EDMONDS, J.
GTE Northwest, Inc. (GTE), challenges, under ORS 183.400, certain rules of the Public Utility Commission (PUC), adopted by Order No. 93-852,1 requiring local [640]*640telephone exchange companies (LECs) to offer “collocation” to enhanced service providers (ESPs) located in their areas. We hold that the rules are valid.
The order in question adopted a regulatory framework known as Open Network Architecture (ONA). The order states that the adopted rules
“advanced two main policy goals: (1) to obtain efficient delivery of enhanced telecommunications services to the public, and (2) to achieve greater competitive equity between providers of telecommunications service.”
[641]*641ONA is concerned with two particular competitors, LECs and their ESP “customers.”2 For purposes of this case, GTE is an LEC. An LEC provides basic telecommunications services to its area, and can also provide “enhanced services” such as call forwarding or voice messaging. ESPs provide only enhanced services and must utilize the LEC’s network to do so. In order to “achieve greater competitive equity” in the enhanced services market, the ONA requires LECs to allow each ESP to occupy a portion of the LEC’s property for the ESP’s equipment. This act is defined as “collocation” under OAR 860-35-110. An ESP may, in the alternative, request the LEC to obtain and place equipment on its premises for that particular ESP’s needs. This act is called “virtual collocation,” as defined by OAR 860-35-110, and it differs from collocation in that the LEC owns the equipment being used for the ESP. The ONA provides that the LEC is to be reimbursed for both types of collocation, and for all other ONA services, through its local exchange or interexchange tariffs. OAR 860-35-040; OAR 860-35-060.3 On review, GTE does not challenge the rules regarding virtual collocation.
GTE argues that the rules regarding collocation effect a “taking” under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution4 and under the Fifth5 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that PUC has [642]*642no statutory authority to ‘ ‘take’ ’ property. With regard to the “taking” issue, it makes only one argument: Collocation is a permanent physical occupation under the holding of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 102 S Ct 3164, 73 L Ed 2d 868 (1982), and as such, “is a taking without regard to the public interests it may serve.” 458 US at 426. See also Ferguson v. City of Mill City, 120 Or App 210, 214, 852 P2d 205 (1993). We begin our discussion by emphasizing that GTE’s petition is limited to a facial challenge of the rules under ORS 183.400 and, therefore, we limit our consideration “to the face of the rule and the law pertinent to it.” AFSCME Local 2623 v. Dept. of Corrections, 315 Or 74, 79, 843 P2d 409 (1992).
In order to determine whether collocation constitutes a permanent physical occupation, it is instructive to examine the holding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra. That case arose out of a New York statute prohibiting a landlord’s interference with the installation of cable television equipment6 on her properly, and the prohibition of any demand for payment by the landlord from either her tenants or the cable television company for the installation of the equipment. The statute also authorized the State Commission on Cable Television to set a reasonable fee for the cable television company to pay to the landlord for the use of her property.7 The Court concluded that the statute’s mandate constituted a permanent physical occupation, and was therefore, a perse taking under the United States Constitution. 458 US at 426. See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 US 245, 250,107 S Ct 1107, 94 L Ed 2d 282 (1987).
In making that determination, the Court reviewed the case law regarding “permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and the cases involving a more temporary invasion * * * on the other.” 458 US at 428. It said that cases involving a physical invasion “are special.” 458 US at 432. It noted that, “[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real prop-. erty, this Court has invariably found a taking.” 458 US at 427. Thus, a permanent physical occupation authorized by [643]*643state law constitutes a taking whether it is the state or a party authorized by the state who is the occupant. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 US (13 Wall) 166, 20 L Ed 557 (1872). A mere temporary invasion will not constitute a per se taking.
Although the Court in Loretto never clearly defines what is a permanent physical occupation, it does give examples of what it considers to be permanent invasions and temporary invasions. Examples of permanent physical invasions include the construction of a dam, which permanently flooded the owner’s property, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., supra, the placement of telegraph poles on the city’s public streets, St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 US 92, 13 S Ct 485, 37 L Ed 380 (1893), and the placement of telegraph lines over a railroad’s right-of-way. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 US 540, 25 S Ct 133, 49 L Ed 312 (1904).
