Guanuna v. Sawatzki

Opinion

2026 UT App 130

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUAN MIGUEL GUANUNA,

Appellant,

v.

LINDSEY R. SAWATZKI AND JONATHAN C. SAWATZKI, Appellees.

Opinion

No. 20240191-CA Filed August 20, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence No. 194904191

Taylor P. Webb and Erin B. Hull, Attorneys for Appellant Juan Miguel Guanuna Mark Wiser and Scott Wiser, Attorneys for Appellee Lindsey R. Sawatzki

Julie J. Nelson, Attorney for Appellee Jonathan C. Sawatzki

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 This appeal arises from a paternity action within a divorce action in the district court. Jonathan C. Sawatzki and Lindsey R. Sawatzki (Mother) were married for seven years. During this marriage, Mother gave birth to two sons. Unbeknownst to Jonathan, 1 Mother had been carrying on an affair with another

1. For clarity and consistency, and with no disrespect intended by the apparent informality, we refer to Jonathan and Miguel by their common names, as the district court did below.

man, Juan Miguel Guanuna, and Jonathan is not the biological father of either child. Miguel, too, was continually deceived by Mother about her relationship with Johnathan.

¶2 After petitioning for divorce from Mother, Jonathan was awarded sole custody of the children. Miguel later learned about the divorce and moved to intervene in the proceedings. Miguel subsequently filed a petition to terminate Jonathan’s parental rights, along with a motion to conduct genetic testing. Results of that testing confirmed that Miguel is the biological father of both children.

¶3 Thereafter, the district court held a hearing on Miguel’s petition. Ultimately, the court concluded that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in Jonathan’s care. The court therefore issued an order disregarding the genetic testing results and adjudicating Jonathan as the children’s legal father. After the ruling, Miguel filed a posttrial motion for relief, which the court denied without holding a hearing.

¶4 Miguel now appeals. Though we are sympathetic to the situation Miguel, Jonathan, and the children have found themselves in as a result of Mother’s years-long deception, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rulings. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶5 Though lengthy and complicated, the factual background of this case is not in dispute. We recount the facts relevant to the issues on appeal.

The Relationships Begin

¶6 Jonathan and Mother began dating in late 2010 or early 2011. Jonathan and Mother became engaged in October 2011, and they scheduled their wedding for April 2012. During this time,

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Mother represented that she was not dating anyone other than Jonathan.

¶7 Mother and Miguel had met in junior high school, although the two had little contact during their younger years. But this changed in late 2010 or early 2011, when they started to date. At the time, Mother told Miguel that she was not involved in any other romantic relationships. And when Mother became engaged to Jonathan, she concealed that fact from Miguel.

Mother Becomes Pregnant

¶8 In January 2012, Mother realized she was pregnant. Because she had not had sex with Jonathan but had been intimate with Miguel, she knew that Miguel was the father. Nevertheless, Mother convinced Jonathan that “her pregnancy was the result of his sperm finding its way to her vagina while they were engaged in heavy petting resulting in him ejaculating.” To help conceal the fact that the pregnancy had occurred before the two were married, Jonathan and Mother moved up their wedding date and were married in February 2012.

¶9 Mother also informed Miguel about the pregnancy. Although Miguel suggested that he and Mother should marry, Mother did not act on this suggestion. The two continued to date and spend time together, and Miguel was actively involved in the pregnancy. Miguel was not informed about Mother’s marriage to Jonathan.

Mother Gives Birth

¶10 Drew 2 was born in September 2012. Jonathan was present for the birth, but Mother did not tell Miguel when she was giving birth, so he was not at the hospital, and Jonathan was named as Drew’s father on the birth certificate.

2. We use pseudonyms for both children.

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¶11 Shortly after returning home from the hospital, Mother took Drew to meet Miguel. Because Miguel had another son from a previous relationship, he knew that because he and Mother were not married, he needed to sign a voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) for Drew. Miguel asked Mother to go with him to sign the VDP, which led to Mother disclosing to him that she was married to Jonathan and that Jonathan’s name was on Drew’s birth certificate. Mother promised that she would complete the necessary steps to correct the birth certificate. After Mother failed to take action for several weeks, Miguel hired an attorney and filed a paternity action.

¶12 In December 2012, facing pressure from Miguel’s paternity action, Mother came clean to Jonathan about being unfaithful during their engagement, and she informed him that Miguel is Drew’s biological father. Jonathan submitted to a paternity test, the results of which confirmed that he is not Drew’s biological father. Thereafter, Mother and Miguel stipulated to joint physical and legal custody of Drew. Mother later withdrew that stipulation, and the case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice in December 2013 after Miguel, apparently relying on Mother’s representations that “she would be taking care of things,” failed to appear at a hearing.

Mother Continues Her Deception

¶13 Mother continued to maintain her relationships with both Jonathan and Miguel, with neither man being fully aware of the extent of Mother’s ongoing relationship with the other. By January 2013, Mother began insisting that Jonathan allow Miguel and his family contact with Drew. Though Jonathan initially opposed such contact, he eventually gave in to Mother’s requests.

¶14 In March 2013, when Drew was six months old, Mother and Jonathan separated. Although the couple did not divorce until 2019, from January 2013 to June 2019 they lived separately more than half of the time. Also, for some portion of this period, Mother spent significant time with Miguel and was able to convince him that they (meaning she and Miguel) lived together.

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Drew saw both Jonathan and Miguel during the times in which Mother was “living” with them, and both men’s extended families provided surrogate care during this period.

Mother Gives Birth Again

¶15 In February 2014, Mother informed Jonathan that she was pregnant again. The two resumed living together in September 2014. Shortly thereafter, Mother gave birth to a second son, Austin. Mother did not designate the child’s father on the birth certificate but listed the child’s last name as Sawatzki.

Mother Marries Miguel

¶16 In April 2016, during one of Mother’s temporary separations from Jonathan, Mother and Miguel married in Las Vegas, Nevada. Prior to the ceremony, Mother had provided Miguel a fake divorce decree that purported to show that her marriage with Jonathan had been dissolved.

¶17 After the wedding, Mother and the children lived at least part-time with Miguel. In January 2017, Austin’s birth certificate was amended to reflect that Miguel is his biological father.

Mother Enters a Third Relationship

¶18 Mother and Jonathan separated for the final time around March 2017, though they did not divorce for financial reasons. A few months later, in October 2017, Mother entered a new romantic relationship—this time with her current husband. Mother moved out of Miguel’s house in September 2018 to pursue this new relationship.

Jonathan Files for Divorce from Mother, and Miguel Intervenes

¶19 In July 2019, Jonathan filed for divorce from Mother. The following month, the district court entered a decree of divorce based on their stipulation. The decree provided, “The parties have two children born to them as issue of the marriage . . . : [Drew],

20240191-CA 5 2026 UT App 130 born in September of 2012, and [Austin], born in September of 2014.” Jonathan was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the children, and Mother was awarded parent-time. Per the terms of the stipulation, Mother was prohibited from allowing the children to contact or see Miguel or his family.

¶20 Miguel soon learned about the divorce. And in November 2019, Miguel filed a motion to intervene in the divorce proceedings, set aside the divorce decree, and alter the custody order. The parties stipulated to Miguel’s intervention, and the district court set aside the provisions of the divorce decree relating to the children. The court then found it was in the children’s best interest to remain in Jonathan’s custody as the case proceeded.

Miguel Petitions to Terminate Jonathan’s Parental Rights

¶21 In November 2020, Miguel filed a petition to terminate Jonathan’s parental rights and “re-establish” his own parental rights and paternity, which he claimed had “been wrongfully terminated.” Miguel asserted that he, not Jonathan, was “the actual biological father” of the children, and he requested that the district court order genetic testing to establish biological parentage. Later, Miguel moved to have the court recognize the results of DNA testing showing that he is the children’s biological father.

¶22 In response to the request for genetic testing, Jonathan noted that Drew’s paternity had been resolved by the paternity action that was dismissed with prejudice in December 2013 after Miguel failed to appear at a hearing. Jonathan argued that, as a result, res judicata barred Miguel from asserting any rights as to Drew. As to Austin, Jonathan asserted that Miguel’s action was governed by Utah Code section 81-5-608 (Section 608), 3 which

3. The statutory provisions that govern this case have been renumbered since the proceedings at issue. But because the provisions have not been substantively amended, we cite the current version of the code for convenience.

20240191-CA 6 2026 UT App 130 allows a court to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing if denying the motion for genetic testing is in the best interest of the child.

¶23 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected Jonathan’s res judicata argument. After then addressing the best-interest factors in Section 608, the court concluded that the evidence supported ordering genetic testing, and it accordingly granted Miguel’s motion for genetic testing. But the court made clear that this decision concerned only whether to order genetic testing; it was not intended “to be the dispositive ruling regarding custody,” and the results would “have no force and effect going forward regarding the best interests or custody determinations.”

¶24 Thereafter, Jonathan stipulated that Drew is Miguel’s biological child and waived testing as to him. Genetic testing for Austin was performed, which confirmed that Miguel is his biological father too.

The Court Orders a Custody Evaluation

¶25 The district court ordered a custody evaluation. From January 2022 through April 2023, a custody evaluator (Evaluator) conducted extensive interviews and prepared a detailed report.

¶26 Evaluator explained that in the summer of 2019, as the divorce between Jonathan and Mother was being finalized, the children “had their world change dramatically” when they were removed from Mother’s primary care, placed in Jonathan’s primary care, and cut off from Miguel and his family. Evaluator observed that in the nearly four years since these events, the children had adjusted to the changes and were “doing quite well” in the existing arrangement. Evaluator credited this success to Jonathan’s “efforts to give them stability and predictability.”

¶27 Evaluator noted that there had been no reported concerns with Jonathan’s ability to meet the children’s needs since they were placed in his primary care in July 2019. By contrast, Miguel

20240191-CA 7 2026 UT App 130 had “chosen to refrain from attempting to directly engage [with] either [Jonathan] or the [children] over th[e] course of that time.” And Evaluator found that Miguel had “no history with any of his 3 sons in a primary care role”; though Miguel is “responsive” to his oldest son’s needs, the son’s mother assumes the primary parental role. Given this fact, Evaluator opined that “having the primary parental role is not Miguel’s aspirational intention for his sons” but that, if permitted, Miguel could “be a supportive and responsive coparent partner in meeting the needs of his children.”

¶28 Evaluator found that from the time of their births until the divorce in 2019, the children “had frequent and continuous participation with both their Guanuna family and their Sawatzki family.” Evaluator recognized that since July 2019, when Jonathan became the children’s “only parental figure,” their bonds with Jonathan had continued to develop but there was no opportunity to maintain their bonds with Miguel or his family. Evaluator found that it was in the children’s “long term best interest . . . to have opportunities to persist in the exercise and development of all of their previously established bonds and significant relationships.”

¶29 Based on the foregoing findings, Evaluator recommended that the parties adopt a triangulated parenting plan with Jonathan and Mother moving toward equal parent-time, Miguel receiving minimum parent-time, and all parties being involved with substantive decisions. To implement this plan, Evaluator recommended that Jonathan and Mother build on the existing parenting structure by continuing to participate in the children’s lives while simultaneously working to reunify the children with Miguel and his family. Evaluator recommended that for the time being, Jonathan should “remain the primary residential parent” and “maintain presumptive legal authority for day-to-day decision making.” But Evaluator suggested that going forward, Jonathan’s “authority and practices as a primary residential parent [would] need to be both limited in scope and inclusive of the [children’s] other parents for substantive decisions affecting” the children.

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¶30 Evaluator clarified that the recommendation to maintain Jonathan as the children’s primary physical and legal custodian was not “an endorsement of [Jonathan] as [his] preferred choice” but instead reflected his belief that, “at present,” maintaining the current situation was “the least detrimental alternative” for the children. (Emphasis omitted.) However, Evaluator cautioned that maintaining the children in Jonathan’s care “[m]ust be conditioned upon [Jonathan] supporting [the triangulated parenting plan]” and that if he refused to do so, “then maintaining his primary residential and legal authority is the wrong long-term choice.”

The Case Proceeds to Trial

¶31 In advance of trial, the parties submitted briefs to the court. Miguel stated that the primary “[i]ssues to be addressed at trial” included the following: (1) “[c]onsidering that Miguel is the biological father of both the children, the Court needs to address the factors of Utah Code [section 81-5-608(3)]”; (2) “[w]hether [Jonathan] or Miguel is the legal father of the minor children”; and (3) “[w]hether the Court can issue an equitable order allowing all three parents to be a part of the minor children’s lives.” Regarding the second issue, Miguel argued that he was “the legal father according to the factors of Utah Code [section 81-5-608(3)].” And regarding the third issue, Miguel argued that should Jonathan be adjudicated as the legal father, the court should “issue an equitable ‘third-party’ visitation plan under Utah Code [section 81-9-402].”

¶32 On September 18, 2023, the district court held a bench trial on Miguel’s outstanding petition to terminate Jonathan’s parental rights and motion to recognize genetic testing results. Miguel and Jonathan testified as to the facts recounted above. Evaluator also testified as to the findings in his report as described above. In addition, immediately before his testimony at trial, the court had the following exchange with Evaluator:

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[The court]: I appreciate your report. . . . So I sort of look at your report as sort of a square hole in a round peg in this case because this analysis is the sort of analysis I would have between two parents who have parental rights and we’re trying to figure out, well, one is the primary and the other isn’t, and we’re going to have reunification.

This is different. The job that I have is to . . .

pick one. . . . [I]t’s not a binary determination. I have to make a best-interest determination.

As I read your report, what I hear you saying is—and correct me if I’m wrong—the [children] are stable. They’re in a predictable place right now, and they are doing well. You would have hoped that we could have some sort of reunification with Miguel going forward.

That sort of indicates to me that, if we’re looking at things right now, that[] it’s in the children’s best interest to stay with [Jonathan]. Do you disagree with that? Or not?

[Evaluator]: I agree with that.

The Court Rules Against Miguel

¶33 Following trial, the district court adjudicated Jonathan as the children’s legal father. The court found both Jonathan and Miguel to be credible witnesses. The court recognized that both men “share a deep love for the children and the goal of preserving their relationship with” the children. The court found that Mother had “maintained a double life, deceiving Jonathan and Miguel, living in two households, and bearing two boys.” But the court explained that “[w]hile Jonathan and Miguel may have experienced similar circumstances in regards to [Mother], they

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[were] not similarly situated . . . before the Court.” Specifically, the court found that while Miguel is the children’s biological father, Jonathan is the presumed father under Utah Code section 81-5-204(1)(a) because he was married to Mother at the time of the children’s births. The court determined that, as the presumed father, Jonathan “had no obligation to do anything to perfect that relationship.” The court determined that Miguel, however, “as an unmarried father, would have had to take certain steps to assert his paternity,” which he did not do (or at least did not complete) until he intervened in the divorce in 2019.

¶34 Relying in part on Evaluator’s report and testimony, the district court then made findings regarding each of the relevant Section 608 factors. As to factor (a)—the length of time between the adjudication proceeding and when the presumed father was put on notice he might not be the genetic father—and factor (c)— the facts surrounding the presumed father’s discovery of his possible nonpaternity—the court found that Jonathan and Miguel both knew that Miguel was Drew’s biological father “for over a decade.” The court found that despite this knowledge, Miguel failed to act to “perfect” his rights until 2019.

¶35 The district court next addressed factor (e)—the age of the children. The court found that the children were nine and eleven years old, they had “resided exclusively with Jonathan for over four years,” and they were “doing well in [his] care.” Given their ages, their “current thriving relationship[s]” with Jonathan, and the importance of maintaining “stability and predictability” in the children’s lives, the court found that factor (e) favored Jonathan.

¶36 The district court grouped together factor (b)—the length of time the presumed father has assumed the role of father—and factor (d)—the nature of relationship between the children and the presumed father. The court recognized that from 2013 to 2018, Miguel had “a substantial relationship with the children” and was involved in their lives. However, the court found that in 2019, things changed when Jonathan assumed the role of the children’s primary caregiver. The court found that since 2019, the children had developed “a strong relationship with Jonathan and they

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[were] thriving under his care.” Conversely, the court found that the children “had no contact with Miguel during this four year time period.”

¶37 Though the district court recognized that the matter had been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, an event for which Miguel was not at fault, it nevertheless rejected Miguel’s argument that it would be “unfair” to weigh the four years during which the children were in Jonathan’s care in favor of Jonathan. The court explained that its ruling would necessarily result in unfairness to one of the parties but concluded that its “role [was] not to apply its sense of fairness to the parties, but to determine what [was] in the children’s best interest, specifically whether it would be inequitable to disrupt the existing father-child relationship[s].”

