1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Aug 04, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 MARTHA GUERRERO, NO. 2:24-CV-0163-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 LAMB WESTON, INC.,
11 Defendant.
12 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 13 (ECF No. 26). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. 14 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the 15 reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 16 GRANTED. 17 BACKGROUND 18 This case concerns claims arising under the Washington Law Against 19 Discrimination (“WLAD”). ECF No. 1. Defendant moves for summary judgment 20 on Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, failed to respond. 1 The undisputed facts as Defendant presents them are as follows. Plaintiff 2 Martha Guerrero began working at Lamb Weston, Inc. (“Defendant”) in 2011 at a
3 processing facility located in Quincy, Washington. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 2. During the 4 relevant time period in 2021, Plaintiff worked as a Trimmer in the Production 5 Department and was training to be a Stockroom Attendant in the Maintenance
6 Department. Id. 7 Defendant maintains an employee handbook and Code of Conduct laying 8 out reporting procedures for instances of harassment and other grievances, as well 9 as the company’s disciplinary and attendance policy. Id. at ¶¶ 5,6,23. Employees
10 that violate work rules are subject to a progressive disciplinary policy. ECF No. 27 11 at ¶¶ 23-27. The first violation results in corrective instruction, the second with 12 reprimand, the third with suspension, and a fourth may result in termination. Id.
13 Plaintiff was aware of Defendant’s reporting procedure, anti-harassment policies, 14 and disciplinary policy. Id. at ¶¶ 10,11; ECF No. 27-1 at 16-17. An employee 15 being absent from a workstation or taking a break beyond an allotted time are such 16 examples of infractions subject to disciplinary action per Defendant’s progressive
17 disciplinary policy. ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 39, 44. 18 A. Plaintiff’s Interactions with Jason Guzman 19 Jason Guzman (“Mr. Guzman”) is a former employee that worked for
20 Defendant during the time period at issue in this action. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 4. Mr. 1 Guzman worked as a supervisor but did not have the authority to hire or fire 2 employees. Id. Roughly a year prior to August 9, 2021, while Plaintiff was
3 climbing the stairs into a palletizer at work, Mr. Guzman was climbing behind her 4 and touched the back of her thigh. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 30. Plaintiff turned and told 5 him stop and Mr. Guzman removed his hand. Id. at ¶ 31.
6 On another occasion around that time, Mr. Guzman messaged Plaintiff on 7 Facebook to come to his office. While there, Mr. Guzman closed the door and 8 tried to grab Plaintiff and kiss her, but Plaintiff rejected his advances and left. ECF 9 Nos. 27 at ¶¶ 32,33. After this interaction, Mr. Guzman occasionally sent
10 Facebook messages to Plaintiff asking her to come to his office or sent her a 11 “wave” to get her attention, all of which Plaintiff ignored. Id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff 12 never reported any of Mr. Guzman’s behavior prior to August 9, 2021.
13 B. Plaintiff’s Termination 14 On July 25, 2021, Plaintiff was given a two-day suspension for failing to 15 report to her designated work area after already having received prior written 16 warnings in accordance with Defendant’s attendance policy. ECF Nos. 27-34, 27-
17 1 at 21-22. Plaintiff’s reasoning for failing to report to her work area was that she 18 did not like the trainer that was scheduled to train her that day. ECF No. 27-1 at 19 20.
20 1 On August 3, 2021, the Human Resources Manager for Defendant’s Quincy 2 facility, Ashley Stucky (“Ms. Stucky”), was notified by a supervisor, Chinaka
3 Springer (“Ms. Springer”), that on August 1, 2021, Plaintiff had reportedly taken 4 an extended break in violation of the company’s break policy. ECF No. 27-1 at 5 27-28. Ms. Stucky called Plaintiff on August 4, 2021 regarding the report and told
6 Plaintiff she was suspended pending an investigation. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 45. During 7 this call, Plaintiff denied the allegation and provided names of witnesses that could 8 corroborate her claim that she did not take an excessive break on August 1. Id. at ¶ 9 46. After the phone call, Plaintiff filed a grievance for harassment alleging that
10 Mr. Guzman falsely reported she took an excessive break on August 1. Plaintiff 11 did not report any sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Guzman against 12 Plaintiff in this grievance. Id. at ¶¶ 48,49.
