Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
February 10, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Guardianship of: No. 59281-9-II
C.G., UNPUBLISHED OPINION A minor child.
MAXA, P.J. – DG appeals the trial court’s grant of a minor guardianship of his daughter
CG to CG’s maternal grandparents, Beth and Nicholas C.1 BCC, CG’s mother, is not a party to
this appeal.
CG was born in Vancouver, Washington, to DG and BCC in February 2022. DG has a
history of methamphetamine use and several prior convictions, including for encouraging child
sexual abuse. He did not pay his bills and had his utilities shut off for a period of time while CG
lived with him. But he continued to use methamphetamine.
Shortly after CG’s birth, BCC and CG moved to Oregon to live with DG. In July 2022,
DG and BCC separated. BCC moved in with her parents, Beth and Nicholas, in La Center,
Washington. In November 2022, Beth and Nicholas filed a petition for minor guardianship of
CG. In December 2022, DG filed for custody of CG in Oregon state court.
1 We refer to Beth and Nicholas by their first names. No disrespect is intended. No. 59281-9-II
The Washington trial court held a conference with the Oregon court under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, chapter 26.27 RCW (UCCJEA). The Oregon
court declined to exercise its jurisdiction over CG, and the Washington court exercised its
jurisdiction over the guardianship petition. After a trial in Washington, the trial court granted
Beth and Nicholas guardianship of CG.
We hold that (1) the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction over the guardianship
proceeding under the UCCJEA, and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
guardianship of CG to Beth and Nicholas.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting guardianship of CG to Beth and
Nicholas C.
FACTS
CG was born in Vancouver on February 11, 2022. DG and BCC are CG’s parents. BCC
and CG lived in Vancouver until February 28, when they moved to Keizer, Oregon, to live with
DG. BCC lived in Keizer with DG until July 31, when she moved into Beth and Nicholas’s
home in La Center. Even while living with DG in Oregon, BCC and CG were at Beth and
Nicholas’s home in La Center a few days each week. BCC and CG lived in La Center with Beth
and Nicholas until May 4, 2023, when they moved back to Oregon to live with DG.
DG has a criminal history. In 2011, DG was convicted in Oregon for second degree
encouraging child sexual abuse and second degree assault. The second degree encouraging child
sexual abuse conviction required DG to register as a sex offender. In 2017, DG pleaded guilty in
Oregon to possession of methamphetamine. In 2019, he pleaded guilty to identity theft in
Oregon.
2 No. 59281-9-II
In March 2022, the Oregon Department of Human Services opened an investigation into
DG for a threat of harm to CG. The investigation resulted in an unfounded determination.
Beth and Nicholas filed a petition for a minor guardianship of CG in November 2022.
They submitted a declaration describing in detail DG’s criminal history and many alleged
parenting deficiencies of both DG and BCC.
The trial court appointed Beth and Nicholas as emergency guardians for CG pending a
hearing on their motion. Both DG and BCC objected to Beth and Nicholas’s petition. At a
hearing on December 6, the trial court stated that it did not see the need for an emergency
guardianship because CG and BCC were in a stable environment while living with Beth and
Nicholas in LaCenter. On January 25, 2023, the trial court entered an order appointing a
guardian ad litem (GAL) for CG.
Meanwhile, on December 12, 2022, DG filed a petition for custody of CG in Marion
County, Oregon. The Oregon court held hearings and appointed a guardian ad litem. BCC was
served with the petition, but she did not file a response or appear in the matter. Apparently, the
Oregon court entered a default order against BCC.2
UCCJEA Proceedings
In February 2023, Beth and Nicholas filed a motion for a UCCJEA conference and for
entry of an order determining that the Washington court had jurisdiction over CG. DG opposed
the motion, arguing that CG had lived in Oregon for a substantial period since her birth.
2 DG claims that the default order was against Beth and Nicholas. But the Oregon caption shows that only BCC was a party, and the Oregon court stated that DG sought default against “the respondent,” who was BCC.
3 No. 59281-9-II
The motion stated that CG was born in Washington, and had lived with Beth and
Nicholas in Washington since the end of July 2022. The motion also stated that CG’s health
insurance and doctors were in Washington.
DG argued that BCC and CG lived in Oregon for five months before the couple
separated, when CG was five and a half months old. DG also argued that Washington lacked
jurisdiction over the custody of CG because CG had lived in Washington for only four months
when Beth and Nicholas filed their petition for guardianship, rather than six months as required
by the UCCJEA.
