Guild v. Warne

36 N.E. 635, 149 Ill. 105
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 29, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 36 N.E. 635 (Guild v. Warne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guild v. Warne, 36 N.E. 635, 149 Ill. 105 (Ill. 1893).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Wilkin

delivered the opinion of the Court:

A statement of the origin, nature and object of this litigation will be found in 127 Ill. 528-29. The decree from which this appeal is prosecuted was rendered on a re-trial of the cause at the October term of the court below for the year 1891. The only issue then submitted to the jury was, whether or not John Warne was, at the time of their execution, mentally capable of malting the conveyances sought to be set aside. Prior to the trial, Clarissa Blackman, a daughter of Warne .and one of the complainants to the bill, died, and her children were made parties in her stead. One of these children and new parties, Dr. F. H. Blackman, and his wife, were allowed to testify on behalf of complainants, over the objection of the •defendants. That ruling is the only error complained of as having occurred during the trial before the jury.

The competency of Dr. Blackman is questioned both because he is a party to the action and because he is interested in the result of the suit. When these objections were urged below, •complainants’ counsel attempted to show by the witness that his mother had so disposed of all her property by will as to leave him no interest whatever in her estate, but they seem to have persisted hvcontinuing him a party complainant to the bill. As such he would unquestionably have been incompetent to testify in his own behalf and that of his co-complainants, at common law, and we are unable to see how it can be maintained that such disability is removed by our statute, unless we ignore section 2 of chapter 51, entitled “Evidence and Depositions.” We think both he and his wife were incompetent witnesses on behalf of complainants. Inasmuch, however, as their disability might be removed, and in our view of the case-the bill should be dismissed for want of sufficient evidence to-, support it, the testimony of these with that of all the other-witnesses in the case has been considered, and given such weight as we think it entitled to, without reference to their present incompetency.

The contention of the complainants below is, that at the time of the execution of the instruments in question John Warne was rendered incapable of transacting the ordinary business affairs of life by the disease of the mind known as; senile dementia, and the decree of the circuit court sustains that contention. In our opinion the evidence not only fails to support it, but is clearly to the contrary. In reaching this conclusion we do not lose sight of the fact that the jury and the chancellor saw the witnesses "and heard them testify, and so were in a better position than we are to weigh their testimony ; nor do W'e ignore the rule that a presumption, for that reason, must be indulged in favor of the decree, which can only be overcome by evidence from which we can say it .is clearly wrong. It is not, however, accurate to say, without qualification, as counsel do, “that appellate courts will not reverse the judgments of trial courts when the evidence of the successful party, considered by itself, without contravening evidence, is clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict.” Language to that effect can doubtless be found in the opinions of this and other courts, but it is only properly used, if at all, where the evidence is conflicting and would justify a finding either way. The testimony of one witness, standing alone, may be clearly sufficient to authorize a verdict and judgment, but if rendered on" that testimony alone, when many others of equal intelligence, truthfulness and opportunity for knowing the facts contradict it, no one will seriously contend that a court of review should not set aside the judgment as being contrary to the evidence. It is also to be borne in mind, though not of controlling importance in this case, that the effect to be given to the verdict of a jury upon a feigned issue in chancery is very different from that of a verdict at law, or where, as in the contest of a will under our statute, the issue must be submitted to a jury. In cases like this, as was said in Kimball v. Cuddy et al. 117 Ill. 218 : “It must be kept in mind that the burden is upon complainants to prove the allegations of their bill; tliat they must show such a degree of mental weakness as renders the maker of the deed incapable of understanding and protecting his own interests; that the mere circumstance that the mental powers have been'somewhat impaired by age or disease is not insufficient, if the maker of the deed still retains a full comprehension of the meaning, design and effect of his acts, unless, by the undue influence of the grantee, he was unable to exercise his will in that respect,”—citing Willemin v. Dunn et al. 93 Ill. 511.

The deed, lease and bill of sale in question were executed in the months of June and August, 1882. The evidence relied upon by the complainants to prove that Warne was at that time of unsound mind, is, with the exception of that of Dr. Blackman, the testimony of non-expert witnesses, who give opinions as to his mental condition about that time, based on what they saw of him and conversations had with him. A large number of this class of witnesses was introduced. Some of them describe him as greatly enfeebled by age, re= peating the stories aud incidents of his early life, telling the same stories over and over in the same conversation, failing to recognize persons with whom he had been familiar, even members of his own family, and a small number of them say he became neglectful of his person and all habits of cleanliness. These are unquestionably symptoms of the disease of the mind with which it is claimed he was afflicted, and some of them are strongly indicative of its presence, but none of them are infallible tests of mental disease in persons of old age,—and to that effect is the expert testimony in this record. Others of these witnesses show little or no opportunity for forming the opinions they give, and their testimony is of no value. The defendants also introduced many witnesses who testified that in their opinions John Warne was in 1882, and in fact as long, as they knew him, a man of sound mind, capable of understanding and comprehending the common business affairs of life. As in the case of the witnesses of complainants, some of these base their opinions on slight observation, and we attach but little importance to their evidence. Others detail-business transactions with him, about that time and long afterwards, which clearly show that he must have been of sound mind; and still others, though transacting no business with him, show that they had good opportunities for forming their opinions, and give intelligent reasons for their belief that he had ordinary intelligence and business capacity.

If would be impossible, within the reasonable limits of an. opinion, to review the evidence of this class of witnesses, and weigh their testimony pro and con, nor could any beneficial results be attained by so doing. If the ease turned on that-class of testimony alone, we would not feel called upon to interfere with the finding .below, although even then, in view of the fact that the burden is upon the complainants, the case would not be free from doubt. When, however, we come to-consider the evidence of those who were present and testify as to the immediate transactions in question, and of other-matters of business growing out of or resulting from them, as well as the expert testimony in the case, the conclusion is irresistible that when he made these conveyances Warne fully understood the nature and effect of the transactions, and was-possessed of at least ordinary business intelligence.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Braun v. Lawder
100 N.E.2d 348 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 1951)
Hudson v. Hudson
86 N.E. 661 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1908)
Seaton v. Lee
77 N.E. 446 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1906)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
36 N.E. 635, 149 Ill. 105, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guild-v-warne-ill-1893.