NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________
No. 19-2208 ______________
GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
v.
TINA M. GONNELLA; JOSEPH D. GONNELLA
Joseph D. Gonnella, Appellant ______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-17-cv-12097) District Judge: Hon. Madeline C. Arleo ______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 23, 2020
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and ROTH Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 12, 2020) ______________
OPINION* ______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. MATEY, Circuit Judge.
Arleen Gonnella passed away in 2017, and this is a dispute about the benefits owed
under her life insurance policy. The District Court found Arleen’s daughter to be the
rightful beneficiary, and entered judgment in her favor. We agree, and will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The late Arleen Gonnella held a policy of whole life insurance issued through
Guardian Life. Following Arleen’s death, her daughter, Tina Gonnella, and ex-husband,
Joseph Gonnella, separately claimed to be the rightful beneficiary to the policy.2 Hoping
to stay out of the argument, Guardian Life began an action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 22, seeking interpleader relief and a release from any liability, leaving the task
of sorting out the beneficiary dispute to the District Court. The District Court obliged. First,
the court entered an order requiring Guardian Life to deposit the proceeds of the policy
with the court. Second, it entered a consent judgment providing interpleader relief, and
dismissed Guardian Life from the action. The District Court then turned to the dispute
between Tina and Joseph.
The policy names Joseph as the primary beneficiary. But he and Arleen divorced in
2012, and executed a Martial Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), dividing up their marital
assets. Relevant here, the MSA states, “[a]ll . . . life insurance policies . . . in the name or
possession of the Wife not otherwise identified herein shall be the sole and separate
2 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names in this opinion for clarity. 2 property of the Wife, and the Husband waives any interest therein.” (App. at 99.)3 The
MSA also says that any modification to its terms must be written and signed by both parties.
Tina argues that since Joseph waived his interest in Arleen’s Guardian Life policy,
under the MSA she was entitled to the death benefit as the policy’s contingent beneficiary.
The District Court agreed. Applying New Jersey law, it granted summary judgment to Tina
and ordered the Clerk to pay the entirety of the death benefit to her. Joseph appealed from
that final order.
II. JURISDICTION
We asked the parties to address whether the District Court properly exercised
jurisdiction over the matter after Guardian Life was dismissed. See Ricketts v. Att’y Gen.,
897 F.3d 491, 493 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (“As always, we have jurisdiction to determine our
own jurisdiction.”) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). Federal Rule
22 provides that “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple
liability may be joined as defendants and required to interplead.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a). An
interpleader action proceeds “in two distinct stages.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis,
553 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2009). First, “the court determines whether the interpleader
complaint was properly brought and whether to discharge the stakeholder from further
liability to the claimants.” Id. Second, “the court determines the respective rights of the
claimants to the interpleaded funds.” Id.
3 The parties agree that the MSA does not otherwise address the Guardian Life policy. 3 But Federal Rule 22 does not confer jurisdiction; an action for relief brought under
the rule must be supported by statutory jurisdiction. See 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1710 (3d ed. 2019). Here, the District Court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete diversity existed between
Guardian Life, a citizen of New York, and the Gonnellas, both citizens of New Jersey, and
because the policy has a life insurance benefit above $75,000. And since there was
jurisdiction at the time of filing, jurisdiction remained even after Guardian Life was
dismissed. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (per curiam)
(1991); see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (noting
that the “time-of-filing rule is hornbook law”). As a result, because Joseph Gonnella
appeals from a final order granting summary judgment to Tina Gonnella, we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. TINA GONNELLA IS THE RIGHTFUL BENEFICIARY OF THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Joseph raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the MSA did not address
insurance beneficiaries, only insurance policy ownership. Second, he argues that he and
Arleen later modified the MSA through an oral agreement restoring his beneficiary status
under the insurance policy. At a minimum, he reasons, these issues raise genuine disputes
of material fact, making summary judgment premature. We address each in turn.
Joseph concedes that he waived any “ownership” interest in the Guardian Life
policy under the MSA. But, he argues, that doesn’t alter his designation as primary
beneficiary under the policy which, he claims, falls outside the scope of the MSA. That
conclusion is incorrect under both the law of contract, and the law of marital settlements.