In March 2023, the Washington trial court held a UCCJEA conference with the Oregon
court. The Oregon court noted that DG filed his petition for custody of CG in Oregon after he
was served with Beth and Nicholas’s petition for minor guardianship that they filed in
Washington. The Oregon court also noted that it entered a default order before it learned about
the Washington case. The Oregon court stated, “[T]here’s not a good basis for Oregon to have
home state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA based on what’s in front of me.” Rep. of Proc. (RP)
at 52-53.
The Washington trial court stated, “The child is here in Washington, has been. This
[guardianship case] predates the Oregon case. . . . And so, if the State of Oregon is not asking
this Court to do so, I think we’d like to just proceed here in Washington.” RP at 53. Both courts
agreed that Washington would exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. The Washington court
entered an order stating that Washington would exercise jurisdiction over the case. The Oregon
court entered an order declining to exercise jurisdiction and vacating its previous default order.
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DG filed a motion for discretionary review in this court regarding the trial court’s
jurisdiction order. A commissioner of this court denied DG’s motion and held that there was no
obvious or probable error that warranted discretionary review.
On May 4, 2023, BCC and CG moved back in with DG in Oregon. On May 5, Beth and
Nicholas filed another motion for an emergency minor guardianship for CG. The motion was
based on the allegation that CG had suffered three significant injuries at Beth and Nicholas’s
home because of BCC’s negligence. The trial court appointed Beth and Nicholas as emergency
guardians for CG pending a hearing on their motion.
After a hearing, the trial court approved the emergency guardianship. In July, the court
again extended the emergency guardianship.3 The trial on Beth and Nicholas’s guardianship
petition was scheduled for August 2023.
Trial Testimony
At trial, Beth testified that when she first met DG in December 2020, he was both drunk
and high. Beth testified that in 2021, she learned that DG had set up cameras in BCC’s
condominium and was recording all of BCC’s conversations. Beth learned that when using
methamphetamine, DG would search for child pornography. After Beth confronted him, DG said
“at least it’s nothing physical” regarding the alleged pornography. RP at 169. Beth testified that
DG had used methamphetamine as recently as August 2022. She also testified that BCC moved
back in with Beth and Nicholas in July 2022 because of “domestic violence” and an incident
during which DG had kicked down the door to his and BCC’s master bedroom. RP at 181.
3 DG serially filed notices of discretionary review in the trial court every time the court extended its order granting Beth and Nicholas’s guardianship of CG pending trial. DG also sought discretionary review through numerous motions in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied all of DG’s motions.
5 No. 59281-9-II
Beth also testified as to the living conditions in DG’s house as “flies everywhere, dishes
in the sink” and “really dirty and gross.” RP at 182. She stated that BCC and DG did not have
trash service due to unpaid bills and almost had a car repossessed. When she helped BCC move
out of DG’s house, she stated that the water and garbage service were shut off and there was a
large pot of water in the living room. DG went to the bathroom in the backyard.
Beth also observed fights between DG and BCC. In September 2022, Beth saw DG and
BCC fighting. Beth also testified that she saw DG and BCC push car doors into one another.
Beth testified that in May 2022 when CG was three months old, BCC left CG home with
DG while she went to the store. BCC was gone for about 45 minutes. CG cried the entire time
to the point of vomiting on herself.
Beth took CG to the doctor for CG’s two-month-old checkup (at the age of three months)
and realized the DG had not added CG as a beneficiary on his health insurance. Beth and
Nicholas paid for CG’s doctor visit.
Beth testified that DG did not participate in his supervised visits with CG. She stated that
she believed that this was because he did not complete his drug tests as required by the
emergency guardianship order. Beth and Nicholas offered video calls with CG to DG, but DG
refused. Beth testified that DG has not provided any financial support for CG.
Nicholas testified that he visited DG’s house when he helped move BCC out of that
house. He testified that DG’s house smelled of “rotting” and was dirty and cluttered. RP at 283.
The home had no running water and there were many bugs flying around leftover food. Nicholas
testified that DG’s home was “very pungent.” RP at 283.
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Nicholas testified that he learned from BCC that DG had relapsed and used
methamphetamine in August 2022. He also stated that he pays for CG’s daycare and babysitting
arrangements while he and Beth are at work.
