as to “whether to enter 5 default judgment” is “discretionary.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 6 Guillory asserts claims against both the Contra Costa defendants insofar as they ordered 7 his participation in the HOPE Program, and against the program itself. While his allegations are 8 often unclear regarding whether he is accusing the Contra Costa defendants, the HOPE Program, 9 or both of violations of his privacy and unconstitutional behavior, it is apparent that Guillory seeks 10 to hold the HOPE Program liable for the wrongs he perceives as having been done against him 11 separate from the Contra Costa defendants. 12 Accordingly, the HOPE Program is ORDERED to respond to Guillory’s default judgment 13 motion by August 11, 2025. I will hold a hearing on this matter on August 20, 2025, at 2:00 PM, 14 via Zoom videoconference, which counsel for the HOPE Program should attend. I will rule on the 15 question of default judgment after the hearing. 16 II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS 17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain 18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. The Contra 19 Costa defendants argue that the Amended Complaint still does not adhere to Rule 8. But Guillory 20 has clarified whom he intends to sue, he has identified that he believes his Eighth Amendment, 21 due process, and equal protection rights have been violated, and that some (or all) of the 22 defendants have violated California state privacy laws pertaining to juvenile adjudication records. 23 Given Guillory’s pro se status and the defendants’ evident ability to respond to his allegations with 24 cognizable defenses, I will address his claims. I am dismissing them as discussed below. 25 III. CONTRA COSTA DEFENDANTS’ IMMUNITY 26 As I explained in the order denying Guillory’s preliminary injunction request, the claims 27 against the Contra Costa defendants fail because they are barred by the absolute immunity 1 DAPO as a state entity. Nothing has changed since that order. 2 A. Absolute immunity for parole officer 3 It is well-settled that judicial officers and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity 4 from civil rights suits when they engage in activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase 5 of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 430 (1976). The Ninth Circuit 6 has held repeatedly that parole officers are absolutely immune from suit arising from “the 7 imposition of parole conditions” under a theory of quasi-judicial absolute immunity. Swift v. 8 California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d at 909; see 9 also Thornton v. Brown, 724 F.3d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Chavez v. Robinson, 12 10 F.4th 978, 997 (9th Cir. 2021). “This immunity applies even where parole officers ‘impos[e] 11 allegedly unconstitutional parole conditions.’” ” Chavez v. Robinson, 12 F.4th at 997 (citing 12 Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839–40). To the extent that Guillory’s allegations against 13 DeJesus solely concern the imposition of Guillory’s conditions of parole—specifically, the 14 mandate that Guillory participate in the HOPE Program sex offender treatment program—DeJesus 15 is immune from Guillory’s claims. 16 In his opposition, Guillory states that he is “accusing Contra Costa County parole, and 17 Carlos de Jesus [sic] of defamation, slander, and falsification of records.” Dkt. No. 34. He 18 contends that DeJesus “added an embezzlement charge” to the Static-99R report “that [he] [has] 19 never been charged or convicted of.” Id. These allegations are not reflected in his Amended 20 Complaint. The Contra Costa defendants do not respond to them in their opposition papers. At 21 the hearing, counsel for the Contra Costa defendants pointed out that Guillory has offered nothing 22 beyond his conclusory allegation that the Static-99R was falsified to substantiate his claim. 23 I will give Guillory leave to amend to explain his allegations pertaining to potential 24 falsification of the Static-99R. He must allege the factual basis for this claim, stating what is false, 25 how it is false, who is responsible for the falsity, and any other relevant information. 26 B. Eleventh Amendment immunity for DAPO 27 Guillory’s claims against DAPO are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which provides 1 equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” 2 U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over suits by 3 individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, unless either the State unequivocally consents 4 to waive its sovereign immunity or Congress abrogates it. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 5 963 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1992); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99- 6 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). 7 The United States Supreme Court has held that an “official-capacity suit is, in all respects 8 other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 9 166, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72, 10 105 S. Ct. 873, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1985); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 11 1991). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the 12 entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. 13 Guillory’s Amended Complaint is not clear about which entities he believes committed 14 what misdeeds, but as I explained in the prior order, DAPO is part of the California Department of 15 Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), an agency of the state. The Contra Costa County 16 parole office, out of which DAPO operates, is a CDCR field office. To the extent that Guillory 17 identifies the local Contra Costa County parole office as a defendant in its official capacity, the 18 real party in interest is the State of California. And since the CDCR is a State entity, Guillory’s 19 claims that proceed against the local parole office in an individual capacity are also, functionally, 20 against the State of California. 21 With respect to § 1983, a governmental agency that is an arm of the state is not a person. 