Brickley, C.J.
These cases present two issues for discussion. The first issue is whether the county in which executives may have approved product designs provides venue in a design defect case. We hold that it does not. The second issue is whether a plaintiff’s experience of damages within a county properly establishes tort venue therein. We hold that it does not.
i
These consolidated appeals concern two accidents involving General Motors vehicles. The facts concerning the accidents are not in dispute. Wilson Gross was seriously injured when his 1984 Chevrolet CK pickup truck overturned in Washtenaw County. Dawn McLain-Sutherland was killed when her 1987 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer collided with a tractor-trailer on M-59 in Oakland County. As a consequence of these accidents, design defect suits were brought against General Motors. Plaintiffs in [152]*152each case brought suit in Wayne County, the location of the world headquarters of General Motors Corporation. Defendants subsequently challenged venue in each of these cases as improper, arguing that no design work occurred in Wayne County. No one disputes that venue is proper in Macomb County, the site of the actual design work for both vehicles.
The procedural histories of these cases are more complicated, especially Gross v General Motors. In summary, plaintiff Gross filed suit in Wayne County. Pursuant to MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion and transferred the case to Washtenaw ■ County, the site of the plaintiff’s accident, whereupon Gross, pursuant to MCL 600.1629(2); MSA 27A.1629(2), and MCR 2.222, moved in Washtenaw County for a change of venue for the convenience of the parties. The Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the motion and, as required by MCL 600.1629(2); MSA 27A.1629(2), transferred the case to the residence of the moving party, Wayne County.
The parties appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the venue transfer of the Washtenaw Circuit Court, and, retaining jurisdiction, returned the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reconsideration of defendant’s original motion for change of venue in light of this Court’s decision in Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). On reconsideration, the Wayne Circuit Court determined that venue was proper in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals then peremptorily affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for change of venue. Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff McLain also filed suit in Wayne [153]*153County. Pursuant to MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion, transferring the case to Oakland County, and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.1 Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, but was denied leave. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
ii
We are asked in these cases to further construe the meaning of MCL 600.1629(1); MSA 27A.1629(1).2 In Lorencz, supra, we were con[154]*154fronted with the question whether this statute limited venue for tort actions to the county in which the tort occurred. We concluded that it does not, that "venue is proper where part or all of the cause of action arose, not merely at the situs of the injury.” Id. at 377. We stated:
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a different venue than the injury in a tort case. For example, in a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or a part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. Under the plain language of MCL 600.1629(1)(a); MSA 27A.1629(1)(a), venue would be properly laid in any one of them. [Id. at 375. Citations omitted.]
In accordance with Lorencz, the parties to these design defect actions do not dispute that the county in which a product is designed is a proper place for venue. However, they disagree with regard to the meaning of the term "design” and accordingly with regard to the place or places where the subject vehicles were designed.
Defendants argue that the subject vehicles were designed at General Motors Warren Technical Center in Macomb County. Plaintiffs counter that the subject vehicles were designed in Macomb and Wayne Counties. They contend that in addition to the actual design work performed at the Tech Center, decisions that affected product design were [155]*155made at General Motors’ world headquarters in Detroit. McLain asserts that General Motors’ product policy group, the executive management committee of the corporation, met at General Motors’ world headquarters in Detroit "to discuss, adopt and approve funding” for development of a throttle body injection system. McLain alleges that these decisions resulted in the production and marketing of a defective fuel system. Gross similarly argues that General Motors’ executives made financial and other decisions that shaped or conditioned the design of the roof and restraint systems of the ck pickup. In short, General Motors’ executives are said to have made "ultimate design decisions” in the corporation’s Detroit offices that thereby provide venue in Wayne County.