¶38 Based on all of this, the district court found that factors (b) and (d) weighed “strongly” in Jonathan’s favor. In addition, the court concluded that Jonathan not only had demonstrated the ability to care for the children during the pendency of the case, but also that he was “better situated to retain his role as the children’s primary physical custodian.” The court noted that this latter conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Miguel was seeking only “visitation with the children, not that he be named their primary caregiver.”

¶39 Finally, the district court assessed factor (f)—the harm that may result to the children if presumed paternity is disestablished. The court noted that Evaluator had described maintaining the current situation as the “least detrimental alternative” and that “harm . . . would result if Jonathan were uprooted from the [children’s] lives.” The court agreed with Evaluator, finding that allowing Miguel to displace Jonathan in the children’s lives would cause the children “serious harm” and “would be horribly destructive, would require reunification efforts by all involved, and would clearly not be in the children’s best interest.”

¶40 After weighing the Section 608 factors, the district court concluded that it was “in the children’s best interest to disregard

20240191-CA 12 2026 UT App 130 the genetic testing and declare Jonathan to be the children’s legal father.” The court noted that while it was “sensitive to [Evaluator’s] recommendation that it adopt a triangulated parenting plan,” that was “beyond the scope of the Court’s review.” Because “a child can have only one legal father,” the court emphasized that its role was simply “to consider the children’s best interests and to choose one father over the other, but not both, based on a best interests analysis.”

¶41 Thereafter, the district court issued an order disregarding the genetic testing results and adjudicating Jonathan as the children’s legal father. The court also reinstated the portions of the divorce decree that had been previously set aside and denied Miguel’s motion to intervene, dismissing his claims with prejudice.

Miguel Files a Posttrial Motion

¶42 With new counsel, Miguel filed a posttrial motion asking the district court to alter or “amend the judgment to reflect that [he] is the legal father of [Austin] and [Drew],” citing newly discovered evidence as well as asserted legal errors. Miguel claimed that “[i]n preparation for filing this motion,” he “discovered” a VDP, purportedly signed by him, and an accompanying denial of paternity (DOP), purportedly signed by Jonathan on the same day in 2017, on file for Austin with the Utah Office of Vital Records and Statistics. Miguel averred that he “was unaware that either the VDP or the [DOP] were on file,” and he asserted that “[n]either [Mother] nor Jonathan ever disclosed the existence of the VDP or the [DOP] to [him] or to th[e] Court . . . even though the documents [were] material to the issues before the Court.”

¶43 Miguel raised four new theories for why he, and not Jonathan, should be deemed the children’s legal father. First, he argued that the court should give effect to the VDP and DOP, both of which “necessitate[d]” him being adjudicated as Austin’s legal father. Second, he argued that “[S]ection 608 d[id] not govern the outcome in this case,” because he had already rebutted Jonathan’s

20240191-CA 13 2026 UT App 130 presumed paternity under the statute. Third, he argued that even if Section 608 applied, the court “erred in its analysis of the factors, giving improper weight to certain factors.” Fourth, Miguel argued that applying Section 608 to deny him paternity would violate his constitutional rights and, thus, the court should apply the canon of constitutional avoidance to accept one of his aforementioned arguments.

¶44 Jonathan opposed Miguel’s motion and filed a cross- motion to have the VDP and DOP declared void because they did not meet the statutory requirements for validity and Jonathan’s signature was forged. Jonathan also argued that Miguel had waived most of the theories raised in his motion. Mother also opposed Miguel’s motion; she filed a declaration asserting that she forged the DOP, and she stipulated to Jonathan’s cross-motion to have both documents declared void.

The Court Denies Miguel’s Posttrial Motion

¶45 After considering the parties’ briefing, the district court denied Miguel’s motion in its entirety. The court did so without conducting a hearing, explaining that the issues had “all been ‘authoritatively decided.’” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h).)

¶46 The district court first addressed Miguel’s argument regarding the VDP and DOP. The court construed this claim to be based on rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows relief from judgment based on fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an opposing party. But the court concluded that Miguel was not entitled to relief under rule 60(b)(3) because he had failed to “cogently explain how Jonathan’s and [Mother’s] conduct was fraudulent.” The court continued:

Although there was plenty of evidence presented at trial showing that [Mother] had been deceptive with both men, Miguel fails to persuade the Court that [Mother’s] conduct in relation to the VDP defrauded him. Indeed, under Miguel’s view

20240191-CA 14 2026 UT App 130 of the facts, all three parties were equally culpable as all allegedly knew of the VDP and DOP. Miguel essentially argues that, at trial, even though all three parties had awareness of, and failed to reveal the existence of, the VDP/DOP, only two of the three should be deemed to have fraudulent intent based on their nonaction.

¶47 As to Miguel’s remaining arguments, which were “independent of his fraud claim,” the district court determined that Miguel was “essentially asking th[e] Court to reconsider its ruling.” The court declined to do so, concluding that these arguments either had been “considered and rejected at trial or could have and should have been raised at trial, but were not,” thus rendering them “waived.”

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶48 Miguel now appeals, raising three primary issues for our review. First, he argues the district court erred in interpreting the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (the Act). See Utah Code §§ 81-5-101 to -902. Specifically, he claims the court improperly refused to recognize that Miguel was the children’s presumed father, which would have foreclosed the need to conduct a Section 608 analysis. Miguel frames this issue as a question of statutory interpretation, but as discussed below, Miguel did not advance this particular interpretation until his posttrial motion, at which point the court deemed the argument to be waived. Our review, therefore, concerns the court’s ruling on the posttrial motion. We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion, while “any underlying legal questions” are reviewed for correctness. Robinson v. Baggett, 2011 UT App 250, ¶ 13, 263 P.3d 411.