13 During Ms. Stucky’s investigation, she learned that the reported excessive 14 break occurred on July 31, 2021 rather than August 1 and found additional 15 evidence corroborating this. Id. at ¶ 50. Ms. Stucky also looked into the 16 information provided by Plaintiff but for her whereabouts on July 31 rather than
17 August 1, 2021, and concluded it did not rebut Ms. Springer’s report. Id. at ¶ 51. 18 On August 6, 2021, Ms. Stucky called Plaintiff to clarify the correct date at issue 19 and asked for any additional information that might rebut the allegation of the
20 1 excessive break. Id. at ¶ 52. Ms. Stucky informed Plaintiff she remained 2 suspended pending the final results of the investigation. Id.
3 On August 9, 2021, Ms. Stucky and Plaintiff had another phone call where 4 Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Guzman was trying to get her fired in retaliation for 5 Plaintiff rejecting his advances roughly a year prior. Id. at ¶ 53. This was the first
6 time Plaintiff had reported Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment. Plaintiff also 7 provided the names of three other female employees she claimed had also been 8 subject to sexual harassment by Mr. Guzman. Id. at ¶ 54. Ms. Stucky told Plaintiff 9 she would look into it but noted that such investigation was separate and unrelated
10 to Plaintiff’s suspension and any discipline related to her July 31, 2021 write-up. 11 Id. at ¶ 57. 12 After this phone call, Ms. Stucky completed her investigation into the report
13 of Plaintiff’s excessive break and concluded it was substantiated. On August 10, 14 2021, Defendant’s Director of Manufacturing made the decision to terminate 15 Plaintiff in accordance with Defendant’s disciplinary policy. Id. at ¶¶ 58,59. 16 Plaintiff received a phone call the same day from Ms. Stucky informing her of her
17 termination for violating company policy. Id. at ¶ 60. 18 On August 10, 2021, Ms. Stucky began investigating Plaintiff’s allegations 19 against Mr. Guzman and interviewed the three women identified by Plaintiff. ECF
20 No. 27 at ¶ 61. Two reported no concerns but the third, Destiny Matthynssens, 1 stated that about a year prior, Mr. Guzman had threatened to treat her differently 2 after she refused to get into his car upon his request, however she never reported
3 the incident. Id. at ¶ 61. 4 On August 11, 2021, Ms. Stucky emailed Plaintiff a response to her 5 grievance and confirmed that Mr. Guzman was not involved in Plaintiff’s recent
6 discipline. Id. at ¶ 62. 7 C. Events After Plaintiff’s Termination 8 On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a union grievance appealing her 9 termination but did not make any allegation the termination had been in retaliation
10 for reporting Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 63. 11 After Ms. Stucky informed Plaintiff Defendant would stand by its decision 12 on her termination, Ms. Stucky interviewed Mr. Guzman regarding the allegations
13 of sexual harassment. Id. at ¶¶ 64,65. Mr. Guzman denied the allegations and told 14 Ms.
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1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Aug 04, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6
7 MARTHA GUERRERO, NO. 2:24-CV-0163-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 LAMB WESTON, INC.,
11 Defendant.
12 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 13 (ECF No. 26). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. 14 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the 15 reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is 16 GRANTED. 17 BACKGROUND 18 This case concerns claims arising under the Washington Law Against 19 Discrimination (“WLAD”). ECF No. 1. Defendant moves for summary judgment 20 on Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, failed to respond. 1 The undisputed facts as Defendant presents them are as follows. Plaintiff 2 Martha Guerrero began working at Lamb Weston, Inc. (“Defendant”) in 2011 at a
3 processing facility located in Quincy, Washington. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 2. During the 4 relevant time period in 2021, Plaintiff worked as a Trimmer in the Production 5 Department and was training to be a Stockroom Attendant in the Maintenance
6 Department. Id. 7 Defendant maintains an employee handbook and Code of Conduct laying 8 out reporting procedures for instances of harassment and other grievances, as well 9 as the company’s disciplinary and attendance policy. Id. at ¶¶ 5,6,23. Employees
10 that violate work rules are subject to a progressive disciplinary policy. ECF No. 27 11 at ¶¶ 23-27. The first violation results in corrective instruction, the second with 12 reprimand, the third with suspension, and a fourth may result in termination. Id.
