Guillermo Zuniga-Lozano v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 20-73614
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUILLERMO ZUNIGA-LOZANO, No. 20-73614

Petitioner, Agency No. A096-059-456

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: N.R. SMITH, NGUYEN, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Guillermo Zuniga-Lozano, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for cancellation of

removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). A due process violation occurs when the proceeding “was so fundamentally

unfair” that a noncitizen was “prevented from reasonably presenting his case” and

there was prejudice, “which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have

been affected by the alleged violation.” Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1199

(9th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

Here, the IJ did not violate Zuniga-Lozano’s due process rights. Although

Zuniga-Lozano did list his wife, Maria, on his witness list, the IJ told Zuniga-

Lozano several times that any witness had to submit declarations thirty days before

the merits hearing. Even though Zuniga-Lozano submitted a declaration from his

daughter, he did not submit one from Maria. The merits hearing was continued

several times and took place almost two years after the IJ first instructed Zuniga-

Lozano to submit a declaration for any witnesses. Because Zuniga-Lozano thus

had ample time to submit Maria’s declaration and did not, it was not

“fundamentally unfair” for the IJ to exclude Maria’s testimony. See id.

Even if the IJ erred, Zuniga-Lozano did not demonstrate any prejudice due

to the exclusion of Maria’s testimony. The basis for Zuniga-Lozano’s cancellation

application was that his removal would result in hardship to his daughter.

Although Maria could have testified about any hardship to their daughter, their

daughter testified at the merits hearing and was found credible. The exclusion of

Maria’s testimony therefore did not “prevent the introduction of significant

2 testimony.” See Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2009). Indeed,

Zuniga-Lozano’s counsel referred to the daughter as the “main witness,” and to

Maria as a “back-up witness.” See Gutierrez v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th

Cir. 2011) (finding no prejudice where excluded testimonies were “the same types

of evidence” provided by other witnesses). Because Zuniga-Lozano and his

daughter testified, the exclusion of Maria’s testimony did not “prevent[] [him]

from reasonably presenting his case.” See Vilchez, 682 F.3d at 1199.

Zuniga-Lozano contends that had Maria testified, she could have

corroborated his testimony, which could have affected the adverse credibility

finding against him. That argument ignores, however, that the IJ based Zuniga-

Lozano’s adverse credibility finding on contradictions between his and his

daughter’s testimonies. Those contradictions would exist even if Maria had

testified so the adverse credibility finding against Zuniga-Lozano was not affected

by the exclusion of Maria’s testimony. See id.

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Zuniga-Lozano’s motion for stay of removal, Dkt. No. 1, is denied.