Guam Dep't of Educ. v. Guam Civ. Serv. Comm'n

• Court: Superior Court of Guam
• Decided: June 2, 2025
• Docket: SP0095-21
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM OF GUAM

GUAM DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. SP0095-21

Petitioner, vs.

GUAM CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL Respondent, REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF and

MARKJ.S.N. TAISIPIC,

Real Party in Interest.

This matter came before the Hcmorable Dana A. Gutierrez on December 17, 2024, for a

hearing on competing petitions by Petitioner Guam Department of Education ("GDOE") and by

Real Party in Interest Mark J.S.N. Taisipic ("Taisipic"). At the hearing, Attorney Matthew E.

Wolff appeared on behalf of GDOE, Attorney Jacqueline T. Terlaje appeared on behalf ofTaisipic,

and Attorney Katherine M. N epton appeared on behalf of Respondent Civil Service Commission

("CSC"). 1

Both Petitions arise from a Decision and Judgment by the CSC, which voided GDOE's

termination of Taisipic's employment. GDOE brings a Petition for Judicial Review ("GDOE

Petition"), seeking to overturn the Decision and Judgment on its merits. Taisipic brings a Petition

1The CSC has consistently maintained that it takes no position in this matter. See, e.g., Notice ofNo Position (Oct. 7, 2021); Respondent's Br. (Jul. 8, 2024). DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep 't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

for Declaratory Relief ("Taisipic Petition"), seeking a declaration that GDOE violated the "60-day

rule" provided by the then-operative version2 of 4 GCA § 4406(b). After review of the Petitions,

written briefings, oral arguments, and applicable Guam law, the Court DENIES Taisipic's

Petition, GRANTS GDOE's Petition, VACATES the CSC's May 20, 2021 Decision and

Judgment, and REMANDS the matter to the CSC for further proceedings not inconsistent with

this Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2014, Taisipic-at the time, a teacher with GDOE-was charged in

Superior Court of Guam Criminal Case No. CF0622-14 ("CF0622-14"). See GDOE Petition at 2

(June 18, 2021). The criminal case involved allegations that Taisipic committed acts of criminal

sexual conduct against a minor. Id. After Taisipic's first court appearance in CF0622-14, the

Superior Court issued an Order of Conditional Release, which ordered that Taisipic be released

from pre-trial confinement, subject to certain conditions. See GDOE Petition, Ex. A. One condition

was that Taisipic have "NO CONTACT/STAY AWAY ... [from] any public or private schools

or other school events where minors are present." Id. at I.

Separately on December 4, 2014, Dr. Jon Femandez-then the Superintendent of GDOE-

received a Memorandum from a GDOE Assistant Superintendent. 3 The Memorandum stated that

local media was reporting that Taisipic had been arrested. GDOE Petition at 2. The Memorandum

requested that GDOE commence an investigation into the allegations against Taisipic, and also

2 Since 2018, 4 GCA § 4406(b) has provided for a "90 day rule." See 4 GCA § 4202.2, 2019 Note; Port Auth. of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Com 'n (Susuico), 2019 Guam 15 ,r 11. However, during the relevant time period for this case (December 2014 through February 2015), the statute provided for a "60-day rule." See id.

3 While the Memorandum bears Assistant Superintendent Gabriel's name, the Memorandum was in fact

signed by Acting Assistant Superintendent Cathy Tydingco. See Tr. at 80-81 (Apr. 15, 2021).

2 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (I'aisipic)

requested that Taisipic be temporarily reassigned to a different work position, where he would

have no contact with GDOE students. See id.

On December 15, 2014, Taisipic provided GDOE with written notice of the criminal

charges against him, including a copy of the Superior Court's Order of Conditional Release. Id.

This written notice contains a stamp which provides a receipt date of December 16, 2014. See

Transcript ("Tr.") at 68-69 (Apr. 15, 2021).

On January 23, 2015, GDOE served Taisipic with a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action

("NPAA") based on his alleged "incapacity to perform required duties." GDOE Petition, Ex.Bat

6-7. The NPAA asserted that teachers who "fail[] to meet the duties required of that profession

may be determined incapacitated." (emphasis in original). Id. The NPAA then explained:

This notice is based solely on the fact that you are prevented by the courts from entering any public or private school or attending school events where minors are present.... A teacher that is legally barred from all contact with minors, lacks the capacity to teach because he [is] denied access to his work site, students and prevented from performing the essential functions of his job.

Id. On January 30, 2015, Taisipic submitted a written Answer to the NP AA, asking GDOE to delay

adverse action proceedings until his criminal case resolved. See GDOE Petition, Ex. C.

On February 11, 2015, GDOE served Taisipic with a Final Notice of Adverse Action

("FNAA"). GDOE Petition, Ex. D. The FNAA asserted that Superintendent Fernandez only had

the authority to temporarily transfer employees to perform other work for up to 90 days, and that

Taisipic's criminal case was unlikely to be fully resolved within 90 days. Id. The FNAA also

asserted that Taisipic stood accused of serious criminal offenses against minors, so Taisipic could

not be reinstated to his teacher position in light of the Superior Court's stay-away order and

GDOE's independent duty to "safeguard and promote the welfare of children and maintain public

trust in the teaching position." See id. Because Taisipic could not report to work, Superintendent

3 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep 't of Educ. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

Fernandez determined that the charge of incapacity set forth in the NPAA was warranted; he thus

terminated Taisipic's employment. Id

On February 17, 2015, Taisipic appealed the FNAA to the CSC, creating CSC Adverse

Action Appeal Case No. 15-AA04T. GDOE Petition at 5. In May 2016, per a stipulation by the

parties, the CSC ordered Case No. 15-AA04T stayed pending the resolution ofTaisipic's criminal

case. Id. On June 11, 2019, CF0622-14 was resolved after Taisipic entered an "Alford plea" on

charges of Official Misconduct and Child Abuse. GDOE Petition at 5.

On October 17, 2019, Taisipic moved the CSC to void his termination based on GDOE's

purported violation of the statutory "60-day rule." The CSC ruled in favor ofGDOE, concluding

that GDOE did not know, and could not have known, the facts forming the basis of Taisipic's

termination until December 15, 2014, so service of the FNAA on February 11, 2015, was timely.

See Taisipic Supp. Excerpts of Record ("SER"), Ex. A (Jul. 9, 2024).

On April 15, April 27, and May 4, 2021, the CSC heard the merits ofTaisipic's appeal. Id

at 6. Ultimately, three of the five CSC Commissioners voted in favor of GDOE, and two voted in

favor ofTaisipic. Id Since GDOE needed four favorable votes to prevail, see 4 GCA § 4407(a),

the FNAA was voided and Taisipic was reinstated. Id. On May 20, 2021, the CSC issued a written

Decision and Judgment to memorialize this ruling. GDOE Petition, Ex. E.

On June 18, 2021, GDOE filed its Petition with the Superior Court of Guam, seeking

review of the CSC's Decision and Judgment. Taisipic initially did not respond to GDOE's Petition.

As set forth in more detail in the Court's Decision and Order (Apr. 24, 2023), GDOE thereafter

submitted an Application for Default Judgment, which the Court denied. In doing so, the Court

also accepted the filing of Taisipic's Petition. On June 23, 2023, GDOE filed a Response to

4 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-2 l; Guam Dep 't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

Taisipic's Petition. As set forth in more detail in the Court's Decision and Order (Jan. 29, 2024),

Taisipic moved to strike GDOE's Response, which the Court also denied.

On March 29, 2024, the Court set a briefing schedule on the Petitions. See Order (Mar. 29,

2024). After briefing concluded, the Court heard oral arguments on December 17, 2024, and

thereafter took the matter under advisement.

DISCUSSION

1. Principles of Judicial Review

Under 4 GCA § 4406(£) and 5 GCA § 9240, a government agency may petition the Superior

Court for judicial review of an adverse action appeal. The Court reviews a petition for judicial

review in accordance with the Administrative Adjudication Law ("AAL"), see Guam Waterworks

Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Mesngon), 2014 Guam 35 ,r 8, and considers whether the CSC's

decision is "not in accordance with law or not supported by substantial evidence," 5 GCA § 9240.

The Court reviews the CSC's conclusions of law de novo and reviews the CSC's findings of fact

under the "substantial evidence" standard. See, e.g., Charfauros v. Civ. Serv. Comm 'n (Guam

Police Dep 't), 2022 Guam 19 ,r 17. Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," and amounts to "more than a mere

scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Id.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the CSC's "60-Day Rule" Conclusion

The Court first considers Taisipic' s Petition, which reargues an issue already decided by

the CSC. Taisipic argues that GDOE violated the statutory 60-day rule by serving the FNAA on

February 11, 2015. Under the then-operative4 version of 4 GCA § 4406, GDOE was required to

4 The statute has since been amended to reflect a "90-day rule" rather than a "60-day rule." See Port Auth.

of Guam v. Civ. Serv. Comm'n (Susuico), 2019 Guam 15 ,r,r 10-11. However, "[b]ecause the facts of this case occurred while the prior version of the rule was in place," the prior rule governs this case. Id. ,r 11.

5 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

serve the FNAA "no later than ... sixty (60) calendar days from the date in which management

knew or should have known the facts or events which form the alleged basis for the adverse

action." 4 GCA § 4406(b)(l)(A) (2015) (emphasis added).

Taisipic argues that the 60-day clock commenced on December 4, 2014: the date on which

Superintendent Fernandez received the Memorandum and thus gained actual knowledge of

Taisipic's criminal prosecution. Taisipic Opening Br. at 5-6. IfTaisipic is correct, then the FNAA

needed to be served by February 2, 2015, and since it was not, the 60-day rule was violated, and

his termination was void ab initio. See 4 GCA § 4406(b)(4). GDOE argues that the CSC correctly

determined that the 60-day clock commenced on December 15, 2014: the date on which Taisipic

provided GDOE with written notice of his criminal case and provided a copy of the Superior

Court's Order of Conditional Release. See Reply Br. at 2-3; SER, Ex. A at 3-4. IfGDOE is correct,

then the FNAA needed to be served by February 13, 2015, and since it was, the 60-day rule was

not violated.

The Court reviews the CSC's determination of when an agency "knew or should have

known" the facts relevant to the 60-day rule for substantial evidence. See Port Auth. of Guam v.

Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Guevara), 2018 Guam 1 'if 41 (applying the "extremely deferential"

substantial evidence standard to analyze a 60-day rule claim); Susuico, 2019 Guam 15 'i['i[ 13-14

(similar). Here, there was substantial evidence to support the CSC's finding. The NPAA and

FNAA charge Taisipic with "incapacity to perform required duties;" thus, the question is when

GDOE knew or should have known the facts of Taisipic's "incapacity." There was substantial

evidence to support the CSC's finding that Taisipic was forbidden from coming to his place of

work; this was plain on the face of the Superior Court's Order. There was also substantial evidence

to support the finding that GDOE did not know this specific fact until December 15, 2014. The

6 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

undisputed evidence showed that Taisipic provided GDOE with a copy of the Order of Conditional

Release on December 15, 2014. There was no evidence before the CSC suggesting that GDOE had

a copy of the Order, or knowledge of the specific stay-away condition it imposes, prior to that date.

Although the evidence suggested that GDOE had actual knowledge that Taisipic had been arrested

by December 4, 2014, an arrest-even for a serious charge like the one Taisipic was accused of-

does not automatically result in a stay-away order. The imposition of pre-trial release conditions

is discretionary, not mandatory. See 8 GCA § 40.20; People v. Song, 2011 Guam 19, 10. A court

may impose restrictions on a defendant's "associations" and "movements," 8 GCA § 40.20(b), but

it is not required to do so. Thus, GDOE's knowledge of Taisipic's arrest is not tantamount to

knowledge that he had been specifically ordered to stay away from GDOE schools. GDOE did not

acquire that specific knowledge until December 15, 2014.

Taisipic cites to 4 GCA § 4202.Z(b) to support his claim that the 60-day clock in fact

commenced on December 4, 2014, but the statute does not help him. Section 4202.Z(b) provides

that the clock begins to run "when the employee gives notice of the charges or conviction of a

crime to the head of the department or agency as required by Title 4 GCA § 4202.1." (emphasis

added). Section 4202.1 provides that an employee who is charged with a crime "shall provide the

head of the department or agency employing the employee with written notice of the charges or

the conviction within seventy-two (72) hours thereof." (emphasis added). Reading these statutes

together, Section 4202.2(b) commences the 60-day clock when the employee gives management

written notice, not merely (as Taisipic argues) when the employer has actual notice. 5 Here again,

5 An employer's actual knowledge of the relevant facts already triggers the 60-day clock under 4 GCA §

4406(b)(l). If 4 GCA § 4202.2 likewise provided that the clock is triggered by the employer's possession of actual notice, then it would be redundant. The Court instead understands 4 GCA § 4202.2 to provide that the employee's act of giving written notice establishes a conclusive presumption of the date on which the employer "knew or should have known" the relevant facts. In other words, the purpose of 4 GCA § 4202.2

7 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Taisipic)

substantial evidence supports the finding that Taisipic gave his written notice on December 15,

2014, which is the relevant date for purposes of Section 4202.2(b). Thus, this statute only

reinforces the conclusion that the 60-day clock began to run on December 15, 2014.

The CSC's factual findings regarding the 60-day rule were supported by substantial

evidence and were not contrary to law. The Court therefore affirms the CS C's finding on this issue

and DENIES Taisipic's Petition for Declaratory Relief.

3. The CSC's Failure to Make Findings of Fact is Reversible Error

GDOE raises five points of alleged error in the CS C's Decision and Judgment. The Court

addresses only the fifth alleged error because it proves dispositive.

GDOE asserts, correctly, that CSC proceedings are governed by the AAL. See Guam

Police Dep 't v. Civil Service Commission (Charfauros), 2020 Guam 12 ,i,i 18-35 (holding that the

AAL applies to adverse action proceedings). The AAL provides that an administrative body's

decision "shall be in writing and shall contain findings of fact, a determination of the issues

presented and the penalty, if any." 5 GCA § 9232 (emphasis added). GDOE argues that the

Decision and Judgment fails to make any findings of fact, most notably any findings by the two

commissioners who voted in favor of Taisipic. GDOE Opening Br. at 16-17. The Court agrees.

The substantive portion of the CSC's Decision and Judgment is approximately one page

long and provides the following:

Employee Taisipic appeals to the Commission his termination from DOE. Employee was a special education teacher. He was arrested for sexual misconduct for two minors and his pre-trial release conditions prevent him from being near children and schools. DOE terminated him because he could not come to school to do his teaching job. . . .

is to foreclose an employer's argument that it did not learn the relevant facts until after it received the employee's written notice-not to foreclose an argument that it did not know the relevant facts before receiving written notice.

8 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep 't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

The Commission heard testimony from witnesses and the Employee. The Chairman opined that Management's burden of proof is that of clear and convincing evidence because the final Notice of Adverse Action was for his inability to come to work as the result of his conditions ofrelease from jail. He was not terminated for conduct which would be a crime. After deliberating, Commissioners Tuncap, Benavente, and Taitano voted in favor of Management. The Chairman and Vice Chairman Smith voted in favor of the Employee. In order to prevail, Management must get a favorable vote from four (4) Commissioners. Here, Management only got three (3) favorable votes and therefore the Employee prevails, and the Adverse Action is dismissed. GDOE Petition, Ex. E at 2. There is no "findings of fact" section of the Decision and Judgment,

nor are any of the statements above explicitly defined as the CSC's factual finding.

There is no Guam Supreme Court case law interpreting the "findings of fact" requirement

of 5 GCA § 9232. However, Guam's statute is substantially similar to a prior version of Section

I 1518 of the California Administrative Procedures Act. See, e.g., Jones v. Maloney, 234 P.2d 666,

671 (Ct. App. 1951) ("Section 11518 provides: 'The decision shall contain findings of fact, a

determination of the issues presented and the penalty, if any.'"); Lucas v. Board ofEducation, 532

P.2d lIO, ll4 (Cal. 1975); see also Gutierrez v. Guam Election Comm'n {Calvo), 20ll Guam 31

14 (noting the AAL is "substantially similar to the California Administrative Procedures Act.")

Accordingly, the Court finds era-appropriate 6 judicial interpretations of Section 11518 to be

persuasive. Cf Charfauros, 2020 Guam 12 1 38 ("Because the Legislature adopted [a different

AAL provision] from California law, California authority interpreting the provision is persuasive

to our own interpretation.").

6 Cal. Gov. Code§ 11518 was significantly amended in 1995, such that the statute is no longer applicable

to the contents of an administrative decision. See Cal. Gov. Code§ 11518, Editors' Notes (West 2025). Therefore, the Court finds California cases from before 1995 to be persuasive here.

9 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-2 l; Guam Dep 't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

California courts have held that an administrative body's findings of fact should be

"liberally construed and need not be stated with the formality required in judicial proceedings."

Savelli v. Board of Medical Examiners, 40 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177 (Ct. App. 1964); see McMillan v.

American Gen. Fin. Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 462, 468 (Ct. App. 1976) ("Other examples of the

judiciary' s willingness to focus on the substance rather than the form of administrative actions are

legion."). With that said, liberal construction still has its limits. As the California Supreme Court

has explained:

The basic purposes of findings are to aid the court in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support them, to enable the court to examine the decision of the administrative agency in order to determine whether it is based upon a proper principle, and to apprise the litigants or parties in regard to the reason for the administrative action as an aid to them in deciding whether additional proceedings should be initiated and, if so, upon what grounds.

Swars v. Council of City of Vallejo, 206 P.2d 355,358 (Cal. 1949) (citations omitted). Thus, to

enable meaningful judicial review, an agency must at least "render findings sufficient both to

enable the parties to determine whether and on what basis they should seek review and, in the

event of review, to apprise a reviewing court of the basis for the board's action." Topanga Assn.

for a Scenic Community v. County ofLos Angeles, 522 P.2d 12, 16 (Cal. 1974).

The Decision and Judgment does not permit meaningful judicial review, no matter how the

Court construes it. First, if the Court construes the Decision and Judgment as making no findings

of fact whatsoever, then it is deficient. See, e.g., Lucas, 532 P.2d at 114 ("Meaningful judicial

reconsideration would be a hollow process in the absence of an explicit statement of factual

findings and issue determinations from the administrative agency."); Koons v. Placer Hills Union

School Dist., 132 Cal. Rptr. 243,246 (Ct. App. 1976) (noncompliance with section 11518 renders

a decision "ineffective"); In re Sturm, 521 P.2d 97, 103 (Cal. 1974) (failure to make findings "is

10 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Taisipic)

fundamentally unfair because an already recognized right of access to a reviewing court is impaired

thereby."); see also State Bd. Of Psychological Examiners v. Norman, 679 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Nev.

1984) (absence of findings "renders impossible a meaningful review of the Board's action by either

the district court or this court: the Board has not provided us with any basis for review.").