A
Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum. Peplinski v Employment Security Comm, 359 Mich 665, 668; 103 NW2d 454 (1960). Neirbo Co v Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp, 308 US 165, 168; 60 S Ct 153; 84 L Ed 167 (1939); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3801, p 4. Courts evaluate convenience primarily in terms of the interests-of the parties and any relevant witnesses. However, the primary goal is to minimize the costs of litigation not only by reducing the burdens on the parties, but also by considering the strains on the system as a whole. See Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno, 454 US 235, 256-257; 102 S Ct 252; 70 L Ed 2d 419 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 507-509; 67 S Ct 839; 91 L Ed 1055 (1947).
In Michigan, plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing the propriety of their venue choice, and the [156]*156resolution of a venue dispute generally occurs before meaningful discovery has occurred. Marsh v Walter L Couse & Co, 179 Mich App 204, 208; 445 NW2d 204 (1989). This arrangement usually works well. Ordinarily, the underlying facts relevant to the venue issue are not seriously in dispute. In such circumstances, the trial court is in a good position to resolve a dispute without extensive discovery.
The venue issues presented in these appeals, however, are different. The parties have argued contentiously regarding the facts surrounding the design of the subject vehicles. They have sought significant discovery and presented complicated factual issues for the trial court to resolve in determining proper venue. Greater discovery for the purposes of venue determination would help remedy this problem, but this would further burden trial courts with "venue trials.”
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Brickley, C.J.
These cases present two issues for discussion. The first issue is whether the county in which executives may have approved product designs provides venue in a design defect case. We hold that it does not. The second issue is whether a plaintiff’s experience of damages within a county properly establishes tort venue therein. We hold that it does not.
i
These consolidated appeals concern two accidents involving General Motors vehicles. The facts concerning the accidents are not in dispute. Wilson Gross was seriously injured when his 1984 Chevrolet CK pickup truck overturned in Washtenaw County. Dawn McLain-Sutherland was killed when her 1987 Chevrolet S-10 Blazer collided with a tractor-trailer on M-59 in Oakland County. As a consequence of these accidents, design defect suits were brought against General Motors. Plaintiffs in [152]*152each case brought suit in Wayne County, the location of the world headquarters of General Motors Corporation. Defendants subsequently challenged venue in each of these cases as improper, arguing that no design work occurred in Wayne County. No one disputes that venue is proper in Macomb County, the site of the actual design work for both vehicles.
The procedural histories of these cases are more complicated, especially Gross v General Motors. In summary, plaintiff Gross filed suit in Wayne County. Pursuant to MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion and transferred the case to Washtenaw ■ County, the site of the plaintiff’s accident, whereupon Gross, pursuant to MCL 600.1629(2); MSA 27A.1629(2), and MCR 2.222, moved in Washtenaw County for a change of venue for the convenience of the parties. The Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the motion and, as required by MCL 600.1629(2); MSA 27A.1629(2), transferred the case to the residence of the moving party, Wayne County.
The parties appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the venue transfer of the Washtenaw Circuit Court, and, retaining jurisdiction, returned the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reconsideration of defendant’s original motion for change of venue in light of this Court’s decision in Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). On reconsideration, the Wayne Circuit Court determined that venue was proper in Wayne County. The Court of Appeals then peremptorily affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for change of venue. Defendant subsequently appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff McLain also filed suit in Wayne [153]*153County. Pursuant to MCL 600.1651; MSA 27A.1651 and MCR 2.223, defendant moved for a change of venue for venue improperly laid. The Wayne Circuit Court granted the motion, transferring the case to Oakland County, and denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.1 Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, but was denied leave. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court.
ii
We are asked in these cases to further construe the meaning of MCL 600.1629(1); MSA 27A.1629(1).2 In Lorencz, supra, we were con[154]*154fronted with the question whether this statute limited venue for tort actions to the county in which the tort occurred. We concluded that it does not, that "venue is proper where part or all of the cause of action arose, not merely at the situs of the injury.” Id. at 377. We stated:
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a different venue than the injury in a tort case. For example, in a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or a part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. Under the plain language of MCL 600.1629(1)(a); MSA 27A.1629(1)(a), venue would be properly laid in any one of them. [Id. at 375. Citations omitted.]
