Gruber (ID 118524) v. Wecker

CourtDistrict Court, D. Kansas
DecidedAugust 27, 2021
Docket5:21-cv-03186
StatusUnknown

This text of Gruber (ID 118524) v. Wecker (Gruber (ID 118524) v. Wecker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gruber (ID 118524) v. Wecker, (D. Kan. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

CHRISTIAN M. GRUBER,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 21-3186-SAC

CHRISTOPHER WECKER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Christian M. Gruber is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this consolidated action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s consolidated Complaints that are discussed herein. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff originally filed these cases pro se in the Osage County District Court. Defendants removed both actions to this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Although the KDOC website reflects that Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility (“EDCF”) in El Dorado, Kansas,1 the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s consolidated Complaint appear to have taken place during his detention at the Osage County Jail in Lyndon, Kansas (“OCJ”). In one Complaint, Plaintiff claims “[Defendant] is showing deliberate indifference to [Plaintiff]’s medical needs and health and safety and not following doctors orders.” Case No. 21-3186, ECF No. 1, at 1. In the other Complaint, Plaintiff states that he is “being denied

1 According to the Kansas Adult Supervised Population Electronic Repository (“KASPER”), Plaintiff was transferred to the EDCF on July 15, 2021. See https://kdocrepository.doc.ks.gov/kasper/. access to the courts” . . . because OCJ officials are “not providing [him] with access to a law library.” Case No. 21-3187, ECF No. 1, at 2. Plaintiff names as Defendants Christopher Wecker; Chris Wells, Sheriff of Osage County, Kansas; and Gerry Nichter, Jail Administrator. Plaintiff states that he seeks to be “discharged from the unlawful portion of his imprisonment.”

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Section “1915A applies to all prison litigants, without regard to their fee status, who bring civil suits against a governmental entity, officer, or employee.” Plunk v. Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579–80 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that the statutory screening provision under § 1915A applies to all prisoners’ actions against governmental entities, officers, and employees, regardless whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis). The independent duty to screen prisoner complaints therefore extends to prisoner actions that have

been removed from state court. See Duff v. Yount, 51 F. App’x. 520, 521 (6th Cir. 2002) (screening removed prisoner action under §§ 1915(e) and 1915A). Accordingly, the Court will screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under § 1915A. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise

a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in

this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. DISCUSSION 1.

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Related

Martin v. Scott
156 F.3d 578 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Bounds v. Smith
430 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court, 1977)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Plunk v. Givens
234 F.3d 1128 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Anderson v. Blake
469 F.3d 910 (Tenth Circuit, 2006)
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents
492 F.3d 1158 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Kay v. Bemis
500 F.3d 1214 (Tenth Circuit, 2007)
Smith v. United States
561 F.3d 1090 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Hall v. Bellmon
935 F.2d 1106 (Tenth Circuit, 1991)
Northington v. Jackson
973 F.2d 1518 (Tenth Circuit, 1992)

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Gruber (ID 118524) v. Wecker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gruber-id-118524-v-wecker-ksd-2021.