Guerra v. Brothers Builders, LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 23, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-1291
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ________________________________________ ) YANSI MEJIA GUERRA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 23-cv-01291 (APM) ) BROTHERS BUILDERS, LLC et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I.

Plaintiff Yansi Mejia Guerra worked for Defendant Brothers Builders, LLC (“BB”) from

about November 2021 through March 2022, performing laborer and mechanic duties on

construction projects in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. During that time,

Plaintiff was subjected to pervasive and severe sexual harassment by Defendant Ricardo Martinez

Rivera, BB’s primary owner. Additionally, BB paid Plaintiff neither minimum wage nor overtime

wages, even though she worked on average 50 hours per week, and it also paid her less than her

male colleagues doing comparable work. Plaintiff brought suit against BB and Rivera, alleging a

host of claims under (1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) the D.C. Human Rights Act

(“DCHRA”), (3) the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), (4) the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act, and

(5) the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law (“DCWPCL”).

Despite proper service and initially responding to the complaint, both Defendants

eventually abandoned defending the action. Plaintiff then secured defaults from the Clerk of Court.

Plaintiff now seeks entry of a default judgment in the amount of $845,095. See Pl.’s Mot. for Default J., ECF No. 27 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.]. She also asks for an award of attorney’s fees and

costs totaling $44,058.10. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

II.

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step process for a plaintiff

seeking default judgment. First, the plaintiff must ask the Clerk of Court to enter default against

a party who has “failed to plead or otherwise defend” itself against the action. Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(a). Second, the plaintiff must move for entry of default judgment. Id. 55(b). Although there

are “strong policies favoring the resolution of genuine disputes on their merits,” default judgments

are appropriate “when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially

unresponsive party.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).

“A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the

complaint.” Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001). Although the default

establishes a defendant’s liability, “unless the amount of damages is certain,” the court is required

to “make an independent determination of the sum to be awarded.” Boland v. Yoccabel Constr.

Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Adkins, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 17). To determine the

appropriate amount of damages, the court “may hold a hearing or rely on detailed affidavits or

documentary evidence.” Boland v. Elite Terrazzo Flooring, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 64, 68 (D.D.C.

2011). A plaintiff “must prove these damages to a reasonable certainty.” Id.

III.

Because the court treats as admitted the facts set forth in Plaintiff’s Declaration,

ECF No. 27-1, Plaintiff has established liability for each claim on which she seeks entry of default.

Those include violations of: (1) the DCHRA for a hostile work environment based on her sex,

quid pro quo sexual discrimination, and retaliation based on a protected activity; (2) the EPA for

2 paying Plaintiff less than her male counterparts for substantially equivalent work, and (3) the

DCWPCL for failing to pay Plaintiff minimum wage and overtime wages. The court therefore

turns to assess whether Plaintiff has proven damages to a “reasonable certainty.”

A.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory, economic, and punitive damages for violations of the

DCHRA. Pl.’s Mot. at 11–25. She requests $400,000 in compensatory damages for pain and

suffering; $17,215 in economic damages for lost wages; and $400,000 in punitive damages. The

record facts support each award component requested.

Plaintiff has established that she was subjected to pervasive and severe sexual harassment

during her short employment with BB. Among other things, Rivera on multiple occasions told

Plaintiff that he had sexual fantasies about her or made other inappropriate sexual remarks,

see Pl.’s Mot., Decl. of Yansi Mejia Guerra, ECF No. 27-1 [hereinafter Guerra Decl.], ¶¶ 22, 25–

27; regularly propositioned her for sex, id. ¶¶ 30, 33, 42, 49; said he would give her a raise if she

had sex with him, id. ¶ 43; pressed his body against hers and grabbed her buttocks and breasts, id.

¶ 46; and blocked her from leaving a bathroom as he exposed his penis and asked her to touch it,

id. ¶¶ 52–53. Rivera then retaliated against her for refusing his advances by adding duties to her

customary workload. Id. ¶ 55. After she reported the ongoing harassment to co-workers, he again

engaged in retaliation by initially denying her medical leave and then refusing to reinstate her

regular daytime schedule and offering her only nighttime hours after she returned to work from

said leave, resulting in her constructive discharge. Id. ¶¶ 60–67. The court finds that the requested

compensatory award of $400,000 is appropriate given the pervasive and severe acts of sexual

harassment that Plaintiff suffered, as well as the acts of retaliation. See Pl.’s Mot. at 20–21 (citing

3 cases in which plaintiffs were awarded non-pecuniary compensatory damages between $300,000

and $800,000 for enduring comparable sexual harassment).

Plaintiff also has established economic damages arising from her constructive discharge.

Plaintiff was unemployed for a period of 20 weeks, causing lost earnings. Guerra Decl. ¶ 69.

Those lost earnings total $17,215, as calculated below.

Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages for violations of the DCHRA, as

Defendants’ conduct was malicious, wanton, reckless, or in willful disregard of Plaintiff’s rights.

See Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 254, 371 (D.C. 1993); Fred A. Smith Mgmt. Co. v.

Cerpe, 957 A.2d 907, 914–15 (D.C. 2008). A punitive damages award of $400,000 is appropriate.

Pietrangelo v. Refresh Club, Inc., No. 18-cv-1943, 2024 WL 3400258, at *12 (D.D.C. July 12,

2024) (agreeing that, for punitive damages arising out of DCHRA violations, a “multiplier of two

is reasonable”), aff’d, No. 24-7126, 2025 WL 1953500 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2025).

B.

Plaintiff has established a violation of the EPA, including Rivera’s individual liability for

that violation. Guerra Decl. ¶¶ 38–40; Pl.’s Mot. at 26 (setting forth basis for Rivera’s individual

4 liability). She has established a backpay amount of $4,500, as calculated below, plus an additional

equal amount of $4,500 in statutory liquidated damages, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

C.

Finally, Plaintiff has established an underpayment of minimum and overtime wages in the

amount of $4,720, as calculated below. Guerra Decl. ¶¶ 12–21; Pl.’s Mot. at 27–30. Trebled

liquidated damages and statutory penalties add an additional $14,160 to that sum. D.C. Code § 32-

1308(a)(1)(A).

D.

Finally, Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs. See Pl.’s Mot. at 30–31. The court has

reviewed the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and the hours billed in this matter. See Pl.’s Mot.,

Decl. of Gregg C. Greenberg in Support of an Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs, ECF No. 27-

2. The court finds the time expended and counsel’s hourly rate to be reasonable. Accordingly, the

court will award $44,058.10 in attorney’s fees and costs.

5 IV.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 27, is granted.

The court awards Plaintiff $845,095 in compensatory and punitive damages, plus $44,058.10 in

attorney’s fees and costs. A separate, final appealable order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

Dated: September 23, 2025 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge