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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 5 G.S., 6 Petitioner, 7 v. 8 C25-2704 TSZ LAURA HERMOSILLO; BRUCE 9 SCOTT; KRISTI NOEM; UNITED ORDER STATES DEPARTMENT OF 10 HOMELAND SECURITY; and PAMELA BONDI, 11 Respondents. 12
13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus 14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, docket no. 1. Having reviewed all papers filed in support 15 of, and in opposition to, the petition, including petitioner’s declaration, docket no. 4-2, 16 respondents’ return, docket no. 6, and petitioner’s traverse, docket no. 9, the Court enters 17 the following order. 18 Background 19 The parties agree that petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States 20 without inspection on August 27, 2022. See Melendez Diaz Decl. at ¶ 4 (docket no. 7); 21 Pet. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 1); Notice to Appear, Ex. A to Pet. (docket no. 4-1 at 36). He was 22 released from Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) custody on September 8, 2022, 1 Immigration Review, Ex. A to Pet. (docket no. 4-1 at 32); Melendez Diaz Decl. at ¶ 6 2 (docket no. 7); Order of Release on Recognizance, Ex. 3 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-3).
3 According to petitioner, after his release from DHS custody in September 2022, a global 4 positioning system (“GPS”) tracking device was placed on his ankle, and he routinely 5 reported to or checked in with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) via 6 the ankle monitor, as well as his phone. See G.S. Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. B to Pet. (docket 7 no. 4-2). Based on a fear of persecution because of his religion and political affiliations, 8 petitioner applied for asylum on March 22, 2023. See Pet. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 1); G.S.
9 Decl. at ¶¶ 1 & 3 (docket no. 4-2). 10 The parties do not dispute that petitioner obtained an Employment Authorization 11 Document (“EAD”), and that, when he was contacted by U.S. Customs and Border 12 Protection (“CBP”) agents on December 9, 2025, petitioner was operating a commercial 13 vehicle that had pulled into a weigh station in Montana for routine inspection. See G.S.
14 Decl. at ¶¶ 5 & 13–20 (docket no. 4-2); Ex. 2 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). The 15 truck tractor (“TT”) with semi-trailer (“ST”) that petitioner was driving was carrying 16 apples being shipped from Chelan, Washington to Lyndhurst, New Jersey. See Report, 17 Ex. to G.S. Decl. (docket no. 4-2 at 6) (identifying the TT and ST at issue as bearing 18 Iowa license plates). No violation was discovered during the examination conducted by
19 Montana Department of Transportation personnel. Id. CBP agents nevertheless detained 20 petitioner,1 and they later wrote a report indicating that petitioner “failed to comply with 21 22 1 According to petitioner, after he was taken into custody, an ICE or CBP agent cut off his GPS tracking device. See G.S. Decl. at ¶ 24 (docket no. 4-2). Respondents have not disputed that the 1 his release conditions.” Ex. 2 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). Which condition or 2 conditions petitioner had allegedly violated were not specified in the report, see id., and
3 in their habeas return, respondents have offered nothing more than conclusory assertions, 4 without any explanation or evidence, see Return at 2 (docket no. 6); see also id. at 6 5 (indicating without any supporting facts that CBP agents “deemed [petitioner] to be a 6 flight risk”). Indeed, notwithstanding petitioner’s EAD, the validity of which has not 7 been challenged, CBP agents relied solely on “encounter[ing petitioner] working in 8 Montana” combined with his immigration status to take him into custody. See Ex. 2 to
9 Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). Petitioner now seeks release from the Northwest ICE 10 Processing Center (“NWIPC”) on the ground that his re-detention without written notice 11 and a pre-deprivation hearing was in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due 12 process of law. See Pet. at ¶¶ 38–40 (docket no. 1). 13 Discussion
14 Respondents do not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, see Return at 4–5 (docket 15 no. 6), and the Court has authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to an individual who is 16 in custody “in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States,” see 17 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Respondents’ contention that the Court should not exercise its 18 discretion to provide habeas relief because 8 U.S.C. § 1225 confers on the executive
19 branch the power to detain certain aliens is entirely lacking in merit. See, e.g., P.T. v. 20 Hermosillo, No. C25-2249, 2025 WL 3294988, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025) 21 (“In determining the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention, the Court will focus not on the 22 Government’s claimed authority to detain, but the process by which Petitioner was 1 As consistently recognized in this District, whether the manner in which an alien 2 was re-detained comported with due process should be analyzed pursuant to the three-
3 part standard set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See P.T., 2025 WL 4 3294988, at *2 (citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 5 2022) (assuming without deciding that Mathews applies in the immigration detention 6 context)); Manuel v. Hermosillo, No. C25-2353, 2025 WL 3690778, at *2–3 (W.D. 7 Wash. Dec. 10, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 3697277 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2025); 8 Francois v. Wamsley, No. C25-2122, 2025 WL 3063251, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3,
9 2025); Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7 10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); Kumar v. Wamsley, No. 25-cv-1772, 2025 WL 2677089, at 11 *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025); E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1321 12 (W.D. Wash. 2025)2; see also Flores Torres v. Hermosillo, No. 25-cv-2687, 2026 WL 13
14 2 Respondents criticize the reasoning in E.A. T.-B. as “conflat[ing] 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).” Return at 6 (docket no. 6). Respondents, however, have missed the 15 point of the E.A. T.-B. Court’s citation to the latter regulation, which reads in relevant part: 16 Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions 17 at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property 18 or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). The E.A. T.-B. Court observed that the decision to release an alien 19 pursuant to § 1236.1(c)(8) is made before the alien appears in immigration court and is based on a conclusion that the alien does not pose a danger to the community and is likely to appear for 20 future proceedings. See 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1323. The E.A. T.-B. Court concluded that, for purposes of the second prong of the Mathews test, re-detaining an alien “without first 21 reconsidering those factors poses a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the alien’s] liberty interest in continued release.” Id. To the extent respondents contend that an agency 22 regulation, namely 8 C.F.R.