22 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Sato v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 23 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining agencies of the state are immune under the Eleventh Amendment 24 from private damages or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court); Flint v. Dennison, 488 25 F.3d 816, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme Court has held that a state’s agency 26 that is responsible for incarceration and correction of prisoners is a state agency for the purposes 27 of the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam). 1 Guillory’s suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Amendment of the claims against DAPO would 2 be futile, given their nature and DAPO’s immunity. They are dismissed with prejudice. 3 IV. GUILLORY HAS NOT STATED A PLAUSIBLE CLAIM 4 Even if the Contra Costa defendants were not immune from Guillory’s claims, he has not 5 plausibly alleged that the challenged parole condition is unconstitutional, that the defendants’ use 6 of his juvenile adjudication records in the context of the treatment program violates federal or state 7 law, or that the defendants have falsified records. 8 A. The conditions of Guillory’s parole appear lawful 9 The California Penal Code section 3053 provides that “The Board of Parole Hearings shall 10 have the power to establish and enforce rules and regulations under which inmates committed to 11 state prisons may be allowed to go upon parole outside the prison buildings and enclosures when 12 eligible for parole, and “[t]he Board of Prison Terms upon granting any parole to any prisoner may 13 also impose on the parole any conditions that it may deem proper.” Cal. Penal Code § 3053. And 14 parolees may be subject to special conditions, which include but are not limited to psychiatric 15 treatment programs, and “[a]ny other condition deemed necessary by the Board [of Parole 16 Hearings] or the Department [of Corrections and Rehabilitation] due to unusual circumstances.’” 17 Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 2513; Decker Coal Co. v. Pehringer, 8 F.4th 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 18 2021). There is a “general presumption of constitutionality of statutes.” Decker, 8 F.4th at 1133. 19 Public records show that Guillory was convicted of Penal Code section 290.012(a) and was 20 convicted of Penal Code section 261(a)(2)-attempted. See Defs’ RJN, Exs. A-B. California Penal 21 Code section 290 requires participation in a Sex Offender Treatment Program. Guillory has not 22 shown why he would be exempted from that requirement. In his preliminary injunction request, 23 he stated that he was never convicted of a sex offense and Contra Costa added convictions to his 24 Static 99-R; in opposing Contra Costa’s motion to dismiss, he contends that Contra Costa falsified 25 records and defamed him, and states that he has “never been convicted of rape by force.” Dkt. No. 26 34. 27 Putting aside, for now, that his allegations about records falsification appear for the first 1 which I have taken judicial notice. Moreover, it appears that his challenged condition of parole— 2 that he participate in the HOPE Program—is a condition imposed not because he was convicted of 3 “rape by force,” as he implies in his opposition, but because he failed to register as a sex offender 4 as required under California law. 5 All facts suggest that the decision to mandate that Guillory participate in a sex offender 6 treatment program as a condition of his parole for violation of Cal. Penal Code section 290.012(a) 7 is lawful. Guillory argues that his participation in the program “force[s] someone to relieve [sic] 8 something traumatic from their past,” and that it is “excessive and disproportionate punishment.” 9 Dkt. No. 6 at 2. While I do not doubt that he is troubled by his mandatory participation in the 10 HOPE Program as a condition of his parole, he offers no authority, and I know of none, suggesting 11 that it is unlawful. 12 B. The California Welfare and Institutions Code does not afford Guillory relief 13 Guillory also alleges that the subject of his juvenile convictions violates the Due Process 14 and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution. He offers no authority to support 15 this conclusion, and it is implausible considering the foregoing analysis. See discussion supra, 16 Sections III, IV. His only legal support for this conclusion is to cite California Welfare and 17 Institutions Code sections 827 and 828; however, neither statute addresses parole or sex offender 18 treatment programs. They concern how a minor’s case file might be properly inspected. Cal. 19 Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 827-828. Nothing suggests that those sections apply to preclude the Contra 20 Costa defendants from providing copies of legal documents relevant to a parolee’s participation in 21 a sex offender treatment program to the facilitator of that program. Taking all the facts that 22 Guillory has alleged to be true, he has not illustrated a cognizable claim for unconstitutional parole 23 conditions.5 24 C. Falsification of records 25 Throughout his preliminary injunction motion and his response to the Contra Costa 26 5 The Contra Costa defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because I 27 have already decided that Guillory’s individual parole officer DeJesus is entitled to absolute 1 defendants’ motion, Guillory has alluded to falsification of his Static-99R report. See Dkt. Nos. 2 15, 23, 34. He has not included allegations about this in his Amended Complaint. See generally, 3 AC. If Guillory is able to plead facts that support his allegation that the defendants somehow 4 || changed or falsified his Static-99R report, he may amend his complaint. If he chooses to amend, 5 || he should include facts explaining who he believes falsified his record and when it was falsified, 6 why he believes it has been falsified, and what impact he believes that falsification has on the core 7 issue of this case: the defendants’ imposition of the parole condition that Guillory attend a sex 8 || offender treatment class. 9 CONCLUSION 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Contra Costa defendants’ motion is GRANTED. The claims 11 against DAPO are dismissed with prejudice because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 12 Guillory may amend his complaint within 30 days of the date below to clarify his allegations 13 against the other defendants regarding falsification of records. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: July 16, 2025

5 17 . William H. Orrick Z 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28