In accordance with Lorencz, the parties to these design defect actions do not dispute that the county in which a product is designed is a proper place for venue. However, they disagree with regard to the meaning of the term "design” and accordingly with regard to the place or places where the subject vehicles were designed.
Defendants argue that the subject vehicles were designed at General Motors Warren Technical Center in Macomb County. Plaintiffs counter that the subject vehicles were designed in Macomb and Wayne Counties. They contend that in addition to the actual design work performed at the Tech Center, decisions that affected product design were [155]*155made at General Motors’ world headquarters in Detroit. McLain asserts that General Motors’ product policy group, the executive management committee of the corporation, met at General Motors’ world headquarters in Detroit "to discuss, adopt and approve funding” for development of a throttle body injection system. McLain alleges that these decisions resulted in the production and marketing of a defective fuel system. Gross similarly argues that General Motors’ executives made financial and other decisions that shaped or conditioned the design of the roof and restraint systems of the ck pickup. In short, General Motors’ executives are said to have made "ultimate design decisions” in the corporation’s Detroit offices that thereby provide venue in Wayne County.
A
Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most convenient forum. Peplinski v Employment Security Comm, 359 Mich 665, 668; 103 NW2d 454 (1960). Neirbo Co v Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp, 308 US 165, 168; 60 S Ct 153; 84 L Ed 167 (1939); 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3801, p 4. Courts evaluate convenience primarily in terms of the interests-of the parties and any relevant witnesses. However, the primary goal is to minimize the costs of litigation not only by reducing the burdens on the parties, but also by considering the strains on the system as a whole. See Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno, 454 US 235, 256-257; 102 S Ct 252; 70 L Ed 2d 419 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 507-509; 67 S Ct 839; 91 L Ed 1055 (1947).
In Michigan, plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing the propriety of their venue choice, and the [156]*156resolution of a venue dispute generally occurs before meaningful discovery has occurred. Marsh v Walter L Couse & Co, 179 Mich App 204, 208; 445 NW2d 204 (1989). This arrangement usually works well. Ordinarily, the underlying facts relevant to the venue issue are not seriously in dispute. In such circumstances, the trial court is in a good position to resolve a dispute without extensive discovery.
The venue issues presented in these appeals, however, are different. The parties have argued contentiously regarding the facts surrounding the design of the subject vehicles. They have sought significant discovery and presented complicated factual issues for the trial court to resolve in determining proper venue. Greater discovery for the purposes of venue determination would help remedy this problem, but this would further burden trial courts with "venue trials.”
In resolving these disputes, we approach our task bearing in mind that venue is simply the location of trial, and its determination should only concern the selection of a fair and convenient location where the merits of a dispute can be adjudicated. Rogoski v Streeter, 364 Mich 115, 119; 110 NW2d 617 (1961); Peplinski, supra at 668. Battles over venue that endure for years and are a great expense should be discouraged and avoided when there are convenient and fair locations for trial that fulfill the venue requirements of Michigan statutes and court rules.
B
In Lorencz, we concluded that MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629 clearly and unambiguously provides that venue is appropriate in all places where [157]*157a cause of action or a part thereof arises.3 However, while Lorencz makes clear that the places of design and manufacture are additional locations from which a cause of action may arise, neither it nor MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629 specifies what it means to "design” or "manufacture” a product. Therefore, unlike Lorencz, in which there was no ambiguity regarding the application of the statute, we must turn to the intent and purposes of the Legislature in establishing this statute to facilitate its interpretation and application. Moore v Dep’t of Military Affairs, 398 Mich 324, 328; 247 NW2d 801 (1976); King v Director of Midland Co Dep’t of Social Services, 73 Mich App 253, 258; 251 NW2d 270 (1977).
