Gross v. Helm
This text of 98 S.W.3d 85 (Gross v. Helm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Carla Helm, Mother, appeals the trial court’s judgment granting Keith Gross, Father, primary custody of the parties’ minor children. 1 Mother argues that the trial court erred in modifying the joint *87 custody arrangement because the court erroneously applied the law in: (l)failing to follow the statutory directive of Section 452.375.6 RSMo.2000, 2 regarding the entry of written findings; and (2) failing to include a specific written parenting plan in its judgment, as required by Section 452.375.9. We reverse and remand.
Factual Background
This case involves a modification of child custody for the two children born of the marriage of Mother and Father. The children are both boys, now ages 14 and 8. According to the terms of the original judgment and dissolution decree, entered in September of 1998, Mother and Father were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the two boys. Both Mother and Father continued to live in the Perryville, Missouri area following the dissolution, with physical custody of the boys alternating on a week-by-week basis. This arrangement continued until March of 2001, when Mother and her new husband moved to Florida. Father and the two boys remained in Perryville. Father and Mother each filed motions for modification of the joint physical custody arrangement, each seeking primary physical custody of the boys. Following a hearing, the court granted Father primary physical custody of the two boys; Mother was granted reasonable and seasonable visitation. Mother now appeals.
Discussion
In this court-tried case, we shall not disturb the ruling of trial court regarding child custody and visitation unless there is no substantial evidence to support the decision, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Stowe v. Spence, 41 S.W.3d 468, 469 (Mo. banc 2001).
In her first point, Mother argues that the trial court erroneously applied the law in failing to follow the statutory directive of Section 452.375.6 by failing to include the required written findings in its judgment.
Section 452.375.6 provides, in pertinent part:
If the parties have not agreed to a custodial arrangement, or the court determines such arrangement is not in the best interest of the child, the court shall include a written finding in the judgment or order based on the public policy in subsection 4 of this section and each of the factors listed in subdivisions (1) to (8) of subsection 2 of this section detailing the specific relevant factors that made a particular arrangement in the best interest of the child.
Or, as explained in Brandow, “[ajccording to the plain language of the statute, when the parties have not agreed to a custodial arrangement, the court is required to include in its judgment a written finding based on the public policy in § 452.375.4 and the factors listed in § 452.375.2(1) to (8), detailing the specific relevant factors that made the chosen arrangement in the best interest of the child.” Brandow v. Brandow, 18 S.W.3d 584, 587-8 (Mo.App. W.D.2000). 3
*88 In the present case, the record reflects that Mother and Father had not agreed on a custody arrangement for their children. Pursuant to the language of the statute, under these circumstances, the trial court was required to include a written finding, in its judgment, detailing the specific relevant factors that made its custody arrangement in the best interest of the children. The court, however, did not include this required written finding. The court’s judgment only states that there:
... has been a change of circumstances that are continuous and substantial in relation to custody of the minor children and requires a modification of the [judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage], and that it would be in the best interest of the minor children that [Father] be granted primary physical custody of the minor children, with reasonable and seasonable visitation with [Mother].
The court’s judgment did not include a written finding based on the public policy set forth in § 452.375.4 and each of the factors listed in § 452.375.2(1) to (8), detailing the specific relevant factors that made the court’s chosen arrangement in the best interest of the children. Because the trial court did not include this required written finding, its judgment is not in compliance with § 452.375.6. See Brandow, 18 S.W.3d at 588. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand with instructions for the court to make the required written findings in compliance with § 452.375.6. See also Haden v. Riou, 37 S.W.3d 854, 866-7 (Mo.App. W.D.2001); Bauer v. Bauer, 38 S.W.3d 449, 456 (Mo.App. W.D.2001).
We also address Mother’s second allegation of error. She claims that the trial court erroneously applied the law in not including a specific written parenting plan in its judgment, as required by Section 452.375.9.
Section 452.375.9 provides:
Any judgment providing for custody shall include a specific written parenting *89 plan setting forth the terms of such parenting plan arrangements specified in subsection 7 of section 452.310. Such plan may be a parenting plan submitted by the parties pursuant to section 452.310 or, in the absence thereof, a plan determined by the court, but in all cases, the custody plan approved and ordered by the court shall be in the court’s discretion and shall be in the best interest of the child.
Section 452.310.7(1) sets forth the arrangements that must be covered in every parenting plan detailing custody, visitation, and residential time. 4
In the present case, the trial court’s judgment, with no greater precision or detail, gave Mother temporary custody of the two boys as follows:
(a) six weeks during the summer vacation;
(b) alternating Christmas and Spring breaks;
(c) such other times as the parties may agree to.
The court’s judgment also provided that Mother was responsible for the cost of transporting the children to and from her home. The trial court’s judgment does not include a specific written parenting plan which includes all the terms set forth in § 452.310.7. As such, the trial court’s judgment is not in compliance with §§ 452.375.9 and 452.310.7. See Brandow, 18 S.W.3d at 588-9;
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
98 S.W.3d 85, 2003 Mo. App. LEXIS 112, 2003 WL 176985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gross-v-helm-moctapp-2003.