Guevara v. Guevara

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Guevara v. Guevara

162 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2989, 2015 WL 903953

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 4, 2015

Docket14-0701

StatusPublished

This text of 162 So. 3d 256 (Guevara v. Guevara) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Guevara v. Guevara, 162 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2989, 2015 WL 903953 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Hilda Guevara (“Hilda”), appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her Petition and Independent Action to set Aside Final Judgment and Other Relief (the “Petition”) with prejudice. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Hilda and appellee, Rodo Guevara (“Rodo”), entered into a marital settlement agreement (the “MSA”) in 2005. Among other things, the MSA contained a provision that the parties would continue to own an apartment building located in Miami (the “apartments”) as tenants in common but that Rodo would have the right to purchase Hilda’s interest in the apartments for $250,000 at any time within the first three years from the date of execution of the MSA. A final judgment of dissolution, approving and ratifying the MSA, was entered on February 14, 2006. In 2013, Hilda filed the instant Petition seeking to set aside the final judgment of dissolution and the MSA on the basis of fraud. Additionally, concerning the apartments, Hilda alleged that Rodo orchestrated a “sham sale” of her interest in the apartments, and that she never received the $250,000 in exchange for her interest in the apartments as provided for in the MSA. To that end, Hilda alleged claims in the Petition for declaratory relief and cancellation of quit claim deed, accounting, and slander of title. Rodo and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court subsequently entered an order dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition with prejudice with regard to Hilda’s claim that she did not receive the $250,000 in exchange for her interest in the apartments *257 as provided for in the MSA. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) (stating that “[ljeave of court [to amend a pleading] shall be given freely when justice so requires”); see also Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc. v. Grove Isle As socs., LLLP, 137 So.3d 1081, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Kay’s Custom, Drapes, Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So.2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). As it relates to all other claims raised in the Petition, however, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the Petition with prejudice. On remand, Hilda shall be permitted to amend only with regard to her claim that she did not receive the $250,000 to which she is entitled under the MSA.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Hilda Guevara (“Hilda”), appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing her Petition and Independent Action to set Aside Final Judgment and Other Relief (the “Petition”) with prejudice. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Hilda and appellee, Rodo Guevara (“Rodo”), entered into a marital settlement agreement (the “MSA”) in 2005. Among other things, the MSA contained a provision that the parties would continue to own an apartment building located in Miami (the “apartments”) as tenants in common but that Rodo would have the right to purchase Hilda’s interest in the apartments for $250,000 at any time within the first three years from the date of execution of the MSA. A final judgment of dissolution, approving and ratifying the MSA, was entered on February 14, 2006. In 2013, Hilda filed the instant Petition seeking to set aside the final judgment of dissolution and the MSA on the basis of fraud. Additionally, concerning the apartments, Hilda alleged that Rodo orchestrated a “sham sale” of her interest in the apartments, and that she never received the $250,000 in exchange for her interest in the apartments as provided for in the MSA. To that end, Hilda alleged claims in the Petition for declaratory relief and cancellation of quit claim deed, accounting, and slander of title. Rodo and the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court subsequently entered an order dismissing the Petition with prejudice.

We find that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Petition with prejudice with regard to Hilda’s claim that she did not receive the $250,000 in exchange for her interest in the apartments *257 as provided for in the MSA. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a) (stating that “[ljeave of court [to amend a pleading] shall be given freely when justice so requires”); see also Grove Isle Ass’n, Inc. v. Grove Isle As socs., LLLP, 137 So.3d 1081, 1095 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014); Kay’s Custom, Drapes, Inc. v. Garrote, 920 So.2d 1168, 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). As it relates to all other claims raised in the Petition, however, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the Petition with prejudice. On remand, Hilda shall be permitted to amend only with regard to her claim that she did not receive the $250,000 to which she is entitled under the MSA.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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162 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2989, 2015 WL 903953, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guevara-v-guevara-fladistctapp-2015.

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