13 Plaintiff was aware of Defendant’s reporting procedure, anti-harassment policies, 14 and disciplinary policy. Id. at ¶¶ 10,11; ECF No. 27-1 at 16-17. An employee 15 being absent from a workstation or taking a break beyond an allotted time are such 16 examples of infractions subject to disciplinary action per Defendant’s progressive
17 disciplinary policy. ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 39, 44. 18 A. Plaintiff’s Interactions with Jason Guzman 19 Jason Guzman (“Mr. Guzman”) is a former employee that worked for
20 Defendant during the time period at issue in this action. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 4. Mr. 1 Guzman worked as a supervisor but did not have the authority to hire or fire 2 employees. Id. Roughly a year prior to August 9, 2021, while Plaintiff was
3 climbing the stairs into a palletizer at work, Mr. Guzman was climbing behind her 4 and touched the back of her thigh. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 30. Plaintiff turned and told 5 him stop and Mr. Guzman removed his hand. Id. at ¶ 31.
6 On another occasion around that time, Mr. Guzman messaged Plaintiff on 7 Facebook to come to his office. While there, Mr. Guzman closed the door and 8 tried to grab Plaintiff and kiss her, but Plaintiff rejected his advances and left. ECF 9 Nos. 27 at ¶¶ 32,33. After this interaction, Mr. Guzman occasionally sent
10 Facebook messages to Plaintiff asking her to come to his office or sent her a 11 “wave” to get her attention, all of which Plaintiff ignored. Id. at ¶ 34. Plaintiff 12 never reported any of Mr. Guzman’s behavior prior to August 9, 2021.
13 B. Plaintiff’s Termination 14 On July 25, 2021, Plaintiff was given a two-day suspension for failing to 15 report to her designated work area after already having received prior written 16 warnings in accordance with Defendant’s attendance policy. ECF Nos. 27-34, 27-
17 1 at 21-22. Plaintiff’s reasoning for failing to report to her work area was that she 18 did not like the trainer that was scheduled to train her that day. ECF No. 27-1 at 19 20.
20 1 On August 3, 2021, the Human Resources Manager for Defendant’s Quincy 2 facility, Ashley Stucky (“Ms. Stucky”), was notified by a supervisor, Chinaka
3 Springer (“Ms. Springer”), that on August 1, 2021, Plaintiff had reportedly taken 4 an extended break in violation of the company’s break policy. ECF No. 27-1 at 5 27-28. Ms. Stucky called Plaintiff on August 4, 2021 regarding the report and told
6 Plaintiff she was suspended pending an investigation. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 45. During 7 this call, Plaintiff denied the allegation and provided names of witnesses that could 8 corroborate her claim that she did not take an excessive break on August 1. Id. at ¶ 9 46. After the phone call, Plaintiff filed a grievance for harassment alleging that
10 Mr. Guzman falsely reported she took an excessive break on August 1. Plaintiff 11 did not report any sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Guzman against 12 Plaintiff in this grievance. Id. at ¶¶ 48,49.
13 During Ms. Stucky’s investigation, she learned that the reported excessive 14 break occurred on July 31, 2021 rather than August 1 and found additional 15 evidence corroborating this. Id. at ¶ 50. Ms. Stucky also looked into the 16 information provided by Plaintiff but for her whereabouts on July 31 rather than
17 August 1, 2021, and concluded it did not rebut Ms. Springer’s report. Id. at ¶ 51. 18 On August 6, 2021, Ms. Stucky called Plaintiff to clarify the correct date at issue 19 and asked for any additional information that might rebut the allegation of the
20 1 excessive break. Id. at ¶ 52. Ms. Stucky informed Plaintiff she remained 2 suspended pending the final results of the investigation. Id.
