Grynberg v. Bp P.L.C.

318 F.R.D. 533, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121179, 2016 WL 4703618
District Court, District of Columbia·Decided September 8, 2016·No. Civil Action No. 2008-0301·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, United States District Judge

In 1990, Grynberg Production Company and BP Petroleum Development Ltd. entered a joint venture to explore and develop oil and natural gas reserves in the Northeastern Caspian Sea off the shore of Kazakhstan. For most of the intervening twenty-five years, they have been locked in contentious litigation, both here and abroad. That litigation spilled into this Court in 2008 when Jack Grynberg and several companies that he controls (collectively “Grynberg”) sued several oil companies and their executives, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law.

Enforcing an arbitration agreement previously executed by the parties, the Court ultimately dismissed Grynberg’s complaint. See Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 585 F.Supp.2d 50 (D.D.C.2008). Grynberg subsequently added his RICO claims to an ongoing arbitration between the parties, where the arbitrator then decided them. Now, eight years after this Court’s decision and six years after the *535 decision of the arbitrator, Grynberg has moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 to vacate this Court’s dismissal of his RICO claims, citing bias by the arbitrator and bad faith by the defendants. For the reasons below, Grynberg is not entitled to that relief. His Rule 60 motion will therefore be denied.

BACKGROUND 1

A.The Underlying Transaction

In 1990, a BP subsidiary and one of Gryn-berg’s companies entered a joint venture to explore and develop oil and natural gas reserves in the Northeastern Caspian Sea off the shore of Kazakhstan. Grynberg contributed original and confidential information about the target reserves to the joint venture; in return, he received an interest in the net profits that BP derived from the reserves’ development. Separately, BP entered a sub-venture with Statoil, which became privy to Grynberg’s original information, subject to confidentiality obligations. Then things went south. In 1993, BP and Statoil joined a consortium of international oil companies hoping to obtain concessions from the Kazakh government to develop reserves, including those covered by the Grynberg-BP joint venture. Grynberg calls this consortium the “Giffen Consortium.” Its namesake, James Giffen, was charged in 2003 with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act arising out of the alleged bribery of Kazakh officials. Ultimately the consortium secured its oil and gas concessions.

Grynberg sued, alleging that BP and Sta-toil had misappropriated his original, confidential information for their own benefit. The litigation resolved in 1999 with two substantially identical settlement agreements—one with BP and another with Statoil. Under the agreements, Grynberg was entitled to an interest in the net sale proceeds derived from development of the covered reserves. More important for present purposes, the agreements also contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that any “dispute or difference arising out of, in relation to or in any way connected with” the settlement “shall be finally and exclusively referred to and settled by arbitration.” See, e.g., BP 1999 Settlement Agreement [ECF No. 114-5] § 10.04(a). Stephen Hochman, who had assisted the parties in their settlement negotiations, was specified in the agreements as the sole arbitrator. In the event Hochman became “unable or unwilling to serve” in that role, arbitration would be completed by a three-arbitrator panel. See id. § 10.05(b).

B. The Arbitration Commences

Before long, a dispute arose under the settlement agreements. In 2001, BP and Sta-toil announced that they would sell their interests in the covered reserves to Total, another international oil company. Those sales became the subject of a number of disputes before the arbitrator. First, Gryn-berg alleged that BP and Statoil had concealed their intention to sell their interests in the covered reserves in order to fraudulently induce him into the settlement agreements. Second, he alleged that BP and Statoil had used a number of side deals to artificially depress the proceeds of the sale—and to thereby artificially reduce Grynberg’s take. Thus began, in 2002, what Grynberg calls the “13 year arbitration from hell.” Grynberg Decl. [ECF No. 114-2] at 4. By mid-2007, the fraudulent inducement claim and side deal claims had been resolved against Grynberg. See 2010 Final Award [ECF No. 114-7] at 7-18. But the arbitration was very contentious. Grynberg plainly thought the arbitrator was not giving his evidence and arguments a fair hearing. During this phase of the arbitration, Grynberg sought outside judicial relief three times, filed approximately 100 communications to the arbitrator and auditor, accused the arbitrator of bias, and demanded that the arbitrator disqualify himself from deciding some remaining claims, which the arbitrator refused to do. See Grynberg, 585 F.Supp.2d at 56.

C. The RICO Claims

Grynberg filed suit in this Court in 2008 alleging violations of RICO and state law *536 (collectively “RICO claims”). His core allegation was that defendants, through their participation in the “Giffen Consortium,” had bribed Kazakh officials in exchange for oil and gas concessions. Those bribes, Grynberg contends, were then misrepresented by the companies as legitimate production costs— thereby depriving Grynberg of profits to which he was entitled under the settlement agreements and implicating him in a scheme of foreign bribery. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶ 24. Enforcing the parties’ arbitration agreement, this Court dismissed Grynberg’s RICO claims, holding that their arbitrability was a question for the arbitrator. See Grynberg, 585 F.Supp.2d at 51. No appeal was taken. Grynberg then added his RICO claims to the still pending arbitration.

The arbitrator divided Grynberg’s new allegations into the “audit claims” and the “DC Based RICO” claims. The “audit claims” centered on whether $28 million of “signature bonuses”—characterized by Grynberg as bribes and by the defendants as legitimate business expenses—could be properly counted as costs in a calculation of BP’s net sale proceeds under the settlement agreements. 2 See 2010 Final Award at 18-19. The “DC Based RICO” claims were essentially the same as those brought in this Court. See id. at 21-22. As the arbitration progressed, Grynberg remained unimpressed with the arbitrator’s handling of his case. In a flurry of correspondence, Grynberg and various attorneys demanded discovery on the RICO and audit claims. See, e.g„ Dec. 8, 2008, Letter from Grynberg to Hochman [EOF No. 141-4] at 3 (“I want to depose the Chief Financial Officer of BP, item by item ... Also, I want to depose everyone who was associated with producing that fraudulent document of expenditures by BP.”). Grynberg also made clear his feelings about the arbitrator, the defendants, and their lawyers. See id. (“Is that arbitration or is that a whitewash? ... It’s a Kangaroo Court that you have run for the last six (6) years.”); id. (defendant corporations are run by “criminal[s]”); id. at 2-3 (counsel are “liars not lawyers” and made “fraudulent presentation^]”)

D. A “Final” Decision

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Grynberg v. Bp P.L.C., 318 F.R.D. 533, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121179, 2016 WL 4703618 (D.D.C. 2016).

318 F.R.D. 533 (Grynberg v. Bp P.L.C.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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