Guillory, Martin Luther v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 11, 2005
• Docket: 14-03-00723-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion issued January 11, 2005

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion issued January 11, 2005.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

_______________

NO. 14-03-00723-CR

MARTIN LUTHER GUILLORY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_______________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 951,941

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Martin Luther Guillory appeals a conviction for aggravated robbery^[1] on the grounds that: (1) his constitutional due process rights were violated when he was tried dressed in jail clothes; (2) extraneous offense evidence was erroneously admitted into evidence; and (3) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction.  We affirm.

Appellant=s first point of error contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by proceeding to trial while he was dressed in jail clothes.  However, due process requires only that a defendant not be compelled to stand trial in such clothes.  Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976); Randle v. State, 826 S.W.2d 943, 944-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  In this case, because appellant not only failed to object to going to trial in jail clothes, but affirmatively declined the trial court=s repeated offers to obtain other clothes, no such compulsion occurred.  Therefore, his first point of error is without merit and overruled. 

            Appellant=s second through seventh points of error challenge the admission of evidence of three extraneous robbery or theft offenses appellant committed against the complainant.  The second, fourth, and sixth points of error are based on relevance, and the third, fifth, and seventh points are based on unfair prejudice.  However, because appellant failed to object at trial on the ground of unfair prejudice, his third, fifth, and seventh points of error present nothing for our review and are overruled.

A trial court=s ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case and in light of what was before the trial court when the ruling was made.  Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  Extraneous offense evidence is admissible if it is relevant for a purpose other than to prove character conformity, such as to rebut a defensive theory.  Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 219-21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

In this case, before the State introduced the extraneous offense evidence, appellant elicited testimony on cross-examination suggesting that he and the complainant were friends and that appellant was actually trying to assist the appellant at the time he was accused of robbing him.  Therefore, evidence of the three previous instances in which appellant had taken money or personal property from the complainant was relevant to rebut this defensive theory and show motive.  Accordingly, appellant=s second, fourth, and sixth points of error are overruled.

Appellant=s eighth and ninth points of error challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to prove that appellant ever threatened the complainant or caused him pain or physical injury.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 29.03 (Vernon 2003).  In reviewing legal sufficiency, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S., 307, 319 (1979); Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the evidence supporting the finding of guilt is so weak, or the contrary evidence so strong, that the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard could not have been met.  See Threadgill, 146 S.W.3d at 664.

In this case, Freddie Maroney, the complainant=s next-door neighbor, testified that at about 9:00 on the night of the offense, she heard noises outside her window, appellant say AWhere is my [expletive] money?,@ and a thumping sound like someone being pushed up against a car.  She then heard the complainant weakly reply, AI don=t know what you=re talking about.@  By the time Freddie and her husband, Bruce, looked out the door, a car was backing out of the complainant=s driveway, and the complainant was not there.

Freddie=s husband, Bruce, testified that when the car returned five minutes later, he went outside to check on the complainant and heard appellant ask, AWhere is the [expletive] money?  Where is the [expletive] money?@  Bruce testified that appellant was angry, and that he saw appellant pushing the complainant down in the seat of the car.  Two other men were also inside the car.

Freddie testified that appellant then grabbed the complainant and pulled him out of the car, jerking him out in a bear hug, and held him like a dishrag, with his legs dangling off the ground.  When the complainant again said, AWhat money? I don=t know what you=re talking about,@ appellant threw him, causing him to hit a brick flower planter. The complainant then said, AYou scared me.  You made me pee myself.@  Bruce testified that, as he helped the complainant up and into his house, the complainant appeared very upset.

This evidence was legally sufficient to prove that appellant threatened the complainant or placed him in fear of bodily injury.  See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. ' 29.03.  Because appellant cites no contrary evidence, his factual sufficiency challenge is also without merit.  Accordingly, appellant=s eighth and ninth points of error are overruled, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/        Richard H. Edelman

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed January 11, 2005.

Panel consists of Justices Yates, Edelman, and Guzman.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]           A jury found appellant guilty, and the trial court assessed punishment of thirty-five years confinement.