3 On August 9, 2021, Ms. Stucky and Plaintiff had another phone call where 4 Plaintiff alleged that Mr. Guzman was trying to get her fired in retaliation for 5 Plaintiff rejecting his advances roughly a year prior. Id. at ¶ 53. This was the first
6 time Plaintiff had reported Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment. Plaintiff also 7 provided the names of three other female employees she claimed had also been 8 subject to sexual harassment by Mr. Guzman. Id. at ¶ 54. Ms. Stucky told Plaintiff 9 she would look into it but noted that such investigation was separate and unrelated
10 to Plaintiff’s suspension and any discipline related to her July 31, 2021 write-up. 11 Id. at ¶ 57. 12 After this phone call, Ms. Stucky completed her investigation into the report
13 of Plaintiff’s excessive break and concluded it was substantiated. On August 10, 14 2021, Defendant’s Director of Manufacturing made the decision to terminate 15 Plaintiff in accordance with Defendant’s disciplinary policy. Id. at ¶¶ 58,59. 16 Plaintiff received a phone call the same day from Ms. Stucky informing her of her
17 termination for violating company policy. Id. at ¶ 60. 18 On August 10, 2021, Ms. Stucky began investigating Plaintiff’s allegations 19 against Mr. Guzman and interviewed the three women identified by Plaintiff. ECF
20 No. 27 at ¶ 61. Two reported no concerns but the third, Destiny Matthynssens, 1 stated that about a year prior, Mr. Guzman had threatened to treat her differently 2 after she refused to get into his car upon his request, however she never reported
3 the incident. Id. at ¶ 61. 4 On August 11, 2021, Ms. Stucky emailed Plaintiff a response to her 5 grievance and confirmed that Mr. Guzman was not involved in Plaintiff’s recent
6 discipline. Id. at ¶ 62. 7 C. Events After Plaintiff’s Termination 8 On August 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a union grievance appealing her 9 termination but did not make any allegation the termination had been in retaliation
10 for reporting Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment. ECF No. 27 at ¶ 63. 11 After Ms. Stucky informed Plaintiff Defendant would stand by its decision 12 on her termination, Ms. Stucky interviewed Mr. Guzman regarding the allegations
13 of sexual harassment. Id. at ¶¶ 64,65. Mr. Guzman denied the allegations and told 14 Ms. Stucky that one of the female witnesses identified by Plaintiff, Zaidy Monroy 15 (“Ms. Monroy), had told him that Plaintiff had asked her to make up allegations 16 against Mr. Guzman so they could get money in a lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 65. Ms.
17 Monroy later confirmed this in a second interview with Ms. Stucky and said that 18 both Plaintiff and Ms. Matthynssens asked Ms. Monroy to make false accusations 19 against Mr. Guzman so they could get a payout in a lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 66. Ms.
20 1 Stucky thereafter closed the investigation into Mr. Guzman after concluding the 2 allegations were unsubstantiated. Id. at ¶ 67.
3 Plaintiff did later produce screen shots of messages she collected between 4 Mr. Guzman and herself or other employees, but not until after discovery in this 5 action began and it appears only to her attorney. Id. at ¶ 68; ECF No. 27-192-93.
6 These screenshots were not submitted to the Court. 7 On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff was reinstated in her position with 8 Defendant under a last-chance agreement negotiated between Defendant and 9 Plaintiff’s union. Id. at ¶ 69. Soon after, Mr. Guzman was terminated from his
10 position with Defendant for attempting to change another employee’s timesheet 11 while offsite. Id. at ¶ 37. 12 On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Grant County Superior
13 Court against Defendant alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation in 14 violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 15 §49.60. ECF No. 1-1. Defendant removed the action to this Court on May 15, 16 2024. ECF No. 1.
