Guardian Trust Co. v. Downingtown Mfg. Co.

25 F.2d 878, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 17, 1928
DocketNo. 3441
StatusPublished

This text of 25 F.2d 878 (Guardian Trust Co. v. Downingtown Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Guardian Trust Co. v. Downingtown Mfg. Co., 25 F.2d 878, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1928).

Opinion

DICKINSON, District Judge.

The art with which this cause concerns itself is one of the oldest and one of the most important. The history of its development is most interesting. The conduct of the trial by counsel and experts has been in keeping with the dignity and importance of the subject. Knowledge has been lavish of “her ample store,” and all the resources of science and experience have been placed at the service of the court. We would not wish to be thought unappreciative of the richness of the offerings made, nor would we like to feel that all this enlightening labor had been wholly wasted. As we view it, however, the decision of the cause turns upon two doctrines of the law, or rather which of them is applicable.

The plaintiff plants the assertion of its claim of right upon letters patent No. 1,205,822, issued May 12, 1912, to William H. Millspaugh, for improvement in paper-making machines. The answer presents the usual defenses, which may be condensed into validity and denial of infringement.

Invention.

Plaintiff’s cause of action rests upon its claim to the exclusive right to make, use, and vend an improvement or adjunct to a E'ourdrinier paper-making machine. This goes by the name of a Millspaugh roll. Is the Millspaugh roll an invention, wjithin the meaning of the patent laws? The patent laws do not primarily define a right given, although they necessarily give such a definition. Primarily they declare and announce a policy. That policy is very happily and adequately expressed in the phrase employed in the grant of the power to Congress to legislate on the subject. There are thus two overlapping thoughts in the idea of a patent law “invention.” There must have been something “invented” and that something must merit the reward of a patent, by bringing into the art a new possession by which its progress is promoted by making the art that much richer. The verbiage with which wo have been supplied, which comes the nearest ■ to conveying these combined ideas or the combination idea, is found in the words “novelty and utility.” The thought is an old one, and universally accepted, so as to give it the character of triteness, that all the elements which enter into a combination may have in themselves no novelty, and the aggregation of them have no utility, and yet the combination may have striking novelty and great utility.

The invention here resides wholly in the combination. Its presence is due, not to the elements or in the bringing of them together, but in their co-ordination. This is clear enough, but there is suggested in its statement another distinction, the thought of which is with more difficulty expressed. It is conceivable that there may be elements in combination and a resulting utility, and yet be much left to be desired. There may enter into the combination one or more machines, with room for the application of skill in their operation. One may take this old combination, and by the use of a better, constructed machine or by greater skill in operation, produce an improved result. Here there may be nothing now, either in means or results, but merely in the degree of utility, and no invention, because there is nothing new in construction or in the principle of operation. The difference is wholly that between a little elephant and a big one.

There may, however, be so great a difference in results in degrees of utility that the results may be said to be not merely a difference in degrees of results, but in results. This is a difference, not between a little man and a big one, but the difference between a Lilliputian and a Brobdingnagian. A test or evidence of the existence of the difference we have attempted to outline may be found in the recognition afforded by general public acceptance. No one may be able to point out any marks of distinction between two things, other than mjhfe degree of excellence of results or otherwise; yet if the difference be great, unusual, and striking, and that part of the public which is concerned accepts and proclaims the results as hot merely better, but as new, this common publie judgment will be accepted as evidence of invention, and from this evidence of invention it will be found. No citation of authorities is needed to support this statement.

Great knowledge and exhaustless ingenuity have been displayed in the effort to show that underlying the Millspaugh roll there is (in addition to improved results) the application of a now, in the sense of a, different; principle from that'before employed in the art. [880]*880There is a difference between thinking you have a thought within your grasp and having it. The practical test of whether you have it is to attempt to convey it to another mind. If you cannot put another in possession of a thought, your failure is strong evidence against your own possession of it. Some thoughts, or what you think are thoughts, have a peculiarly elusive quality. No matter how clearly you may think you have them formulated in 'yo^r own mind, the moment you attempt to give them expression they slip from your grasp. Very often this is due to a change in the angle of view. The subject has the characteristic of some ingeniously constructed advertising signs. Looked at from one angle, you see clearly one message; change very slightly the angle of view, and you see just as clearly another.

Again, there are subjects of thought which, viewed in the mass and as general propositions, seem to be clearly and indeed sharply defined, but when viewed in the concrete and particular elude us and vanish. This is very much the difficulty' which confronted this patentee when he came to express his inventive concept in the words of a claim. If a cloth is saturated with water, and the problem is presented of, getting rid of the moisture, the differences in the principles of operation of different methods which may be employed are readily seen. The cloth may be simply exposed to the atmosphere and the water evaporated. The wet cloth may be run between rolls or wringers, and the water expressed or squeezed ou.t. The cloth may be subjected to a large current of air of high velocity, and the water blown or blasted or carried out by and with the air which passes through the interstices in the cloth. No mind would be slow to recognize that here were three different methods, nor would the thopght of difference be blurred by the truth that there was some evaporation, some squeezing, and some passage of air through the cloth in each instance. Nor would any one deny invention to the introduction of any one of these meth-, ods, if before unknown and the result improved. If, however, the wet cloth were placed over a pan or other cavity, and the water removed by the creation of a vacuum in the cavity, one would ask for further light before finding that the water was squeezed oiit when A employed this method, but blasted out when B employed it.

The paradox embraced in this proposition presents the opposing contentions of the parties in one aspect of this cáse. The cause is, we assume, of importance because of the money results following its ruling. We know it has been a hard-fought one. An attending circumstance, and perhaps consequence, has been that neither side feel it to be safe to accept any proposition of fact or law advanced by the other. We venture, however, upon the statement of some facts (in themselves of no controversial value), in order to bring out the. force of the opposing arguments addressed to us.

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25 F.2d 878, 1928 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/guardian-trust-co-v-downingtown-mfg-co-paed-1928.