4 Start with the “basic contract principle[]” that we interpret the terms of an MSA to
give the “words of an agreement . . . their ordinary meaning” so that when “the parties’
intent is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, [we] must enforce the agreement
as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.” Woytas v. Greenwood Tree
Experts, Inc., 206 A.3d 386, 392 (N.J. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). And the MSA states that Joseph “waives any interest” in Arleen’s insurance
policies, ownership or otherwise. (App. at 99) (emphasis added). An “interest” means “[a]
legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________
No. 19-2208 ______________
GUARDIAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
v.
TINA M. GONNELLA; JOSEPH D. GONNELLA
Joseph D. Gonnella, Appellant ______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 2-17-cv-12097) District Judge: Hon. Madeline C. Arleo ______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 23, 2020
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and ROTH Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: March 12, 2020) ______________
OPINION* ______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. MATEY, Circuit Judge.
Arleen Gonnella passed away in 2017, and this is a dispute about the benefits owed
under her life insurance policy. The District Court found Arleen’s daughter to be the
rightful beneficiary, and entered judgment in her favor. We agree, and will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The late Arleen Gonnella held a policy of whole life insurance issued through
Guardian Life. Following Arleen’s death, her daughter, Tina Gonnella, and ex-husband,
Joseph Gonnella, separately claimed to be the rightful beneficiary to the policy.2 Hoping
to stay out of the argument, Guardian Life began an action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 22, seeking interpleader relief and a release from any liability, leaving the task
of sorting out the beneficiary dispute to the District Court. The District Court obliged. First,
the court entered an order requiring Guardian Life to deposit the proceeds of the policy
with the court. Second, it entered a consent judgment providing interpleader relief, and
dismissed Guardian Life from the action. The District Court then turned to the dispute
between Tina and Joseph.
The policy names Joseph as the primary beneficiary. But he and Arleen divorced in
2012, and executed a Martial Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), dividing up their marital
assets. Relevant here, the MSA states, “[a]ll . . . life insurance policies . . . in the name or
possession of the Wife not otherwise identified herein shall be the sole and separate
2 Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names in this opinion for clarity. 2 property of the Wife, and the Husband waives any interest therein.” (App. at 99.)3 The
MSA also says that any modification to its terms must be written and signed by both parties.
Tina argues that since Joseph waived his interest in Arleen’s Guardian Life policy,
under the MSA she was entitled to the death benefit as the policy’s contingent beneficiary.
The District Court agreed. Applying New Jersey law, it granted summary judgment to Tina
and ordered the Clerk to pay the entirety of the death benefit to her. Joseph appealed from
that final order.
II. JURISDICTION
We asked the parties to address whether the District Court properly exercised
jurisdiction over the matter after Guardian Life was dismissed. See Ricketts v. Att’y Gen.,
897 F.3d 491, 493 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (“As always, we have jurisdiction to determine our
own jurisdiction.”) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002)). Federal Rule
22 provides that “[p]ersons with claims that may expose a plaintiff to double or multiple
liability may be joined as defendants and required to interplead.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 22(a). An
interpleader action proceeds “in two distinct stages.” Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hovis,
553 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 2009). First, “the court determines whether the interpleader
complaint was properly brought and whether to discharge the stakeholder from further
liability to the claimants.” Id. Second, “the court determines the respective rights of the
claimants to the interpleaded funds.” Id.
3 The parties agree that the MSA does not otherwise address the Guardian Life policy. 3 But Federal Rule 22 does not confer jurisdiction; an action for relief brought under
the rule must be supported by statutory jurisdiction. See 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1710 (3d ed. 2019). Here, the District Court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because complete diversity existed between
Guardian Life, a citizen of New York, and the Gonnellas, both citizens of New Jersey, and
because the policy has a life insurance benefit above $75,000. And since there was
jurisdiction at the time of filing, jurisdiction remained even after Guardian Life was
dismissed. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (per curiam)
(1991); see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (noting
that the “time-of-filing rule is hornbook law”). As a result, because Joseph Gonnella
appeals from a final order granting summary judgment to Tina Gonnella, we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. TINA GONNELLA IS THE RIGHTFUL BENEFICIARY OF THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Joseph raises two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that the MSA did not address
insurance beneficiaries, only insurance policy ownership. Second, he argues that he and
Arleen later modified the MSA through an oral agreement restoring his beneficiary status
under the insurance policy. At a minimum, he reasons, these issues raise genuine disputes
of material fact, making summary judgment premature. We address each in turn.