17 DISCUSSION 18 Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 26. 19 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se as Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew as her attorney on
20 April 3, 2025. ECF No. 23. A litigant proceeding pro se is still bound by the rules 1 of procedure. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Per Local Rule 2 7(c)(2)(A)(ii), a pro se litigant has 30 days after the mailing of a dispositive motion
3 to file a response. That deadline has come and gone with no response from 4 Plaintiff. 5 A district court has discretion to determine whether a party’s failure to
6 respond to an opposing party’s argument should be deemed consent to the entry of 7 an adverse order. LCivR 7(e); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 652 (9th Cir. 8 1994) (per curiam); see also Atain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Todd, No. 4:18-CV-5022- 9 RMP, 2019 WL 2030329, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2019) (“A failure to respond
10 to an opposing party's argument is deemed consent to the entry of an adverse 11 order.”); Wilcox v. Batiste, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1125 (E.D. Wash. 2018) 12 (granting summary judgment on two claims pursuant to LCivR 7(e) due to party's
13 failure to respond). However, this discretion “is necessarily abused when 14 exercised to grant a motion for summary judgment where the movant's papers are 15 insufficient to support that motion or on their face reveal a genuine issue of 16 material fact.” Henry v. Gill Indus., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
17 Brydges, 18 F.3d at 652. 18 After reviewing Defendant’s briefing and provided evidence, the Court 19 concludes granting summary judgment is warranted in this case.
20 1 A. Claim One: Sexual Harassment 2 Plaintiff first alleges discrimination based on the hostile work environment
3 created due to Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment. Sex discrimination is prohibited 4 under the WLAD, RCW § 49.60, which includes sexual harassment in 5 employment. “To establish a hostile work environment case, the employee must
6 prove (1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2) the harassment was because of sex; 7 (3) the harassment affected the terms or conditions of employment; and (4) the 8 harassment is imputed to the employer.” Haubry v. Snow, 106 Wash. App. 666, 9 675 (2001).
10 Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot meet the third element—the harassment 11 was so severe or pervasive that it affected the condition or terms of Plaintiff’s 12 employment. ECF No. 26 at 11. In assessing the third element, the Court must
13 examine the totality of the circumstances by considering the “frequency of the 14 discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 15 humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes 16 with an employee’s work performance.” Sangster v. Albertson’s, Inc., 99 Wash.
17 App. 156, 163 (2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 18 (1993)). “Casual, isolated or trivial manifestations of a discriminatory 19 environment do not affect the terms or conditions of employment to a sufficiently
20 1 significant degree to violate the law.” Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 2 Wash. 2d 401, 406 (1985).
3 The conduct complained of, primarily Mr. Guzman touching the back of 4 Plaintiff’s thigh and later attempting to kiss Plaintiff in his office a year prior to 5 Plaintiff’s termination, appear to have been isolated incidents. After the latter
6 interaction, Mr. Guzman occasionally sent Facebook messages to Plaintiff asking 7 her to come to his office or sent her a “wave” to get her attention, all of which 8 Plaintiff ignored. ECF No. 27-1 at 84-85. However, during Plaintiff’s deposition, 9 she could not recall how many messages were sent, what the messages explicitly
10 said, or provide copies of them due to deleting them in fear her boyfriend would 11 see them and get involved. Id. at 81. The only interaction through Facebook not 12 deleted was one of the “waves” sent by Mr. Guzman. Id. Plaintiff also never
13 testified in the portion of her deposition provided to the Court that Mr. Guzman’s 14 actions were physically threatening or humiliating or that they unreasonably 15 interfered with her work performance. As Plaintiff has not responded to 16 Defendant’s summary judgment motion with evidence or argument to the contrary,
17 the Court cannot conclude there is a genuine issue of fact on the face of the 18 materials Defendant provided. 19 Furthermore, even if Mr. Guzman’s conduct did create a discriminatory
20 work environment, the undisputed facts do not demonstrate the conduct could be 1 imputed to Defendant. ECF No. 26 at 13-14. “To hold an employer responsible 2 for the discriminatory work environment created by a plaintiff’s supervisor(s) or
3 co-worker(s), the employee must show that the employer (a) authorized, knew, or 4 should have known of the harassment and (b) failed to take reasonably prompt and 5 adequate corrective action.” Glasgow, 103 Wash. 2d at 407. Plaintiff admitted to
6 never having reported Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment prior to the August 9, 7 2021 phone call and does not present any evidence showing Defendant should 8 have known of the harassment and failed to take corrective action. Once Ms. 9 Stucky did learn of it, she promptly investigated Plaintiff’s claims and concluded
10 they were unsubstantiated. The undisputed record does not indicate that based on 11 the information known to Ms. Stucky at the time, she acted unreasonably in her 12 investigation and conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Guzman had no
13 merit. Therefore, Plaintiff lacks a factual basis to bring a hostile work environment 14 claim against Defendant. 15 B. Claim Two: Retaliation 16 Plaintiff also brings a retaliation claim under the WLAD. A WLAD
17 retaliation claim has three elements: “(1) the employee took a statutorily protected 18 action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal 19 link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment
20 action.” Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 192 Wash. 2d 403, 411 (2018). Plaintiff 1 alleges in her complaint that she was terminated from her position in response to 2 complaining about Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment and a hostile work
3 environment. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 4.9,4.10. Defendant argues Plaintiff has presented 4 no evidence of a causal link between Plaintiff’s complaint of sexual harassment 5 and her termination as required for a retaliation claim. ECF No. 26 at 16-18. An
6 employee proves causation “by showing that retaliation was a substantial factor 7 motivating the adverse employment decision.” Allison v. Hous. Auth., 118 Wash. 8 2d 79, 96 (1991). “‘The proper inquiry is whether the . . . evidence suggests 9 a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse
10 action sufficient to defeat summary judgment.’” Cornwell, 192 Wash. 2d at 415 11 (quoting Reich v. Hoy Shoe Co., 32 F.3d 361, 367 (8th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in 12 original).
13 Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to the Court suggesting a causal 14 connection between her filing a complaint about Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment 15 and being terminated by Defendant. To the contrary, Defendant’s provided 16 evidence supports its contention that Plaintiff’s termination had been in accordance
17 with Defendant’s disciplinary policy which Plaintiff knew of, including that any 18 additional written warning after suspension could result in termination. ECF No. 19 27-1 at 16-17. Plaintiff acknowledged that the 2-day suspension she received for
20 the July 25, 2021 attendance violation was substantiated. ECF Nos. 27-34, 27-1 at 1 21-22. Additionally, during Plaintiff’s deposition she did not appear to dispute, or 2 provide any evidence disputing, that the reported excessive break she took several
3 days later on July 31, 2021 was also substantiated, violated Defendant’s break 4 policy, and was the reported reason for her termination. ECF No. 27-1 at 27-29. 5 Moreover, Plaintiff admitted she did not submit a complaint or ever report
6 Mr. Guzman’s sexual harassment to Stucky or any other manager until after she 7 was told of the disciplinary issue related to her taking an excessive break. ECF 8 Nos. 27 at 14-15, 27-1 at 74-75. The fact that she reported Mr. Guzman’s sexual 9 harassment, while on suspension pending an investigation of her reported
10 excessive break, the day before she was officially terminated, does not alone 11 suggest the complaint was a substantial factor for the termination in light of the 12 evidence provided. Therefore, as Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to
13 establish a prima facie case of retaliation, this claim must also be dismissed. 14 15 16
17 // 18 // 19 //
20 // 1|} ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26) is 3 GRANTED. 4 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment for Defendant, furnish copies to counsel and Plaintiff, and close the file. The 6|| deadlines, hearings and trial date are VACATED. 7 DATED August 4, 2025. | Bay Gon cB: 9 2 as i; THOMAS Ok <> United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY