1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5
6 GUARDIAN PROTECTION PRODUCTS, Case No. 1:20-cv-01680-SKO INC., 7 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiff/Counter-defendant, DENYING IN PART NOTICES AND 8 REQUESTS TO SEAL DOCUMENTS v. 9 (Docs. 74, 76) G.P.P., INC. d/b/a GUARDIAN 10 INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS,
11 Defendant/Counter-claimant. _____________________________________/ 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 On February 19, 2025, Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Guardian Protection Products 15 (“Guardian”) filed a “Notice of Request to Seal Documents” (the “Guardian Notice”) (Doc. 74) and 16 submitted to the Court a “Request to Seal Documents” (the “Guardian Request”) pursuant to E.D. 17 Cal. Local Rule 141, seeking to seal documents and exhibits relating to their “Motion for 18 Terminating and Monetary Sanctions, or, in the Alternative, Witness Exclusion and/or an Adverse 19 Inference Jury Instruction Against GIS” (the “Guardian Motion”) (Doc. 75). 20 That same day, Defendant and Counter-claimant G.P.P., Inc. (“GIS”) filed a “Notice of 21 Request to Seal Documents” (the “GIS Notice”) (Doc. 76) and submitted to the Court a “Request to 22 Seal Documents” (the “GIS Request”) pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local Rule 141, seeking to seal 23 documents and exhibits relating to their “Motion to Exclude Gary Gaukler” (the “GIS Motion”) 24 (Doc. 77). 25 Each of these requests to seal were, at least in part, based on the opposing party’s designation 26 of certain information as “Confidential” or “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only” under the 27 stipulated protective order (Doc. 70 (the “Protective Order”)). On February 20, 2025, the Court 28 1 issued a minute order instructing the parties to file responses to the opposing party’s request to seal 2 if they sought to have any part of the opposing party’s motion, memorandum, or supporting exhibits 3 sealed and, if so, to make a particularized showing of good cause. (Doc. 78). Both parties filed 4 timely responses. (Docs. 79 (Guardian’s response); 80 (GIS’s response)). 5 The Court has reviewed the notices, requests, parties’ responses to the minute order, and the 6 documents sought to be sealed, and has determined that the notices, requests, and responses make 7 an adequate showing of good cause as to exhibits O and R of the Declaration of Cassie L. Black in 8 support of GIS’s Motion (the “Black Declaration”). The Court construes the responses to the 9 Court’s minute order as withdrawing all other requests to seal. For the reasons set forth below, the 10 Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the notices and requests. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 13 v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because “the courts of this country 14 recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 15 records and documents.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 16 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 17 overcoming the strong public access presumption. Id. 18 Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents: the “compelling reasons” 19 standard for documents directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents 20 attached to summary judgment motions, and the lesser “good cause” standard for documents only 21 tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as those offered in support of non- 22 dispositive, discovery type motions: 23 [J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated] differently from 24 records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold 25 of showing that “compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive 26 motions. 27 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see 28 also Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098; Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th 1 Cir. 2009). 2 The good cause standard, applicable here, “comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the 3 issuance of protective orders in the discovery process.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. 4 Rule 26(c) states that the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 5 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 6 also Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (stating that the good cause standard under Rule 26(c) asks “whether 7 ‘good cause’ exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the 8 needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.”). 9 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a blanket protective order does not by itself demonstrate 10 “good cause” for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 11 (“Although the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective order, the order 12 contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify reliance by the United 13 States....”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party 14 seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make the ‘good 15 cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document.”); San Jose Mercury 16 News, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1103; Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 17 1992) (“Further, because the protective order was a stipulated blanket order, International never had 18 to make a ‘good cause’ showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the 19 deposition transcripts in the first place. Nor does it allege specific prejudice or harm now. Broad 20 allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy 21 the Rule 26(c) test.”) (citations omitted); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 22 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even if the parties agree that a protective order should be entered, they 23 still have the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally 24 apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in 25 question should not receive judicial protection.”) (citations omitted). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Guardian seeks to seal the following documents relating to its “Motion for Terminating and 28 Monetary Sanctions, or, in the Alternative, Witness Exclusion and/or an Adverse Inference Jury 1 Instruction Against GIS,” (Doc. 75): (1) Guardian’s unredacted Notice of Motion and Motion and 2 (2) the unredacted declaration of Aaron P. Rudin in support of the Motion (the “Rudin Declaration”) 3 along with accompanying exhibits 2–5, 7, 16, 17, 18, and 23. Guardian’s sole stated justification 4 for redacting and sealing these documents is that they include materials either designated by GIS as 5 “Confidential”1 or “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only”2 under the parties’ stipulated protective 6 order.
