Grundy v. City of Janesville

54 N.W. 1085, 84 Wis. 574, 1893 Wisc. LEXIS 98
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedApril 11, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 54 N.W. 1085 (Grundy v. City of Janesville) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grundy v. City of Janesville, 54 N.W. 1085, 84 Wis. 574, 1893 Wisc. LEXIS 98 (Wis. 1893).

Opinion

OetoN, J.

On and before the 17th day of April, 1890, there was a depression about a foot and a half wTide, and about ten inches deep, commencing at the east side of South Academy street, in the city of Janesville, and extending about three fourths of the distance across said street. This depression was about ninety-six feet from the northerly side of Dodge street, where that street intersects South Academy street, and was on the line of a trench dug across said street in the fall of 1S88 by the Hew Gas Light Company of Janesville, for the purpose of laying service gas pipe into the house of one John McCulloch, opposite, from the main gas pipe in said street. The plaintiff was riding with her husband, Samuel G-rundy, in a single buggy, about 9 o’clock in the evening of said day, along said street, and when they came to said depression the forward wheels of the buggy went into it with a sudden jolt and jar, which, threw the plaintiff violently up above the seat of the buggy, and she came down in such way as to severely injure her spinal cord and the nerves connected therewith, and produce a permanent physical disability, accompanied by much pain and suffering. The plaintiff brought suit against the city to recover, damages for her [577]*577said injury, on tbe ground that said depression was a dangerous defect in said street, and that the city was liable for its defective condition and want of repair.

The city served a notice, together with a copy of the summons in the action, upon the said New Gas Light Company, notifying said company that if the said street was in such a defective condition it was by reason of the carelessness and neglect of said company in not properly restoring said street, at the place of the alleged accident,after laying down the gas pipe in said trench, and that the city would hold said company liable for the damages and costs, if any, in said case. The city, in its answer to the complaint, pleaded in abatement of the action such liability of the gas company. The plaintiff thereupon made said gas company a party defendant, and served upon it a complaint charging said company with culpable negligence in restoring said street at that place, after laying down its gas pipe in said trench, and stating the particulars of her; injury caused thereby, and demanded judgment against said company therefor. This proceeding to hold the gas company primarily liable for such injury is in accordance writh secs. 13395, 1339c, S. & B. Ann. Stats., which provide, in effect, that whenever a city would be liable for an injury caused by any defect in one of its streets, and such defect was caused by the default or negligence of another person or corporation, such person or corporation shall be primarily liable for all damages arising from such injury.

The testimony on behalf of the plaintiff tended strongly to show that said street was dangerously defective and out of repair at said place, and by reason of culpable negligence, and to establish the plaintiff’s right to recover damages for her injury; and the plaintiff’s right to recover is not much controverted on this appeal. The main and material question contested on the trial was whether the said gas company was liable by reason of its negligence in not re[578]*578storing said street at the place of the accident, after laying down its gas pipe. At the close of the evidence the court, on motion to that effect, directed the jury to find a verdict in favor of the gas company, and the jury found a verdict of $5,000 damages in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant the city of Jane'sville, and in favor of the gas company, as directed. Most of the errors assigned by the learned counsel of the appellant arose in the controversy between the city of Janesville and the New Gas Light Company.

1. It is assigned as error that the court compelled the city to pass upon the jury list before the gas light company, to take the initiative in cross-examining witnesses, and to introduce its evidence first. These are matters of practice arising under this new law, which, in the absence of rules, must be necessarily left to the discretion of the trial court; and whatever practice that court may adopt in these respects cannot affect very materially the rights of either defendant.

2. The witness Parish testified to having seen a place in said street near McCulloch’s house where gravel had been placed after the accident. The counsel for the appellant moved to strike out this testimony, and the court denied the motion. It \yas allowed for the sole purpose of showing the location of the former depression, and to identify itj and it was expressly limited to such purpose. It was therefore admissible.

'3. Mrs. McCulloch, who lived in the house opposite said depression in South Academy street, testified, as a witness for the plaintiff, to her having seen said depression in the spring of 1890, and then stated that “ she heard wagons going into the ditch at night.” This last statement was objected to by appellant’s counsel, and the objection was overruled. She saw the depression, and described it, and she heard wagons going into it in the night. [579]*579What she saw and heard were the evidence of her senses that there was a depression there of some depth. Her seeing and hearing coincided as to that fact, both equally reliable and admissible.

4. Hiram Merrill, general manager of the gas company, testified, as a witness for the company, that he was notified by a Mr. ITanthorn, an officer of the city, after the accident, that there was a place on Academy street that needed repairing, or to that effect. In reply to a question by the court he testified that he said to Mr. Hanthorn that it was “ about time our responsibility ceased so far as repairing that ditch.” Mr. Merrill, as an officer of the gas company, when notified by an officer of the city to repair that ditch, had the right, and it was his duty, to reply to such notice and deny the responsibility of his company for it. If he did so, he then had the right to testify to it in connection with his testimony of the notice, so as not to leave the inference of assent by his silence to the duty of the company to repair it. It .was a part of the res gestae of the notice. It was his reply to it. But, besides this, it was entirely immaterial, and did not and could not affect the rights of the parties in any respect whatever.

5. The error on which the learned counsel of the appellant appears most to rely for reversing the judgment is the direction of the court to the jury to find a verdict in favor of the defendant the gas light company on the evidence. The principles of law which should govern the trial court in passing upon a motion to direct a verdict one way or the other are correctly stated in the brief of the learned counsel of the appellant. It is only where there is no reasonable ground for dispute as to what the evidence is, and what facts are established by it, and as to all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of or against a party, that the court may direct a verdict. Such a direction is not governed by the same rule as the setting aside a verdict [580]*580and granting a new trial, for that may be done in the discretion of the court, when there is a clear preponderance of the evidence against the verdict.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dickens v. Kensmoe
212 N.W.2d 484 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1973)
Wheeler v. Portland-Tacoma Auto Freight Co.
9 P.2d 101 (Washington Supreme Court, 1932)
Fonder v. General Construction Co.
130 N.W. 884 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1911)
Lind v. Uniform Stave & Package Co.
120 N.W. 839 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1909)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
54 N.W. 1085, 84 Wis. 574, 1893 Wisc. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grundy-v-city-of-janesville-wis-1893.