Guerra-Bravo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-4115
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OSMAN MANRIQUE GUERRA- No. 24-4115 BRAVO; OSMAN YOEL GUERRA- Agency Nos. MARROQUIN; NESBIA MILLEY A220-905-732 MARROQUIN-YAQUE DE GUERRA, A220-905-730 A220-905-731 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 7, 2025**

Before: OWENS, LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Lead petitioner Osman Manrique Guerra-Bravo, his wife Nesbia Milley

Marroquin-Yaque de Guerra, and their minor son Osman Yoel Guerra-Marroquin,

natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of Immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of their appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

denial of their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where the BIA writes its own decision, as it

did here, we review the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts the

IJ’s decision.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2020). We

review for substantial evidence the BIA’s factual findings, including

determinations as to persecutors’ actual motives, Vasquez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 7

F.4th 888, 893 (9th Cir. 2021), and the possibility of reasonable relocation, see

Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019). As the parties are

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the petition for

review.

1. An asylum applicant must establish that a statutorily protected ground

“was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Under this nexus requirement, “a motive is a ‘central reason’ if

the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did not exist” or

“if that motive, standing alone, would have led the persecutor to harm the

applicant.” Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Guerra-Bravo

failed to establish “any nexus between any harm [he] suffered and membership in

his proposed particular social group” of “Guatemalans who publicly cooperate

2 24-4115 with law enforcement.” Although Guerra-Bravo was threatened and attacked in

2014 and 2015, these harms preceded his cooperation with law enforcement. Cf.

Rodriguez Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 753 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that

the nexus requirement for asylum was satisfied in part because the petitioner

suffered harm “immediately after” asserting her feminist political opinion).

Instead, Guerra-Bravo testified that these threats and attacks were part of an

extortion scheme. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1019 (9th Cir.

2023) (upholding the BIA’s finding of no nexus because the petitioner “did not

demonstrate that the gang members who sought to extort money from [her] . . .

were motivated by anything other than an economic interest” (alteration in

original) (citation omitted)). Moreover, despite Guerra-Bravo’s belief that the men

who approached his neighbor in 2021 were associated with the earlier assailants,

he presented no evidence that these men pursued him on account of his cooperation

with law enforcement. See id. at 1022 (noting that the petitioner had not

“present[ed] the court with factual evidence to support her theoretically valid nexus

theory” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

2. Absent a finding of past persecution, substantial evidence supports the

BIA’s determination that Guerra-Bravo did not show that he had a well-founded

fear of future persecution. “[A]n applicant ‘does not have a well-founded fear of

persecution if the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of

3 24-4115 the applicant’s country of nationality . . . [and] under all the circumstances it would

be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.’” Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at

1029 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Guerra-Bravo

did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution because he failed to show

that it was not reasonable for him to relocate within Guatemala. Guerra-Bravo

testified that “[he] had already moved once, and they found [him] again,” but he

does not present any link between the 2021 visitors and the earlier assailants other

than the visitors’ tattoos and motorcycle. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641

F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that the petitioner’s testimony that she would

“never be able to escape . . . in Mexico” was insufficient alone to prove an inability

to relocate internally). Prior to the 2021 visitors, Guerra-Bravo had resided in

Jalapa without incident for over six years. See Gomes v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1264,

1267 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a previous successful internal relocation

undermined a claim of an inability to safely relocate).

3. Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that there

was no nexus at all, we also uphold the BIA’s denial of Guerra-Bravo’s

withholding of removal claim. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 360

(9th Cir. 2017) (noting that when there is “no nexus at all,” there is no distinction

in the application of the “a reason” nexus standard for withholding of removal and

4 24-4115 the “one central reason” standard for asylum).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

5 24-4115