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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5
6 GUARDIAN PROTECTION PRODUCTS, Case No. 1:20-cv-01680-SKO INC., 7 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND Plaintiff/Counter-defendant, DENYING IN PART NOTICES AND 8 REQUESTS TO SEAL DOCUMENTS v. 9 (Docs. 74, 76) G.P.P., INC. d/b/a GUARDIAN 10 INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS,
11 Defendant/Counter-claimant. _____________________________________/ 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 On February 19, 2025, Plaintiff and Counter-defendant Guardian Protection Products 15 (“Guardian”) filed a “Notice of Request to Seal Documents” (the “Guardian Notice”) (Doc. 74) and 16 submitted to the Court a “Request to Seal Documents” (the “Guardian Request”) pursuant to E.D. 17 Cal. Local Rule 141, seeking to seal documents and exhibits relating to their “Motion for 18 Terminating and Monetary Sanctions, or, in the Alternative, Witness Exclusion and/or an Adverse 19 Inference Jury Instruction Against GIS” (the “Guardian Motion”) (Doc. 75). 20 That same day, Defendant and Counter-claimant G.P.P., Inc. (“GIS”) filed a “Notice of 21 Request to Seal Documents” (the “GIS Notice”) (Doc. 76) and submitted to the Court a “Request to 22 Seal Documents” (the “GIS Request”) pursuant to E.D. Cal. Local Rule 141, seeking to seal 23 documents and exhibits relating to their “Motion to Exclude Gary Gaukler” (the “GIS Motion”) 24 (Doc. 77). 25 Each of these requests to seal were, at least in part, based on the opposing party’s designation 26 of certain information as “Confidential” or “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only” under the 27 stipulated protective order (Doc. 70 (the “Protective Order”)). On February 20, 2025, the Court 28 1 issued a minute order instructing the parties to file responses to the opposing party’s request to seal 2 if they sought to have any part of the opposing party’s motion, memorandum, or supporting exhibits 3 sealed and, if so, to make a particularized showing of good cause. (Doc. 78). Both parties filed 4 timely responses. (Docs. 79 (Guardian’s response); 80 (GIS’s response)). 5 The Court has reviewed the notices, requests, parties’ responses to the minute order, and the 6 documents sought to be sealed, and has determined that the notices, requests, and responses make 7 an adequate showing of good cause as to exhibits O and R of the Declaration of Cassie L. Black in 8 support of GIS’s Motion (the “Black Declaration”). The Court construes the responses to the 9 Court’s minute order as withdrawing all other requests to seal. For the reasons set forth below, the 10 Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the notices and requests. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 All documents filed with the court are presumptively public. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 13 v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). This is because “the courts of this country 14 recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 15 records and documents.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 16 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of 17 overcoming the strong public access presumption. Id. 18 Two standards generally govern requests to seal documents: the “compelling reasons” 19 standard for documents directly related to the underlying causes of action, such as documents 20 attached to summary judgment motions, and the lesser “good cause” standard for documents only 21 tangentially related to the underlying causes of action, such as those offered in support of non- 22 dispositive, discovery type motions: 23 [J]udicial records attached to dispositive motions [are treated] differently from 24 records attached to non-dispositive motions. Those who seek to maintain the secrecy of documents attached to dispositive motions must meet the high threshold 25 of showing that “compelling reasons” support secrecy. A “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive 26 motions. 27 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see 28 also Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098; Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 677 (9th 1 Cir. 2009). 2 The good cause standard, applicable here, “comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the 3 issuance of protective orders in the discovery process.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, LLC, 809 F.3d at 1097. 4 Rule 26(c) states that the court “may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 5 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 6 also Pintos, 605 F.3d at 678 (stating that the good cause standard under Rule 26(c) asks “whether 7 ‘good cause’ exists to protect the information from being disclosed to the public by balancing the 8 needs for discovery against the need for confidentiality.”). 9 As the Ninth Circuit has stated, a blanket protective order does not by itself demonstrate 10 “good cause” for sealing specific information and documents. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1183 11 (“Although the magistrate judge expressly approved and entered the protective order, the order 12 contained no good cause findings as to specific documents that would justify reliance by the United 13 States....”); Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[A] party 14 seeking the protection of the court via a blanket protective order typically does not make the ‘good 15 cause’ showing required by Rule 26(c) with respect to any particular document.”); San Jose Mercury 16 News, Inc., 187 F.3d at 1103; Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 17 1992) (“Further, because the protective order was a stipulated blanket order, International never had 18 to make a ‘good cause’ showing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) of the need for protection of the 19 deposition transcripts in the first place. Nor does it allege specific prejudice or harm now. Broad 20 allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy 21 the Rule 26(c) test.”) (citations omitted); see also Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 22 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Even if the parties agree that a protective order should be entered, they 23 still have the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is equally 24 apparent that the obverse also is true, i.e., if good cause is not shown, the discovery materials in 25 question should not receive judicial protection.”) (citations omitted). 