The Court also characterized a permanent physical occupation as a “property restriction of an unusually serious nature,” because it effectively destroys the traditional property rights to possess property, exclude others from its use, and to use and to dispose of portions of one’s property:
“First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights. Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking, it is clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, 458 US at 435-36. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, when the owner forever loses the ability to exercise any of the above property rights, the Court considers the occupation to be permanent.
[644]*644In contrast, temporary invasions include the construction of a temporary dam in a river to permit construction of a tunnel, which denied an owner access to his property, Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago,
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EDMONDS, J.
GTE Northwest, Inc. (GTE), challenges, under ORS 183.400, certain rules of the Public Utility Commission (PUC), adopted by Order No. 93-852,1 requiring local [640]*640telephone exchange companies (LECs) to offer “collocation” to enhanced service providers (ESPs) located in their areas. We hold that the rules are valid.
The order in question adopted a regulatory framework known as Open Network Architecture (ONA). The order states that the adopted rules
“advanced two main policy goals: (1) to obtain efficient delivery of enhanced telecommunications services to the public, and (2) to achieve greater competitive equity between providers of telecommunications service.”
[641]*641ONA is concerned with two particular competitors, LECs and their ESP “customers.”2 For purposes of this case, GTE is an LEC. An LEC provides basic telecommunications services to its area, and can also provide “enhanced services” such as call forwarding or voice messaging. ESPs provide only enhanced services and must utilize the LEC’s network to do so. In order to “achieve greater competitive equity” in the enhanced services market, the ONA requires LECs to allow each ESP to occupy a portion of the LEC’s property for the ESP’s equipment. This act is defined as “collocation” under OAR 860-35-110. An ESP may, in the alternative, request the LEC to obtain and place equipment on its premises for that particular ESP’s needs. This act is called “virtual collocation,” as defined by OAR 860-35-110, and it differs from collocation in that the LEC owns the equipment being used for the ESP. The ONA provides that the LEC is to be reimbursed for both types of collocation, and for all other ONA services, through its local exchange or interexchange tariffs. OAR 860-35-040; OAR 860-35-060.3 On review, GTE does not challenge the rules regarding virtual collocation.
GTE argues that the rules regarding collocation effect a “taking” under Article I, section 18, of the Oregon Constitution4 and under the Fifth5 and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and that PUC has [642]*642no statutory authority to ‘ ‘take’ ’ property. With regard to the “taking” issue, it makes only one argument: Collocation is a permanent physical occupation under the holding of Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 102 S Ct 3164, 73 L Ed 2d 868 (1982), and as such, “is a taking without regard to the public interests it may serve.” 458 US at 426. See also Ferguson v. City of Mill City, 120 Or App 210, 214, 852 P2d 205 (1993). We begin our discussion by emphasizing that GTE’s petition is limited to a facial challenge of the rules under ORS 183.400 and, therefore, we limit our consideration “to the face of the rule and the law pertinent to it.” AFSCME Local 2623 v. Dept. of Corrections, 315 Or 74, 79, 843 P2d 409 (1992).
In order to determine whether collocation constitutes a permanent physical occupation, it is instructive to examine the holding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra. That case arose out of a New York statute prohibiting a landlord’s interference with the installation of cable television equipment6 on her properly, and the prohibition of any demand for payment by the landlord from either her tenants or the cable television company for the installation of the equipment. The statute also authorized the State Commission on Cable Television to set a reasonable fee for the cable television company to pay to the landlord for the use of her property.7 The Court concluded that the statute’s mandate constituted a permanent physical occupation, and was therefore, a perse taking under the United States Constitution. 458 US at 426. See FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 US 245, 250,107 S Ct 1107, 94 L Ed 2d 282 (1987).
In making that determination, the Court reviewed the case law regarding “permanent physical occupation, on the one hand, and the cases involving a more temporary invasion * * * on the other.” 458 US at 428. It said that cases involving a physical invasion “are special.” 458 US at 432. It noted that, “[w]hen faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real prop-. erty, this Court has invariably found a taking.” 458 US at 427. Thus, a permanent physical occupation authorized by [643]*643state law constitutes a taking whether it is the state or a party authorized by the state who is the occupant. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 US (13 Wall) 166, 20 L Ed 557 (1872). A mere temporary invasion will not constitute a per se taking.
