Gue v. City Council

11 Va. Cir. 511, 1982 Va. Cir. LEXIS 59
CourtAlexandria County Circuit Court
DecidedApril 28, 1982
DocketCase No. (Chancery) 11698
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Va. Cir. 511 (Gue v. City Council) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Alexandria County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gue v. City Council, 11 Va. Cir. 511, 1982 Va. Cir. LEXIS 59 (Va. Super. Ct. 1982).

Opinion

By JUDGE WILEY R. WRIGHT, JR.

When commenced, this suit challenged the legality of certain actions taken by the City of Alexandria in failing to approve a site plan for the redevelopment of the property which is the subject of this cause, downzoning the property and enacting a height limitation restricting redevelopment of the property. After negotiations, the parties settled all of the issues between them except one, namely: whether that portion of Alfred Street on the property of the complainants is a public or private street. The resolution of this issue is of critical importance to the City and the complainants because it determines whether the complainants are entitled as a matter of right to approval of their site plan for the conversion of the existing apartment units on the property to condominiums.

The parties entered into an agreement and stipulation, which is filed herein, setting forth the exact terms of the agreement between them. On December 16, 1981, the Court entered a pre-trial order which, among other things, sets forth certain undisputed facts material to this cause and certain disputed questions of law bearing on the status of Alfred Street. It has been agreed that the unlawful taking issue referred to in the order will be held in [512]*512abeyance pending a determination of the public versus private character of Alfred Street. There are few, if any, facts genuinely in dispute; and, therefore, the Court will state the facts only to the extent necessary to give the reasons for its conclusions.

The subject property, which is the location of the Hunting Terrace Apartments, is owned by a limited partnership which, together with its immediate predecessor in title, will hereinafter be referred to as Hunting Terrace. The defendants and their predecessors in office will hereinafter be referred to as the City.

The plat admitted into evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit No. 10 portrays the property, the alignment of Alfred Street and significant points referred to by the witnesses in their testimony. The portion of Alfred Street between points "A" and "B" is referred to in the pre-trial order as "the captioned strip." This strip of land and the area between points "B" and "C" have never been surfaced or used as a right-of-way. The area between points "C" and "D" was improved as a street in about 1943 and has been in continuous use as a street since that time.

Prior to the commencement of the trial, the Court ruled that the City had the burden of proof to establish dedication. This ruling is consistent with the holding in Staunton v. The Augusta Corporation, 169 Va. 424, 433, 193 S.E. 695 (1937). The parties agree that there has been no express dedication of Alfred Street and the Court so found at the conclusion of the City's case.

The City predicates its contention that Alfred Street is a public street on the application of three legal doctrines: (1) accretion and reliction; (2) implied dedication; and (3) equitable estoppel. Hunting Terrace says that the first doctrine is inapplicable under the facts of this case, that the City has failed to prove an implied dedication and that, if equitable estoppel is applicable, it should be applied against the City.

The City relies on the doctrine of accretion and reliction to lay claim to any land within the extended lines of Alfred Street created by changes in the shoreline or boundary of Hunting Creek. The City says that as a riparian owner it would have the right to extend a public street over land gained by accretion or uncovered by reliction. Assuming, without deciding, that this doctrine [513]*513would apply to land abutting Hunting Creek, the navigability of which was neither proven nor disproven, the question remains whether the City has proven that it is a riparian owner. The ruling of the Court that there has been no express dedication of Alfred Street includes the portion thereof brought within the boundaries of Alexandria by virtue of the annexation suit which resulted in the mandate of the Supreme Court of Appeals which is Defendant’s Exhibit No. 1. Thus, the City must prove an implied dedication of that portion of Alfred Street located on the annexed land before the doctrine of accretion and reliction has any applicability to this case.

In Staunton v. The Augusta Corporation, supra, the court quoted with approval from the headnotes prepared by the court in Morlang v. City of Parkersburg, 84 W. Va. 509, 100 S.E. 394 (1919), as follows:

Dedication being an exceptional and peculiar mode of passing title to interest in land, the proof thereof must be full and clear; and the acts proved, which it is claimed constitute such dedication, must be inconsistent with any construction other than that of a dedication. 169 Va. at 437.

The City relies on two documents to prove its claim of riparian ownership, viz. a document with attached plat, dated March 22, 1915, showing the boundaries of the City of Alexandria, prepared by E. C. Dunn, City Engineer, in compliance with the aforesaid mandate of the Supreme Court of Appeals and the 1804 plat of Alexandria described in paragraph 6, page 2, of the pre-trial order. (The 1804 plat itself was not offered in evidence; however, the Court will consider the facts concerning the plat set forth in the pre-trial order.) In the opinion of the Court these two plats standing alone are insufficient to establish the dedication, either expressly or impliedly, of that portion of Alfred Street between points "A'’ and "B". This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that a portion of Alfred Street claimed to have been embraced by these two plats was conveyed to Hunting Terrace by land grant from the Commonwealth of Virginia. (See Complainant’s Exhibits No. 21 and 22.) Even if the Court were [514]*514to agree with the contention of the City as to the area between points "A" and "B", I fail to perceive how the doctrine of accretion and reliction would operate to do anything more than extend Alfred Street in a straight line to the edge of Hunting Creek.

The City contends that, even if its claim to Alfred Street based on the doctrine of accretion and reliction is rejected, Hunting Terrace has, nevertheless, impliedly dedicated the area between points "A" and "D" on Defendant’s Exhibit No. 10 as a public street. The City relies in large measure on the several documents it offered in evidence to support this contention. Hunting Terrace says that when the true purpose of these documents is understood they fail to prove the City’s case.

The principle of dedication by the act of the owner of land is succinctly stated in Buntin v. Danville, 93 Va. 200, 24 S.E. 830 (1896), as follows:

Dedication is an appropriation of land by its owner for the public use. It may be express or implied. It may be implied from long use by the public of the land claimed to have been dedicated. Dedication is not required to be made by a deed or other writing, but may be effectually and validly done by verbal declarations. The intent is its vital principle, and the dedication may be made in every conceivable way that such intention may be manifested. It must, however, be manifested by some unequivocal act, and is not effectual and binding until accepted. When the intention of the owner to make the dedication has been unequivocally manifested, and there has been acceptance by competent authority, or such long use by the public as to render its reclamation unjust and improper, the dedication is complete. 93 Va. at 204.

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Related

Ocean Island Inn, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach
220 S.E.2d 247 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1975)
Buntin v. City of Danville
24 S.E. 830 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1896)
Keppler v. City of Richmond
98 S.E. 747 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1919)
City of Staunton v. Augusta Corp.
193 S.E. 695 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1937)
Morlang v. City of Parkersburg
100 S.E. 394 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1919)

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11 Va. Cir. 511, 1982 Va. Cir. LEXIS 59, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gue-v-city-council-vaccalexandria-1982.