¶49 Second, Miguel argues the district court erred in its analysis of the Section 608 factors. A court’s decision to disregard genetic testing results under Section 608 “involves a determination of the best interest of the child and is discretionary

20240191-CA 15 2026 UT App 130 by statute.” In re I.C., 2025 UT App 20, ¶ 32, 565 P.3d 876, cert. denied, 570 P.3d 663 (Utah 2025). Thus, such a decision is entitled to deference and will not be overturned “unless it goes against the clear weight of the evidence or leaves the appellate court with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation simplified).

¶50 Third, Miguel challenges the district court’s denial of his posttrial motion for relief based on fraudulent concealment of the VDP and DOP. We review a district court’s ruling on a posttrial motion “for an abuse of discretion,” but we review “any underlying legal questions for correctness.” Robinson, 2011 UT App 250, ¶ 13 (quotation simplified). Whether a party is entitled to a hearing on a posttrial motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Pang v. International Document Services, 2015 UT 63, ¶ 8, 356 P.3d 1190.

ANALYSIS

I. Interpretation of the Act

¶51 Miguel first argues the district court erred in failing to recognize him as the children’s presumed father under the Act. He contends that recognizing him as such would have obviated the need for a Section 608 analysis because that section authorizes a court to disregard genetic testing results only where the results exclude the presumed father. In response, Jonathan contends that we should not consider this argument because the court below deemed it to be waived and none of the exceptions to our preservation rule apply. We agree with Jonathan.

¶52 Under the Act, a “father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by,” among other things, “an unrebutted presumption of the man’s paternity.” Utah Code § 81- 5-201(2). A presumption of paternity arises in several situations. As relevant here, those situations include where (1) “the man and the birth mother of the child are married to each other and the

20240191-CA 16 2026 UT App 130 child is born during the marriage” or (2) “after the birth of the child, the man and the birth mother of the child married each other in apparent compliance with law, . . . the man voluntarily asserted the man’s parentage of the child, and there is no other presumptive father of the child.” Id. § 81-5-204(1)(a), (d). Once a man is presumed to be the father of a child, that presumption may be rebutted only in certain ways, including by “genetic test results that exclude the presumed father.” Id. § 81-5-607(3)(a).

¶53 But rebutting a presumption of paternity is necessary but not sufficient to displace a presumed father. “The Act . . . contemplates that, in some situations, a court can ignore genetic test results when determining paternity.” Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶ 31, 529 P.3d 319. Pursuant to Section 608, a court may choose to disregard genetic test results that exclude the presumed father where it determines that doing so is in the best interest of the children. See Utah Code § 81-5-608(2), (3).

¶54 Here, Miguel filed a posttrial motion pursuant to rules 52(b), 59(c), 59(e), and 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, asking the district court to alter or amend the judgment to reflect that he is the children’s legal father. Among other arguments, Miguel asserted that the court should interpret the Act in a manner different from which it already had. Specifically, he argued for the first time that the court did not need to conduct a Section 608 analysis as that section did “not govern the outcome in this case, because Miguel had rebutted Jonathan’s presumption of parentage under the [Act].”

¶55 In ruling on this motion, the district court declined to address the merits of Miguel’s new Section 608 argument. The court explained, “[Miguel’s] motion . . . makes several general arguments, independent of his fraud claim”—including that Section 608 does not apply—“essentially asking this Court to reconsider its ruling.” But because these arguments had “either been considered and rejected at trial or could have and should have been raised at trial, but were not,” the court “deemed [them] to be waived.”

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¶56 “Although a new argument may be advanced when moving for a new trial, the trial court may refuse to consider the merits of the argument because it may find the issue waived.” State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551 (quotation simplified). Because the district court here took that route and did not address the merits of Miguel’s new Section 608 argument, “the issue remains unpreserved for appellate review and may be addressed only if the challenging party can show plain error or exceptional circumstances.” Id. Miguel suggests that review is appropriate under either the plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to our preservation rule. 4 We disagree on both counts.

¶57 First, plain error review does not apply in most civil cases. See Kelly v. Timber Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 41, 507 P.3d 357. While this court has left open the possibility that plain error review might be available in civil cases that “involve significant interests on par with those at issue in criminal cases, such as” cases involving the “termination of parental rights,” id.

¶ 42 n.10, the issue remains unsettled, see Cove at Little Valley Homeowners Ass’n v. Traverse Ridge Special Service Dist., 2022 UT 23, ¶¶ 40 & n.5, 44, 513 P.3d 658. Miguel did not acknowledge this fact in his opening brief, much less argue why we should extend plain error review to this civil paternity action. Consequently, Miguel did not “devote adequate attention” to this claim and has therefore “fail[ed] to carry [his] burden of persuasion on appeal.” Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 12–13, 391 P.3d 196 (quotation simplified); see also Cove, 2022 UT 23, ¶ 44 (“The parties in this case do not address the viability of the plain error exception in civil cases. This places us in a disadvantageous position to make broad pronouncements about the doctrine. . . . [W]e leave the broader question for a case in which it is briefed and before us.”).

4. Miguel does not challenge the district court’s waiver determination.

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¶58 Second, the ineffective assistance of counsel exception likewise does not apply. “[C]riminal defendants are constitutionally entitled to effective representation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Thomas v. Hillyard, 2019 UT 29, ¶ 13 n.11, 445 P.3d 521. But the same is not true for civil litigants. Id. Because there is “no parallel [to the Sixth Amendment] in the civil context,” the constitutional “protection against ineffective assistance of counsel” does not ordinarily extend to civil cases. Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 135 P.3d 861.