Sherri Farr was the court appointed GAL who conducted an investigation and prepared
three reports for the guardianship proceedings. Farr interviewed Beth and Nicholas, DG, and
BCC for her first two reports. Farr stated that neither DG nor BCC participated in Farr’s
investigation for her third report. Farr recommended that Beth and Nicholas be appointed as
guardians of CG. Farr testified that DG has “ups and downs,” “out-of-control behavior,” and
“outbursts.” RP at 368. She also reported that BCC was concerned about leaving CG alone with
DG while bathing or changing. Farr testified that DG told her he was using drugs up until
November 2022.
DG also testified. He stated that he worked as a repairman for recreational vehicles until
a hand injury prevented him from working. He admitted that he was convicted of possession of
pornography of minors in December 2011 and that he never completed sex offender treatment
classes. DG claimed that he had no substance abuse issues after CG was born. DG testified that
he had used drugs since BCC and CG moved in with Beth and Nicholas but was in a drug abuse
recovery class. He also completed parenting classes. DG stated that he took care of CG and
attended to her daily needs. But he acknowledged that he had not helped Beth and Nicholas with
CG’s expenses. DG also testified that during the incident in which CG cried for 45 minutes
while BCC went to the store, he unintentionally fell asleep because of a long work day.
On cross-examination, DG testified that he used methamphetamine from July 2022 to
March 2023. He also testified that he had an active arrest warrant in Arizona. DG admitted that
7 No. 59281-9-II
during a fight with BCC, he kicked a door down to a room CG and BCC were in because “I
didn’t wanna wait, so I went in.” RP at 565. He stated that he had not seen CG since May 2023.
BCC testified that one day she had gone to the store to pick up formula. She was gone
for about 45 minutes and left CG with DG. BCC testified, “[CG] had been crying when I got
home, and I picked her up immediately. And I had gone to find where [DG] was, and he had
fallen asleep on the bed in the master bedroom.” RP at 629.
BCC also testified that one night she was putting CG to bed and had locked the bedroom
door behind her. DG came to the room and asked for the door to be unlocked. When BCC did
not do so because she was putting CG to bed, he kicked in the door and then lay down in the bed
and went to sleep.
The trial court entered an order granting Beth and Nicholas guardianship of CG until she
is 18. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction over CG. The court found,
[CG] lived in Washington with a parent or someone acting as a parent for at least the 6 months just before this case was filed, or if the child is less than 6 months old when the case was filed, they had lived in Washington with a parent or someone acting as a parent since birth. Moreover, the court held a UCCJEA conference and found that Oregon declined to exercise jurisdiction.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 632.
Regarding the guardianship, the court found that “[i]t is in [CG’s] best interest to appoint
a guardian” and DG and BCC were “not willing or able to provide for the support, care,
education, health, safety, and welfare of a child under age 18 (exercise the parenting functions in
RCW 26.09.004).” CP at 633. The court made several specific findings of fact, including: (1)
there was “no parent willing or able to exercise parenting functions,” (2) DG and BCC had “not
maintained a stable and consistent relationship with [CG],”(3) “[n]either parent has exercised
appropriate judgment while caring for the child,” (4) DG had not “provided for the daily needs of
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[CG],” (5) DG had not “addressed his drug use,” or “visited [CG] since the emergency
guardianship went into effect,” (6) CG was exposed to domestic violence when DG kicked down
the door and that his explanation of the incident “makes no sense,” and (7) “[i]t is in [CG’s] best
interest to appoint a guardian.” CP at 633.
Appeal and Subsequent Developments
DG appealed the trial court’s guardianship order. Two weeks later, a notice of appeal was
filed on behalf of BCC. However, her name was typed rather than handwritten on the signature
line. On March 21, 2024, a certificate of service was filed stating that BCC’s notice of appeal
had been served. Again, BCC’s name was typed rather than signed. Also on March 21, a motion
and declaration to waive the appellate court filing fee was filed, purportedly by BCC. BCC’s
name was signed in two places.
On March 22, Beth and Nicholas filed a “Motion for Sanctions for Forging and
Submitting Forged Pleadings.” Mot. for Sanctions for Forging and Submitting Forged Pleadings
(Mar. 22, 2024). The motion alleged that DG had forged BCC’s name on pleadings. Attached to
the motion was a sworn declaration from BCC, which stated,
The signature to a document in this appeal ostensibly executed by me on March 21, 2024, is a forgery. I did not sign it. I believe [DG] did. I do not desire to bring any motion in this court. I do not desire to be involved in any aspect of [DG]’s appeal in the cause number to which my referenced forged “signature” is appended. All my “signatures” under this cause number are forgeries and are not reflective of anything I desire in this appeal brought solely by [DG].