On the other hand, the Court could construe certain lines of the Decision and Judgment to

be inteded as findings of fact, such as "[Taisipic's] pre-trial release conditions prevent him from

being near children and school," or "[Taisipic] was not terminated for conduct which would be a

crime." GDOE Petition, Ex.Eat 2. But even if the Court treats these statements as "findings," this

would still not "enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency's mode of analysis."

Topanga, 522 P.2d at 18.

An administrative body's decision must, at minimum, "point out the specific ground upon

which the agency has based its decision[.]" Savelli, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 177; cf In re Dep 't of

Agriculture v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Rojas), 2009 Guam 19 ,r 31 (finding an action by the CSC

"arbitrary and capricious" because it was undertaken "without articulating in its decision a

reasoned basis for doing so."). The Court recognizes that the CSC's decision arises from the

circumstance where, as a result of the "Rule of Four," the decision reflects the vote of a minority

of the commissioners. 7 Nonetheless, the Decision and Judgment does not make clear what the

commission as a whole, and those two commissioners in particular, actually concluded. There is

no explicit conclusion in the Decision and Judgment that GDOE failed to prove its case, nor is it

7Title 4 GCA § 4402 provides that "[t]he affirmative vote of four (4) members shall be required for any action of the Commission." This has been interpreted as a "Rule of Four," meaning that "when the party with the burden of proof does not receive four votes for its position, the opposing party is entitled to a decision in its favor." Guam Power Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 967 F.2d 586 *I (9th Cir. 1992); see also Limtiaco v. Guam Fire Dept, 2007 Guam 10 ,r 65 (recognizing the Rule of Four).

11 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Taisipic)

clear in context what findings, or lack thereof, enabled such a conclusion. If the CSC found by

clear and convincing evidence 8 that "[Taisipic's] pre-trial release conditions prevent him from

being near children and school," then it is not clear what GDOE failed to prove regarding Taisipic's

"incapacity to perform required duties.".

The hearing transcript suggests that Taisipic may have prevailed for several other reasons:

for example, because at least one commissioner thought that GDOE failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that Taisipic was actually incapacitated;9 or because the termination failed to

accord with GDOE's own procedural rules and regulations, 10 or because the charge against

Taisipic was in fact merely pretextual, 11 or all of the above. The Court cannot speculate about what

factors each individual commissioner considered, or to what extent, in rendering their votes. But

absent some explanation of why the CSC ruled as it did, speculation would be the only possible

mode ofreview.

8 The Decision and Judgment states only that the Chairman "opined" that clear and correct evidence was

the proper burden of proof; it does not state that the commission actually applied this standard. However, the Chairman was correct as a matter of law. See 4 GCA § 4407(a); Port Auth. of Guam v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Javelosa), 2018 Guam 9 ,i 16.

9 See Tr. at 42 (May 4, 2021) (Chairman: "Mr. Taisipic, as alleged by DOE Management, was incapacitated

to perform his duties and responsibilities as a teacher. It's very obvious through observation that Mr. Taisipic has no physical or mental disabilities at all.").

'° See Tr. at 45 (Chairman: "Management has the responsibilities to further discuss and to consider the matter with Employee Taisipic to find amicable resolution and to protect employee's right to due process. One attempt to remedy is for DOE Management to invoke with all personnel rules and regulation. DOE Rule -- (inaudible) -- it says -- (inaudible) examination to transfer Mr. Taisipic to another classified position with DOE subject to meeting the minimum qualification required if on the new position with no loss of pay and benefit while waiting for the outcome of his alleged case.").

11 See Tr. At 39 (May 4, 2021) (Mr. Smith: "But at the end of the day, I'm going to vote for the employee.

I think he-they just didn't want him around."); id. at 43 (Chairman: "IfDOE is not accusing the employee of the alleged crime as charged, then I asked myself, why terminate him? To me, this is mind-boggling. I was not convinced or clear as to why Management [] terminated Mr. Taisipic.").