¶59 This general rule is subject to one key exception: “Parents are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in child welfare proceedings.” In re R.D., 2024 UT App 91, ¶ 33, 554 P.3d 318; see also In re adoption of K.A.S., 2016 UT 55, ¶¶ 22, 38, 390 P.3d 278 (holding that in some circumstances, a parent facing termination of parental rights may enjoy a constitutional due process right to counsel); In re E.H., 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that parents are statutorily entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in juvenile proceedings). But because this proceeding concerns a paternity determination rather than a termination of parental rights, there is no indication that this exception applies. See Marchand v. Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, ¶ 12, 147 P.3d 538 (declining to “recognize ineffective assistance of counsel as a proper ground for a new trial in a custody dispute”).

¶60 In sum, we conclude that Miguel waived his argument that Section 608 does not apply in this case. We further conclude that it would be inappropriate to reach the merits of this argument under either the plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel exceptions to our preservation rule. These exceptions are not ordinarily available in civil cases, and Miguel has not persuaded us that this case warrants expanding either exception.

II. Section 608 Factors

¶61 Miguel next argues that the district court’s Section 608 analysis was “flawed.” Specifically, he contends the court

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(A) “failed to comply with [Evaluator’s] recommendation,” (B) “misunderstood the scope of its task in adjudicating parentage,” and (C) “erred in applying [S]ection 608.” We address each point in turn.

A. Evaluator’s Recommendation

¶62 Miguel argues the district court erred in rejecting Evaluator’s recommendation that “it was in the [c]hildren’s best interest to be reunited with Miguel.” He contends the court relied on a “single exchange” with Evaluator at the outset of his trial testimony and “completely disregarded” Evaluator’s testimony and report without articulating a basis for doing so. We disagree.

¶63 Although a “district court is not bound to accept a custody evaluator’s recommendation,” if a court chooses to reject the recommendation, it “is expected to articulate some reason for doing so.” Lobendahn v. Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 37, 540 P.3d 727 (quotation simplified). Here, the court did exactly that.

¶64 In its findings of fact, the district court addressed Evaluator’s report and recommendation. The court explained that Evaluator’s recommendation was for a “triangulated parenting plan” that would allow the children to maintain relationships with both Jonathan and Miguel. But given the legal posture of the case, the court rejected that recommendation. The court articulated its reasoning as follows: “Although [Evaluator] testified that he believed [a triangulated parenting plan] may have been in the best interests of the children, that is not the determination this Court is required to make in this matter. Here, the Court is obligated to determine whether it is in the [children’s] best interests to declare Jonathan or Miguel as the [children’s] legal father.”

¶65 Because the district court clearly articulated why it chose to reject Evaluator’s recommendation, Miguel’s argument falls short. The court carefully considered Evaluator’s report but ultimately concluded that it was “sort of a square hole in a round

20240191-CA 20 2026 UT App 130 peg” and, therefore, the resulting recommendation was of limited value. This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.

¶66 In any event, Miguel’s claim that the district court improperly relied on an exchange with Evaluator at trial as a basis to disregard the written report is not supported by the record. After explaining to Evaluator that, while thoughtfully prepared, the report was not directly relevant given that the court was not ordering reunification but was instead picking one man as the legal father, the court asked Evaluator what would be in the children’s best interest “if we’re looking at things right now.” (Emphasis added.) And to that question, Evaluator affirmed that it would be best for the children to remain with Jonathan. Thus, although Evaluator “would have hoped” for reunification with Miguel at some point in the future, when presented with the options available at the time of trial, Evaluator recommended that the children remain with Jonathan.

B. Scope of Task in Adjudicating Parentage

¶67 In a related vein, Miguel argues the district court misunderstood the scope of its task in adjudicating parentage as a binary choice between Jonathan and Miguel. He contends that because the court’s task was to adjudicate parentage based on what was in the children’s best interest, it should have followed Evaluator’s recommendation to implement a “triangulated parenting plan” that would have given both Miguel and Jonathan legal rights to the children. That is, Miguel contends the court should have adjudicated him as the father, allowed for Jonathan to file for guardianship, and “allow[ed] the parties to work out some visitation and reunification through that guardianship.” This argument lacks legal support.

¶68 First, this matter came before the district court as a paternity action within a divorce proceeding. Thus, adjudicating parentage was exactly what the court was asked—and authorized—to do. Miguel cites no statutory authority that allows a court in a paternity case to adjudicate one person as the father and simultaneously grant guardianship to a third party. And

20240191-CA 21 2026 UT App 130 indeed, we are not aware of any provision that would allow the court to do so.

¶69 Second, even if the district court had acted in the way Miguel suggests by adjudicating him as the father and then “allow[ing]” Jonathan to file for guardianship, there is no guarantee that the guardianship would survive long-term. This is so because the only guardianship available to Jonathan in this circumstance would be a consent-based guardianship under the probate code. See Utah Code § 75-5-204(1)(a). Thus, the practical reality is that even if Miguel initially agreed to a guardianship, he could terminate it at any time with functionally no court review. See In re V.K.S., 2003 UT App 13, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 1284 (“If [a parent who consents to a guardianship] thereafter petitions for termination of the guardianship and custody of the child, the probate court must grant the petition unless there has been a final factual determination depriving the parent of custody or terminating the parent’s parental rights, by a court with proper jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). This outcome would be contrary to the children’s best interest and Evaluator’s recommendation. The court therefore did not err by confining its decision to adjudicating parentage.