Mot. for Sanctions for Forging and Submitting Forged Pleadings at 5 (Mar. 22, 2024). BCC’s
signature on the declaration was significantly different than the signature on the March 21
motion and declaration.
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A commissioner of this court continued the issue of sanctions until the court received a
communication directly from BCC regarding whether she wanted to dismiss her appeal. BCC
subsequently filed the following pleading:
I, [BCC], am voluntarily requesting that the appeal filed under my name be dismissed. The signature to a document in this appeal (Court of Appeals No. 59281-9-II) (Clark County Cause No. 22-4-01478-06) supposedly filed by me on March 21, 2024, is a forgery. I didn’t sign it. [DG] filed this document “on my behalf”, I hadn’t even seen it until it was filed. I do not wish to be apart of [DG’s] appeal in any way.
Mot. For Voluntary Dismissal (Apr. 15, 2024). Accordingly, this court dismissed BCC’s appeal.
The court did not address the request for sanctions against DG.
ANALYSIS
A. MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
Initially, in their briefing to this court, Beth and Nicholas include a motion to dismiss
DG’s appeal based on the allegation that DG forged BCC’s signature on appeal pleadings. We
decline to dismiss DG’s appeal.
RAP 17.4(d) states, “A party may include in a brief only a motion which, if granted,
would preclude hearing the case on the merits.” Because granting Beth and Nicholas’s motion
would preclude addressing the merits of DG’s appeal, the motion is properly made.
DG’s apparent forgery of BCC’s signature was highly improper. However, BCC’s appeal
was dismissed, and the alleged forgery has no effect on DG’s appeal. And the court
commissioner did not address Beth and Nicholas’s request to impose sanctions on DG. Under
these circumstances, we decline to dismiss DG’s appeal.
B. JURISDICTION
DG argues that Oregon rather than Washington had exclusive jurisdiction over CG. We
disagree.
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1. Legal Principles
The UCCJEA is a set of uniform laws adopted by many states to resolve conflicts related
to interstate child custody disputes. In re Custody of A.C., 165 Wn.2d 568, 574, 200 P.3d 689
(2009). Washington’s UCCJEA is codified act chapter 26.27 RCW. The UCCJEA is the
“exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state.”
RCW 26.27.201(2).
RCW 26.27.201(1) states,
Except as otherwise provided . . . a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;
(b) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under (a) of this subsection, or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum under RCW 26.27.261 or 26.27.271, and:
(i) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) All courts having jurisdiction under (a) of this subsection have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under RCW 26.27.261 or RCW 26.27.271; or
(d) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection.
(Emphasis added.)
RCW 26.27.021(7) states,
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“Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent. A period of temporary absence of a child, parent, or person acting as a parent is part of the period.
Whether a trial court has the authority to exercise its jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is a
mixed question of law and fact. In re Marriage of McDermott, 175 Wn. App. 467, 483, 307 P.3d
717 (2013). We treat the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact as true on appeal and review
its conclusions of law de novo. Id.
2. Effect of Commissioner’s Ruling
Beth and Nicholas argue that DG is bound by the ruling of a commissioner of this court
denying DG’s motion for discretionary review on the jurisdiction issue. We disagree.
RAP 2.3(b) determines whether discretionary review is warranted. Relevant here, this
court can grant discretionary review only if the trial court committed probable or obvious error.
RAP 2.3(b)(1)-(2). Here, the commissioner denied discretionary review because there was no
probable or obvious error.
However, the commissioner did not make a final decision on the merits of DG’s
jurisdiction argument. Instead, the commissioner merely denied discretionary review under RAP
2.3(b). RAP 2.3(c) states, “[T]he denial of discretionary review of a superior court decision does
not affect the right of a party to obtain later review of the trial court decision or the issues
pertaining to that decision.” Therefore, a commissioner’s discretionary review ruling does not
create the law of the case and has no binding effect on a subsequent appeal. See Gull Indus., Inc.
v. Granite State Ins. Co., 18 Wn. App. 2d 842, 854 n.8, 493 P.3d 1183 (2021).