Although the Court in Loretto never clearly defines what is a permanent physical occupation, it does give examples of what it considers to be permanent invasions and temporary invasions. Examples of permanent physical invasions include the construction of a dam, which permanently flooded the owner’s property, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., supra, the placement of telegraph poles on the city’s public streets, St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 US 92, 13 S Ct 485, 37 L Ed 380 (1893), and the placement of telegraph lines over a railroad’s right-of-way. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 195 US 540, 25 S Ct 133, 49 L Ed 312 (1904).
The Court also characterized a permanent physical occupation as a “property restriction of an unusually serious nature,” because it effectively destroys the traditional property rights to possess property, exclude others from its use, and to use and to dispose of portions of one’s property:
“First, the owner has no right to possess the occupied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from possession and use of the space. The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights. Second, the permanent physical occupation of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonpossessory use of the property. Although deprivation of the right to use and obtain a profit from property is not, in every case, independently sufficient to establish a taking, it is clearly relevant. Finally, even though the owner may retain the bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the permanent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the property.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, 458 US at 435-36. (Citations omitted.)
Thus, when the owner forever loses the ability to exercise any of the above property rights, the Court considers the occupation to be permanent.
[644]*644In contrast, temporary invasions include the construction of a temporary dam in a river to permit construction of a tunnel, which denied an owner access to his property, Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 US 635, 25 L Ed 336 (1879), and requiring a shopping mall to allow individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on property it held open to the public. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 US 74, 100 S Ct 2035, 64 L Ed 2d 741 (1980). In PruneYard, even though individuals were allowed physically to invade the owner’s property, the owner could impose reasonable time, manner and place restrictions on the free speech activities. The Court reasoned that the owner’s ability to impose such restrictions made the invasion “temporary and limited in nature.” 458 US at 434. Thus, characteristics of a temporary occupation focus on the duration of the physical invasion and the owner’s ability to control the extent of the invasion to some degree.
In this case, we agree with GTE that there may be a physical invasion if the rules are implemented against an LEC. The PUC requires LECs to allow a portion of their property to be used for collocation. The “placement of a fixed structure,” the Court said in Loretto, “is an obvious fact [of physical occupation].” 458 US at 437. GTE argues that the rules effectively cause a permanent occupation. However, the occupation in this case is not “permanent” within the meaning of Loretto, because the LECs have some control over the extent and duration of the occupation. OAR 860-35-110(4)(f) requires the occupying ESP to vacate the space after at least 12 months’ written notice, in the event that the LEC needs the space for basic services. Finally, OAR 860-35-110(4)(a) vests an LEC with some control when there is no existing space for collocation. Moreover, an LEC’s ability to use its own property is not unfettered. In the abstract, no taking occurs if the interest that the utility claims is an interest it never had in the first instance. See Northwest Gas Co. v. City of Portland, 300 Or 291, 711 P2d 119 (1985). LECs are regulated heavily in the use of their property by the PUC.8 [645]*645See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 US 986, 104 S Ct 2862, 81 L Ed 2d 815 (1984);9 California Housing Securities, Inc. v. U.S., 959 F2d 955 (Fed Cir), cert den _ US _, 113 S Ct 324 (1992).10 In that sense, the exercise of the PUC’s authority to control the use of an LEC’s property under its rules does not offend the traditional rights to possess property and to exclude others from the use of it. Thus, GTE’s argument that the limitations on its use of its own property are unconstitutional necessarily requires a balancing of the interests between private property rights and governmental interests. As we have said, those kinds of tests are not applicable to a facial challenge made on the basis that there is a permanent physical invasion.
The ramifications of the rights that the LECs retain persuade us that the criteria required by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, for a permanent “taking” have not been met. Whether a “taking” occurs because of a temporary invasion is not an issue we need decide in the light of petitioner’s facial challenge. It follows that, the rules on their face do not violate Article I, section 18, or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.11
In the fight of this conclusion, we need not discuss GTE’s other arguments.
Rules held valid.