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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 5 G.S., 6 Petitioner, 7 v. 8 C25-2704 TSZ LAURA HERMOSILLO; BRUCE 9 SCOTT; KRISTI NOEM; UNITED ORDER STATES DEPARTMENT OF 10 HOMELAND SECURITY; and PAMELA BONDI, 11 Respondents. 12
13 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus 14 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, docket no. 1. Having reviewed all papers filed in support 15 of, and in opposition to, the petition, including petitioner’s declaration, docket no. 4-2, 16 respondents’ return, docket no. 6, and petitioner’s traverse, docket no. 9, the Court enters 17 the following order. 18 Background 19 The parties agree that petitioner is a citizen of India who entered the United States 20 without inspection on August 27, 2022. See Melendez Diaz Decl. at ¶ 4 (docket no. 7); 21 Pet. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 1); Notice to Appear, Ex. A to Pet. (docket no. 4-1 at 36). He was 22 released from Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) custody on September 8, 2022, 1 Immigration Review, Ex. A to Pet. (docket no. 4-1 at 32); Melendez Diaz Decl. at ¶ 6 2 (docket no. 7); Order of Release on Recognizance, Ex. 3 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-3).
3 According to petitioner, after his release from DHS custody in September 2022, a global 4 positioning system (“GPS”) tracking device was placed on his ankle, and he routinely 5 reported to or checked in with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) via 6 the ankle monitor, as well as his phone. See G.S. Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. B to Pet. (docket 7 no. 4-2). Based on a fear of persecution because of his religion and political affiliations, 8 petitioner applied for asylum on March 22, 2023. See Pet. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 1); G.S.
9 Decl. at ¶¶ 1 & 3 (docket no. 4-2). 10 The parties do not dispute that petitioner obtained an Employment Authorization 11 Document (“EAD”), and that, when he was contacted by U.S. Customs and Border 12 Protection (“CBP”) agents on December 9, 2025, petitioner was operating a commercial 13 vehicle that had pulled into a weigh station in Montana for routine inspection. See G.S.
14 Decl. at ¶¶ 5 & 13–20 (docket no. 4-2); Ex. 2 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). The 15 truck tractor (“TT”) with semi-trailer (“ST”) that petitioner was driving was carrying 16 apples being shipped from Chelan, Washington to Lyndhurst, New Jersey. See Report, 17 Ex. to G.S. Decl. (docket no. 4-2 at 6) (identifying the TT and ST at issue as bearing 18 Iowa license plates). No violation was discovered during the examination conducted by
19 Montana Department of Transportation personnel. Id. CBP agents nevertheless detained 20 petitioner,1 and they later wrote a report indicating that petitioner “failed to comply with 21 22 1 According to petitioner, after he was taken into custody, an ICE or CBP agent cut off his GPS tracking device. See G.S. Decl. at ¶ 24 (docket no. 4-2). Respondents have not disputed that the 1 his release conditions.” Ex. 2 to Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). Which condition or 2 conditions petitioner had allegedly violated were not specified in the report, see id., and
3 in their habeas return, respondents have offered nothing more than conclusory assertions, 4 without any explanation or evidence, see Return at 2 (docket no. 6); see also id. at 6 5 (indicating without any supporting facts that CBP agents “deemed [petitioner] to be a 6 flight risk”). Indeed, notwithstanding petitioner’s EAD, the validity of which has not 7 been challenged, CBP agents relied solely on “encounter[ing petitioner] working in 8 Montana” combined with his immigration status to take him into custody. See Ex. 2 to
9 Wong Decl. (docket no. 8-2 at 4). Petitioner now seeks release from the Northwest ICE 10 Processing Center (“NWIPC”) on the ground that his re-detention without written notice 11 and a pre-deprivation hearing was in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due 12 process of law. See Pet. at ¶¶ 38–40 (docket no. 1). 13 Discussion
14 Respondents do not challenge the Court’s jurisdiction, see Return at 4–5 (docket 15 no. 6), and the Court has authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to an individual who is 16 in custody “in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States,” see 17 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Respondents’ contention that the Court should not exercise its 18 discretion to provide habeas relief because 8 U.S.C. § 1225 confers on the executive
19 branch the power to detain certain aliens is entirely lacking in merit. See, e.g., P.T. v. 20 Hermosillo, No. C25-2249, 2025 WL 3294988, at *2 n.1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025) 21 (“In determining the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention, the Court will focus not on the 22 Government’s claimed authority to detain, but the process by which Petitioner was 1 As consistently recognized in this District, whether the manner in which an alien 2 was re-detained comported with due process should be analyzed pursuant to the three-