12 No. 59281-9-II
3. Consideration of UCCJEA Factors
DG argues that the Oregon court failed to consider all of the facts during the UCCJEA
conference before it declined jurisdiction. We disagree.
DG argues that the only evidence before the Oregon court was a letter from Beth and
Nicholas’s attorney, and the court did not consider DG’s argument. But DG appeared at the
hearing and his attorney submitted evidence as to why Oregon should retain jurisdiction. There
is no indication that the Oregon court did not consider DG’s evidence and arguments. Therefore,
we reject DG’s argument.
DG also argues that the Oregon court’s decision to decline jurisdiction was made
extremely quickly, and the court did not explain why Washington would be the better forum. But
the record shows that the Oregon court made its decision based on the evidence before the court,
including the fact that the Washington proceeding predated the Oregon proceeding. Moreover,
we note that the record does not show any attempt by DG to clarify or seek reconsideration of the
Oregon court’s decision to decline jurisdiction in Oregon court. We reject DG’s argument.
4. Jurisdiction under UCCJEA
DG argues that the trial court erred in determining Washington was CG’s home state
under the UCCJEA because CG was only temporarily absent from Oregon when she went to
Washington. We disagree.
Here, CG was in Washington for only four months when Beth and Nicholas filed their
petition for guardianship. CG was born on February 11, 2022. CG lived in Oregon from
February 28 to July 31, when CG and BCC moved back to Washington with Beth and Nicholas.
And Beth and Nicholas filed their initial petition for guardianship in November. Therefore,
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Washington was not CG’s home state “within six months before the commencement of the
proceeding.” RCW 26.27.201(1)(a).
But the Oregon court declined to exercise jurisdiction because it believed Washington
was the more appropriate forum. Therefore, we must analyze whether Washington could
properly exercise its jurisdiction under RCW 26.27.201(1)(b), which addresses whether:
(i) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
BCC and CG have a “significant connection” to Washington. RCW 26.27.201(1)(b)(i).
BCC and CG lived in Washington with Beth and Nicholas for an extended period – over seven
months at the time of the UCCJEA hearing. During that time, Beth and Nicholas cared for CG
and performed various daily tasks for her. This was more than mere physical presence.
In addition, there was substantial evidence of CG’s care, protection, training, and
personal relationships in Washington. CG lived with BCC and Beth and Nicholas in
Washington, and CG had a personal relationship with them. BCC and Beth and Nicholas cared
for CG in Washington, and CG had a doctor in Washington. Therefore, even if Washington was
not CG’s “home state” under RCW 26.27.201(1)(a), the trial court did not err in exercising its
jurisdiction under RCW 26.27.201(1)(b).
DG argues that Oregon had exclusive original jurisdiction due to the investigation by
Oregon Child Protective Services. But even if Oregon first exercised jurisdiction, the Oregon
court subsequently declined to exercise its jurisdiction at the UCCJEA conference. And we have
no authority review the Oregon court’s choice to decline jurisdiction.
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Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in exercising its jurisdiction over the
guardianship proceeding.
C. GUARDIANSHIP ORDER
DG argues that the trial court erred by granting Beth and Nicholas’s petition for a
guardianship of CG. We disagree.
RCW 11.130.190(1) states, “A person interested in the welfare of a minor, including the
minor, may petition for appointment of a guardian for the minor.” Under RCW 11.130.185(2), a
trial court
may appoint a guardian for a minor who does not have a guardian if the court finds the appointment is in the minor’s best interest and: ....
(c) There is clear and convincing evidence that no parent of the minor is willing or able to exercise parenting functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004.
The trial court applied subsection (c) here.
Under RCW 26.09.004(2)(a)-(f), parenting functions include “[m]aintaining a loving,
stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child”; attending to the child’s daily needs
“such as feeding, clothing, physical care and grooming, supervision, health care, and day care,
and engaging in other activities which are appropriate to the developmental level of the child”;
providing adequate education; assisting the child in developing relationships; “[e]xercising
appropriate judgment regarding the child’s welfare”; and financially supporting the child.
We review the trial court’s grant of a petition for guardianship for an abuse of discretion.