C. Application of Section 608

¶70 Lastly, Miguel argues the district court “erred in applying [S]ection 608.” He contends that the court failed to consider whether Jonathan’s and Mother’s conduct estopped them from denying Miguel parentage and that the court improperly weighed certain factors. Once again, we are not persuaded.

¶71 Section 608 provides that “[i]n a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child,” a district court may “disregard the genetic test results that exclude the presumed father” if it determines that “(i) the conduct of the birth mother or the presumed father . . . estops that party from denying parentage; and (ii) it would be inequitable to disrupt the parent-child relationship between the child and the presumed father.” Utah Code § 81-5-608(2). In making this determination, the court “shall

20240191-CA 22 2026 UT App 130 consider the best interest of the child,” including enumerated statutory factors. Id. § 81-5-608(3).

¶72 The district court in this case carefully adhered to this statutory framework when determining whether it was in the children’s best interest to disregard the genetic testing results. The court specifically addressed Section 608 factors and detailed its reasoning for why those factors weighed in favor of Jonathan rather than Miguel. Then, applying these factors, the court concluded that the factors “strongly favor[ed]” disregarding the genetic test results and adjudicating Jonathan as the children’s legal father.

¶73 Nevertheless, Miguel faults the district court for not “consider[ing] whether Jonathan or [Mother’s] conduct estopped them from denying Miguel’s parentage.” See id. § 81-5-608(2)(b). However, the court was not required to do so. Miguel’s argument is based on a fundamentally flawed reading of the estoppel provision of the statute. This is so for two main reasons.

¶74 First, Section 608 grants a district court the ability to “disregard the genetic test results” based on “the conduct of the birth mother or the presumed father.” Id. (emphasis added). But that is not what Miguel is proposing the district court should have done. Rather, it is his position that the court should have done exactly the opposite—that is, it should have not disregarded the test results.

¶75 Second, estoppel does not apply here in the way advocated by Miguel. Estoppel is “[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has said or done before or what has been legally established as true.” Estoppel, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). In the context of Section 608, estoppel prevents a mother or a presumed father (namely, Jonathan) from denying the parentage of the presumed father (namely, Jonathan) based on genetic testing. See Utah Code § 81-5-608(2)(b). Because Jonathan was the presumed father and he was not denying paternity, by virtue of the statute’s plain language, the estoppel

20240191-CA 23 2026 UT App 130 provision does not apply in the way Miguel suggests. The district court therefore did not err in failing to address it further.

¶76 The next part of Miguel’s Section 608 challenge concerns the manner in which the district court weighed the statutory factors. In particular, he claims that the court “improperly weighed” five factors “only against [him] and not Jonathan.” 5 To support this argument, Miguel points to the court’s findings related to each factor and asserts that the court ignored certain conflicting record evidence. This effort falls short of that required to successfully challenge a court’s factual findings on appeal.

¶77 “The existence of conflicting evidence in the record is not sufficient to set aside a district court’s findings.” Lobendahn v. Lobendahn, 2023 UT App 137, ¶ 27, 540 P.3d 727. “Rather, to successfully challenge a district court’s factual findings on appeal, the appellant must overcome the healthy dose of deference owed to factual findings by identifying and dealing with the supportive evidence and demonstrating the legal problem in that evidence, generally through marshaling the evidence.” Id. ¶ 23 (quotation simplified). “The pill that is hard for many appellants to swallow is that if there is evidence supporting a finding, absent a legal

5. These include factors (a) through (e), which read as follows:

(a) the length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that the presumed father . . . was placed on notice that the presumed father . . . might not be the genetic father of the child;

(b) the length of time during which the presumed father . . . has assumed the role of parent of the child;

(c) the facts surrounding the presumed father’s . . .

discovery of . . . [his] possible nonparentage;

(d) the nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed father . . . ; [and]

(e) the age of the child.

Utah Code § 81-5-608(3).

20240191-CA 24 2026 UT App 130 problem—a fatal flaw—with that evidence, the finding will stand, even though there is ample record evidence that would have supported contrary findings.” Id. ¶ 27 (quotation simplified).

¶78 Here, Miguel makes no attempt to address the evidence the district court found weighed in favor of Jonathan. Critically, much of the court’s analysis hinged on the “undisputed fact” that Jonathan had been the children’s primary caregiver during the four years leading up to trial and the children had a strong relationship with him and were thriving in his care. In light of this fact, the court was particularly concerned about the harm that the children would suffer should they be removed from Jonathan and placed with Miguel. Simply pointing to Mother’s deception as an excuse or explanation for why Miguel did not have custody of the children during this time and asserting that the court should have assigned more weight to the fact that he was not at fault does not change the reality that the court already heard and weighed this evidence. And ultimately, though the court was sympathetic to Jonathan’s and Miguel’s situation and recognized that its decision “would by definition be unfair to one or the other of them,” the court made clear that their interests were not the driving factor in its decision. Indeed, the court explained that its “role [was] not to apply its sense of fairness to the parties, but to determine what [was] in the children’s best interest, specifically whether it would be inequitable to disrupt the existing father-child relationship.”

¶79 As a final note, Miguel does not grapple with the fact that aside from the parties’ history, in undertaking its best interest analysis, the district court placed weight on the proposed future living situation. That is, the court found relevant that Miguel was seeking only “visitation with the children, not that he be named their primary caregiver.” The court emphasized that this fact supported its conclusion that Jonathan would “continue to be the best option for the [children] as a parent going forward.”