Joseph concedes that he waived any “ownership” interest in the Guardian Life
policy under the MSA. But, he argues, that doesn’t alter his designation as primary
beneficiary under the policy which, he claims, falls outside the scope of the MSA. That
conclusion is incorrect under both the law of contract, and the law of marital settlements.
4 Start with the “basic contract principle[]” that we interpret the terms of an MSA to
give the “words of an agreement . . . their ordinary meaning” so that when “the parties’
intent is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, [we] must enforce the agreement
as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.” Woytas v. Greenwood Tree
Experts, Inc., 206 A.3d 386, 392 (N.J. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). And the MSA states that Joseph “waives any interest” in Arleen’s insurance
policies, ownership or otherwise. (App. at 99) (emphasis added). An “interest” means “[a]
legal share in something; all or part of a legal or equitable claim to or right in property.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). So by waiving his right to “any interest,” Joseph
waived his beneficiary interest in the policy.4
New Jersey law governing the revocation of probate and non-probate transfers by
divorce produces the same result. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:3–14. That law provides that “a
divorce . . . revokes any revocable[] dispositions or appointment of property made by a
divorced individual to his former spouse in a governing instrument[.]” Id. § 3B:3–
14(a)(1)(a). And the statute continues: “[i]n the event of a divorce . . . provisions of a
governing instrument are given effect as if the former spouse . . . disclaimed all provisions
revoked by this section[.]” Id. § 3B:3–14(a)(2); see also Fox v. Lincoln Fin. Grp, 109 A.3d
221, 227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (noting that “the Legislature . . . acted in
4 New Jersey law accords the same: “when spouses divorce and enter into a property-settlement agreement that purports to settle all questions pertaining to their respective interests in distribution of the marital assets, the proceeds of a life-insurance policy subject to the lifetime control of one spouse should ordinarily be considered as encompassed within the terms of the settlement agreement.” Vasconi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 590 A.2d 1161, 1165 (N.J. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 [§] 3B:3-14 to provide that divorce automatically revokes a disposition of property made
by a divorced individual to his former spouse in a governing instrument which, by
definition, includes an insurance policy.”). So the auto-revocation statute severed Joseph’s
interest as primary beneficiary of the policy.
Finally, Joseph maintains that an oral agreement followed, and modified, the signed
MSA. And he notes that § 3B:3-14(a)’s default rule applies “[e]xcept as provided by the
express terms of a governing instrument, a court order, or a contract relating to the division
of the marital estate made between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage,
divorce or annulment.” Id. § 3B:3-14(a). So, he argues, this oral agreement defeats § 3B:3-
14(a)’s application because it serves as a “contract relating to the division of the marital
estate made between the divorced individuals . . . after the . . . divorce.” Id.
Joseph concedes that no one other than he and Arleen was privy to this spoken
promise. So he bolsters his position by noting that he and Arleen enjoyed an amicable
relationship after divorce, as evidenced by his continued involvement in her financial
affairs, their mutual concern for each other during health emergencies, and her request to
share the Gonnella family burial plot. He also asserts that neither he nor Arleen ever
removed each other as primary beneficiary under their respective life insurance policies
(including the Guardian Life policy), and that his signed affidavit, which he submitted to
the District Court, supports his recollection of their oral agreement.
But all this extrinsic evidence still fights the terms of the MSA, which allows for
only a written modification signed by both parties. And because the MSA addresses the
disposition of any life insurance policies held by Joseph or Arleen, § 3B:3-14 cannot nullify
6 the agreed-upon terms of that agreement.5 For that reason, as persuasively stated by the
District Court, “any subsequent agreement involving [Arleen’s] life insurance policy
would directly modify the provision of the MSA which clearly states that each waived any
interest in the other’s life insurance policy. Thus, such an agreement would need to be in
writing as per the terms of the MSA.” (App. at 207 n.3.)
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
5 Even if we were to consider the validity of the purported oral agreement, our analysis would not proceed far because in New Jersey “a mere verbal expression of intent to change a beneficiary designation is ineffective.” DeCeglia v. Estate of Colletti, 625 A.2d 590, 594 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). Since his designation as primary beneficiary of the policy had severed, Arleen would have needed to reinstate Joseph as the primary beneficiary under the policy. See id. at 593. But Arleen took no action that would corroborate Joseph’s account of their unwritten agreement. 7