Gudino v. Schultz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: 24-4645
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE GUDINO, No. 24-4645 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 2:21-cv-03387-MCS-MAR v. MEMORANDUM*

JASON SCHULTZ,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Mark C. Scarsi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 2, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Jorge Gudino appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under §§ 1291

and 2253, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for habeas corpus.

Hoyos v. Davis, 51 F.4th 297, 305 (9th Cir. 2022). Our review is constrained by

the deferential standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) as to “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The California Court of

Appeal’s decision on direct review is the relevant state-court decision for purposes

of our review because the California Supreme Court summarily affirmed that

decision. See Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 801 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining

that federal courts on habeas review, look to the “‘last reasoned decision’ from the

state court”).

Gudino argues the prosecution’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike

Juror 57 violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79 (1986). See United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018)

(setting forth the three-step process for considering a Batson challenge). He argues

that the prosecution’s stated racially neutral reasons were insufficient and the state

court’s denial of his Batson claim is based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). He challenges the prosecution’s concerns about

Juror 57’s tardiness, lack of maturity and sophistication, and apparent disinterest in

the proceedings. Gudino, however, has not shown that the state court’s

determination that he had not demonstrated purposeful discrimination was based

2 24-4645 on an unreasonable determination of facts. Juror 57’s tardiness and lack of interest

in the proceedings were sufficient to support the state court’s factual determination

that Juror 57 was struck for race-neutral reasons. See Mikhel, 889 F.3d at 1028

(explaining that, at Batson’s third step, the defendant must show purposeful

discrimination); see also Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004)

(concluding that, unless the defendant establishes pretext, tardiness was sign of

immaturity and is a legitimate reason for challenging a juror); United States v. You,

382 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “lack[ing] sufficient age and

maturity level,” and lack of “appropriate intellect or sophistication” were “valid

and non-discriminatory” reasons for exercising peremptory challenges).

AFFIRMED.

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