Guillen v. ICAO

CourtColorado Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 24, 2025
Docket25CA0690
StatusUnpublished

This text of Guillen v. ICAO (Guillen v. ICAO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Colorado Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guillen v. ICAO, (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

25CA0690 Guillen v ICAO 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0690 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 33553-2024

Maritza Guillen,

Petitioner,

v.

Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,

Respondent.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 24, 2025

Maritza Guillen, Pro Se

No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 In this unemployment compensation benefits case, claimant,

Maritza Guillen, seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim

Appeals Office (the Panel). In its order, the Panel affirmed the

hearing officer’s decision dismissing Guillen’s administrative appeal

because of her failure to participate in two hearings. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Guillen applied for unemployment compensation benefits. In

September 2024, a deputy for the Division of Unemployment

Insurance (the Division) disqualified Guillen from receiving benefits

under section 8-73-108(5)(e)(XVII), C.R.S. 2024 (failing to return to

work as scheduled after an authorized leave). Guillen appealed the

deputy’s decision, and the Division set a hearing on her

administrative appeal for November 26, 2024. But Guillen failed to

participate in the hearing and her administrative appeal was

dismissed.

¶3 Guillen requested a new hearing, which the Division set for

December 31, 2024. Guillen did not participate in that hearing

either, and her administrative appeal was dismissed for failing to

participate in the second hearing. Guillen appealed the dismissal

to the Panel, asserting that, at the scheduled time of the hearing,

1 she was “waiting on the phone call” but “it happened to be calls

from unknown numbers” and she did not “deactivate the unknown

number blocker.”

¶4 The Panel affirmed the dismissal of Guillen’s administrative

appeal, observing that Guillen did not answer the calls for the

second hearing despite three attempts to contact her. Two

voicemails were also left for Guillen, one in English and another in

Spanish, with instructions to return the call before 8:15 a.m. that

day to avoid a dismissal. Because the Division didn’t receive a

return call by that time, her administrative appeal was dismissed.

¶5 The Panel also noted that the hearing notices sent to Guillen

were printed in English and Spanish and specified that the call

might come from an out-of-state number. The Panel concluded

that, while Guillen’s failure “to read the entire hearing notice may

have been unintentional and unfortunate, we cannot find that a

reasonably prudent claimant would have made the error.” The

Panel further determined that Guillen’s failure to “listen to the

voicemail messages left on her phone at the time of the hearing was

within her control.”

2 ¶6 The Panel cited Department of Labor & Employment

Regulation 12.1.3.5, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2, which provides

that if a party who appeals a decision fails to participate for two

scheduled hearings as directed, “the appeal shall be dismissed and

the deputy’s decision shall become final.” The Panel concluded that

the hearing officer correctly applied Regulation 12.1.3.5 in

dismissing Guillen’s administrative appeal.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

¶7 The scope of our review of the Panel’s order is narrow. As

relevant, the only issue that we may review is whether the Panel

properly dismissed Guillen’s administrative appeal due to her

failure to appear at the two hearings. Further, we must affirm the

Panel’s order unless its findings of fact do not support its decision,

or the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d),

C.R.S. 2024; see also Huddy v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 894 P.2d

60, 62 (Colo. App. 1995) (other than the powers inherent to any

court, an appellate court’s review of unemployment compensation

orders is limited to the grounds provided in section 8-74-107).

3 III. Analysis

¶8 In her appeal to this court, Guillen makes the same argument

she did to the Panel. She also asserts that the unemployment

process “is something unique” and that she tried to understand the

steps of the process, but nobody told her she needed to “unlock her

phone to get whatever call from unemployment.” She also says she

returned the call to a number “with a 303-something area code” but

that “the communication was bad.”

¶9 After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude

that the Panel correctly applied Regulation 12.1.3.5 in upholding

the dismissal of Guillen’s administrative appeal. If an

administrative appeal is dismissed because an appealing party

failed to appear at the first hearing, and the party requests a new

hearing, “a rebuttable presumption of good cause shall be

established and a new hearing shall be scheduled.” Dep’t of Lab. &

Emp. Reg. 12.1.3.4, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. In this case, good

cause was presumed for Guillen’s failure to successfully participate

in the first hearing, and a second hearing was scheduled.

¶ 10 But Regulation 12.1.3.5 provides that “good cause may not be

established for the failure of an appealing party to participate in a

4 second hearing as directed which was set because that party failed

to participate as directed in the first hearing.” Because Guillen

failed to participate as directed in the second hearing, her

administrative appeal was dismissed and the deputy’s decision

became final under Regulation 12.1.3.5.

¶ 11 The Panel was required to apply the plain language of the

applicable regulations. Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 2019

CO 41, ¶ 25 (when a regulation’s language is clear and

unambiguous, it must be applied as written). Because we conclude

that the Panel’s decision was supported by the record and not

erroneous, we must affirm the Panel’s decision. See

§ 8-74-107(6)(c)-(d).

IV. Disposition

¶ 12 The Panel’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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Related

Dep't of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc.
2019 CO 41 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2019)
Huddy v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
894 P.2d 60 (Colorado Court of Appeals, 1995)

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