Guilford Trust Company v. Milo Community Hospital

227 A.2d 612, 1967 Me. LEXIS 198
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedMarch 28, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 227 A.2d 612 (Guilford Trust Company v. Milo Community Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guilford Trust Company v. Milo Community Hospital, 227 A.2d 612, 1967 Me. LEXIS 198 (Me. 1967).

Opinion

MARDEN, Justice.

On report. This is a complaint seeking construction of a clause creating a trust in the Will of Ina E. Boone, late of Brown-ville.

The Will was executed in 1946 and- remained in the possession of the testatrix.

Paragraph EIGHTH of the Will, creating the reference trust, referred to “directions attached.” The Piscataquis Savings Bank was nominated as Executor and Trustee of the Will.

Shortly before the death on November 18, 1958 of the testatrix she delivered to an official of the Piscataquis Savings Bank a sealed envelope, which upon being opened after her death was found to contain a Will and an undated, handwritten and signed document in letter form (letter) bearing at its top, in a position which would indicate the addressee, the words “Piscataquis Savings Bank.”

If the letter were physically attached to the Will, in any way, it was by a paper clip.

The envelope and contents were delivered to the bank’s counsel, who seasonably delivered the Will with the letter attached to it by a paper clip to the Probate Court.

The Will was seasonably allowed on January 1, 1959, but the status of the letter does not appear to have been adjudicated at that time.

Paragraph EIGHTH of the Will read as follows:

“I give, bequeath and devise all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate to Piscataquis Savings Bank, of Dover-Fox-croft, Maine, in trust nevertheless, to be used toward establishing a home for aged people and cripples in Piscataquis County, preferably in the Town of Milo, providing such a home can be established within a period of ten years from the date of my decease. If at the expiration of ten years from the date of my decease such a home has not been established, then I direct my Trustee hereinafter named, to pay yearly to the Shriners Hospital, Springfield, Mass, the interest from said residue of my estate, but when a home for aged people and cripples is established in Piscata-quis County I direct my said Trustee to pay the residue of my estate to the Directors or Trustees of said home to he used according to directions attached to this my last will and testament; if at the end of twenty years from the date of my decease such a home has not been established in Piscataquis County, then I direct my said Trustee to pay to said Shriners Hospital said residue and remainder of my estate. I name Piscataquis Savings Bank, of Dover-Foxcroft, Maine, Trustee and Executor of this my last Will and Testament, hereby revoking all former Wills by me made.”

The Piscataquis Savings Bank being unqualified to act as a fiduciary, the Guilford Trust Company, here plaintiff, was appointed Trustee and has since served in that capacity.

*614 The Milo Community Hospital (Hospital), by virtue of planned expansion of its facilities, has since claimed that it is qualified to receive the corpus of the Boone Trust, and has made a demand upon the Trustee. The Trustee addressed a petition to the Probate Court asking the effect, if any, of the so-called “directions attached” to the Will and whether the Hospital was entitled to the fund, which court by decision of April 25, 1966, held that the instructions (letter) were not a part of the Will, but that the Hospital was entitled to receive the trust fund. The Shriners Hospital for Crippled Children appealed and the matter comes up on report with stipulated questions as follow:

“A. Does the document in a form of a letter addressed to the Piscataquis Savings Bank filed in the Probate Court with the will constitute part of the will, or if not, may it be considered in defining the testatrix’s intentions in connection with the use of the word ‘home’ in the aforesaid will?
“B. In the light of the testimony and evidence presented to the Probate Court in and for Piscataquis County, does the proposed building and services therein described constitute ‘a home for aged people and cripples in Piscataquis County’?
“C. Does the Milo Community Hospital qualify as a' beneficiary of the trust established under the Will of Ina E. Boone as said will is finally constituted and interpreted by the Law Court?”

Question 1

In the present proceeding the letter was identified as being done by the hand of the testatrix and the signature to it was identified as that of the testatrix. The letter was expressed in the first person and explained what the writer meant by “an old womans home” and how, in general terms, such home would qualify as beneficiary of the residuary estate. The nature and content of the letter would permit it logically to be considered as “directions” applicable to the Will. Whether or not it was “attached” to the Will under circumstances as to make it a part of the Will by incorporation, see Fitzsimmons v. Harmon, 108 Me. 456, 458, 81 A. 667, 37 L.R.A.,N.S., 400, and Sleeper v. Littlefield, 129 Me. 194, 199, 151 A. 150, 71 A.L.R. 518, is in issue.

There is no evidence that the letter was in existence at the time the Will was executed.

If the letter had been allowed by the Probate Court as part of the Will there could be no issue about its use for interpretative purposes at this time. It could not have been so allowed, for the issue was im-pleaded and considered by the Probate Court in the present proceeding. In any event the burden of establishing the Will of Ina E. Boone was upon its proponents, 57 Am.Jur., Wills § 854, which proof includes observation of the statutory formalities, Mitchell et al., Exceptants In re Will of Emma J. Loomis, 133 Me. 81, 82, 174 A. 38, and qualification of any document sought to be incorporated within the Will by reference, Sleeper, supra, at page 199, 151 A.2d at p. 150. If it were not allowed as part of the Will it can neither be considered a part of the Will now, 7 years later, nor as affecting the interpretation of the Will.

The present record does not qualify it as part of the Will.

The answer to both parts of Question 1 is in the negative.

Question 2

What is a home? The word is understood by everyone, but cannot be completely defined by anyone. Certain it is that the very characteristic which distinguishes a home from all other types of shelter is the characteristic best understood, but least subject to definition.

“It is impossible to formulate a comprehensive definition of the word ‘home.’ *615 * * * Men and animals have an instinctive idea of its meaning.” White v. White (1944), 183 Va. 239, 31 S.E.2d 558 [6], 562.

That characteristic has to do with the peculiar relationship between the person and his home.

“Home”: “Focus of domestic affections (home is where the heart is).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1961.
“A home is a dwelling place of a person, distinguished from other dwelling places of that person by the intimacy of the relation between the person and the place.” Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 13.

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Related

Estate of Sweet
519 A.2d 1260 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1987)
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266 A.2d 218 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1970)

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Bluebook (online)
227 A.2d 612, 1967 Me. LEXIS 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guilford-trust-company-v-milo-community-hospital-me-1967.