3 part standard set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See P.T., 2025 WL 4 3294988, at *2 (citing Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 5 2022) (assuming without deciding that Mathews applies in the immigration detention 6 context)); Manuel v. Hermosillo, No. C25-2353, 2025 WL 3690778, at *2–3 (W.D. 7 Wash. Dec. 10, 2025), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 3697277 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2025); 8 Francois v. Wamsley, No. C25-2122, 2025 WL 3063251, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3,
9 2025); Ledesma Gonzalez v. Bostock, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2841574, at *7 10 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 2025); Kumar v. Wamsley, No. 25-cv-1772, 2025 WL 2677089, at 11 *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2025); E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1321 12 (W.D. Wash. 2025)2; see also Flores Torres v. Hermosillo, No. 25-cv-2687, 2026 WL 13
14 2 Respondents criticize the reasoning in E.A. T.-B. as “conflat[ing] 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9) and 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).” Return at 6 (docket no. 6). Respondents, however, have missed the 15 point of the E.A. T.-B. Court’s citation to the latter regulation, which reads in relevant part: 16 Any officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions 17 at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property 18 or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). The E.A. T.-B. Court observed that the decision to release an alien 19 pursuant to § 1236.1(c)(8) is made before the alien appears in immigration court and is based on a conclusion that the alien does not pose a danger to the community and is likely to appear for 20 future proceedings. See 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1323. The E.A. T.-B. Court concluded that, for purposes of the second prong of the Mathews test, re-detaining an alien “without first 21 reconsidering those factors poses a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the alien’s] liberty interest in continued release.” Id. To the extent respondents contend that an agency 22 regulation, namely 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(9), which provides that “release may be revoked at any time in the discretion of . . . [certain officials], in which event the alien may be taken into 1 145715, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 20, 2026); A.C.J. v. Hermosillo, No. C25-2486, 2025 2 WL 3907144, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 30, 2025), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 73857 (W.D.
3 Wash. Jan. 9, 2026). 4 All three Mathews factors weigh in petitioner’s favor: (i) he has a protected 5 liberty interest in not remaining in custody at NWIPC, (ii) the absence of pre-deprivation 6 procedures created an unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivation, and (iii) the 7 governmental interest in petitioner’s re-detention without a hearing is minimal or 8 non-existent. See P.T., 2025 WL 3294988, at *2–4; see also Yildirim v. Hermosillo,
9 No. C25-2696, 2026 WL 111358, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 15, 2026) (noting that any 10 factual disputes related to the justification for the petitioner’s re-detention should have 11 been resolved at a pre-deprivation hearing, not after-the-fact during habeas proceedings); 12 Flores Torres, 2026 WL 145715, at *6–8; A.C.J., 2026 WL 73857, at *3–6; Manuel, 13 2025 WL 3690778, at *3; Francois, 2025 WL 3063251, at *4–5; Ledesma Gonzalez,
14 2025 WL 2841574, at *7–9; Kumar, 2025 WL 2677089, at *3–4; E.A. T.-B., 795 F. Supp. 15 3d at 1321–24. In this matter, respondents have not provided any reason for disrupting 16 petitioner’s work as a commercial truck driver or for re-detaining him, and the type of 17 post-hoc rationalization, unsupported by any facts or evidence, that has been displayed in 18 this case demonstrates exactly why the pre-deprivation hearing required by Mathews is
19 necessary; it serves as a crucial bulwark against the unfettered disregard of individual 20 liberty interests. 21 22 physical custody and detained,” somehow undermines the E.A. T.-B. Court’s analysis, they ignore the supremacy of the United States Constitution and the executive branch’s duty to 1 Conclusion 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:
3 (1) Petitioner’s habeas petition, docket no. 1, is GRANTED; 4 (2) Respondents shall immediately RELEASE petitioner from custody at the 5 NWIPC, and they shall not re-detain petitioner without at least seven (7) days’ advance 6 written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral decisionmaker; 7 (3) Respondents shall reinstate the Order of Release on Recognizance issued in 8 September 2022, with the same conditions previously imposed, and petitioner shall
9 comply with those conditions unless they are amended after providing petitioner at least 10 thirty (30) days’ advance written notice and an opportunity to be heard; if a GPS tracking 11 device is required, then respondents shall make arrangements at their own expense to 12 outfit petitioner with such monitoring equipment; 13 (4) Within twenty-four (24) hours of the entry of this Order, respondents shall
14 file a declaration confirming that petitioner has been released from custody and stating 15 the date and time of his release; and 16 (5) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated this 22nd day of January, 2026.
19 A 20 Thomas S. Zilly 21 United States District Judge 22