In 1986, the Michigan Legislature passed the tort reform act4 and in so doing modified Michigan’s venue statutes for tort proceedings. One of the Legislature’s remedial goals was to limit venue shopping by plaintiffs. In its report to the Legislature, the House Special Committee on Liability Insurance5 specifically identified the problem of [158]*158cases having "only a marginal relationship to Wayne County” being filed there because attorneys believed they might obtain larger jury verdicts from Wayne County juries.6
The former tort venue statute, MCL 600.1627; MSA 27A.1627, allowed a plaintiff to file a tort claim in the "county in which all or a part of the cause of action arose . . . .” The first draft of the new legislation, HB 5150, eliminated this language and made the site of injury the priority location for venue.7 This version of the bill was rejected by the House. Ultimately, the House and Senate passed HB 5154, which returned the "in which all or a part of the cause of action arose” language of MCL 600.1627; MSA 27A.1627. This bill was signed by the Governor and became MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629.
As stated above, the primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature through reasonable con[159]*159struction in consideration of the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. Moore, supra at 328. The legislative history of MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629 strongly suggests that the Legislature considered and rejected a tort venue statute strictly limiting venue to the place where the injury occurred. However, we do not interpret this decision to mean that the Legislature repudiated its overall desire to limit abusive forum shopping.
Under plaintiffs’ interpretation of MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629, any county in which corporate executives make decisions regarding product development could become proper venue. Such a rule could greatly intensify the problem of venue shopping. Telephone conferences could result in proper venue being established in counties with only the most remote connection to the actual design of a product.
In addition to promoting greater venue shopping, plaintiffs’ proposed rule does violence to MCL 600.1629(1); MSA 27A.1629(1) as a whole. When construing a statute, the Court must give effect to every phrase, clause, and word as far as possible; one part of the statute should not be construed so as to render another part unnecessary. People ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Society of Good Neighbors, 327 Mich 620, 626; 42 NW2d 761 (1950); In re Harris Estate, 151 Mich App 780, 785-786; 391 NW2d 487 (1986). If this Court were to accept the position of plaintiffs McLain and Gross, the county of a manufacturer’s headquarters would always be the proper venue in a design defect cause of action, rendering MCL 600.1629(1)(b), (c); MSA 27A.1629(1)(b), (c) unnecessary and inconsequential. This is not what the Legislature had in mind. Consequently, plaintiffs’ interpretation cannot be adopted.
[160]*160Finally, in interpreting a statute, the meaning of the Legislature is to be found in the terms and arrangement of the statute without straining or refinement, and the expressions used are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense. People v Powell, 280 Mich 699, 704; 274 NW 372 (1937); Deloria v Atkins, 158 Mich 232, 241-242; 122 NW 559 (1909). While undoubtedly corporate executives make decisions that establish the parameters within which design decisions are made, it cannot be forthrightly maintained that General Motors’ executives designed the ck pickup or the s-10 Blazer any more than their approval of a new car model means that it was manufactured where it was approved. The approval of a particular design concept has little to do with the actual design. What makes a design defect actionable is not its approval, but its tangible design.
Certainly, there is no question that a manufacturer is accountable and liable for negligent decision making that causes injury to its customers, regardless of where these design decisions are made. However, what is at issue here is not liability, but venue. We hold that the county most tangibly related to an alleged defect in design is the location where a design defect cause of action arises. In Gross v General Motors and McLain v General Motors, that location was Macomb County, where General Motors Warren Technical Center is located.
III
Plaintiff Gross also argues that there is no need for this Court to reach the general issue of venue in design defect cases because the facts of his case provide an alternative and independent ground for [161]*161finding venue appropriate in Wayne County.8 Cit[162]*162ing Lorencz, plaintiff argues that the place or places where a plaintiff suffers damages is a place where part of a tort action arises and is therefore a proper place for venue. Because he has endured pain and suffering in Wayne County, it is claimed that venue lies in that county. For essentially the same principles of statutory interpretation applied above, we reject such a rule.