26 III. DISCUSSION 27 Guardian seeks to seal the following documents relating to its “Motion for Terminating and 28 Monetary Sanctions, or, in the Alternative, Witness Exclusion and/or an Adverse Inference Jury 1 Instruction Against GIS,” (Doc. 75): (1) Guardian’s unredacted Notice of Motion and Motion and 2 (2) the unredacted declaration of Aaron P. Rudin in support of the Motion (the “Rudin Declaration”) 3 along with accompanying exhibits 2–5, 7, 16, 17, 18, and 23. Guardian’s sole stated justification 4 for redacting and sealing these documents is that they include materials either designated by GIS as 5 “Confidential”1 or “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only”2 under the parties’ stipulated protective 6 order. (See Guardian Request at 2–4). In response to the Court’s order requiring GIS to respond by 7 (1) identifying which, if any, materials it sought to be redacted or sealed and (2) making a 8 particularized showing of good cause, GIS stated that it did not seek to seal exhibits 2–5, 7, 16, 17, 9 18. It further represented that after a meet and confer with Guardian, Guardian had agreed to 10 withdraw exhibit 23 in light of “confidentiality rights of nonparties.” (Doc. 80 at 2–3). 11 GIS, for its part, seeks to seal the following documents relating its “Motion to Exclude Gary 12 Gaukler,” (Doc. 77): (1) image one in its Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion; (2) image 13 three in the same memorandum, (3) exhibit O (GUARDIAN000002) to the Declaration of Cassie 14 L. Black in support of GIS’s Motion (the “Black Declaration”), and (4) exhibit R to the Black 15 Declaration. GIS seeks sealing of exhibits O and R on the basis that those documents “contain 16 personally identifying information for tens of thousands of nonparties to this action” and that “public 17 disclosure of this identifying information would result in harm to th[o]se individuals.” (GIS Request 18 at 1; Doc. 80 at 2). As to images one and three, GIS seeks sealing based on the sole justification 19 that these images were derived from materials designated by Guardian as “Confidential” or 20 “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only” under the parties’ stipulated protective order. (See id. at 1). 21 In response to the Court’s order requiring Guardian to respond by (1) identifying which, if any, 22 materials it sought to be redacted or sealed and (2) making a particularized showing of good cause, 23 1 “Confidential” information is defined in the parties’ stipulated protective order as being reserved to materials that the 24 producing party “believes, in good faith, contains information that, if disclosed, would cause injury to its business or business relationships with others; that contain trade secrets or other confidential and non-public research, development 25 or commercial information; that contain non-public personal information; or that contain other information for which a good faith claim of the need for protection from disclosure can be made under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or 26 other applicable law.” (Doc. 70 at 4). 2 “Confidential: Attorney’s Eyes Only” is defined in the parties’ stipulated protective order as being reserved to materials 27 that the producing party “believes, in good faith, that (i) the material contains or reflects confidential information that comprises highly sensitive technical, business or research information regarding products or services, and (ii) the 28 information is so commercially sensitive that disclosure to the opposing party is likely to cause competitive harm to the 1 Guardian stated that it did not seek sealing of the images one and three because it “does not believe 2 that there is good cause to seal those images,” but that it did seek sealing of Exhibit O because “it 3 contains personal identifying information of more than 40,000 individuals that are not parties to this 4 lawsuit and would not reasonably expect their personal identifying information to be disclosed to 5 the public in connection with this lawsuit,” (Doc. 79 at 2–3). 6 Considering these privacy interests, the parties’ have adequately articulated “good cause” 7 for maintaining confidentiality as to exhibits O and R to the Black Declaration. See Richter v. 8 Oracle Am., Inc., 2023 WL 5663217, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2023) (the “legitimate interest in 9 ensuring the privacy of personal information outweighs the public’s interest in access to court 10 filings.”); Logistics Guys Inc. v. Cuevas, 2024 WL 4839824, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024) 11 (granting motion to seal phone numbers of various nonparties and defendant under heightened 12 compelling reasons standard); Laatz v. Zazzle, Inc., 2024 WL 4493441, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 13 2024) (sealing personal information of party under good cause standard, noting that “protecting 14 personal information” satisfies the heightened compelling reasons standard). 15 The Court construes the parties’ responses as withdrawing or otherwise mooting the 16 remaining requests for sealing and will therefore deny the remaining requests.3 17 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 18 For the forgoing reasons, the parties’ Notices and Requests to Seal Documents related to 19 Defendant’s Motion to Strike and Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Compel (Docs. 74, 76) are 20 GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 21 The Court ORDERS that the exhibits O and R to Declaration of Cassie L. Black in support 22 of GIS’s “Motion to Exclude Gary Gaukler” be FILED UNDER SEAL in accordance with Local 23 Rule 141. By no later than two (2) days of the date of this Order, the parties SHALL file on the 24 docket updated redacted versions of exhibits O and R to Declaration of Cassie L. Black in support 25 of GIS’s Motion to Exclude Gary Gaukler. All other documents associated with Guardian’s 26 “Motion for Terminating and Monetary Sanctions, or, in the Alternative, Witness Exclusion and/or 27
28 3 Based on GIS’ representations, (see Doc. 80 at 2), the Court understands the parties’ position to be that Guardian 1 an Adverse Inference Jury Instruction Against GIS,” (Doc. 75), and GIS’ “Motion to Exclude Gary 2 Gaukler,” Doc. 77), are to be filed publicly on the docket. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4
5 Dated: March 3, 2025 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto . UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6
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