12 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep 't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

Each of the aforementioned consideration-if they were indeed considered by the

commissioners-would prompt different analyses on judicial review. For example, if the CS C's

conclusion was that GDOE failed to prove that Taisipic was actually incapacitated, the Court could

review whether substantial evidence supported that specific conclusion. If the CSC's conclusion

was that Taisipic's termination did not accord with GDOE's own procedural rules and regulations

in terminating Taisipic, the Court could analyze the rules in question. Or even if the CSC's

conclusion was explicitly based in holistic considerations of "wrongness" or "unfairness," the

Court could potentially analyze whether these considerations properly bear on whether "the action

of [GDOE] was correct" as provided by 4 GCA § 4407(a). But since there is no definite evidence

in the record showing that these (or any other) considerations in fact formed the CS C's conclusion,

it would be pointless to undertake these analyses.

The Court's task on judicial review is to determine whether the CSC's decision is "not in

accordance with law or not supported by substantial evidence." 5 GCA § 9240. The Decision and

Judgment does not permit either analysis. The Decision and Judgment does not make explicit

findings or state the reason for its conclusion, and thus also does not explain the analytical link

between its findings and its conclusion. The Court cannot review whether the Decision and

Judgment is in accordance with law because it is not clear what principle of law enabled the

conclusion. The Court cannot review whether the Decision and Judgment is supported by

substantial evidence because it is not clear what evidence, if any, the CSC relied upon. Under these

circumstances, meaningful judicial review is impossible. The Court therefore GRANTS GDOE's

Petition and VA CATES the CSC's Decision and Judgment.

13 DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep'I ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n (Taisipic)

4. The Court Denies GDOE's Request for Costs

GDOE's Petition, though not its subsequent briefing, requests that the Court award it "costs

on appeal" without elaboration on the basis for such an award. GDOE Petition at 15. In general,

Guam follows the "American rule," which provides that "each party bears its own expenses of

litigation." Fargo Pacific, Inc. v. Korando Corp., 2006 Guam 22 'I/ 49. Exceptions to the American

rule apply where cost-shifting is "(I) authorized by statute, (2) authorized by contract, or (3)

allowed in judicially-established equitable circumstances." Flemingv. Quigley, 2003 Guam 4 'I/ 7.

However, none of these circumstances are present here.

GDOE cites no statute authorizing its recovery of court costs. Although many Petitions for

Judicial Review implicate 4 GCA § 4406.1, that statute does not apply here because it contemplates

awards only to prevailing employees, not prevailing employers. See id. ("If an employee in the

classified service ... prevails in whole or in part before the Civil Service Commission ... the

employee shall be awarded and paid costs, if any[.]") (emphasis added). There is no applicable

contract between the parties. None of the specific "equitable circumstances" recognized by

Fleming v. Quigley appear to be present here. See 2003 Guam 4 '117 n.3 (noting "the common fund,

substantial benefit, private attorney general, third-party tort, and bad faith theories of recovery" as

recognized exceptions). Since "departures from the American rule are narrowly drawn

exceptions," In re Guardianship ofMoylan, 2018 Guam 8 'I/ 11, and since GDOE has not provided

a justification for such a departure, the Court declines to award costs to GDOE.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the Court DENIES Taisipic's Petition for Declaratory Relief.

The Court GRANTS GDOE's Petition for Judicial Review except for its request for an award of

14 .' DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING GDOE'S PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DENYING TAISIPIC'S PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF SP0095-21; Guam Dep't ofEduc. v. Civil Serv. Comm 'n (Taisipic)

costs, VACATES the CSC's May 20, 2021 Decision and Judgment, and REMANDS this matter

to the CSC for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Decision and Order.

SO ORDERED this 2nd day of June, 2025.

H utJt

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