In re Guardianship of F.S., 33 Wn. App. 2d 24, 35, 559 P.3d 138 (2024), review denied, 4 Wn.3d
1015, 564 P.3d 562 (2025). “Determining who should be appointed as a child’s guardian is a
fact-intensive inquiry that trial courts are necessarily in a better position than the appellate courts
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to decide.” In re Guardianship of L.C., 28 Wn. App. 2d 766, 772, 538 P.3d 309 (2023). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it “(1) adopts a view that no reasonable person would take and is
thus manifestly unreasonable, (2) rests on facts unsupported in the record and is thus based on
untenable grounds, or (3) was reached by applying the wrong legal standard and is thus made for
untenable reasons.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. F.S., 33 Wn. App. 2d
at 35. “ ‘Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded,
rational person of the truth of the declared premise.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Guardianship of
Cornelius, 181 Wn. App. 513, 536, 326 P.3d 718 (2014)). We do not decide the credibility of
witnesses or weigh the evidence. In re Welfare of A.W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186
(2015).
RCW 11.130.185(2)(c) requires clear and convincing evidence that “no parent of the
minor is willing or able to exercise parenting functions.” Under the clear and convincing
evidence standard, substantial evidence exists when the fact is “shown by the evidence to be
highly probable.” In re Dependency of A.N.C., 24 Wn. App. 2d 408, 414, 520 P.3d 500 (2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Challenged Findings of Fact
DG argues that several of the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.4
a. Parenting Functions Finding
DG challenges the trial court’s findings of fact that state, “There is no parent willing or
able to exercise parenting functions,” “[DG] ha[s] not maintained a stable and consistent
4 Because BCC does not appeal, we only address these findings with regard to DG.
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relationship with the child,” DG has not “visited the child since the emergency guardianship
went into effect,” and DG has not “provided for the daily needs of [CG].” CP at 633.
The evidence shows that DG is not willing or able to exercise parenting functions and
that he regularly used methamphetamine during CG’s life. Testimony also showed that DG has
failed to pay his bills, had his water shut off, and lived in conditions that a fair-minded person
could find was not suitable parenting. Similarly, there was some evidence showing that when
DG uses methamphetamine, he searches for child pornography. This was enough of a concern
that BCC exercised caution with CG when DG would bathe CG or change her diaper. These
behaviors are not proper parenting functions. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s finding that there is no parent willing or able to exercise parenting functions.
We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s other challenged
findings. It was undisputed that DG had not visited CG since she was placed with Beth and
Nicholas through the emergency minor guardianship, and he admitted that he had not helped
Beth and Nicholas with CG’s expenses. Therefore, a fair minded person also could find that DG
has not maintained a stable or consistent relationship with CG.
b. Parental Judgment Finding
DG challenges the trial court’s finding of fact that states, “[n]either parent has exercised
appropriate judgment while caring for the child.” CP at 633. Because BCC does not appeal, we
only address this finding with regard to DG.
Testimony at trial showed that DG failed to exercise appropriate parental judgment in the
few moments he solely was responsible for CG. During the time BCC went to the store for
formula, DG fell asleep and allowed CG to cry for 45 minutes. A fair minded person could
determine that this was not appropriate parental judgment. In addition, DG did not provide a
17 No. 59281-9-II
sanitary home for CG, and there is evidence that he spent funds to support his methamphetamine
use rather than paying for utilities or garbage service. And DG failed to add CG to his health
insurance coverage. Therefore, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding.
c. DG’s Drug Use Finding
DG challenges the trial court’s finding of fact that states DG “has not addressed his drug
use.” CP at 633.
DG testified that he still smokes marijuana and had used methamphetamine during CG’s
life. He admitted that he used methamphetamine from July 2022 to March 2023. Although DG
completed required drug classes as a result of his previous criminal convictions, DG testified that
he does not attend regular meetings or continue education regarding drug use. And DG refused
to submit comprehensive drug testing as part of the emergency guardianship process. Therefore,
a fair-minded person could find that DG had not addressed his drug use. We conclude that
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
d. Domestic Violence Finding
DG challenges the trial court’s finding of fact that states, “The testimony regarding [DG]
kicking down the door makes no sense and is an act of domestic violence to which the child was
exposed.” CP at 633.
The veracity of this incident turns on the credibility of witnesses, which we do not
review. A.W., 82 Wn.2d at 711. BCC, Beth, and DG all provided testimony about the incident.
DG testified that he just wanted to enter the room, which led him to kick down the door. But
Beth’s testimony was that this incident was a fight. The trial court weighed the credibility of the
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witnesses and determined that DG’s account of the incident made little sense. We do not review
a trial court’s credibility determinations. A.W., 182 Wn.2d at 711.
