Grosche v. Washington State Employees' Retirement Board

418 P.2d 476, 69 Wash. 2d 337, 1966 Wash. LEXIS 950
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 22, 1966
DocketNo. 38404
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 418 P.2d 476 (Grosche v. Washington State Employees' Retirement Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grosche v. Washington State Employees' Retirement Board, 418 P.2d 476, 69 Wash. 2d 337, 1966 Wash. LEXIS 950 (Wash. 1966).

Opinion

Ott, J.

September 30, 1963, William C. Grosche was separated from service with the Washington State Highway Department because of physical disability. He filed a claim with the Washington State Employees’ Retirement Board in which he contended that his retirement resulted from a duty disability, and requested retirement benefits as provided by RCW 41.40.200. A hearing was had upon the claim. The board found that his retirement resulted from a non-duty disability and awarded him a pension as provided by RCW 41.40.230.

William C. Grosche appealed to the Superior Court for Thurston County, which confirmed the findings and order of the board.

From the trial court’s judgment sustaining the board’s findings and order, William C. Grosche has appealed.

This appeal presents a single issue: Does the record con[338]*338tain substantial evidence to support the findings of the Washington State Employees’ Retirement Board that William C. Grosche’s retirement resulted from a nonduty disability?

The facts are not seriously in dispute. William C. Grosche was a maintenance employee of the state highway department. He had performed his highway maintenance duties, stationed at Republic, Washington, for nearly 10 years. His duties in the winter season included operating a snow plow, driving a truck, and assisting in sanding the roads where necessary. Many years prior to his employment with the highway department, he had had rheumatic fever, which illness caused extensive damage to his heart. He could nevertheless perform the normal highway maintenance duties.

December 12, 1961, he was using snow plow equipment to remove snow from the highway between Republic and Keller Ferry. Prior to arriving at the ferry, he changed the blade of the snow plow, which blade weighed between 60 and 100 pounds. He arrived at the hill leading to the ferry, and helped a person who had driven into the ditch get his vehicle back on the highway. He “chained up” his truck and sanded the hill roadway three times, which, because he had no assistant, required that he get in and out of the cab and move the truck along by short distances. When he returned home that evening, he was completely exhausted and could not eat his dinner. He did not report for work the next day, and, on December 18, 1961, was examined by Dr. Dell S. Thornton, who found Mr. Grosche to be suffering from the effects of a mitral valve defect, or possibly heart block or fibrillation, or “perhaps he had caused a small infarction in the partition between the two ventricles.”

About one month later, on January 12, 1962, at the request of the highway department, Mr. Grosche was examined by Dr. Theodore J. Fuller, a heart specialist in Wenatchee. Dr. Fuller recommended that when he returned to work he perform only light maintenance duties. Early in February 1962 he returned to work full time. September [339]*33920,1963, Dr. Graham S. McConnell found him to be “a total, complete cardiac cripple.”

September 30,1963, Mr. Grosche was separated from service because of his cardiac condition. Appellant contends that his disability on September 30, 1963, was the natural and proximate result of his exertion more than 21 months before in the performance of his duties on December 12, 1961, and that the record contains no substantial evidence that appellant’s separation from his employment was the result of nonduty disability.

The pertinent statutes relating to duty and nonduty disability are as follows:

Subject to the provisions of RCW 41.40.310 and 41.40.320, upon application of a member, or his employer, a member who becomes totally incapacitated for duty as the natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty, while in the service of an employer, without wilful negligence on his part, shall be retired: Provided, The medical adviser after a medical examination of such member made by or under the direction of the said medical adviser shall certify in writing that such member is mentally or physically totally incapacitated for the further performance of his duty to his employer and that such member should be retired: Provided further, That the retirement board concurs in the recommendation of the medical adviser: And provided further, No application shall be valid or a claim thereunder enforceable unless filed within two years after the date upon which the injury occurred. (Italics ours.) RCW 41.40.200.
Subject to the provisions of RCW 41.40.310 and 41.40.320, upon application of a member, or his employer, a member who has been an employee at least ten years, and who becomes totally and permanently incapacitated for duty as the result of causes occurring not in the performance of his duty, may be retired by the retirement board: Provided, The medical adviser, after a medical examination of such member, made by or under the direction of the said medical adviser shall certify in writing that such member is mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty, and such incapacity is likely to be permanent and that such member should be retired: Provided further, That the retire[340]*340ment board concurs in the recommendation of the medical adviser. RCW 41.40.230.

One who claims the retirement benefits provided by RCW 41.40.200 must prove to the board, inter alia, that, as a “natural and proximate result of an accident occurring in the actual performance of duty,” he became totally incapacitated.

We have held that the findings of the retirement board must be sustained if there is substantial evidence to support them. King Cy. Employees’ Ass’n v. State Employees’ Retirement Bd., 54 Wn.2d 1, 336 P.2d 387 (1959).

Doctors McConnell and Thornton, testifying on behalf of the appellant, admitted that his serious heart condition was not the result of his employment, but stated that, in their opinion, the extra exertion required of him on December 12, 1961, possibly contributed to his disability.

On cross-examination, Dr. McConnell, the only medical witness who had examined Mr. Grosche prior to December 12, 1961, testified as follows:

Q. Actually, isn’t it true, Doctor, that the condition you found in Mr. Grosche on the 23rd of September 1963 was something you might very well expect to find in any person who had suffered serious valvular damage as the result of rheumatic fever and over a long period of time had suffered gradual deterioration from recurring bouts of the fever, and the like, isn’t this really what you had when you saw Mr.

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Related

Dillard v. Washington Public Employees' Retirement System
597 P.2d 428 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
418 P.2d 476, 69 Wash. 2d 337, 1966 Wash. LEXIS 950, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grosche-v-washington-state-employees-retirement-board-wash-1966.