COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner Argued at Salem, Virginia
GROVER F. HOSTETTER, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2378-98-3 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. FEBRUARY 15, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY George E. Honts, III, Judge
Ross S. Haine, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted Grover F. Hostetter, Jr., of driving under
the influence of alcohol and two counts of involuntary
manslaughter. He contends the trial judge violated Code
§ 19.2-295.1 and constitutional due process protections by denying
him the right to present at the sentencing proceeding relevant
mitigating evidence. We affirm the convictions.
I.
The evidence at trial proved that Hostetter was driving a
truck south on Route 11 a little faster than fifty miles per hour.
The truck went onto the right shoulder of the southbound lane,
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. came back into the southbound lane, and slid sideways into the
northbound lane of the three-lane highway. Hostetter's truck
struck a northbound car, killing the car's driver and her sister,
a passenger.
Hostetter did not have a driver's license. The evidence
proved that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from Hostetter's
person and that empty and full beer cans were found at the scene
among the debris. When hospitalized after the accident,
Hostetter's blood alcohol level was .22 to .24% by weight by
volume.
The jury convicted Hostetter of two counts of involuntary
manslaughter, which were lesser-included offenses of the indicted
offenses of aggravated involuntary manslaughter, and of driving
under the influence of alcohol. Through evidence presented at the
punishment phase pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.1, the Commonwealth
proved Hostetter's prior criminal record. It established that
Hostetter had been convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol, destroying a motor vehicle, obstruction of justice by
threat of force, writing two checks on accounts with insufficient
funds, using obscene language over a telephone, driving a motor
vehicle after suspension of his driving privilege, and three
counts of assault and battery.
In mitigation, Hostetter proved his school record. In
addition, Dr. Elyce Pike provided expert testimony on Hostetter's
limited mental capacity. She testified that Hostetter was mildly
- 2 - retarded with an I.Q. of sixty and a corresponding mental age of
seven or eight and that a person with this level of mental
retardation would be incapable of abstract thinking or problem
solving. She told the jury that such a person cannot inhibit
behaviors, would be unable to control alcohol consumption, would
be incapable of drinking responsibly, would never be able to pass
the written test to obtain a driver's license, and would have
diminished driving ability.
Dr. Pike also testified that people with Hostetter's limited
mental capacity tend to mimic as a survival mechanism. She
testified that "they don't want to appear mentally retarded, but,
in some of the examinations, where you have . . . social
situations . . . [these] people have a very, very limited ability
to know what's going on. And that's what [Hostetter's
examination] demonstrated."
Cathy Davis, a school psychologist and director of education
for a public school system, testified as an expert in special
education. Consistent with Dr. Pike's testimony, Davis described
the limitations of people with Hostetter's mental capacities. She
described their difficulties with controlling alcohol consumption,
writing checks, and everyday living skills.
Hostetter submitted a letter from a community service board
detailing his participation after the accident in a substance
abuse program. Hostetter had attended 20 out of 21 sessions, with
his one absence being excused. The letter reported that
- 3 - "Hostetter has been a very quiet and attentive member of the
therapy program. He just recently verbally acknowledged his
alcoholism, and has done so on a regular basis since." The letter
also stated that, "when pressed, [Hostetter] will acknowledge that
his alcohol abuse contributed to the deaths of two people."
A manager at an automobile dealership testified that
Hostetter had worked for him two years cleaning the facilities and
washing cars. He testified that Hostetter had performed his job
well, but needed help with "[r]eading directions, things like
that."
Anthony Ruley, who had been co-habiting with Hostetter's
sister for the previous 21 years, testified that he had known
Hostetter for that period and that Hostetter had a "real hard"
life. When Ruley testified that Hostetter's father threw beer at
Hostetter and shot him, the prosecutor objected that the testimony
was irrelevant. The trial judge sustained the objection "to that
sort of detail." The trial judge similarly sustained an objection
to Ruley's testimony concerning Hostetter's parents' abuse of
alcohol. Ruley then testified that during an argument Hostetter's
father shot Hostetter in the back. He further testified that
Hostetter "was a good boy, he's had a hard life."
In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented the testimony of the
brother, nephew, and sister-in-law of the two dead sisters. Each
of these witnesses described the sisters' lives and the impact of
their deaths on the family. William Reulein testified that the
- 4 - decedents were his only sisters and that their parents had died
when he was seventeen, leaving only the three of them. He
described his sisters' adult lives and the impact of their deaths
on him and his family.
Reulein's son described his first childhood memories of his
aunts, and he testified concerning the impact of their deaths on
him, his parents, and his children. Reulein's wife testified
concerning the impact on her life of the death of her
sisters-in-law. She described one of them as her best friend.
Before instructing the jury to consider Hostetter's sentence,
the trial judge permitted Hostetter's counsel to proffer Ruley's
expected testimony. Ruley said that Hostetter "had a terrible
life." When Hostetter was young, his father "[threw] beer on him,
kick[ed] him in the butt, many, many times, [and ran] him out of
the house." Other uncles did the same to Hostetter. He testified
that Hostetter "suck[ed] his fingers until he was about thirteen
or fourteen years old, [until] he'd have sores around his face."
He further testified that Hostetter's family consumed a lot of
alcohol and treated Hostetter so badly when they were intoxicated
that "it was just over the boundaries." He said that Hostetter's
father "basically treated him like a dog all his life." The
prosecutor objected on the ground of hearsay to Ruley's testimony
that, when Hostetter was eight or nine, his aunt and uncle tied
him to a tree in a cemetery and left him for more than an hour.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner Argued at Salem, Virginia
GROVER F. HOSTETTER, JR. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 2378-98-3 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. FEBRUARY 15, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKBRIDGE COUNTY George E. Honts, III, Judge
Ross S. Haine, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted Grover F. Hostetter, Jr., of driving under
the influence of alcohol and two counts of involuntary
manslaughter. He contends the trial judge violated Code
§ 19.2-295.1 and constitutional due process protections by denying
him the right to present at the sentencing proceeding relevant
mitigating evidence. We affirm the convictions.
I.
The evidence at trial proved that Hostetter was driving a
truck south on Route 11 a little faster than fifty miles per hour.
The truck went onto the right shoulder of the southbound lane,
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. came back into the southbound lane, and slid sideways into the
northbound lane of the three-lane highway. Hostetter's truck
struck a northbound car, killing the car's driver and her sister,
a passenger.
Hostetter did not have a driver's license. The evidence
proved that a strong odor of alcohol emanated from Hostetter's
person and that empty and full beer cans were found at the scene
among the debris. When hospitalized after the accident,
Hostetter's blood alcohol level was .22 to .24% by weight by
volume.
The jury convicted Hostetter of two counts of involuntary
manslaughter, which were lesser-included offenses of the indicted
offenses of aggravated involuntary manslaughter, and of driving
under the influence of alcohol. Through evidence presented at the
punishment phase pursuant to Code § 19.2-295.1, the Commonwealth
proved Hostetter's prior criminal record. It established that
Hostetter had been convicted of driving under the influence of
alcohol, destroying a motor vehicle, obstruction of justice by
threat of force, writing two checks on accounts with insufficient
funds, using obscene language over a telephone, driving a motor
vehicle after suspension of his driving privilege, and three
counts of assault and battery.
In mitigation, Hostetter proved his school record. In
addition, Dr. Elyce Pike provided expert testimony on Hostetter's
limited mental capacity. She testified that Hostetter was mildly
- 2 - retarded with an I.Q. of sixty and a corresponding mental age of
seven or eight and that a person with this level of mental
retardation would be incapable of abstract thinking or problem
solving. She told the jury that such a person cannot inhibit
behaviors, would be unable to control alcohol consumption, would
be incapable of drinking responsibly, would never be able to pass
the written test to obtain a driver's license, and would have
diminished driving ability.
Dr. Pike also testified that people with Hostetter's limited
mental capacity tend to mimic as a survival mechanism. She
testified that "they don't want to appear mentally retarded, but,
in some of the examinations, where you have . . . social
situations . . . [these] people have a very, very limited ability
to know what's going on. And that's what [Hostetter's
examination] demonstrated."
Cathy Davis, a school psychologist and director of education
for a public school system, testified as an expert in special
education. Consistent with Dr. Pike's testimony, Davis described
the limitations of people with Hostetter's mental capacities. She
described their difficulties with controlling alcohol consumption,
writing checks, and everyday living skills.
Hostetter submitted a letter from a community service board
detailing his participation after the accident in a substance
abuse program. Hostetter had attended 20 out of 21 sessions, with
his one absence being excused. The letter reported that
- 3 - "Hostetter has been a very quiet and attentive member of the
therapy program. He just recently verbally acknowledged his
alcoholism, and has done so on a regular basis since." The letter
also stated that, "when pressed, [Hostetter] will acknowledge that
his alcohol abuse contributed to the deaths of two people."
A manager at an automobile dealership testified that
Hostetter had worked for him two years cleaning the facilities and
washing cars. He testified that Hostetter had performed his job
well, but needed help with "[r]eading directions, things like
that."
Anthony Ruley, who had been co-habiting with Hostetter's
sister for the previous 21 years, testified that he had known
Hostetter for that period and that Hostetter had a "real hard"
life. When Ruley testified that Hostetter's father threw beer at
Hostetter and shot him, the prosecutor objected that the testimony
was irrelevant. The trial judge sustained the objection "to that
sort of detail." The trial judge similarly sustained an objection
to Ruley's testimony concerning Hostetter's parents' abuse of
alcohol. Ruley then testified that during an argument Hostetter's
father shot Hostetter in the back. He further testified that
Hostetter "was a good boy, he's had a hard life."
In rebuttal, the prosecutor presented the testimony of the
brother, nephew, and sister-in-law of the two dead sisters. Each
of these witnesses described the sisters' lives and the impact of
their deaths on the family. William Reulein testified that the
- 4 - decedents were his only sisters and that their parents had died
when he was seventeen, leaving only the three of them. He
described his sisters' adult lives and the impact of their deaths
on him and his family.
Reulein's son described his first childhood memories of his
aunts, and he testified concerning the impact of their deaths on
him, his parents, and his children. Reulein's wife testified
concerning the impact on her life of the death of her
sisters-in-law. She described one of them as her best friend.
Before instructing the jury to consider Hostetter's sentence,
the trial judge permitted Hostetter's counsel to proffer Ruley's
expected testimony. Ruley said that Hostetter "had a terrible
life." When Hostetter was young, his father "[threw] beer on him,
kick[ed] him in the butt, many, many times, [and ran] him out of
the house." Other uncles did the same to Hostetter. He testified
that Hostetter "suck[ed] his fingers until he was about thirteen
or fourteen years old, [until] he'd have sores around his face."
He further testified that Hostetter's family consumed a lot of
alcohol and treated Hostetter so badly when they were intoxicated
that "it was just over the boundaries." He said that Hostetter's
father "basically treated him like a dog all his life." The
prosecutor objected on the ground of hearsay to Ruley's testimony
that, when Hostetter was eight or nine, his aunt and uncle tied
him to a tree in a cemetery and left him for more than an hour.
- 5 - In support of the proffer, Hostetter's counsel argued as
follows:
Your Honor, I think there's, part of the problem here is all the victim impact testimony comes in, explaining the impact of all these events on the victims' families, and going into great detail, in describing who the people were, or who the victims were, in this case, they're humanized, they're brought in from children to adulthood, and the jury's allowed to hear all that evidence as, as to who the victims are as people in this case, what we are trying to do, is present some evidence as to who the defendant is in this case, his life, his life history, what kind of person he is, what kind of background he comes from, what the jury had now, is this view of the victims and nothing from the defendant, so, so there's a confrontation issue here. . . .
The jury recommended a sentence of twelve months in jail
for driving under the influence of alcohol and ten years on each
count of involuntary manslaughter. The trial judge imposed
those sentences and made the twelve month sentence concurrent
with the ten year sentences for a total of twenty years.
II.
In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-295.1 provides that in the
"proceeding limited to the ascertainment of punishment . . . [,
after] the Commonwealth has introduced . . . evidence of prior
convictions, . . . the defendant may introduce relevant,
admissible evidence related to punishment." Applying this
statute, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
[W]e hold that a trial court, in determining what evidence is relevant to punishment
- 6 - under Code § 19.2-295.1 may be guided in the exercise of its discretion, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility, by the factors set forth in Code § 19.2-264.4(B), as interpreted in Coppola [v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979)]. The kind of evidence contemplated by [Code] § 19.2-295.1 bears upon the record of the defendant and the nature of his crime. Evidence of a good previous record, and extenuating circumstances tending to explain, but not excuse, the commission of the noncapital crime is admissible mitigating evidence. And, a trial court's discretionary ruling on this issue should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 44, 510 S.E.2d 232, 236
(1999) (footnote omitted).
Assuming without deciding that the evidence proffered by
Hostetter was admissible, we hold that the error in excluding it
was harmless. The defense proved extensive facts concerning
Hostetter's mental deficiencies. In addition, Ruley testified
that Hostetter's life had been "[r]eal hard," that Hostetter
lived with his mother "practically all his life," that
Hostetter's father had shot him in the back and threw beer cans
at him, and that Hostetter "was a good boy, he's had a hard
life." In addition, the jurors were aware of Hostetter's
present and past crimes.
Given this evidence, it cannot reasonably be said that the
jurors' verdict would have been different if they had also known
that Hostetter's father and uncles had regularly thrown beer on
him, kicked, and hit him. See Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
- 7 - App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (holding that error
is harmless when we can conclude "had the error not occurred,
the verdict would have been the same"). Moreover, the
introduction of evidence that Hostetter still sucked his thumb
at age fourteen and was exposed to excessive alcohol consumption
in the family would not have added any additional persuasive
value to Hostetter's evidence. We note that Hostetter's expert
witness testified concerning his limited mental capacity and his
inability to control alcohol consumption or to drink
responsibly. We cannot conclude that the verdict would have
been affected by testimony tending to prove that these
conditions had a genesis in his family life in addition to his
mental retardation. Clearly, evidence was presented to the jury
that Hostetter's problems flowed from extenuating circumstances.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
- 8 -