In addition, substantial evidence supports that this was an act of domestic violence. DG
kicked down a door in what appears to be a fit of anger. His child and girlfriend were behind the
door. A fair minded person could believe that this was an act of domestic violence. Therefore,
we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
DG argues that this was a single incident that does not show an extensive history of
domestic violence or an inability to parent. But the trial court’s finding does not say that there is
an extensive history of domestic violence or that the incident showed an inability to parent.
e. DG’s Relationship with CG
DG claims that the trial court made a finding that “D.G. has not maintained a relationship
with C.G. during the pendency of the May 5, 2023 emergency order.” Br. of Appellant at 40.
However, the court made no such finding. As discussed above, the court did make a finding that
“[DG] ha[s] not maintained a stable and consistent relationship with the child.” CP at 633. We
conclude above that substantial evidence supports this finding.
f. Lack of Expert Testimony
DG argues that the trial court’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence
because there was no expert testimony about any actual harm to CG. But there is no requirement
that an expert provide such testimony. And DG does not provide any meaningful argument about
how any expert testimony would impact the trial court’s findings of fact. Expert testimony is not
required for a trial court to determine whether or not a parent is unable to take care of a child or
if a child has suffered actual detriment. We reject DG’s argument.
19 No. 59281-9-II
3. Approval of Guardianship
DG argues that the trial court erred when it approved Beth and Nicholas’s guardianship
petition. We disagree.
Under RCW 11.130.185(2)(c), the trial court may appoint a guardian for a minor (1) “if
the court finds the appointment is in the minor’s best interest” and (2) “[t]here is clear and
convincing evidence that no parent of the minor is willing or able to exercise parenting functions
as defined in RCW 26.09.004.”
As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s multiple findings
regarding DG’s parenting. These findings reflect clear and convincing evidence that DG is not
willing or able to exercise parenting functions. And these findings support the court’s conclusion
that a guardianship is in CG’s best interest.
DG emphasizes that he has a constitutional right to parent. Therefore, he argues that to
obtain a guardianship Beth and Nicholas must show that he is an unfit parent or that placing CG
with him would result in “actual detriment to the child’s growth and development.” In re
Custody of L.M.S., 187 Wn.2d 567, 571, 387 P.3d 707 (2017). He argues that Beth and Nicholas
did not present evidence of actual detriment to CG for the court to order a guardianship, citing In
re Custody of A.L.D., 191 Wn. App. 474, 363 P.3d 604 (2015).
But L.M.S. and A.L.D. both involved a prior version of the nonparental guardianship
statute, former RCW 26.10.032(1) (2003). The old statute required only a declaration that the
child was not in the physical custody of either parent and evidence demonstrating “that neither
parent is a suitable custodian.” Former RCW 26.10.032(1). L.M.S. held that to pass
constitutional muster, in addition to meeting the prior statute’s standard the petitioner was
required to show an unfit parent or detriment to the child. 187 Wn.2d at 576.
20 No. 59281-9-II
The current nonparental guardianship statute requires a showing that the guardianship is
in the child’s best interest and that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates no parent is
willing or able to exercise the list of parenting functions listed in RCW 26.09.004(2). We
conclude that if a trial court makes the required findings under RCW 11.130.185(2)(c), those
findings will meet the constitutional threshold to avoid a violation of the constitutional right to
parent.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err when it granted guardianship of CG
to Beth and Nicholas.
D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Beth and Nicholas request attorney fees on appeal under RAP 18.1(a). RAP 18.1(a)
permits reasonable attorney fees if granted under applicable law. RCW 26.27.511, part of the
guardianship statute, states, “The court shall award the prevailing party . . . necessary and
reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including . . . attorneys’ fees . . .,
unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be
clearly inappropriate.”
Beth and Nicholas are the prevailing party in this guardianship action. DG has not shown
that an attorney fee award would be clearly inappropriate. Therefore, we award Beth and
Nicholas their reasonable attorney fees on appeal.
Beth and Nicholas also ask us to grant the “fullest equitable relief it feels is merited to
restrain [DG] from submitting further appellate litigation.” Br. of Resp’t at 24. But they do not
identify what form of equitable relief we should grant. We therefore decline to award equitable
relief at this time.
21 No. 59281-9-II
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s grant of minor guardianship of CG to Beth and Nicholas C.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is
so ordered.
MAXA, P.J.
We concur:
LEE, J.
CHE, J.