¶80 In sum, Miguel “clearly views the evidence as compelling a different outcome, but it is not within our purview to engage in a reweighing of the evidence, and [Miguel] has not demonstrated that the evidence underlying the district court’s findings is

20240191-CA 25 2026 UT App 130 insufficient.” Id. ¶ 24 (quotation simplified). As a result, we will not disturb the court’s factual findings regarding the Section 608 factors. 6

III. Miguel’s Posttrial Motion

¶81 Miguel argues the district court erred in denying his posttrial motion for relief. He claims the court erred because (A) it did not hold a hearing on the motion, (B) it did not find that Mother’s actions in concealing the VDP and DOP amounted to fraud, (C) it did not grant relief under rule 59, and (D) it failed to apply the statutory procedure for challenging the VDP and DOP. We address each argument in turn.

A. Hearing on the Posttrial Motion

¶82 As a threshold matter, Miguel argues the district court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his posttrial motion, despite all parties requesting a hearing. Not so.

¶83 Rule 7(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires the district court to hold a hearing where the motion “would dispose of the action or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively decided.” Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h) (emphasis added). Here, the district court acknowledged that

6. As an additional basis for relief, Miguel invokes the constitutional avoidance canon and urges us to adopt a reading of Section 608 that would avoid denying him paternity and violating his constitutional rights. See Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶¶ 52–53, 529 P.3d 319 (explaining the constitutional avoidance canon). But Miguel did not raise this argument until his posttrial motion, at which point the district court deemed it waived and declined to consider it on the merits. Thus, the argument is unpreserved for appellate review, and we will not address it further as Miguel has argued no exception to preservation. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ¶ 46, 114 P.3d 551.

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Miguel had requested a hearing on his motion, but it declined that request, concluding that “because the issues bearing on this Motion have all been ‘authoritatively decided,’ a hearing is not necessary.” (Quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 7(h).) The court was not required to enter specific findings explaining its conclusion. See Pang v. International Document Services, 2015 UT 63, ¶ 12, 356 P.3d 1190 (concluding that rule 7(h)’s language “does not require district courts to enter specific findings before denying a request for a hearing”).

B. Mother’s Fraudulent Conduct

¶84 Miguel next argues the district court erred in declining to grant him posttrial relief on the ground that Mother’s actions in failing to reveal the existence of the VDP and DOP did not amount to fraud under rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. He claims the court’s decision was based on its erroneous belief that rule 60(b)(3) requires parties to plead fraud “with particularity.” See Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”).

¶85 Miguel’s appellate position fails to account for the whole picture. The district court did not decline to grant relief merely because Miguel had failed to prove fraud under a heightened standard. Rather, it concluded that Miguel could not prove that Mother’s conduct constituted fraud at all since he purportedly agreed that he signed the very document that he argued was fraudulently concealed from him. The court explained: “[U]nder Miguel’s view of the facts, all three parties were equally culpable as all allegedly knew of the VDP and DOP. Miguel essentially argues that, at trial, even though all three parties had awareness of, and failed to reveal the existence of, the VDP/DOP, only two of the three should be deemed to have fraudulent intent based on their nonaction.” Because Miguel has not sufficiently engaged with this reasoning and explained how he was unaware of the existence of a document he purportedly signed, he has not persuaded us that the court abused its discretion in concluding that he was not entitled to relief under rule 60(b).

20240191-CA 27 2026 UT App 130

C. Rule 59 Relief

¶86 Miguel argues the district court erred in failing to grant him relief under rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But Miguel once again fails to grapple with the basis of the court’s ruling.

¶87 Though the bulk of Miguel’s posttrial motion focused on the newly discovered VDP and DOP, Miguel also raised several new legal arguments that were “[i]ndependent” of his fraud claim. The district court declined to grant him relief under rule 59(a)(7) for any of these new arguments, finding that the arguments either had been waived because they could have been raised at trial but were not, or were raised at trial and the court was “exercis[ing] its discretion to not reconsider them.” Miguel has not directly challenged these determinations on appeal.

D. Statutory Procedure for Challenging the VDP and DOP

¶88 Miguel’s final argument is that the district court erred by suggesting that the DOP was invalid without undertaking the proper statutory analysis. He claims that had the court correctly applied the statutory framework, it would have concluded that the DOP and VDP were valid, effective, and legally binding documents, which would have changed the outcome of this case.

¶89 This argument fails at the outset, however, because neither the DOP nor VDP at issue here are valid on their face. Among other things, a VDP must “state that the child whose paternity is being declared . . . does not have a presumed father, or has a presumed father whose full name is stated.” Utah Code § 81-5- 302(1)(d). Here, the VDP does not meet this requirement because it does not indicate that Jonathan was the presumed father at the time the document was allegedly executed. 7 And this deficiency

7. The VDP form asks the mother to make the following assertion: “I am not/have not been married to any man at the time of this (continued…)

20240191-CA 28 2026 UT App 130 also proves fatal to the DOP, because in cases where a “declaration of paternity and [a] denial of paternity are both necessary, neither is valid until both are signed and filed.” Id. § 81- 5-304(1)(b).

CONCLUSION

¶90 The district court did not err or abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the children’s best interest to disregard the genetic testing results and adjudicate Jonathan as the children’s legal father. And the court likewise did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Miguel’s posttrial motion for relief. We therefore affirm the court’s ruling in all respects.

child’s birth or in the 300 days preceding the birth.” Mother did not check the box indicating that this assertion was true, because she was married to Jonathan. Miguel contends that as a result, the VDP as submitted “was factually accurate and not fraudulent.” But this obscures the relevant issue: the VDP was incomplete because it did not “state that the child whose paternity [was] being declared . . . d[id] not have a presumed father, or ha[d] a presumed father whose full name [was] stated.” Utah Code § 81- 5-302(1)(d).

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