In Lorencz, we described the various locations where a products liability suit might arise, specifically referring to the elements of such a cause of action. We stated:
In a cause of action arising from a tortious injury, there are four elements:
" '1. The existence of a legal duty by defendant toward plaintiff;
'2. the breach of such duty;
'3. the proximate causal relation between the breach of such duty and an injury to the plaintiff; and
'4. the plaintiff must have suffered damages.’ ” [Id. at 375. Citations omitted; emphasis added.]
We then concluded:
It is clear that a breach of duty can occur in a [163]*163different venue than the injury in a tort case. For example, in a products liability action, the product can be designed in one county, manufactured in another, and the injury may occur in yet a third. A plaintiff, alleging proper facts, can file suit in any one of these places because all or a part of the cause of action arose in any one of them. Under the plain language of MCL 600.1629(l)(a); MSA 27A.1629(l)(a), venue would be properly laid in any one of them. [Id. Citations omitted.]
Plaintiff states that because damages are an element of a tort action, they too must provide a place or places where a tort action arises. If this argument is accepted, the place or places where a person suffers any damages is a proper location for venue pursuant to MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629.
In support of this argument, plaintiff cites Witt v CJ Barrymore’s, 195 Mich App 517; 491 NW2d 871 (1992). In Witt, the plaintiff was injured in a Toledo, Ohio, bar when an intoxicated customer assaulted and beat her. The plaintiff was from Monroe County, Michigan, and the defendant was a Michigan corporation based in Macomb County. In interpreting and applying MCL 600.1629(1)(a), (b); MSA 27A.1629(1)(a), (b), the Court of Appeals concluded pursuant to Lorencz that venue was proper in Monroe County because an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action arose there, i.e., "[a] portion of plaintiff’s claimed economic, noneconomic, and loss of consortium damages . . . .”9 Witt, supra at 522._
[164]*164Such a reading of Lorencz is not illogical. While we did not explicitly provide that the location of damages suffered by the plaintiff is a proper site for venue, damages were explicitly listed as an element of a tort suit.10 However, statutes must be construed to prevent absurd or illogical results and to give effect to their purposes. Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority v Attorney General, 146 Mich App 79, 85; 379 NW2d 474 (1985). An expansive application of plaintiff’s proposed rule would open Pandora’s box regarding forum shopping, permitting any potential plaintiff who merely receives some medical treatment or physical therapy in Wayne County or who moves into Wayne County after an accident to file suit there. As provided above, such a result is contrary to the intent of the Legislature in establishing MCL 600.1629(1); MSA 27A.1629(1).
Moreover, courts are bound to construe statutes so as to give them validity and a reasonable construction; seeming inconsistencies in the various provisions of a statute should be reconciled, if possible, so as to arrive at a meaning that gives effect to all parts of the statute. People ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Society of Good Neighbors, [165]*165supra at 626; In re Harris Estate, supra at 785-786. Establishing the place where a plaintiff experiences pain and suffering as a proper place for venue has the effect of making MCL 600.1629(1)(c); MSA 27A.1629(1)(c) a venue provision of first priority, i.e., elevates the provisions of MCL 600.1629(1)(c); MSA 27A.1629(1)(c) to equal footing with MCL 600.1629(1)(a); MSA 27A.1629(1)(a) and above MCL 600.1629(1)(b); MSA 27A.1629(1)(b).
In our discussion of damages, in dicta, in Lorencz, we allowed an interpretation of MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629 that overstates the limits of tort venue. We now clarify the role of damages in establishing tort venue. Under MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629, venue in a tort action is proper only at the situs of an injury, or in the place or places where the breach of a legal duty occurs that subsequently causes a person to suffer damages. Tangential damages that occur other than at such places are irrelevant to venue determination.
iv
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gross v General Motors and remand the case to Wayne County for further disposition consistent with this opinion. In McLain v General Motors, we remand the case to Oakland County for trial.
Riley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Brickley, C.J.